Economics 15/01/2010: Negative equity & entrepreneurship

There is an interesting piece of research relating to the issue of negative equity that sheds some light on potentially disastrous effects on the economy from our current crisis in house prices.

First, a quick synopsis of the paper (available here):

“In the absence of any correlation between wealth and entrepreneurial talent, initial net wealth should have an explanatory power in the decision to become an entrepreneur only for households that are financially constrained; its importance should decrease with wealth.”

In other words, if you believe that higher starting wealth does not make for a better entrepreneur further, then only households that have no capacity to borrow – no assets to borrow against – or that have insufficient income to take on the risk of becoming an entrepreneur should be constrained in their pursuit of entrepreneurship by wealth considerations. This means that as household wealth increases, the constraint of wealth on ability to take up entrepreneurship falls.

The paper tests this theoretical predictions for the Italy, showing that: “…household's initial wealth is indeed important in the decision to become an entrepreneur and its effect is lower for the richest households.” (Point 1)

“Furthermore, the effect of net wealth is stronger when legal enforcement of the loan contract is weaker...” Which, of course means that as the regulators, government, or lenders fail to enforce lending contracts, such lax enforcement increases the role that initial wealth plays in constraining entrepreneurship, making it harder for assets-poorer households to pursue business opportunities. (Point 2)

“Finally, conditional on becoming entrepreneurs, initial household wealth does not significantly affect the size of the business.” So that once a person becomes entrepreneur, the levels of their initial asset holdings do not act to determine the rate of their success in business. (Point 3)

“In summary, it seems that imperfections in capital markets can induce people to accumulate assets in order to facilitate the decision to become entrepreneurs.”

And so now, to interpreting these results for Ireland.

Majority of our households rely on house equity to act as their main life-cycle asset. As house equity is being destroyed by the negative equity, two things happen to household financial position:

1. Net wealth declines directly with increase in negative equity; and
2. Net future wealth declines directly with the gap between rental value of the property and the mortgage cost (in effect, people in negative equity are paying more for their property than it is worth, thus reducing disposable income available for other savings and investments.
   

So on the net, the twin effects of negative equity in Ireland have so far (during this crisis) meant that as property prices declined by ca 40-50% already, while rents have fallen over 15%, Irish households worst affected by the negative equity (home buyers in 2006-2007) have seen combined effect of falling wealth to the tune of 49-58%.

That is a serious chunk of wealth being destroyed, implying some adverse effects on future entrepreneurship rates. Since the rates of success in entrepreneurship do not suffer from initial wealth effects, we can assume that entrepreneurs lost due to negative equity are of average type. Which means some serious losses to the economy over the years to come.

But wait, there is more: Point 1 clearly suggests that the adverse impact of negative equity will be felt more by those would be entrepreneurs who come from lower wealth-holding groups of Irish population. No, not exactly the poor (although them as well), but from:

• Traditionally assets-poor younger households – so Ireland is now foregoing higher future rates of entrepreneurship from younger generations (also, incidentally, most adversely impacted by rising unemployment);
• Traditionally mortgages-heavy families – so Ireland is now potentially cutting into its business potential when it comes to families, thus adversely impacting future population growth rates as well;
• Lower middle class would-be-entrepreneurs – so that Irish society is now running a greater risk of reducing social class mobility, as entrepreneurship is often the only ticket out of lower middle class;
• And yes – the poor would-be-entrepreneurs: people who like many of our best business leaders today came from the poorer family backgrounds.
  

Points 2 & 3 go straight to NAMA. As NAMA in effect simply means a bailout clause for bankers, it undermines enforceability of lending contracts – for bankers directly, for developers indirectly via NAMA holiday clauses, and for households also indirectly via political manipulation of lending going on behind the scenes. Which means that overall, Ireland is moving, thanks to NAMA, toward a society where entrepreneurship will be even more polarized into the domain of the better-off. Yet another obstruction on that social mobility ladder that business ownership entails.

So here you go, to all those (like some of our economics commentators) who say that negative equity only matters when people want to move, I’d say – read real evidence, folks.

Economics 11/01/2010: Manufacturing Activity Sliding

Once again, spot on with the general trend toward renewed deterioration in Q4, industrial production posted a 9.1% decline in November 2009. Per CSO: “The seasonally adjusted volume of industrial production for Manufacturing Industries for the three month period September to November 2009 was 3.1% lower than in the preceding three month period.” Monthly change was -9.1% as well in November, for Manufacturing Industries as contrasted with 1.6% decline in October. In all industries, November decline was 8%, compared with October monthly decline of 1.4%.

The sectors contributing most to the change in November were: Computer, electronic and optical products (-36.1%) and Food products (-12.5%). The “Modern” Sector, comprising a number of high-technology and chemical sectors, showed an annual decrease in production for November 2009 of 3.7% while a decrease of 17.7% was recorded in the “Traditional” Sector. In seasonally adjusted terms, the picture was slightly less poor: Modern Sectors declined 10.5% in monthly terms, marking second consecutive monthly decrease (the index fell 5.8% back in October 2009), while Traditional sectors fell 2.2% in November, after registering an increase of 5.5% in October. The series are obviously volatile – analysis of volatility is to follow later (grading times for both UCD & TCD) – but all signs point to a renewed deterioration taking hold.

Economics 11/01/2010: One voice of reason...

On a note continuing yesterday's post - someone (hat tip to Patrick) brought to my attention Dolmen's note on the prospects for 2010, which I personally found to be of an excellent quality. The strategy is backed by serious arguments linked up with fundamentals, unlike the stuff coming out of some other stockbrokers here. The note is available here, but a couple of highlights are below:
"With stronger growth in economies such as the US and Europe compared to Ireland, 2010 will provide a good opportunity for Irish investors to increase the international diversification in their portfolios." You bet. For anyone wearing Green Jersey, my suggestion would be to look no further than IMF forecasts for growth (I plan to publish a comparative note on Ireland v Small Open Economies later this week).

Dolmen guys forecast US economy to grow at 3.5% in terms of GDP, a forecast that - despite having some risks to the downside - is reasonable in my view. Eurozone, held back by 'weaker economies' of Spain and Italy is expected to expand by 1.50%, the UK - by 1.30%, and Ireland, hmmm... Dolmen think +0.25%, my feeling +/-0.5% in GDP and up to -1.25% in GNP terms. Good luck to anyone who believes Irish equities are oversold on these comparatives. To me - they are overbought!

Dolmen predicate their Irish forecast as follows: "Ireland should see a reversal of the two years of negative GDP in 2010. The move away from negative growth will be welcome, but we estimate a slight increase of 0.25% in GDP for next year. The last three budgets have taken 7.4% of GDP out of the economy and with a further 1.8% to follow next year, there remains considerable challenges facing our economy." Correct.

But look beyond the Budget 2011 - Nama will remove some €4-5 billion annually through its operations, stalling the entire property market (due to increased uncertainty concerning supply of commercial and residential properties to the market) and doing nothing to restart credit cycle in the economy (don't take my word on this - look at the banks chiefs' statements).

Unemployment will continue to rise until second half of 2010, when massive scale withdrawals from the labour force and substantial emigration from Ireland will start reducing (artificially) the numbers unemployed. Numbers in employment will not rise, save for the wasteful state-subsidised 'jobs creation'. This means precautionary savings will stay with us, and deleveraging will remain anemic for consumers.

Corporate profitability will remain subdued - Dolmen expect 0.5% deflation in Ireland for 2010, as compared with 2% inflation in the US and the UK and 1.1% inflation for the Eurozone as a whole. Good luck to those stockbrokers who think profitability can be rebuilt with falling prices.

Interest rates gap will close up with US rates expected to rise to 0.75-1% by the end of 2010 from 0% currently, UK rates exected to increase from 0.5% in december 2009 to 1% in 2010, while the Eurozone rates are expected to stagnate at 1%. Now, I personally think the ECB will hike to 1.25-1.50 by the end of 2010. This is significant as far as FX rates for the euro are concerned. If the gap closes, euro will devalue somewhat against the sterling and the USD, implying some boost to exports. But if the gap remains where it is today (roughly), there is little momentum, bar for differences in the growth rates, to devalue the euro.

US and UK bond yields will push away - slightly - from the Eurozone averages, implying that demand for dollar and sterling will be weker (and add to this a bit of the moderation in demand for US Treasuries from China and the BRICs in general). Again, this restricts the scope for euro devaluation.

Dolmen make a call on the USD and sterling vis-a-vis the euro, but I am not that comfortable doing the same.

On Irish property markets: "In Ireland, the problems facing the commercial property sector have not improved. When compared to other Euro-Zone cities, Dublin property yields increased the most in Q3. Vacancy rates are also the highest in the sample of Euro-Zone cities... Any improvement in the sector is dependent on the outcome of NAMA and with the possibility that a number of properties may come to the market in the next year, together with the large level of unoccupied offices, the outlook for Irish commercial property looks bleak for 2010." Dead right!

Lastly, if you want to see what I mean by weaker earnings outlook for Ireland Inc on the back of our weak economy - see the end of Dolmen's note with yeild estimates for Irish equities. Marvelous - this does really support the idea of 10% growth for property markets and 100% increase in banks shares that Bloxham chief has predicted for us. I wouldn't hold my breath for that kind of a ride...

Economics 10/01/2010: A desperate state of economic analysis

This week has been marked by some remarkable statements on the prospects for Irish economy in 2010 that simply cannot be ignored.

Firstly, yesterday, Irish Times (here) decided to devote substantial space to the musing of one of the stock brokerage houses. Bloxham's chief came out to tell us that things are going to be brilliant in 2010: 10% growth in house prices and commercial real estate valuation, and ca 100% increase in banks shares prices to €3 per share for BofI and AIB. So:

1. Pramit Ghose thinks that there is little to Irish economy other than demand for property and banks shares. The implication of this is that the only way that prosperity and growth will be achieved once again in Ireland is through another construction and lending boom. Have our stockbrokers learned anything new from the crisis? Doesn't look like it.
   
2. Mr Ghose also seem to have little time for the fundamentals of Irish consumers and domestic economy. Massively heavy debts loaded onto Ireland Inc don't matter for growth to him. Neither are sky-high marginal taxation and the prospect for more tax hikes in Budget 2011, nor even high unemployment mar his optimism.
   

Banks shares will rise, you see, because investors will become optimistic. Optimistic about what, Mr Ghose? Low profitability of our zombie banks? Their over-stretched customers who cannot be squeezed for higher margins without triggering massive defaults? High default rates on already stressed loans and high proportion of negative equity mortgages on the books? Exporting sectors suffering from the lack of credit and overvalued currency? The reversion of the interest rate curve upward due to expected ECB policy changes and margins rebuilding efforts by the banks? Double-digit deficits on the Exchequer side?

All in, Mr Ghose thinks that the banks shares might reach €3 per share sometime in 2010. He might be wrong, he might be right. I have no prediction on a specific price target. But here is a thought:

The two banks need some €5-6 billion in capital post Nama. At €3 per share two banks market cap will be around €4.5 billion. So with recapitalization - whether by the state or by the international dupes (oh, sorry - investors) - the market value of the two banks will be €9.5-10.5 billion or close to their 2006-2007 valuations. What sort of expectations curve does Mr Ghose have to get there?

A glimpse into his thinking can be provided by his July 22, 2008 note reproduced below:
You judge the merits of this prediction for yourself, but here are the facts
85-142% wrong?

Oh, and do note that in his July 2008 note, Mr Ghose doesn't do any better in historical analysis either. He completely failed to take into the account real (as in inflation-adjusted) returns to equities. If that little inconvenient fact is considered, the '2/3rds of the 1996 price offer' paid on Mr Ghose's family house 8 years after the crisis would represent just 33-40% of the 1996 offer real price. Markets did come back for Thailand, but once inflation (see IMF) is factored in, Mr Ghose's analysis yields a real loss on the 1996 offer of 50%! Ouch...

Mr Ghose's Chief Economist seems to have little time for Mr Ghose's optimism for 2010. Writing an intro to Daft Report this week he states (here): "in overall terms, I would expect house prices to drop another 10-15% on average this year, with Dublin again seeing the biggest decline [now, Mr Ghose thinks prime real estate will lead in growth, which means Dublin]. ...Looking further ahead, I expect house prices to be higher on average in 2011 than in 2010, and should rise on a five-year view as the labour market returns to normal. That said, the level of any increase in house prices over the next few years is likely to be only in single digits, with three factors - the banks' adoption of a more cautious stance to lending than in the 'Celtic Tiger' era, the return of interest rates to 'normal' and the possible introduction of a property tax for 'principal' homes of residence - all weighing negatively on the market."


The second comment, courtesy of today's Sunday Tribune (page 1, Business), comes from Prof John Fitzgerald of ESRI. After largely staying off the topic of Nama and banks recapitalization for the entire duration of the public debate, Prof Fitzgerald decided to offer an opinion on Ireland's 'financial rescue'.

Now that the stakes in the game are low, credit must be claimed for the future 'I too was critical' position, should things go spectacularly wrong on the Nama side.

Prof Fitzgerald thinks that state-injected funds into INBS and Anglo are totally worthless and will be lost. Who could have thought such a radical thingy!?

Some 4 months ago I provided my estimates showing the demand for recapitalization post-Nama totaling €9.7-12.4 billion (here and here). Having spent the entire 2009-long debate on Nama on the sidelines, Ireland's ESRI macroeconomics chief is now telling us that €10-12 billion will be required to complete recapitalization of the banks. This, according to the Tribune is news!

I am delighted to know that Prof Fitzgerald belatedly decided to agree with myself, Brian Lucey, Karl Whelan, Peter Mathews and Ronan Lyons. One only wishes that next time a matter of economic urgency, like Nama, comes up for a public discussion, he joins the debate when it matters - not four months after the fact.

Economics 08/01/2010: Live Register

Here we go, folks – as predicted, right on the minute. Live Register is up again to new historic highs. Seasonally adjusted number of new unemployment claimants rose 3,300 in December, just as the country was ‘enjoying’ what the media and the politicians were heralding as a ‘buoyant’ Christmas sales season. Now, recall the ‘moderation’ and ‘improvements’ (per our Government claims) in the past, namely – October 2009, when the Live Register declined 3,000 for the first time since March 2007. December increase has more than offset that, and it comes on 900 new claimants added back in November.

New Live Register record is now at 426,700 – 1,200 above September 2009 previous record of 425,500. Unemployment is now at 12.5% (up from 12.4% a month ago), with lower participation rate and emigration – two factors driving people out of the labour force and thus out of unemployment count (as if those who have no jobs and are not looking for one are any better off than those who are officially unemployed) are the only thing that keeps the unemployment rate hitting 13% now. The estimated unemployment rate has thus risen from 8.5% a year ago to 12.5% today – a 4 percentage points rise in 12 months.

The trend suggests that we are likely to reach 13.3-13.7% unemployment this year, with the median probability forecast of 13.5%.

The monthly increase in the seasonally adjusted series consisted of an increase of 2,900 males and 500 females – suggesting that the latest jobs losses are not coming out of retail and services sectors. 800 additions came from under 25 year olds, suggesting once again that the core employment sectors and age categories are being hit this time around – just as in the latest QNHS results for Q3 2009 which showed that industrial / manufacturing jobs are now leading other sectors in terms of jobs losses. 2,700 seasonally adjusted jobs losses were in over 25-years of age categories.

One added point. We tend to look at the seasonally adjusted series, which tell us more about comparative dynamics of the time series. But in level terms, seasonally unadjusted Live Register now stands at 423,595, up a massive 10,090 in one month or 133,577 in 12 months since the end of December 2008 (+46.1%). This compares with an increase of 119,642 (+70.2%) in 2008. Of course, 46.1% sounds like a better deal than 70.2% - which in parlance of our stockbrokers, banks and Government analysts usually means a ‘moderation in the rate of increase’ or ‘bottoming out’ of the trend. Alas, the numbers are much more grave than the percentage change terms imply. In absolute terms, measured in average weekly increases recorded in the month, December was the seventh worst month in 2009 (+2,523 average weekly increase).

Finally, the CSO release also provides an insight as to just how tricky computations of unemployment are. CSO highlights two programmes whereby taxpayers pay unemployed individuals to either continue their work or to engage in other activities. These individuals, still in receipt of state aid are then removed from the unemployment roster. The two programmes that yield this type of treatment are Short-Term Enterprise Allowance scheme (since May 2009 paying workers out of the JB system to engage in self-employment) and work Placement Programme (since August 2009 engaging workers in 6-months long from the social welfare rosters to undertake unspecified ‘employment’). CSO states the numbers of such ‘employed’ individuals who are not otherwise accounted for on the Live Register to be at 3,785 at the end of September 2009, the latest date for which the figures are available. Given that this number increased by roughly 2,500 since October 2008, it is safe to assume that average monthly additions to the programmes stand at around 200. This, in turn implies that some 4,600 people are currently ‘employed’ with the use of these state funds that are not included in the Live Register, bringing the real number of claimants in Ireland to over 430,000 in seasonally adjusted terms.

Economics 07/01/2010: NTMA's end of year results

Here is an interesting one: NTMA published their End Year review. Per statement (page 3 top): “The National Pensions Reserve Fund Discretionary Investment Portfolio (the Fund excluding the preference shares in Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks held on the direction of the Minister for Finance) earned a return of 20.9 per cent in 2009. Since the Fund’s inception in 2001, the Investment Portfolio has delivered an annualised return of 2.6 per cent per annum. Including the bank preference shares and related warrants, which are held at cost and zero respectively, the Fund recorded a return of 11.6 per cent in 2009. At 31 December 2009 the total Fund’s value stood at €22.3 billion.”

If the state were to invest €7 billion it gave AIB and BofI for their preference shares in the Discretionary Fund, the returns on these investments would have been roughly €1.463 billion in 2009. Instead, we got zilch in risk-adjusted returns.


Ok, one would say that ‘investing’ in AIB and BofI is a sensible undertaking as the banks are market-determining entities for ISE. Nope, wrong. Page 4 of release states: “As a result, the Investment Portfolio had an elevated level of quoted equity investment of 80 per cent following completion of the recapitalisation in May compared with 57 per cent before the preference share investments were made. The Fund took advantage of the strong equity market rally to reduce its absolute risk and exposure to the equity markets through phased equity sales of €2.7 billion through the remainder of the year. The Investment Portfolio’s exposure to the quoted equity markets had been reduced to 63 per cent by year end.”

So as the result of AIB & BofI ‘investments’, NPRF is now more heavily geared toward equities as a class. Full stop. Now, give this a thought. We have a Pension fund with 63% exposure to equities that has been forced to sell equity on the basis of the need to re-gear toward banks shares in the economy where banks are the weakest point… Aggressive high risk investment strategy. What’s next? A highly geared derivative undertaking with taxpayers money? Ooops – we already got one, called NAMA SPV.

Back to page 3 stuff: “During 2009 the Minister for Finance directed the Fund to invest €7 billion in preference shares issued by Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks for the purposes of recapitalising these institutions. The terms of the deal, which was negotiated by the NTMA, include a non-cumulative fixed dividend of 8 per cent on the preference shares and warrants which give an option to purchase up to 25 per cent of the enlarged ordinary share capital of each bank following exercise of the warrants. The dividends payable on the preference shares are not recognised or accrued by the Fund until declaration by the bank concerned. These investments were funded by €4 billion from the Fund’s own resources and by €3 billion from a frontloading of the Exchequer contributions to the Fund for 2009 and 2010.”

Two points here:

1. 2009 thus saw a direct transfer of €3 billion to NPRF from the economy that has contracted by 10.5% (GNP). Since NPRF is a de facto piggy bank for public sector pensions only, this type of fiscal management, of course, has no precedent. It is equivalent to taking from the strained middle classes (taxpayers) to award future pay for public employees.
2. This reminds us as to just how outrageously overpriced the preference shares we bought were. AIB and BofI preference shares yielding 8%? Remember – these two banks have balancesheets weaker than those of the main UK banks. Yet, at the same time we were signing off on 8% return, the UK banks bonds were yielding 12-15%. What’s the opportunity cost of such a sweetheart deal for the banks from taxpayers’ perspective? 7% yield foregone, or in 2009 terms - €490 million.
   

Add the two bolded numbers: €1.953 billion is the opportunity cost to the taxpayers of the AIB and BofI capital injection in foregone earnings. This is more than double the amount of savings generated by the Exchequer through public sector wage ‘cuts’ in 2010 Budget.


Another interesting thingy – page 4: “NAMA will acquire loans with a nominal value of approximately €80 billion”. Hold on, folks – was it €77 billion or €80 billion? Or should we take it from the NTMA that +/-€3 billion in taxpayers funds exposure is simply pittance that can be rounded off? What’s next? February 2010 numbers rising to €85 billion, then to €90 billion by March? Why not just state ‘we’ll buy anything they throw at us’ and close off this Cossack Dance with the numbers?


Pages 5 (end) and 6 provide a small, but interesting insight into operational efficiencies of the State Claims Agency: “There has been a substantial decline in employer and public liability claim volumes associated with incidents that have occurred since the SCA was established. Since 2002 the number of employer liability claims has fallen by 71 per cent and the number of public liability claims has fallen by 19 per cent. The total number of active employer and public liability claims has fallen by 35 per cent in 2009 compared with 2008.”

Sounds like good news? All claims are down since 2002 and in particular between 2008 and 2009. Happy times? Not really: “During 2009 the SCA paid out a total of €64 million against all classes of claims. This compares with a total of €53 million in 2008.” So let me run this by you – cases numbers are down 35%, but payouts are up 20.8%! I guess the gravity of injuries in the public sector rose dramatically during the year.


Lastly, Appendix 1 lists bond issues for 2009. This is a nice summary of the fine work being done by the NTMA in placing our debt (although most of it has gone to the banks to be rolled into ECB). But the worrying thing is the time profile of these bonds. €14.53 billion of the bonds issued this year will mature (and will be rolled over) during or before 2014 - the deadline for our compliance with the Stability & Growth Pact ceilings on deficit and debt. Such a large amount, coming already on top of the billions in short/medium-term debt issued in 2008 doesn't do much to support markets confidence in Ireland actually delivering on 2014 commitment...