13/7/19: Mapping the declines in jobs creation

Increasing market power concentration, falling entrepreneurship, rising concentration amongst the start ups, unicorns and billions in investment, the markets have been rewarding larger companies at the expense of the smaller and medium enterprises for years. And this has had a problematic impact on human capital and jobs creation.

Here is the data on the levels of employment in medium-large companies over the years, based on the U.S. markets data:

In simple terms, per each dollar of investors' money, today's companies are creating fewer jobs - a trend that was present since at least 2000, and consistent with the onset of the Goldilocks Economy. But the most pronounced collapse in jobs creation from investment has been since 2017. Excluding recessionary periods, in 2002-2006 average annual decline in the number of employees per $1 billion in market valuation was 3.45%. Over 2009-2013 this number rose to 4.73% and in 2014-2019 the rate of decrease averaged 8.05% per annum.

13/7/19: BRICS and G7

As a side note: the BRICS now have a bigger share of the world economy than the Euro area and the U.S. combined:

In 2019, BRICS combined GDP will surpass (using PPP-adjusted GDP) that of G7 economies, and in 2020, based on IMF forecasts, it will exceed the combined share of the world GDP for the US + EU27 economies.

Not a single BRICS economy is currently represented in G7. Dire...

13/7/19: BRICS Current Account Surpluses: Its Russia and China Story

China and Russia dominate BRICS' current account dynamics and this is not about to change.

Both China and Russia have been posting strong current account figures in recent years, and this is not changing with the onset of the Russia sanctions in 2014 and the Trump Trade Wars in 2018. The two economies clearly dominate the emerging markets' current account dynamics in terms of both the sign of the balances (surpluses) and their magnitudes.

The caveat for Russia is that its current account gains are coming in at the time of relative weakness in its exports and net capital outflows:

Meanwhile, per latest data, U.S. trade deficit with China has widened once again as Chinese exports to the U.S. contracted by ca 7.8 percent y/y, while U.S. exports to China fell 31.4 percent. Which means the U.S. trade deficit with china is up 3 percent compared to June 2018.

It is a classic textbook example on how to lose 'bigly' from a trade war.

13/7/19: Russian v European Dependency Ratios: 1950-2100

Doing some numbers crunching on a different project, I just came across this interesting database from the UN showing population projections through 2100. One interesting aspect of this data is the forecasts/projections for the dependency ratio - basically, a number of working age population per 100 people of non-working age.

There are caveats attached to the analysis of this data, including the changes in the duration of the working age (over the years, younger age dependency has moved toward 24 years from 19 years due to extended period spent in education, while for older age dependency, the mark has been moving from 64 years to 69 years as the last year in working age group). These caveats aside, here is a really eye-opening chart:

We consistently hear about the demographic catastrophe that has visited Russia since 1990-1991 collapse of the USSR. We are also constantly hearing the claim that the Russian society is demographically so challenged, it is running out of people. The chart above shows that, actually, that is not exactly true. Russia has been showing pretty decent readings on population dependency ratio compared to its peers ever since the mid-1970s. More so, through 2020, the estimates from the UN suggest that Russia is performing better than its peers in Europe in terms of overall dependency. This is expected to change - to the detriment of the Russian society and economy - in 2030-2040, but thereafter, Russia is expected to once again perform better than overall Europe.

Similar picture arises when one looks at more modern definition of dependency age ranges:

This data suggests that the popular narrative about the relative decline of Russian population dynamics compared to other European states is at least highly imperfect.

13/7/19: Great Recession in Europe and the U.S. Great Depression

In a one-chart summary, why Euro has been a painfully failing experiment in monetary policy:

The above chart shows the comparative in real GDP levels between the Great Depression in the U.S. (1929-1936) and the Great Recession in Greece (starting from 2008 with data through 2018, and then using IMF estimate for 2019 published in April 2019 WEO, and IMF WEO forecasts from 2020 through 2024, data from 2025 on is taken at a linear trend using 2024 growth forecast). In simple terms, the U.S. real GDP reached its pre-Great Depression levels in the 7th year following the onset of the crisis, although some estimates put this to year 10, depending on the base used.  Greek Great Recession is now in year 11, and counting. By the end of 2019, the IMF estimates that the Greek economy will be 22.1 percent below the 2007 levels, and by 2024 (the furthest IMF forecast we have), it is expected to be 16.2 percent below the 2007 levels.

While one can make the point on Greece's 'unique status' as an economy that should never have been in the Euro in the first place, three arguments stand out against this point:

1.  Greece is a member of the Eurozone, and if this membership was attained over all rational arguments against it, this very fact shows that the Euro is a poorly structured monetary arrangement; 
2. As a member of the Eurozone, Greece should have been provided with monetary and fiscal tools for addressing the massive crisis the country experienced. Per chart above, it clearly was not accorded such: and
3. Greece is hardly the only economy in this situation. Italy is patently in the same boat, and as shown in the chart below, nine out of the EA19 states have experienced longer duration of recovery from the Great Recession than the U.S. from the Great Depression.

10/7/19: Financialising Stagnant Growth: From Japanified Economy to Christine Lagarde

Monetary policy since the GFC of 2008 has been characterised by the near-zero (and even negative) policy rates, negative bank rates, negative Government debt yields and rampant asset price inflation. The result has been zombification of the advanced economies.

Here is the latest advanced estimate of the Eurozone real GDP growth based on the CEPR/Banca d'Italia Eurocoin indicator:

Current forecast for 2Q 2019 growth in the Eurozone, based on Eurocoin indicator is for 0.17% q/q expansion. June Eurocoin sits at 0.14%, the lowest since September 2013. The growth rate forecast has now been sub-0.25% (below 1% annual) in five months (through June 2019) and counting. Meanwhile, the link between growth and inflation has been weakening, as shown in the chart below:

Both, from the point of view of view of the current data relative to 1Q 2019 and to 2Q 2018 and to Q1 2018, growth rates are shrinking, per above. The ECB, however, remains stuck in the proverbial hard corner (chart next):

 Five years into zero policy rates, inflation is gradually creeping up (chart above), but growth is nowhere to be seen (chart next):

Worse, tangible fundamentals (captured by the models, like Eurocoin) of economic growth are becoming less and less consistent with actual growth outruns - a feature of the economy that is becoming dependent on things other than real investment and real demand for generating expansion in GDP. Both, the chart above and the chart below, highlight this troubling fact.

All of this suggests that we are in the period in economic development that is fully consistent with the secular stagnation thesis: traditional tools of monetary and fiscal policies are no longer sufficient in generating real economic growth. Instead, these tools help sustain economies overloaded with debt. It is an extend-and-pretend model of economic development: as long as corporates and households can be supported in carrying existent debt loads through monetary accommodation, the economy remains afloat (no recession, nor crisis blowout), but the levels of debt are so prohibitively high that no new debt can be accumulated to generate economic expansion.

The markets know as much. Investors know that zombie loans (loans with no capacity of servicing them should interest rates rise) mean zombie banks. Zombie banks mean zombie new borrowing markets. Zombie new borrowing markets mean zombie real investment by households and companies. Zombie investment means zombie demand. Zombie demand means deflationary supply. Rinse and repeat.

This knowledge in the markets is tangible. It takes a change in investors expectations (as in recent changes in outlook toward the reversal of the monetary tightening in the U.S. and Europe) to reprice assets. No actual value added growth enters the equation. Assets are no longer being priced on their productive capacity. And the markets are now fully finacialised. Which is to say, they are now fully monetary policy-driven.

Enter Christine Lagarde, the new head of the ECB. Lagarde's appointment is hardly an accident or a politically correct nod to women in leadership. It is the only logical choice of the financialised zombie economics of the monetary policy. To re-start borrowing or debt cycle, the EU is hoping for mutualisation of the sovereign debt markets. In other words, it is hoping to leverage the only unencumbered asset the EU still has: surplus countries' bonds. Lagarde's job at the ECB will be to run the creation of the eurobonds, bonds that will proportionally link euro area members' bonds into a single product to be monetised by the ECB as a support for market pricing. There is probably EUR 2-3 trillion worth of the international and monetary demand for these, opening up the room for more borrowing and more fiscal spending.

7/7/19: Employment to Population Rate in the U.S.: General Labor Force vs African Americans

With 'booming' and 'tight' labor markets, the White House is only happy to argue these days that we are in a Golden Era of employment/unemployment for all, including the African Americans. Is this, in fact, the case?

Firstly, I am not too keen on the arguments that any President in office should get the credit for jobs creation. At the very best, Presidential decisions simply support jobs creation by the private sector, and can be instrumental in creating jobs (albeit less in sustaining them) in the public sector. Secondly, jobs are just numbers, unless they are distinguished by their quality - something that is hard to do.

But the White House claims are usually about the aggregate jobs numbers / statistics, as opposed to the more granular analysis. So it might be worth taking them to the test.

One comparable - across different cohorts and time periods, as well as business cycles - metric is that of employment to population ratio. It takes total number in employment and divides it into the total population of working age for a specific group. Here is the chart (data from FRED database with calculations performed by myself):

Across the entire workforce, E-to-P ratio is sitting at 60.6%, statistically indistinguishable from the historical average of 60.64%, and 4.1 percentage points below all time high of 64.7%. For the category 'Black or African American', the E-to-P ratio is currently at 58.2%, which is above 55.13% historical average and is 3.2 percentage points below all time high of 61.4%.

Which means that current reading for African Americans population in terms of employment-to-population ratio is better, relative to their own historical trends than for the overall population. But, the ratio is still lower for African Americans than for the overall population in level terms.

What about the historical positioning of the gap between the overall population E-to-P ratios and that for the African Americans?

The gap between the employment-to-population ratio for the African Americans and that for the overall population is around the lowest levels it has ever been and is well below the historical average.

So, yes, the claims that employment has been relatively strong for both the general population and for the African Americans pans out to be true in at least this metric, which is - as noted above - by far not the only metric that matters.

7/7/19: 2Q 2019 BRIC PMIs: The Bad, The Ugly, and The Uglier Still

BRIC PMIs for June are out and with them we have 2Q 2019 figures. And the story they tell is two-fold:

• Fold 1: There is an ongoing Global-scale slowdown in the economy that is broad, sharp and testing the waters of a mild recession approaching
• Fold 2: The BRICs are barely providing any upside support to the Global momentum.

Take Manufacturing:

This is simply the 'Uglier' side of the ugly. Global Manufacturing PMI hit 49.8 in 2Q 2019 - statistically, zero growth level, nominally - a manufacturing recession ward, albeit a very shallow one. More ominously, we now 6 consecutive quarters into declining growth reading. Now, per BRICS: Brazil at 50.9 (holding somewhat just above the water line, but down from 53.0 in 1Q 2019); Russia is at 50.1 - basically zero growth and down from 51.3 in 1Q 2019; India is at 52.2, down from 53.6 in 1Q 2019, and China is at 49.9, having delivered four quarters of statistically zero growth readings. So BRIC GDP shares-weighted Manufacturing PMI is at 50.6, which means the overall Manufacturing sector is barely staying afloat on the choppy growth seas. In 1Q 2019 the same was 51.0 and the 2q 2019 reading is at the lowest level since 3Q 2016.

Services sector posted Global PMI at 52.1. Which sounds like 'growth, but is hardly impressive. 2Q 2019 was the weakest since 4Q 2016, and marks the fourth quarter of shrinking PMI readings.

BRICs: Why, they are barely staying above the Global trend. Brazil is in a statistical Services recession at 48.6 in 2Q 2019, the worst reading in 3 consecutive quarters; Russia posted Services PMI of 51.4 in 2Q 2019 - seemingly respectable, but the lowest reading since 4Q 2015; China Services PMI is at 53.1, basically unchanged on 53.0 in 1Q 2019 (about the only 'british' spot); and India is at 50.3, the lowest for any quarter since 1Q 2018.

All of which means that the Composite activity index reading is a bit of debacle:

Overall, Global Composite PMI fell to 51.5 in 1Q 2019, the lowest reading since 2Q 2016. Dynamics are also bad: Global Composite PMI has now declined every quarter since its local peak of 54.2 in 1Q 2018. And the BRICs are in the same boat: Brazil Composite is at 49.3, the lowest reading in 3 quarters; Russia Composite at 51.2, the lowest in 13 quarters; India Composite at 51.4 is the slowest growth signal in seven quarters; and China is at 51.4 for the lowest reading in 8 quarters.

Not a pretty sight... 

7/7/19: Investment for growth is at record lows for S&P500

Interesting chart via @DavidSchawel showing changes over time in corporate (S&P500 companies) distribution of earnings:

In simple terms:

1. Much discussed shares buybacks are still the rage: running at 31% of all cash distributions, second highest level after 34% in 2007. On a cumulated basis, and taking into the account already reduced free float in S&P 500 over the years, this is a massive level of buybacks.
2. 'Investment for growth' - as defined - is at 51% - the lowest on record.
3. Meaningful investment for growth (often opportunistic M&As) is at 38%, tied for the lowest with 2007 figure.

S&P 500 firms are clearly not in investment mode. Despite 'Trump incentives' - under the TCJA 2017 tax cuts act - actual capex is running tied to the second lowest levels for 2018 and 2019, at 26% of all cash distributions.

6/7/19: American Pride: Another Divide

A great nation, divided and wanting for change as it may be... But just how divided are Americans? Bloomberg chart on a recent Gallup Poll data is quite telling:

The first thing to note is the demographic divide by age. Less than 50 percent of 18-29 year olds in the survey are 'extremely' or 'very' proud of being American. Less than 2/3rds of those of age 30-49 do as well. For older generations, the same number is 80 percent and higher.

The second is the partisan divide by party affiliation: only 50 percent of those identifying with the Democratic Party are 'extremely' or 'very' proud, against ca 95 percent of the Republicans. The Independents clock in under 65 percent.

Overall, Liberals, Democrats and the young are the flash points of relative disenchantment with the American identity, although the proportions of those who do not identify themselves as proud whatsoever and those identifying as proud 'only a little' is below 1/3rd for all three categories.

The numbers suggest less of a disillusionment problem than the weakening of the sentiment. Which does offer a glimpse of hope: repairing American's perceptions of their identity is not an insurmountable task. The good news, American people do appear to be longing for change and hope. The tougher-to-deal-with news is that we seem to lack leadership candidates to take us there...

3/7/19: Record Recovery: Duration and Perceptions

While last month the ongoing 'recovery' has clocked the longest duration of all recoveries in the U.S. history (see chart 1 below), there is a continued and sustained perception of this recovery as being somehow weak.

And, in fairness, based on real GDP growth during the modern business cycles (next chart), current expansion is hardly impressive:

However, public perceptions should really be more closely following personal disposal income dynamics than the aggregate economic output growth. So here is a chart plotting evolution of the real disposable income per capita through business cycles:

By disposable income metrics, here is what matters:

1. The Great Recession was horrific in terms of duration and depth of declines in personal disposable income.
2. The recovery has been extremely volatile over the first 7 years.
3. It took 22 quarters for personal disposable income to recover to the levels seen in the third quarter of the recovery.

So what matters to the public perception of the recovery in the current cycle is the long-lasting memory of the collapse, laced with the negative perceptions lingering from the early years of the recovery.

To confirm this, look at the average rate of recovery in the real disposable income per quarter of the recovery cycle. The next two charts plot this metric, relative to the (a) full business cycle - from the start of the recession to the end of the recovery (next chart) and (b) recovery cycle alone - from the trough of the recession to the end of the recovery (second chart below):

So looking at the trough-to-peak part of the cycle (the expansion part of the cycle) alone implies we are experiencing the best recovery on modern record. But looking at the start-of-recession-to-end-of-recovery cycle, the current recovery period has been less than spectacular, ranking fourth in strength overall.

Which is, of course, to say that our negative perceptions of the recovery are anchored to our experience of the crisis. We are, after all, behavioral animals, rather than rational agents.

2/7/19: Inverted Yield Curve

Inverting U.S. yield curve is one of the best early indicators of recessions. Or at least it used to be... before all the monetary policy shenanigans of the last 11 years. Regardless, the latest U.S. Treasury yields dynamics are quite disquieting: