18/3/20: Yield Curve and Recessions

Some things work even in pandemics:

18/3/20: Banks, The Fed and Money Markets Woes

My article for the International Banker on pre-Covid monetary policy bottlenecks in the US markets is out and available here: https://internationalbanker.com/finance/banks-the-fed-and-money-markets-woes/

18/3/20: Past Recessions and COVID19 Crisis

As governments around the world are revising the expected duration of the extraordinary restrictive measures aimed at containing COVID19 pandemic, it is worth looking back at the history of past recessions by duration:

The chart above clearly shows that U.S. recessions (generally historically shallower and less prolonged than those in Europe) have been lengthy in duration, with only two recessions lasting < 8 months and only six lasting less than 10 months. The 1918-1919 recession was preceded by the Spanish Flu epidemic, but the recovery from the recession was also supported by the end of the WW1. Some more on the Spanish Flu pandemic effects on the economy can be found here: https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/files/pdfs/community-development/research-reports/pandemic_flu_report.pdf.

The 1918-1919 recession was not an isolated incident, as it was followed closely by the twin recession of 1920-1921. The joint episodes lasted 25 months. Similarly, the 1980 and 1981 twin recessions should also be treated as a joint episode of 22 months duration. Adjusting for these, average recession has been lasting 15 months, not 13 months, with only four recession of duration < 10 months.

Should, as now expected, the Covid2019 pandemic cause a global recession, it is unlikely to be short-lived, implying that any fiscal and monetary supports required to ameliorate the crisis core effects will have to be in place for much longer than the 2-3 months currently implied by the crisis contagion and social distancing restriction.

15/3/20: Acute beds and hospital beds capacity

With Covid-19 cases worldwide reaching almost 143,000 worldwide, it is worth examining some of the data on healthcare systems' capacity to absorb the influx of patients in weeks to come.

Here is an interesting set of data from OECD comparing the numbers of hospital beds per 1,000 population across the range of countries (I highlight some interesting comparatives):

These are not ICU beds with specialized equipment, of course, but it is hard to imagine that the relationship between ICU beds and general counts of beds is non-linear. Some people on Twitter claimed that the U.S. has higher number of acute care beds, than, say Italy or S. Korea. Which is simply, factually, false. Here's OECD data:

U.S. has 2.44 acute care beds per 1,000 population, Italy has 2.62, while S. Korea has 7.14. For those who are interested, Ireland has 2.77 and the OECD average is 3.59, with the median of 3.23.

The reality is simple: no country is fully ready for the onset of the Covid pandemic at the scale of what has happened in more impacted countries, like Italy, Korea or China. But of all countries we have data for, the U.S. system of healthcare is probably the least capable of handling any large scale public health events, not only due to mediocre capacity, but due primarily to the lack of access to healthcare.

Consider the following facts:

• Over 40% of Americans cannot afford to cover a financial emergency of > $1,000 per annum;
• Average health insurance deductible in the U.S. was in excess of $4,578 in 2018 (see chart below: source https://www.ehealthinsurance.com/resources/individual-and-family/how-much-does-individual-health-insurance-cost); for workers covered by their employers, average deductible was $1,573 in 2018 (https://www.kff.org/health-costs/report/2018-employer-health-benefits-survey/);
• By the above two facts, average family in the U.S. simply cannot afford the deductibles they are contracted for;
• The U.S. 27.5 million people were uninsured in 2018, meaning they cannot afford any care;
• 10-12.5 million of undocumented immigrants residing in the U.S. have no insurance and cannot afford any care. 

Roughly-speaking, between 159 and 162 million people living in the U.S. either have no access to insurance or cannot afford their deductibles. Does anyone expect these people to be pro-active in accessing testing and treatment for Covid early on?

9/3/20: Beware the Endlessly Inflating Global Debt Bubble

My latest article for Manning Financial on the global debt overload is available here: https://issuu.com/publicationire/docs/mf_spring_2020?fr=sZjI3NzI2MTg4NA. Alternatively, see posted below (click on each image to magnify):

9/3/20: BRIC PMIs 1Q 2020: The Test of Covid2019

BRIC PMIs for February 2020 are out and showing massive strains of #COVID2019 on Chinese economy and the twin supply and demand shocks impact on the Global economy:

Starting with Manufacturing:

India is the only BRIC economy that provided strong support to the upside for Global Manufacturing PMI, with India 1Q 2020 Manufacturing PMI reading so far at 54.9, the strongest since 2Q 2012. Brazil Manufacturing PMI was at 51.7 - marking a moderately strong expansion - roughly in line with 51.8 ad 51.9 for 4Q 2019 and 3Q 2019, respectively. In contrast, Russian Manufacturing PMI continued to show contracting sector activity at 48.1, marking the third consecutive quarter of sub-50 readings. Last time Russian Manufacturing reported cautiously positive PMIs was in 1Q 2019.

The real story, however, was Chinese Manufacturing PMI. Thanks to Corona Virus, PMI fell to 45.7 over January-February 2020, with February reading of 40.3 being a complete disaster. The quarterly average is now at it lowest reading since 1Q 2009 when it was at 44.0 and is likely to tank further in March.

Thus, BRIC Manufacturing PMI sat at an abysmal 48.6 reading in 1Q 2020 based on January-February data, the lowest reading since 4Q 2015 and notch below 48.8 reading for Global Manufacturing PMI.

Services PMIs showed the same dynamics as Manufacturing. Again, India led to the upside at 54.9, and Brazil followed at 51.6. Russia remained in solid growth territory, however, in the sector with 1Q 2020 PMI reading at 53.1. China tanked: Chinese services PMI fell to 39.2 in 1Q 2020, dragging the BRIC Services PMI to 45.6 in 1Q 2020, down from 52.3 in 4Q 2019. This is lowest BRIC Services PMI reading on record (note: I use GDP weights to compute BRIC PMIs). Global Services PMI was at 49.9.

Composite PMIs traced the patterns described above for Services and Manufacturing. India Composite PMI was at 57.0 the strongest since 1Q 2011. Brazil Composite PMI was at 51.6, basically unchanged on 4Q 2019 reading of 51.5. Russia Composite Index was at 51.8, down from 4Q 2019 reading of 52.7. China Composite PMI fell to 39.7, its lowest reading on record. Global Composite PMI was at 49.15.

Once again, these readings to-date are impact benchmarks for Corona Virus pandemic shock to the global economy, since the data does not cover the massive spread of contagion from China to other economies which happened in March. The next update, due in early April, should be brutal, as COVID19 bites across the broader global economy.

9/3/20: Irish February PMIs: Baseline for the Covid2019 Impact

With the start of March and with corona virus impacting the global economy, I have decided to restart coverage of Irish PMIs - something I did not do for some years now. So here are some of the 1Q 2020 results based on January-February data.

First off, Sector and Composite PMIs on a quarterly average basis. As reminder, Composite PMIs are computed by me based on Markit and CSO data as GDP share-weighted averages for each sub-component, namely Manufacturing, Services and Construction:

Services clearly lead the recovery from 4Q 2020 weakness, with both Manufacturing and Construction nominally in the expansion territory, but statistically too close to zero growth to be congratulatory.

Composite PMIs ex-Construction are statistically within long term average and consistent with subdued growth rates. Composite ex-Construction (based on just Manufacturing and Services) is at 52.86 against the upper bound for the 95% confidence interval around the historical mean of 52.74. Including Construction, the Composite PMI rises to 56.14.

Monthly PMIs against period averages:

None of this data reflects any major concerns with COVID2019, since no cases have been identified in Ireland in the period covered by data. The impact should be felt in March 2020 figures due at the start of April. So we can look at the above charts as the base for the upcoming COVID2019 impact.

8/3/20: Global Economy's Titanic: Meet Your Iceberg

Here's that iceberg that is drifting toward our economy's Titanic... and no, it ain't a virus, but it is our choice:

Via: @Schuldensuehner

Years of easy credit, easy money. The pile of debt from Baa to lower ratings is the real threat here, for its sustainability is heavily contingent on two highly correlated factors: cost of debt (interest rates) and availability of liquidity. The two factors are closely correlated, but are also somewhat distinct. And both are linked to the state of the global economy.

There are additional problems hidden within A and even Aa rated debt, since these ratings are vulnerable to downgrades, and current Aa rating shifting to Baa or Ba will entail a discrete jump in the cost of debt refinancing and carry.

8/3/20: COVID-19: Global Growth Trends

So far, one thing is clear: we are in an exponential growth (not linear) when it comes to #Covid-19, everywhere, except for Japan...

Here is the full data set through March 7th:

Two observations worth making: ex-China data is exponential. The doubling rate remains at around 4 days since February 24th, prior to that, it was at 6-7 days. Which indicates acceleration in the exponential trend. With China data included, the trend is a bit more complex: we have exponential sub-trends of different steepness, with the first period through February 8th, followed by the step-function (on average still exponential) through February 17th, a linear sub-trend over 18th-24th of February and a new exponential trend since February 25th.

Post-February 25th trend is dominated by global infections, as opposed to China-based infections.

Currently, 17 countries have in excess of 100 confirmed cases:

2/3/20: BRIC Manufacturing PMI: February 2020

A quick post: Manufacturing PMIs are out for the BRIC economies and, unsurprisingly, things are tanking in China and remain seriously under pressure in Russia:

This is the first snapshot of the effects of Coronavirus #COVID19 #CoronaOutbreak on Chinese top-level economic activity figures. The data plotted above is quarter-based averages of the monthly indicator published by Markit. The BRIC quarterly index is computed by me using relative economy size weights for each BRIC economy. In the preceding 3 quarters, BRICs led global manufacturing activity. In 1Q 2020 so far, the BRIC economies as a group have been a drag on global growth.

25/2/2020: No, 2019-nCov did not push forward PE ratios to 2002 levels

Markets are having a conniption these days and coronavirus is all the rage in the news flow.  Here is the 5 days chart for the major indices:

And it sure does look like a massive selloff.

Still, hysteria aside, no one is considering the simple fact: the markets have been so irrationally priced for months now, that even with the earnings being superficially inflated on per share basis by the years of rampant buybacks and non-GAAP artistry, the PE ratios are screaming 'bubble' from any angle you look at them.

Here is the Factset latest 20 years comparative chart for forward PEs:

You really don't need a PhD in Balck Swannery Studies to get the idea: we are trending at the levels last seen in 1H 2002. Every sector, save for energy and healthcare, is now in above 20 year average territory.  Factset folks say it as it is: "One year prior (February 20, 2019), the forward 12-month P/E ratio was 16.2. Over the following 12 months (February 20, 2019 to February 19, 2020), the price of the S&P 500 increased by 21.6%, while the forward 12-month EPS estimate increased by 4.1%. Thus, the increase in the “P” has been the main driver of the increase in the P/E ratio over the past 12 months."

So, about that 'Dow is 5.8% down in just five days' panic: the real Black Swan is that it takes a coronavirus to point to the absurdity of our markets expectations.

23/2/20: Fake Data or Faking Data? Inflation Statistics

As economists and analysts, almost all of us are trying - at one point or another - make sense of the, all too often vast, gap between the reality and the economic statistics. I know, as I am guilty of this myself (here's a recent example: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2020/02/18220-irish-statistics-fake-news-and.html).

An interesting and insightful paper from Oren Cass of the Manhattan Institute dissects the extent of and the reasons for the official inflation statistic failing to capture the reality of the true cost of living changes in the U.S. over recent years (actually, decades) here: https://www.manhattan-institute.org/reevaluating-prosperity-of-american-family). It is a must-read paper for economics students, analysts and policymakers.

His key argument is that: "Economists and families see three things differently:

• Quality Adjustment. Products and services that rise substantially in price but in proportion to measured quality improvements can become unaffordable, while having no effect on inflation.
• Risk-Sharing. New products and services can increase costs for the entire population yet deliver benefits to only a very small share, while having no effect on inflation.
• Social Norms. Society-wide changes in behaviors and expectations can alter the value or necessity of a good or service, while having no effect on inflation."

In other words, over time, official inflation starts to measure something entirely different than the real and comparable across time consumption expenditure. As the result, you can have a paradox of today: low inflation is associated with falling affordability of life. 

An example: "In 1985, ... it would require 30 weeks of the median weekly wage to afford a three-bedroom house at the 40th percentile of a local market’s prices, a family health-insurance premium, a semester of public college, and the operation of a vehicle. By 2018, ... a full-time job was insufficient to afford these items, let alone the others that a household needs."

To address some of the shortcomings of the inflation measures, Cass offers a different metric, called COTI - Cost of Thriving Index - which basically amounts to the number of weeks that a given line of expenditure requires in terms of median income. Or "Weeks of Income Needed to Cover Major Household Expenditures". Two charts below illustrate:

And here is a summary table:

Excluding food, other necessities and looking solely at Housing, Health Insurance, Transport and College Education, the number of weeks of work at an overall median wage required to cover the basics of the necessary expenditure is now in excess of 58.4 weeks. For female workers' median wage, the number is 65.6 weeks. 

Which means that even before you consider other necessities purchases, and before you consider taxes, you are either dipping massively into debt or require a second income to cover these. 

Note: these do not account for income taxes, state taxes, property taxes, dental insurance. These numbers do not cover payments for water, gas, electricity. There is no mandatory car insurance included. No allowances for deductibles coverage savings (e.g. HSAs). No childcare, no children expenditures, no food purchases, and so on.

And even with all these exclusions, median income cannot afford the basics of living in today's America. 

A word from Fed, anyone?