Yesterday I posted some thoughts on Ruble appreciation over recent months http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/10415rubles-mysterious-rise-some.html. Here is last night's BOFIT note on the same, highlighting CBR repo arrangements as the policy tool also contributing to changes in the trend:
Saturday, April 11, 2015
11/4/15: BOFIT on Ruble Rise Debate
Yesterday I posted some thoughts on Ruble appreciation over recent months http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/10415rubles-mysterious-rise-some.html. Here is last night's BOFIT note on the same, highlighting CBR repo arrangements as the policy tool also contributing to changes in the trend:
Friday, April 10, 2015
10/4/15: Comments on the EU Comm Paper “Building a Capital Markets Union”
I have recently been asked to present my views on the European Capital Markets Union proposals from the European Commission to the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform. Here is the briefing paper to accompany my presentation:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2592918
10/4/15:Ruble's Mysterious Rise: Some Thoughts
There is an interesting debate starting up around the Ruble: in recent weeks, Ruble appreciation against the USD has pushed it out of its traditional long term alignment with oil prices, as noted in the chart below:
Source: @Schuldensuehner
There are several possible factor that can account for this.
- Oil price expectations - if the markets expect oil prices to rise further, Ruble buyers can bid the currency up ahead of the oil price changes. This is unlikely in my view, as we are not seeing oil price firming significantly in both spot and futures markets.
- Oil price revelation - if the markets priced in severe forecasts uncertainty linked to oil price dynamics to the Russian economy back in October-December 2014, then the new information about Russian economy's performance in Q1 2015 should lead to re-pricing of risks. In my opinion, Ruble was heavily oversold in December (not in october-November) and there is some upside potential, given that the Q1 2015 data coming out of the Russian economy is not as apocalyptic as some currency markets analysts expected. Notably, there has been a significant cut in USD long positions vis-a-vis Ruble in recent days, which signals speculative re-alignment toward long-Ruble.
- Demand Factor 1 - March is the end of Q1, so it is the month of rising demand for Ruble to cover corporate tax liabilities (Russian corporates pay taxes in Rubles). VAT receipts are also coming due. And estimated forward taxes and charges. In my opinion, this helps to temporarily boost Ruble valuations.
- Demand Factor 2 - March is the last month before major companies in Russia are due to reverse their forex holdings to October 2014 levels (per December agreement hammered out by President Putin). This means increased supply of USD and other currencies, and increased demand for Rubles. Again, a temporary factor, in my opinion.
- Supply Factor - March and April are also large months for corporates to book in energy-related exports earnings. Note that Russian Central Bank is recording a small rise in reserves in late March, followed by a decline in April.
- Demand Factor 3 - March also was the month of largest (for 2015) external debt redemptions by Russian banks and corporates. Repayment of these debts involves buying dollars and selling Rubles, but timing-wise, companies have been pre-building their forex reserves for some time, so it is most likely that in recent 3 weeks there has been less demand for dollars (and other forex) than in previous 2 months. Note, I covered this here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/8415-rubles-gains-are-convincing-but.html
- Demand factor 4 - since the start of 2014, Russia actively pursued reduction of the degree of dollarisation in its economy. The first stage of this process involved increasing trade settlements in other currencies (most recent one - announced this week - with Indonesia). This, alongside with imports collapse, reduced external trade-linked demand for dollars. The second phase of de-dollarisation started in February, when Russian retail deposits started exiting dollars and shifting back into Ruble on improved confidence in the banks and high deposit rates. Again - a temporary support for the Ruble.
- Demand factor 5 - as Russian CDS show, probability of default declines for Russia sustained in recent weeks implies improved demand for Russian Government (and local) bonds, issued in Ruble markets. The result is improved demand for OFZs and, thus, for Ruble.
- Real vs Nominal exchange Rates - inflation dynamics in Russia are most likely drawing a gap between real and nominal exchange rates, so nominal rate firming up is not imposing equivalent increase in the real rates.
In other words, we have many, many moving parts to one equation. One can't tell the dominant one, or which are likely to last longer, but my sense is that majority of these forces are temporary and the long-run link between Ruble and oil price will be regained.
Now, assuming oil price dynamics remain where they are today (weak upside), Ruble is likely to devalue again, back to USD/RUB 55-57 range. If inflation does not fall toward 10% in Q2 2015 (and I do not think it will), we are likely to see Ruble move into USD/RUB 60-65 range over this quarter. On the other hand, improved outlook for the economy (signalling, say annual contraction closer to 3.5-4 percent) can see Ruble staying within the USD/RUB 50-53 range.
One thing is for sure: so far, the Central Bank of Russia has managed damn well its dance in a very tight monetary policy corner between runaway inflation, prohibitively high interest rates and a massive squeeze on forex valuations. How long this 'smart game' in multidimensional and highly dynamic chess can go on is everyone's guess.
10/4/15: Irish Construction Sector Performance: a European Perspective
Irish Construction Sector has been a positive contributor to GDP over the second half of 2014, prompting some - in fact many - media outlets to herald the return of the Men in Hard Hats. You can be excused for wondering, as to how many men (and women) in hard hats are out there working today, given there is little visible activity on the ground, but the numbers do not lie. Or so they say.
Here is the latest data from the Eurostat giving construction sector activity in terms comparable across the EU states.
Actual activity for all building and construction sectors in Ireland over Q4 2014 was running some 53.2% below the average activity levels recorded in 2000-2002. Over the course of 2014, average activity in the sector in Ireland was 53.2% below the same activity over 2000-2002. Both metrics ranked Ireland as the third worst-performing construction sector in the group of euro area 15 economies.
Having risen to 111.20 in Q4 2010, the index of overall construction activity in Ireland was at the highest level since Q4 2009, but below any quarter for the period of Q1 2000-Q4 2009.
Things are even worse in the case of building activity (ex-civil engineering), where Ireland ranks second worst, on par with Portugal in the EU28. Here, Q4 2014 reading is 63.5% below 2000-2002 average and full year 2014 average reading is 69% lower than 2000-2002 average. Once again, the index is currently reading at the highest level since Q4 2009, but as above, this reading is well below any quarterly reading between Q1 2000 and Q4 2009.
Here is a chart showing relative performance to EU and EA:
Two things to note in the above:
- EU and EA uplift in Q4 2014 has been more pronounced than that for Ireland.
- The trends are now not exactly converging, with EU and EA both pushing up, while Ireland's upward momentum appearing to be weakening once again from H1 2014 on.
One aside question is: with the above evidence at hand, can anyone explain a huge rise in the reported 'investment' in commercial property in 2014? Other than buy-to-flip strategies of the vulture funds, where is all this 'investment' going?
10/4/15: Shared Economy of the Future: It's All About the Bandwidth Access
A very interesting chart plotting evolution of the auto markets in the current technological environment from the Morgan Stanley:
The point of convergence is the 'Shared Economy'. But the real insight here is not about the auto market. Instead it is about technologically-enabled breakdown of the barriers between:
- Producers and consumers: as technology allows for greater and greater customisation, product offer becomes consumer/user driven in services and increasingly in physical goods;
- Owners and users: one model of 'own-to-use' is now increasingly being replaced by a dual option: 'own-to-use' or 'contract-to-use'. Goods conversion to services (e.g. ability to extract service from the physical goods without the need for ownership) adds another dimension to this.
This is happening in auto industry, but it also happens increasingly in smaller ticket goods and services markets. And it is going to change dramatically the retail sector. Here is an interesting article on Amazon vision of the present (not even the future) in terms of purchasing (note: the issue here is to what extent can brand standardisation consolidate product offers):
All of this, ultimately, is about the ability to create a 'shared bandwidth' around a quasi-commoditised service with some heterogeneity and customisation around it, and efficiently allocate consumer access to it. Which really means that the 'shared economy' is like a shared pipeline: someone will, in the end, have to arbitrage access to it, just as today someone has to arbitrage access to shared services (tolls, grids, etc). For now, we do so very inefficiently even crudely (very little demand-linked variability in toll pricing, long-term contracts nature of access to grids etc), but as the number of users-producers rises and their share in the overall economy grows, this arbitraging will have to become more refined, more dynamic, real time responsive.
I will be speaking about these and other longer-term trends in retail sector at an international retail sector conference in June so stay tuned.
Thursday, April 9, 2015
9/4/15: Expresso on IMF's WEO Update: Secular Stagnation is Here
Portugal's Expresso on IMF's 'secular stagnation' evidence via April 2015 WEO Update (Chapter 3): http://expresso.sapo.pt/a-receita-do-fmi-mais-infraestruturas-mais-inovacao-mais-produtividade=f918917. With my comments...
My view in full:
IMF findings on potential and long-term growth trends in the advanced economies published as a part of the April 2015 WEO update confirm what we have already known for some time: the ongoing economic growth slowdown is not only structural in natural, but is permanent, in economic terms.
More importantly, however, the IMF study shows that the structural slowdown in growth has started prior to the onset of the Global Financial Crisis and has been concentrated, in terms of drivers, in demographics of ageing, leading to decline in investment, and a fall off in the growth of the total factor productivity as advanced economies continued to exhaust growth along the technological frontier.
In simple terms, this confirms the thesis of the secular stagnation, especially as formulated by Robert J. Gordon (see http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2012/08/2882012-challenging-constant-growth.html).
From my point of view, the study documents one key trend: the trend of increasingly lower contribution of the human capital to growth over the period of 2001-2007 in the presence of slower, but still, relatively sustained growth contribution from employment.
This shows that during the pre-crisis boom, much of economic growth was derived not from intensive margin (technological progress and linking of technology to greater labour productivity) but from extensive margin (increased supply of physical capital and asset bubbles).
In the future, this imbalance in growth will require significant policy corrections in order to restore human capital growth to 2001-2003 levels. Absent these highly disruptive policy reforms (covering taxation systems, provision and distribution of key public services, restructuring of enterprise management systems etc), the world will find itself at the tail end of technological growth frontier, with low rates of return to technology and innovation and, as the result, permanently lower growth in the advanced economies.
9/4/15: IMHO Proposals Concerning Home Repossessions
IMHO proposals to the Department of Finance on the Risk of Significant Home Repossessions is now available here: https://www.evernote.com/shard/s442/sh/e8e02a47-30c0-49c5-9846-d09f1ab9c18f/20f2d8894a0ab47c9fde09b245120436.
9/4/15: Expresso on Putin-Tsipras Meeting
Portuguese Expresso coverage of yesterday's meeting between President Putin and Prime Minister Tsipras, with a comment of my own http://expresso.sapo.pt/grecia-inicia-primavera-com-a-russia=f918953.
Wednesday, April 8, 2015
8/4/15: Three Strikes of the New Financial Regulation: Part 3 – The Capital Markets Union
My new blogpost for @LearnSignal blog covering the Capital Markets Union regulations is now available on line: http://blog.learnsignal.com/?p=172
8/4/15: Ruble's Gains Are Convincing, But Risks Remain
Three charts:
Russian car sales
Source: @moved_average
Down 42.5% y/y in March (estimated 43% decline).
Ruble v Dollar is going up and up:
Source: @Schuldensuehner
Ruble v Euro is also up and up...
Source: @Schuldensuehner
Linking all three? The myth of Ruble liquidity squeeze (e.g. here and here). Reality: sharp drop in imports, slight improvement in oil prices (and more importantly stabilisation of the trend to the upside) and improving conditions in the domestic banking sector are all driving ruble value up.
Another strong contributing factor is timing of external debt redemptions:
Source: https://www.tradingfloor.com/posts/pop-goes-the-rouble-4296859
These are now past their 2015 peaks.
All positive, but uncertainty remains and is still extremely high, so I would not be surprised if ruble starts posting some losses in and around the end of Q2.
8/4/15: Irish Quarterly PMIs: Services, Manufacturing & Construction
Given we now have data for PMIs for Ireland (via Markit and Investec) through March (see analysis of Manufacturing PMI here and Services PMI here), let's update quarterly PMI averages and compute my own 'composite' indicator based on 3 core sectors: Manufacturing, Construction and Services. Note: Construction sector PMIs are computed on the basis of january-February data as there are lags of 2 weeks in reporting these by Markit.
Manufacturing PMI for Q1 2015 stood at 56.5, down from 56.6 in Q4 2014. Thus, Q/Q the PMI is down 0.18%. In Q4 2014 Manufacturing PMI was up 0.77% Q/Q. So we have a slowdown in growth, but growth nonetheless. The same holds for yearly comparatives. Q1 2015 was up 5.1% y/y, after posting 5.5% growth in Q4 2014 and 8.2% growth in Q3 2014. The series are trending above 50.0 for the 7th quarter in a row.
Services PMI fell from 61.9 in Q4 2014 to 61.6 in Q1 2015, down 0.5% Q/Q, having posted a decline of 0.3% q/q in Q4 2014. Yearly growth rates also slowed down: in Q3 2014 y/y growth in Services PMI was 5.8%, this fell to 3.7% in Q4 2014 and to 2.8% in Q1 2015. Still, we now have 17 consecutive quarters of growth in Services as recorded by PMIs in excess of 50.0.
Construction PMI (based on 2 months of data for 2015) is currently standing at 54.6, down from 63.8 in Q4 2014. This is a marked reversal in the q/q growth rates from 3.2% in Q4 2014 to -14.5% in Q1 2015, though we need to see March data to make any conclusions on this. Yearly growth rates are falling off the cliff too: in Q3 2014 Construction PMI rose 21.3% y/y, which declined to 8.5% growth in Q4 2014 and to estimated -5.3% contraction in Q1 2015. Again, as with Manufacturing, we do have continued 7 quarters of above 50 readings in the series, so the slowdown is in the rate of growth, not an outright contraction in activity.
As the chart above shows, Composite Index (computed by myself based on sectoral weights in the National Accounts) has posted a relatively sharp decline, driven primarily by the Construction PMI reading. As of today (absent March data for Construction PMI) the composite indicator is reading at 59.0, down from 60.7 in Q4 2014. This is the lowest reading in four quarters, so y/y the index is still up 1.4%, although the rate of growth in the index has fallen from 4.2% recorded in a year through Q4 2014 and 6.7% growth posted in Q3 2014. Nonetheless, the index continues to trend above 50 for the 17th quarter in a row.
Tuesday, April 7, 2015
7/4/15: IMF: Ninth Time is Gonna be Lucky in Ukraine
It is perhaps revealing that the IMF is being forced to defend its Ukraine package 2.0 only a month after it was unveiled. And even do so without providing any explicit risk assessments. Here is the latest on the Fund efforts on this front. Lipton's full speech is here: http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2015/040715.htm
Of note two things:
- This is an 9th lending programme by the Fund to Ukraine, with 8 previous ones being... err... not exactly successful.
- The current programme is based on (see details here: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr1569.pdf) assumed 2015 real GDP contraction of 5.5%, growth of 2% in 2016, 3.5% in 2017 and 4% every year thereafter through 2020. And below is the table of forecasts from the Central Bank of Ukraine (NBU) showing 2015 forecast for -7.5% growth and 2016 forecast for 3% growth. It also shows that NBU estimates y/y growth in Q4 2014 to have been -14.8% and Q1 2015 growth to be -15%. And that -7.5% growth in 2015 will require positive growth in Q4 2015 and a relatively modest contraction in Q3 2015.
All of which suggests that the Fund leading 'assumption' on growth might be a touch optimistic. And that makes its leading 'target' for debt/GDP ratio of 94% at year end 2015 to be a touch unrealistic. Just as the Funds' all previous leading assumptions and targets that the IMF set in all previous lending arrangements with Ukraine.
But, as the Good Director might say, this time it is different...
7/4/15: IMF WEO on Global Investment Slump: Part 2: It's Demand, Not Supply ..
IMF released Chapter 4 of the April 2015 World Economic Outlook update. The chapter covers the issue of lagging growth in private investment (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/pdf/c4.pdf).
IMF findings focus on 5 questions:
I covered chapter’s main findings for questions 1-2 in the earlier post here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/7415-imf-weo-on-global-investment-slump.html
Now, onto the remaining questions and the core conclusions:
Q3: "The overall weakness in economic activity since the crisis appears to be the primary restraint on business investment in the advanced economies. In surveys, businesses often cite low demand as the dominant factor. Historical precedent indicates that business investment has deviated little, if at all, from what could be expected given the weakness in economic activity in recent years. …Although the proximate cause of lower firm investment appears to be weak economic activity, this itself is due to many factors. And it is worth acknowledging that, as explained in Chapter 3 [of the WEO], a large share of the output loss compared with pre-crisis trends can now be seen as permanent."
Here's a handy chart showing as much:
Q4: "Beyond weak economic activity, there is some evidence that financial constraints and policy uncertainty play an independent role in retarding investment in some economies, including euro area economies with high borrowing spreads during the 2010–11 sovereign debt crisis. …In particular, firms in sectors that rely more on external funds, such as pharmaceuticals, have seen a larger fall in investment than other firms since the crisis. This finding is consistent with the view that a weak financial system and weak firm balance sheets have constrained investment. Regarding the effect of uncertainty, firms whose stock prices typically respond more to measures of aggregate uncertainty have cut back more on investment in recent years, even after the role of weak sales is accounted for."
Here is an interesting set of charts documenting that financial and policy factors played more significant role in depressing investment in the euro area 'peripheral' states:
Note: in Ireland's case, financial constraints (quality of firms' balance sheets) is the only explanatory factor beyond demand side of the economy for investment collapse in 2013-present, as uncertainty (blue line) strongly diverged from the actual investment dynamics.
Q5: "Finally, regarding the apparent disconnect between buoyant stock market performance and relatively restrained investment growth in some economies, the chapter finds that this too is not unusual. In line with much existing research, it finds that the relationship between market valuations and business investment is positive but weak. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that stock market performance is a leading indicator of future investment, implying that if stock markets remain buoyant, business investment could pick up."
Conclusions
Meanwhile, the IMF does note the role of debt overhang (legacy debts) in corporate sector as one of the drivers for the current investment slump. "Although this chapter does not further investigate the separate roles of weak firm balance sheets and impaired credit supply, a growing number of studies do so and suggest that both channels have been relevant." In particular, "For example, Kalemli-Ozcan, Laeven, and Moreno (forthcoming) investigate the separate roles of weak corporate balance sheets, corporate debt overhang, and weak bank balance sheets in hindering investment in Europe in recent years using a firm-level data set on small and medium-sized enterprises in which each firm is matched to its bank. They find that all three of these factors have inhibited investment in small firms but that corporate debt overhang (defined by the long-term debt-to-earnings ratio) has been the most
important."
Thus, once again, how likely is it that low cost and abundant credit supply unleashed onto SMEs - as our policymakers in Ireland and the EU are dreaming day after day - will be able to repair investment collapse? Err… not likely.
IMF findings focus on 5 questions:
- "Is there a global slump in private investment?"
- "Is the sharp slump in advanced economy private investment due just to weakness in housing, or is it broader?"
- "How much of the slump in business investment reflects weakness in economic activity?"
- "Which businesses have cut back more on investment? What does this imply about which channels—beyond output—have been relevant in explaining weak investment?"
- "Is there a disconnect between financial markets and firms’ investment decisions?"
I covered chapter’s main findings for questions 1-2 in the earlier post here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/7415-imf-weo-on-global-investment-slump.html
Now, onto the remaining questions and the core conclusions:
Q3: "The overall weakness in economic activity since the crisis appears to be the primary restraint on business investment in the advanced economies. In surveys, businesses often cite low demand as the dominant factor. Historical precedent indicates that business investment has deviated little, if at all, from what could be expected given the weakness in economic activity in recent years. …Although the proximate cause of lower firm investment appears to be weak economic activity, this itself is due to many factors. And it is worth acknowledging that, as explained in Chapter 3 [of the WEO], a large share of the output loss compared with pre-crisis trends can now be seen as permanent."
Here's a handy chart showing as much:
Figure 4.6. Real Business Investment and Output Relative to Forecasts: Historical Recessions versus Global Financial Crisis (Percent deviation from forecasts in the year of recession, unless noted otherwise; years on x-axis, unless noted otherwise)
Q4: "Beyond weak economic activity, there is some evidence that financial constraints and policy uncertainty play an independent role in retarding investment in some economies, including euro area economies with high borrowing spreads during the 2010–11 sovereign debt crisis. …In particular, firms in sectors that rely more on external funds, such as pharmaceuticals, have seen a larger fall in investment than other firms since the crisis. This finding is consistent with the view that a weak financial system and weak firm balance sheets have constrained investment. Regarding the effect of uncertainty, firms whose stock prices typically respond more to measures of aggregate uncertainty have cut back more on investment in recent years, even after the role of weak sales is accounted for."
Here is an interesting set of charts documenting that financial and policy factors played more significant role in depressing investment in the euro area 'peripheral' states:
Figure 4.10. Selected Euro Area Economies: Accelerator Model—Role of Financial Constraints and Policy Uncertainty (Log index).
Note: in Ireland's case, financial constraints (quality of firms' balance sheets) is the only explanatory factor beyond demand side of the economy for investment collapse in 2013-present, as uncertainty (blue line) strongly diverged from the actual investment dynamics.
Q5: "Finally, regarding the apparent disconnect between buoyant stock market performance and relatively restrained investment growth in some economies, the chapter finds that this too is not unusual. In line with much existing research, it finds that the relationship between market valuations and business investment is positive but weak. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that stock market performance is a leading indicator of future investment, implying that if stock markets remain buoyant, business investment could pick up."
Conclusions
- So IMF finds no need for any systemic the supply-side adjustments on capital/credit side.
- It finds no imbalances in the capital markets and finds that demand is the main driver for collapse in investment.
Meanwhile, the IMF does note the role of debt overhang (legacy debts) in corporate sector as one of the drivers for the current investment slump. "Although this chapter does not further investigate the separate roles of weak firm balance sheets and impaired credit supply, a growing number of studies do so and suggest that both channels have been relevant." In particular, "For example, Kalemli-Ozcan, Laeven, and Moreno (forthcoming) investigate the separate roles of weak corporate balance sheets, corporate debt overhang, and weak bank balance sheets in hindering investment in Europe in recent years using a firm-level data set on small and medium-sized enterprises in which each firm is matched to its bank. They find that all three of these factors have inhibited investment in small firms but that corporate debt overhang (defined by the long-term debt-to-earnings ratio) has been the most
important."
Thus, once again, how likely is it that low cost and abundant credit supply unleashed onto SMEs - as our policymakers in Ireland and the EU are dreaming day after day - will be able to repair investment collapse? Err… not likely.
7/4/15: IMF WEO on Global Investment Slump: Part 1: It's Private Sector Issue..
IMF released Chapter 4 of the April 2015 World Economic Outlook update. The chapter covers the issue of lagging growth in private investment.
Titled "PRIVATE INVESTMENT: WHAT’S THE HOLDUP?", IMF paper starts with a simple, yet revealing summary:
"Private fixed investment in advanced economies contracted sharply during the global financial crisis, and there has been little recovery since. Investment has generally slowed more gradually in the rest of the world. Although housing investment fell especially sharply during the crisis, business investment accounts for the bulk of the slump, and the overriding factor holding it back has been the overall weakness of economic activity. In some countries, other contributing factors include financial constraints and policy uncertainty. These findings suggest that addressing the general weakness in economic activity is crucial for restoring growth in private investment."
So the key message is simple: investment contraction is not driven primarily by the failures of the financial system, but rather by the weak growth - a structural, systemic slowdown in growth. Full text available here: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/pdf/c4.pdf
Let's take a closer look at IMF findings that focus on 5 questions:
- "Is there a global slump in private investment?"
- "Is the sharp slump in advanced economy private investment due just to weakness in housing, or is it broader?"
- "How much of the slump in business investment reflects weakness in economic activity?"
- "Which businesses have cut back more on investment? What does this imply about which channels—beyond output—have been relevant in explaining weak investment?"
- "Is there a disconnect between financial markets and firms’ investment decisions?"
The chapter’s main findings are as follows (in this post, I will cover questions 1-2 with remaining questions addressed in the follow up post):
Q1: "The sharp contraction in private investment during the crisis, and the subsequent weak recovery, have primarily been a phenomenon of the advanced economies." Across advanced economies, "private investment has declined by an average of 25 percent since the crisis compared with pre-crisis forecasts, and there has been little recovery. In contrast, private investment in emerging market and developing economies has gradually slowed in recent years, following a boom in the early to mid-2000s."
Figure 4.1. Real Private Investment (Log index, 1990 = 0)
Q2: "The investment slump in the advanced economies has been broad based. Though the contraction has been sharpest in the private residential (housing) sector, nonresidential (business) investment—which is a much larger share of total investment—accounts for the bulk (more than two-thirds) of the slump. There is little sign of recovery toward pre-crisis investment trends in either sector."
Figure 4.2. Real Private Investment, 2008–14 (Average percent deviation from pre-crisis forecasts)
Spot Ireland in this…
And per broad spread of contraction, see next:
Figure 4.3. Categories of Real Fixed Investment (Log index, 1990 = 0)
But here's an interesting chart breaking down investment contraction by public v private investment sources:
Figure 4.4. Decomposition of the Investment Slump, 2008–14 (Average percent deviation from spring 2007 forecasts)
This, sort of, flies in the face of those arguing that Government investment should be the driver for growth, as it shows that public investment contraction had at most a mild negative impact on some euro area states (Ireland is included in the above under "Selected euro area").
Next post will cover Questions 3-5 and provide top-level conclusions.
7/4/15: BRIC PMIs via Markit
And so Markit now releases a 'summary' of BRIC PMIs... not quite in a full release, but...
Useful... and you can read more in-depth analysis of BRIC Services PMIs here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/6415-bric-services-pmis-overall.html and on Manufacturing PMIs here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/2415-bric-manufacturing-pmi-march-marks.html
Ah, the perils of doing analysis in the age when the big boys follow... As always, thanks to Markit for publishing at least few remaining headline numbers of PMIs.
7/4/15: Irish Services PMI: March 2015
Irish Services PMI was published by Markit/Investec today.
March Services PMI stood at 60.9, down from 61.4 in February, marking the third consecutive month of m/m declines from the local high of 62.6 in December 2014. Current reading is the lowest in 12 consecutive months.
Still at 60.9, the index is signaling robust growth in the sector. More importantly, 3mo average is at 61.6 for Q1 2015, which is marginally weaker than 61.9 average for Q4 2014 and well above Q1 2013 reading of 54.2 and Q1 2014 reading of 59.9.
March marks the first time since January when both Manufacturing and Services PMIs declined. Last time this happened before January 2015 was in May 2014, so twin decline is a rather rare event. This said, both indices remained well above their post-crisis averages in March, although over the last 12 months, Manufacturing averaged 56.2 (which means March reading out-performed the average at 56.8) against Services 12 mo average of 61.9 (which means that March reading under-performed the average at 60.9).
Broadly-speaking, we are seeing reduction in the rate of growth in both Manufacturing and Services, albeit from very high levels.
More detailed quarterly analysis to follow, so stay tuned.
7/4/15: Another Quango for Ireland to Undo Ineffectiveness of a Host of Quangos
Only in Ireland... the Government that has:
- One office of the Financial Services Ombudsman,
- One office of the Financial Regulator,
- One office of Consumer Protection in the Central Bank,
- One office of the Consumer Protection Agency,
- One Insolvency Services
the same Government that has promised, upon election, to cut the number of quangos in Ireland is now seeking to establish a new quango to deal with the failure of all of the above quangos with the issue of banks veto in personal insolvency deals.
And it gets more absurd - the only reason the entire problem arises is... the Government decision to grant the banks full and asymmetric veto power in the insolvency deals.
You cannot make this up. Really...
Details: http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/politics/new-watchdog-to-put-pressure-on-banks-that-veto-debt-deals-31122855.html
And a reminder of the days gone (source: @rkavanagh09)
Oh, yeah, baby, Bold Reformists!
And a reminder of the days gone (source: @rkavanagh09)
Oh, yeah, baby, Bold Reformists!
Monday, April 6, 2015
6/4/15: BRIC Services PMIs & Overall Activity in Q1 2015
BRIC Services PMIs (published by Markit) are finally out, with the last two countries instalments today, so time to look at the Q1 2015 data. And from the top level view, things are not encouraging:
- Brazil Services PMI slipped from 52.3 in February (a 14-months high that was a huge upside surprise) to a 70-months low of 47.9 in March - a massive fall. On a quarterly basis, things are not as bad, but that is all down to February reading. 3mo average for Q1 is at 49.5 - still contractionary/zero growth, compared to 49.3 Q4 1024 average and against weak growth recorded in Q1 2014 (50.5 average). In last 8 months, Brazil managed to post only two months of Services PMIs above 50, with only one month reading being statistically significantly above 50.0. In short, we now have a sign of deepening slowdown in the economy, based on both Manufacturing and Services surveys.
- Russia Services PMI was predictably weak at 46.1 in March, although a gain on totally abysmal 41.3 reading in February. 3mo average through Q1 2015 is at 43.8 and this is well below already contractionary 47.1 average through Q4 2-14. Q1 2014 registered a weak contraction/static growth of 49.6. March reading was the strongest in 5 months, but overall Services side of the Russian economy has posted below 50 survey readings continuously over 6 months now. This, coupled with another (4th monthly) below 50 reading in Manufacturing suggests that there is an ongoing significant recession in the economy and that this has accelerated in Q1 2015 compared to Q4 2014.
- China Services PMI remained in relatively moderate growth territory in March (at 52.3 against 52.0 in February) and 3mo average for Q1 2015 is at 52.0, weaker than Q4 2014 average of 53.2, but up on Q1 2014 average of 51.2. China never posted below 50 PMI in Services before , so we are left tracking relative weaknesses in positive growth signals here. Weak improvement in Services survey is offset, in China's case, by strong deterioration in Manufacturing index which fell below 50 in March.
- India Services PMI was somewhat weaker in March 2015 at 53.0 compared to February 53.9 reading. Still, this marks the second highest reading in 9 months. India's Services PMI average for Q1 2015 is at 53.1 - a major improvement on 51.3 average through Q4 2014 and a big gain y/y - in Q1 2014, Services PMI was averaging only 48.2. March marked 11th month of above 50 readings for Indian Services surveys. India is the only BRIC country that managed to post m/m growth (above 50 readings) across both sectors: Manufacturing and Services.
Chart below shows Services surveys dynamics:
Table below summarises changes in Manufacturing and Services PMIs:
Pooling together Services and Manufacturing surveys data, chart below shows the overall BRIC trend in growth. March came in with a slowdown of overall economic activity across the block of the largest emerging markets economies and this slowdown took place in the already weak growth environment. While the series remain on an upward trend established from the local low attained in July 2013, this trend is no longer convincing and since June 2014, there has been a pronounced downward sub-trend. This does not bode well for the global economy.
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Sunday, April 5, 2015
5/4/15: Russian Offshore Capital Amnesty Law Proposal
Last week, Russian Duma received the government bill on amnesty for illegal expatriation of capital for private individuals.
- The bill will require those applying for amnesty to fully declare their offshore assets.
- Upon declaration, that has to filled before the end of 2015, there will be no penalty for unauthorised expatriation.
- The claimant is entitled, under the proposed law, to full confidentiality and do not have to disclose the sources of their assets held abroad.
- The only liability that does arise under the proposal is the one relating to back taxes. In some cases, assets held abroad are subject to tax in Russia.
- When that is the case, claimants will be required to settle any unpaid or underpaid tax obligations that arise from their ownership of the asset.
- The bill does not specify the full set of procedures for settling tax liabilities.
Illegal expatriation arises, for private citizens (excluding public and government officials, and elected representatives who are covered by more substantial restrictions on ownership and declaration of overseas assets), primarily from the restriction on expatriation of funds.
Some earlier versions of the bill required imposition of automatic fines on expatriated capital (this version was presented to the Government, but rejected in favour of a more liberal version), as well as a requirement to repatriate all foreign assets. The latter requirement was dropped in both versions considered by the Government and is not in the draft sent to Duma for consideration.
In the cases where foreign assets assets have been accumulated in the tax havens for the purpose of tax evasion, these assets will have to be repatriated. More on the current proposal here: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-26/russia-sets-terms-for-capital-amnesty-to-correct-past-mistakes-
At this stage, the new proposal does not cover assets acquired through illegal means, only assets expatriated for tax purposes. The new bill was developed in close cooperation with the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on money laundering and other financial crimes, but FATF is not quite happy with the draft legislation. The reason for FATF objections is the lack of disclosure and information sharing. This is a serious matter, as failure to comply with FATF regulations can get Russia blacklisted. Russian Government is promising a separate bill to cover assets accumulated through money laundering and other criminal activities, but it remains unclear if this system of presenting separate pieces of legislation on several different, but potentially connected types of assets will satisfy the FATF. See more on this here: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/putin-s-capital-amnesty-could-put-russia-on-money-laundering-blacklist/514470.html.
Russian role within the FATF has been actively positive in recent years. However, Western sanctions during 2014 have led to some serious conflicts within the FATF, prompted primarily by the US delegation to the organisation that has clearly been using FATF as a vehicle for exerting geopolitical pressure on Russia (see http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/05/us-ukraine-crisis-moneylaundering-idUSBREA440RR20140505).
Question is: from the global perspective, is the new draft law a good thing or a bad thing?
Globally-allocated Russian capital, held by private individuals, can be divided into 3 (unequal in volume) types:
- Type 1 - the unknown quantum of assets acquired using illicit gains from activities in Russia, and illegally shifted out of Russian. This bit is not covered by the new legislation, but Russian Government has already said it plans to introduce a separate piece of legislation to cover these assets, and it has promised that it will fully comply with FATF.
- Type 2 - the unknown quantum of assets, probably similar to that covered by Part 1 and, together with Type 1 accounting for more than 2/3rds of all Russian-owned assets held abroad, has been expatriated to minimise tax exposures. Some of it legally, some illegally. This bit is covered by the proposed bill. As I understand it, Russian authorities can make a determination if some of the assets declared under Type 2 really relate to Type 1. If they do, Russian can notify FATF, but if they don't, Russian does not have to notify FATF.
- Type 3 - smaller share of Russian assets abroad is perfectly legal and is not covered by the proposed law. To-date, FATF had no complaints with Russia on these assets.
Since 2002, Russia is deemed as compliant with FATF regulations. Under the current state of our knowledge about Russian assets held abroad, FATF has no systemic complaint against Russia. The new law will not reduce this level of compliance and will not undermine information available to FATF. It may even increase it, and the follow up law for dealing with Type 1 assets promises to increase it even further. So what is the point for threatening Russia with non-compliance and black-listing today? What is the basis for such a threat?
As non-specialist on FATF, I would welcome all informed comments on this issue from the readers.
5/4/15: Irish Whiskey vs Scotch 2013-2014 data
Irish whiskey resurgence in recent years (here) has been a welcome development, in terms of offers and brands expansions, and in terms of exports growth. Between 2009-2014, average annual rate of growth in Irish whiskey exports stood at 9.86% pa.
However, owing to decades of under-development and the state policies of the past, Irish whiskey remains a poor cousin (in global sales terms) to Scotch. Over 2002-2013, Scotch posted an impressive exports growth of 7.0% pa on average, beating Irish growth over the same period. And it did so from a much higher base. Here are the comparatives:
In simple terms, Scotch exports are 3.8 times the size of all exports by the Irish drinks sector and almost 13 times the size of our exports of whiskey. All along, our state agencies and policymakers continue to measure success in volumes of sales, rather than in value. As the result, we are missing the boat in the high end, high value-added markets, going instead for the tradition market for Irish whiskey: mixer market.
Good news: with multiple new distilleries coming into production in the last 3-5 years, we are starting to see a promise of this trend being reversed, with some producers embracing quality over quantity approach. Bad news: it takes 12 years, plus, to mature premium whiskey. More bad news: Irish domestic markets for inputs into distillery: from barley to malt to electricity are either expensive (we rank third most expensive country for electricity supply to enterprises) or not available due to CAP-incentivised standardisation (lack of specialist barley is dire in Ireland, according to several smaller distillers I spoke to recently).
Update: Here is an interesting set of results from an international whiskey/whisky competition: http://uk.businessinsider.com/best-whiskeys-from-the-san-francisco-world-spirits-competition-2015-4?r=US# Note that Ireland features 3 brands (all independents) against massive dominance of Scotch.
Saturday, April 4, 2015
4/4/15: US Jobs ≠ US Wages Inflation. Why not?
Want to understand why the US Economy adding jobs is not translating into the US workers gaining wages? Here's a handy PBS report worth reading: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/why-you-shouldnt-expect-wages-to-rise-any-time-soon/
H/T to John Komlos
Update: an interesting take on the ongoing US economic slowdown from the BusinessInsider: http://uk.businessinsider.com/2015-has-broken-everyones-assumptions-so-far-2015-4?r=US. Note the Atlanta Fed estimate of zero growth in Q1. Weather might be the case. Oil prices, however, are bogus scape goat. Here's a chart showing that the US in fact is the driver for lower oil prices:
H/T for that to @business
4/4/15: A Sign of Ruble Stabilisation? Russian Forex Reserves Rise
The latest data (through last week) published two days ago by the Central Bank of Russia shows that Russian Forex reserves have risen for the second week in a row. In the week of 27/03/2015 Forex reserves rose USD7.9 billion to USD360.8 billion and in the week prior they were up USD1.2 billion. Thus, relative to the crisis period low of USD351.7 billion set in the week of 13/03/2015, Russian Forex reserves are up USD9.1 billion. This puts weekly reserves at USD2.2 billion below end of February reading.
This is a very uncertain development at this point in time. Russian Forex reserves were down 15 consecutive weeks prior to the last two weeks of increases, so it is too early to read the latest upticks as reversal of the trend, but it is pretty clear that, for now, things have stabilised somewhat.
Monthly data, not yet fully available, but reflective of the last week results, suggests that the aggregate reserves are slightly up m/m. At the end of March, Forex reserves at USD360.8 billion appear to be up USD579 million on the end of February.
In the year through the end of March 2015, the reserves are down USD125.33 billion (-25.8%) and on the start of the sanctions, these are down USD132.53 billion (-26.9%). Q1 2015 (end of quarter) reserves are down USD24.66 billion on end of Q4 2014. In other words, we need to see several more weeks of improved reserves before we can call a new trend.
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