30/4/17: The Scariest Chart in the World

The scariest chart in the world this week, indeed this month, comes from the U.S. and plots U.S. real GDP growth with 1Q 2017 print at just 0.7% y/y.

Yes, the print ranks 13th from the bottom for any positive growth quarter since 2Q 1947. And yes, the rate of growth is (a) preliminary (subject to revisions) and (b) seeming one-off (driven by fall-off in consumer demand, despite strong indicators on consumer confidence side). There are reason and heaps of arguments why this print should not be treated as huge concern and that things might improve in 2Q and on.

But... the really scary stuff is longer-term trend in U.S. growth. And that is illustrated in the chart below:

Look at the grey bars: these take periods of expansion in the U.S. economy and average rates of growth over these periods. Notice the patter? Why, yes, the average expansion-consistent rates of growth have fallen, steadily, since 1975 through today. Worse, controlling for volatile growth (average rates) in pre-1975 period, an exponential trend for average expansion-consistent growth rates (the yellow line) is solidly trending down.

The latest period of economic expansion is underperforming even that abysmal trend. And 1Q 2017 is underperforming that worse than abysmal average.

Now, let me highlight that point: yellow line only considers periods of consistent growth (omitting official recessions, and one unofficial recession of  2001). So, no: the depth of the Great Recession has nothing to do with the yellow line direction. If anything, given the depth of the 2008-2009 crisis, the most current grey bar should have been at around 4%, almost double where it sits today.

That is what makes the chart above the scariest chart of April. And will probably make it the scariest chart of May too.

30/4/17: Did Russia Really Cut 2017 Defense Budget by a Quarter?

Headline figures from the Federal Treasury of the Russian Federation show a budgetary cut to the country defense spending of a whooping 25.5% y/y for 2017: from RUB3.8 trillion (USD65.4
billion) to RUB2.8 trillion.

However, the headline figure of 25.5% is misleading, because it is based on a fiscal defense allocation in 2016 that includes the federal funding for defense industry debt reductions.

Let me explain.

Russian defense budget (excluding debt payments) in 2016 was RUB3.07 trillion. Debt payments added ca RUB700-800 billion to that amount. Which means that 2017 defense allocation represents a decline of just 7% on 2016 actual defense spending figure, slightly deeper cut, but still in line with previously budgeted 6% reduction. In other words, relative to October 2016 projections for 2017, latest budgetary proposal is to reduce defense spending by an additional RUB230-240 billion, not by RUB1.06 trillion associated with 25.5% cut figure.

Since the start of 2014 economic crisis, and the associated funding crisis (relating to sanctions against a range of Russian lenders and corporates), Russian defense sector has suffered from sustained debt pressures. In December last year, the Ministry of Finance, made a one-time payment to defense contractors to reduce their commercial debt levels, amounting to between RUB700 and RUB800 billion. The range of numbers that reflects timing of payments and exchange rates used, plus rounding differences.

Multi-annual budgetary framework implies that on top of 7% cut in 2017, defense budget will also face reductions of 3.8% in 2018 and 4.8% in 2019. On top of this, the reductions in 2017-2019, even if implemented (a big if) come on foot of Russian defense spending expansion in 2011-2014 that saw nominal defense spending rising at almost 20% per annum. Even with a 7% cut, 2017 defense spending will still be some 14.4% above 2014 levels (in nominal terms).

Based on the ludicrous mistake of including one-off debt repayment into defense budget figures, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) - a defense spending watchdog - reported that "Russia increased its spending by 5.9 per cent in 2016 to $69.2 billion, making it the third largest spender. Saudi Arabia was the third largest spender in 2015 but dropped to fourth position in 2016. Spending by Saudi Arabia fell by 30 per cent in 2016 to $63.7 billion, despite its continued involvement in regional wars." Even though the same report admits that "late in 2016 actual spending was pushed substantially higher by a decision to make a one-off payment of roughly $11.8 billion in government debt to Russian arms producers. Without this debt repayment, Russia’s military spending would have decreased by 12%".

This, in the nutshell, is the circus that is 'analysis' of Russian data: with actual spending down, and amounting to ca USD57.4 billion, Russia is still behind Saudi Arabia in terms of military expenditures. The one-off payment of debt in the State Owned semi-commercial military suppliers, hardly represents an expenditure that materially increased Russian army, navy of its airforce, in as much as, say Greek debt restructuring did not materially increase country investment or output. But, the narrative of 'Bad Kremlin is beefing up its military to start WW3' is simply too delightful to pass.

Thing is, personally, I am not a fan of either increasing spending on the military (for any country, including Russia) or subsidising debt loads of State (or private) enterprises. However, if we are to bother reporting fiscal spending across specific programmes, debt relief is not equivalent to increased spending on core programmes relating to defense. It's a waste of taxpayers' resources. But it is not a waste that has gone into funding new bombs or howitzers.

28/4/17: Macron v Le Pen: Data Maps

The must-see set of data maps relating to upcoming Macron-Le Pen Presidential election (round 2) in France is available here: https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-french-election-maps/. Their relative positions (slightly changing since round 1) are explained here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2017/04/15417-naughty-and-not-very-nice-french.html.

28/4/17: The VUCA Markets

My regular column with the Cayman Financial Review covering the current development of the risk-uncertainty frameworks in the markets is now available here: http://www.caymanfinancialreview.com/2017/04/26/welcome-to-the-vuca-world/.

28/4/17: Euromoney on Italian Risks

Euromoney article on the continued evolution of the Italian crisis: http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3712913/Country-risk-Italy-is-the-volcano-waiting-to-erupt.html, quoting - amongst others - myself.

28/4/17: Trump Tax Plan: Impact on Ireland

My (quick) take on the potential impact of the U.S. corporate tax reforms for Ireland: https://www.thesun.ie/news/917087/ireland-could-benefit-from-donald-trumps-cuts-to-us-tax-rates-according-to-a-top-economist/. Hint: don't panic.

28/4/17: Russian Economy Update, Part 4: Aggregate Investment

The following is a transcript of my recent briefing on the Russian economy. 

This part (Part 4) covers outlook  for aggregate investment over 2017-2019. Part 1 covered general growth outlook (link here), part 2 covered two sectors of interest (link here) and part 3 concerned with monetary policy and the ruble (link here).

From the point of Russian economic growth, investment has been the weakest part of the overall ex-oil price dynamics in recent years.

Rosstat most recent data suggests that the recovery in seasonally adjusted total fixed investment continued in 1Q 2017, with positive growth in the aggregate now likely for the 2Q 2017:

• 4Q16 investment was down about 1% from 2015
• Total investment rose from 22.12% of GDP in 2015 to 25.63% in 2016, and is expected to moderate to 22.23% in 2017, before stabilsing around 22.9% in 2018-2019
• The investment dynamics are, therefore, still weak going forward for a major recovery to take hold
• However, 2017-2019 investment projections imply greater rate of investment in the economy compared to 2010-2014 average
• However, last year fixed investment was down by 11% from 2014
• This is primarily down to Rosstat revision of figures that deepened the drop in investment in 2015
• About a quarter of total aggregate investment in Russia comes from small firms and the grey economy
• Rosstat data suggests that such investment was roughly unchanged in 2016 compared to 2015
• Other fixed investments, which are mostly investments of large and mid-sized companies, shrank by about 1% in 2016
• This compounds the steep drops recorded in the previous three years (down 10% in 2015 alone), so the level of investment last year remained below that of the 2009 recession
• Investments of large and mid-sized companies within oil & gas production sector rose robustly in 2016
• This marked the third consecutive year of growth in the sector
• Much of the increases was driven by LNG sub-sector investments which is associated (at current energy prices) with lower profit margins 
• On the positive side, investments in LNG facilities helps diversify customer base for Russian gas exporters - a much-needed move, given the tightening of the energy markets in Europe
• In contrast to LNG sub-sector, investment in oil refining continued to shrink, sharply, in 2016 for the second year in a row, 
• Other manufacturing investment also recorded continued sharp declines
• The same happened in the electricity sector
• In contrast, following two years of contraction, investment in machinery and equipment stabilised for the mid- and large-sized corporates
• Construction sector activity was down 4% y/y in 2016, marking third consecutive year of declines
• Exacerbating declines in 2015, commercial and industrial buildings completions fell again in 2016
• Apartments completions also fell y/y marking the first drop in housing completions since 2010

As the chart above illustrates:

• The forecast if for 2017-2019 improvements in investment contribution to growth, with trend forecast to be above 2010-2014 average
• However, historically over 2000-2016 period, investment has relatively weak/zero correlation (0.054) with overall real GDP growth, while investment relative contribution to growth (instrumented via investment/growth ratio) has negative correlation with growth even when we consider only periods of positive growth
• This implies the need for structural rebalancing of investment toward supporting longer-term growth objectives in the economy, away from extraction sectors and building & construction

Going forward:

• Russia's industrial / manufacturing production capacity is nearing full utilisation 
• The economy is running close to full employment
• Leading confidence indicators of business confidence are firming up
• Corporate deleveraging has been pronounced and continues
• Corporate profitability has improved 
• Nonetheless, demand for corporate credit remains weak, primarily due to high cost of credit 
• Most recent CBR signal is for loosening of monetary policy in 2017, with current rates expected to drop to 8.25-8.5 range by the end of 2017, down from 10% at the start of the year
• Irrespective of the levels of interest rates, however, investment demand will continue to be subdued on foot of remaining weaknesses in structural growth and lack of reforms to improve business environment and institutions

Taken together, these factors imply that the recovery in fixed investment over 2017-2019 period is likely to be very slow, with investment recovery to pre-2015 levels only toward the end of forecast period.

Thematically, there is a significant investment gap remaining across a range of sectors with strong returns potential, including:

• Food production, processing and associated SCM;
• Transportation and logistics
• Industrial machinery and equipment, especially in the areas of new technologies, including robotics
• Chemicals
• Pharmaceuticals and health technologies

28/4/17: Russia Cuts Headline Rate by 50bps

Bigger than forecast move by the Russian Central Bank to cut rates (down 50bps against consensus - and my own - forecast of 25bps cut) signals the CBR's comfort with inflationary expectations forward.

As noted in my regular advisory call on the Russian economy earlier this week (transcript here), inflation fell substantial in 1Q 2017, with current FY 2017 forecast sitting at around 4.3 percent. In line with this, CBR started cutting rates at the end of March, moving from 10% to 9.75% for its benchmark one-week auction rate. Today, the CBR lowered the rate to 9.25%.

According to CBR: "“Inflation is moving towards the target, inflation expectations are still declining and economic activity is recovering. Given the moderately tight monetary policy, the 4 percent inflation target will be achieved before the end of 2017 and will be maintained close to this level in 2018-2019.”

Median Bloomberg estimate is for the rate to fall to 8.5% by the end of the year. As I noted in the call: "I expect ...year-end (2017) rate target of around 8.25-8.5% if inflation remains on the path toward 4.3% annual rate, or 8.75-9% range if inflation stays around 4.6% annual rate".

The latest move helps the cause of the Federal budget (championed by the Economic Ministry) that needs to see ruble lose some of its attractiveness as a carry trade currency. In recent months, ruble has been the third best performing currency in the world, resulting in investors willing to borrow in foreign currencies to invest in rubles denominated assets. The net effect of this on the Russian economy is improving demand for imports and deteriorating budget dynamics (as Russian budget operates ruble-based expenditure, funded to a large extent by dollar and other forex revenues from exports of primary materials).

Nabiulina's move today, however, should not be interpreted as the CBR surrender to the Economic Ministry agenda of lowering ruble value. Instead, the rate cut is clearly in line with inflation targeting and also in line with previously stated CBR concerns about investment environment in Russia. Russian aggregate investment has been extremely weak in recent years, and economic recovery needs to involve a dramatic reversal of investment volumes to the upside, especially in areas of technology, R&D, and product and processes innovation. High interest rates tend to significantly reduce investment by making capital expenditure more expensive to fund.

27/4/17: Russian Economy Update, Part 3: Ruble and CBR Rates

The following is a transcript of my recent briefing on the Russian economy. 

This part (Part 3) covers outlook  for ruble and monetary policy for Russia over 2017-2019. Part 1 covered general growth outlook (link here) and part 2 covered two sectors of interest (link here).

Outlook for the ruble and CB rates

The ruble has appreciated this year about 6.6% against the US dollar, from 61.15 at the start of 2017 to just above 57.10 so far, and 3% against the euro from 64.0 to 62.06, compared to the start of 2016, ruble is up on the dollar ca 21.3% and on the euro some 22.4%

• The ruble has been supported by the strengthening in the trade surplus in late 2016 into early 2017, and by improved foreign investment inflows
• The ruble has been on an upward trend after hitting the bottom at the start of 2016
• However, rate of appreciation has fallen in recent months, while volatility has risen
• March real effective (trade-weighted) exchange rate (RER) was up nearly 30% y/y, as reported by BOFIT (see chart below)
• As noted by some researchers (e.g. BOFIT), “in Russia, exchange rate shifts tend to pass through relatively quickly and strongly to consumer prices, so ruble strengthening tends to curb inflation” which, in turn, increases private and fiscal purchasing power
• Another effect of the ruble appreciation is that it lowers government ruble-denominated tax revenue through direct link between energy exporting taxes (oil and gas) and oil prices, which are denominated in dollars 

For domestic businesses, a stronger ruble:

• Reduces their price competitiveness with respect to imports, but also 
• Lowers the cost of imported capital, technology and intermediates
• Majority of Russian manufacturers are relatively highly dependent on such imports and have very limited non-ruble exports

• Stronger ruble has very limited effect on the volume of Russian exports, primarily due to heavy bias in exports in favour of dollar-denominated energy and other primary materials
• Ruble appreciation reduces the costs of foreign debt service for firms (a positive for larger firms and banks) and can lead, over time, to lower borrowing costs within Russian credit markets (a positive for all firms)

In line with the export-import effects discussed above:

• Volume of Russian exports grew by over 2 % last year (primarily driven by oil and gas prices recovery and continued elevated volumes of Russian production of primary materials), plus by another (second consecutive) year of grain harvests 
• In 2017, export growth should slow as both harvest and energy prices effects dissipate
• Volume of exports of goods and services fell 1.87% in 2014, 0.41% in 2015 and 0.68% in 2016. Current forecasts suggest that the volume of exports will rise 4.5-4.6% in 2017
• Volume of imports was much harder hit by the crisis
• Volume of imports of goods and services fell 7.6% in 2014, followed by 25.0 drop in 2015 and 4.0% decline in 2016
• Current forecasts suggest strong, but only partial recovery in demand for imports, with volumes expected to rise 7.0-7.2% in 2017
• Key driver for imports growth will be the recovery in aggregate demand, plus appreciation of the ruble
• Key downward pressure on imports will continue to come (as in 2016) from trade sanctions and from ongoing reforms of public and SOEs procurement rules and systems (more on this later)
• Russia’s current account surplus contracted last year to less than 2% of GDP, printing at USD 22.2 billion, down from USD69 billion in 2015
• 2017 projections of the current account surplus range widely, although no analyst / forecaster projects a negative print, despite expected increase in imports
• IMF’s most current (April 2017) projection is for 2017 CA surplus of USD51.5 billion
• This level of CA surpluses would stand above the 2014-2016 average (USD 49.6 billion), but below 2010-2013 average (USD67.4 billion) and lower than 2000-2007 average (USD 55.7 billion)
• If IMF projection comes through, CA surplus will be supportive of significantly tighter fiscal deficit than currently projected by Moscow
• As a percentage of GDP, CA surplus is expected to come in at 3.30% in 2017, slightly above 2014-2016 average of 3.19% and slightly below the 2010-2013 average of 3.42% of GDP

Inflation

• With Russian inflation falling and current account surplus strengthening, 2017 will witness further pressures on the ruble to appreciate vis-à-vis the dollar and the euro
• Russia’s annual inflation fell below 5% in 1Q 2017
• The CB of Russia has kept a relatively tight monetary stance, holding the key rate at nearly 10% through most of 1Q, as consistent with the CBR strict targeting of the inflation rate (4% inflation target set by the end of 2017)
• CBR dropped rate to 9.75% at the end of March, noting a faster-than-expected drop in inflation and a slight decline in inflation expectations 
• Inflation fell from 4.6% in February to 4.5% in March and 4.1% as of mid-April
• 12-month forecast now at 4.3%
• CBR governor Nabiullina said the central bank does not share the finance ministry's view of a overvalued ruble, which is consistent with her projecting continued cautious stance on inflation
• Finance Minister, Anton Siluanov, recently stated that the ruble is overvalued by 10–12%
• Consistent with this, I expect a 25 bps cut at April 28th meeting of CBR Council and year-end (2017) rate target of around 8.25-8.5% if inflation remains on the path toward 4.3% annual rate, or 8.75-9% range if inflation stays around 4.6% annual rate

27/4/17: Russian Economy Update, Part 2: Two Key Sectors

Two key sectors to watch

Now, looking at some sectors across the Russian economy

Manufacturing:

• In 2015, total volume of manufacturing output dropped 5.4% and in 2016 it was basically unchanged on foot of robust growth in the chemical sector (+5.6% growth) and food sector (ca 2% growth)
• Other positive growth sectors were Pulp & Paper and Rubber & plastics, Wood products and Machinery and Equipment. The latter sector has been in a free-fall since 2012
• Negative growth continued in Transport vehicles (negative growth since 2014), Metals and products (also in decline since 2014)
• Production of oil products fell, ending years of growth starting even before 2007
• Construction materials experienced their second year of declining output
• Electrical machinery & equipment continued to contract for the fourth year in a row

• Corporate Leverage:
• Overall, economy continued to deleverage out of debt, especially external debt. CBR data shows that by the end of 2016, private sector external debt stood at USD470 billion, of which more than ¾ was held by non-financial corporates and ¼ held by the banks.
• The external debt/GDP ratio was stable and benign at 36%
• Corporate debt is largely - 80% - non-ruble denominated, while the same number for the banks was around 87%
• Corporate deleveraging slowed down substantially in 2016 as debt rollovers fell and debt renegotiations/restructurings declined
• Changes in ruble valuations had positive effect on debt burden in the oil and gas sector (forex earnings) and negative effect on debt burden in domestic producers
• If in 2014-2015, companies used receipts of funds from parent holding enterprises to roll over maturing debt, in 2016 these funds were increasingly used to pay down debt. In effect this means that the first part of the deleveraging cycle has swapped external debt for internal debt, while current phase of the cycle is witnessing overall debt levels reductions.

Banking sector:

• In contrast to 2014-2015, the ruble valuations acted largely to reduce debt burdens in the banks, as ruble appreciation in 2016 supported the forex valuation of the foreign debt 
• Banks deleveraging continued in 2016, at a pace that is roughly ½ the rate of 2015 and 2014 
• Data from the CBR show total banking sector assets fell last year by 3.5% in nominal terms
• Controlling for FX effects (ruble appreciation), total assets were up ca 2% at the end of 2016, compared to the end of 2015
• Stock of loans outstanding to the corporate sector was down roughly 4%, while stock of loans to households rose by more than 1%
• However, overall household credit contracted 7% in 2015, making 2016 recovery weak 
• Non-performing loans (NPLs) are declining as a share of the assets base, with decline accelerating in recent months
• NPL ratio for corporate loans still exceeded 6%
• Household credit NPL ratio was about 8%
• Aggregate banking sector 2016 profits rose five-fold to $15 billion y/y
• Three large SOE banks (Sberbank, VTB and Gazprombank) accounted for over half of the banking sector profits
• The CBR has continued to weed-out poorly run and non-performing banks using tools ranging from full shut down to forced mergers 
• At the start of 2017 there were 623 active credit institutions in Russia, of which 205 institutions had general banking licenses
• At the same time in 2016 there were 733 active credit institutions

26/4/17: Russian Economy Update, Part 1: Growth Outlook

The following is a transcript of my recent briefing on the Russian economy. This part (Part 1) covers general economic outlook for Russia over 2017-2019. 

Growth outlook and recovery analysis

Russia's Composite PMI = 56.7 in 1Q 2017, the strongest growth performance since 4Q 2006

• In both Manufacturing and Services sectors, Russian economy has outperformed in 1Q 2017 global economic growth momentum

• Russia is currently the strongest BRIC economy for the fourth consecutive quarter

• Russian Manufacturing PMIs averaged 53.2 in 1Q 2017, unchanged on 4Q 2016 and up on 49.1 average for 1Q 2016  

• 3rd consecutive quarterly PMI reading for Manufacturing that sits above 50.0 marker

• Russia Services PMI for 1Q 2017 came in at a blistering pace of 56.8, up on already significant growth in 4Q 2016 at 54.6 and significantly above 1Q 2016 reading of 50

• All in, this was the fourth consecutive quarter of Services PMIs above 50.0

• Energy and commodities prices

• Lack of structural reforms within Russia

• Key support was higher output in natural gas and the broader extractive sector (+ more than 1% y/y in 1Q 2017)

• Seasonally adjusted manufacturing output recovered in March, but still down almost 1 % y/y.

• Growth will be led by private domestic demand which also stimulates imports; and

• Firmer oil prices.

• The latest forecasts of the CBR and Econ Ministry expect GDP increasing by 1–2% pa over 2017–2020

• The forecasts assume the annual price of Urals crude to average USD40–50 a barrel

• Key drivers for growth assumed to be household consumption and fixed investment (both expected to rise 2–3 % pa)

• In contrast, imports are expected to outpace in growth terms exports, with current account surplus falling, although remaining in the ‘black’ at USD6-8 billion range

• The financial account deficit (excluding currency reserves) is expected to be within the range of USD6–10 billion annually

• GDP growth will be expected to fall to around 1% if Urals price falls to USD35 a barrel and zero growth will kick in at the USD25 per barrel. This astonishingly low level for zero growth oil price is a testament to aggressive deleveraging of fiscal and private sector balancesheets during the 2014-2016 recession

• Approaching presidential elections of 2018 may put pressures on Moscow to increase public spending. While this would be running contrary to current budgetary plans, it will provide a short run boost to growth. However, such a boost would come at the expense of reducing Russian fiscal policy resilience in the longer term

• Continued tensions in Syria can spillover into a [limited] conflict involving Russia and either Turkey or the U.S.-led coalition or even the U.S. forces. Such an event would trigger massive spike in geopolitical uncertainties and will undoubtedly severely disrupt markets and investment flows, as well as global trade flows

• Emerging tensions (with growing Russian involvement) around North Korea, where Russian traditional role of being a distant secondary guarantor to China is gradually moving up the scale, just as China appears to be more accommodative of he Western demands

• Currently stable, but nonetheless risky and ambiguous outlook in Eastern Ukraine, with continued risk spillovers (albeit much more subdued) to Easter European politics

• Still evolving (and for now benign) re-alignment of powers in Central Asia that can spiral out of control 

• Emerging and occasionally visible (albeit relatively benign) policy confrontations with Belarus

• Potential for re-igniting of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

• Internal protests focusing on lack of meaningful anti-corruption reforms, especially set against the backdrop of continued, but abating, internal power struggles, involving some close past allies of the Kremlin – struggles that occasionally involve accusations of corruption and graft

• Internal issues relating to human rights abuses, especially and most recently, highly visible and robust accusations of suppression of LGBT minorities in Chechnya

Another factor is import recovery: 

• Imports recovery can run stronger than forecast, hitting largely modest in scale, although rather successful in the short run in some sectors, policies aimed at import substitution

• This stability suits both the West and Russia, where the sanctions are supporting domestic producer

• Given these dynamics, there is no pressure for Russia to abandon its current trade sanctions stance, despite the public statements by the Government to the contrary

• This is exemplified by the lack of changes in trade relations with Turkey post-normalisation of relations, and especially by March 2017 changes to Turkish tariffs on Russian exports of grains (corn and wheat)

• In mid-March this year, Turkey imposed 130% import tariff on imports of certain food items from Russia, including wheat and corn imports

• Although Turkey is one of the largest export markets for wheat and corn for Russian producers (Russian exports last year valued at roughly USD550 million), Russia did not attempt to trade food tariffs for its own import bans on Turkish products, including fruit and vegetables

• A year-old ban is beneficial to both Turkey and Russia from geopolitical perspective, even though it fuels higher inflation in Russia so much so that instead of relaxing its own prohibitions, Russia expanded the imports ban for Turkish goods to a wider range of plant materials

Overall, in the long run, achieving faster sustainable and resilient growth will require deeper structural reforms. These include: improving the business environment and institutional structures, accelerating modernization of the capital base and adoption of new technologies, raising R&D and technological capital investments, accelerating modernization of management systems, and significantly reducing the state share of the economy, including the extent of the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) dominance across a range of sectors

• Implementation of such reforms will support private investment and raise productivity growth rates for both TFP and labour productivity

• Structural reforms would also reduce economy’s dependence on extraction industries and, if targeted toward processing sectors, can significantly improve value added component of these sectors, helping to de-link economic growth from energy prices and commodities prices in general

• While the Economic Ministry is now tasked with drafting a set of economic policy reforms to cover the period through 2035, to-date, we have no indications which reforms are being considered. We are unlikely to see any official drafts prior to the onset of the 2018 Presidential election campaigns, and the impact of any such reforms is unlikely to materialise before 2020.

Despite some robust numbers, the economy remains relatively exposed to the downside risks, including

Somewhat deflating the leading indicators, Rosstat reported that seasonally and workday-adjusted industrial output recovered in March on a relatively weaker February

After a two years-long recession, real GDP growth should be + 1.3-1.6% this year (mid-point 1.4-1.5%)

Continued sluggish performance in 2017-2019 is due to the economy already running near full capacity and lacking deeper structural reforms to boost long term growth potential. Thus, my expectation is for real GDP growth to remain around 1.4-1.5% mark over 2017-2019

Risks:

Biggest short-term risk (upside and downside): the price of oil

A second risk factor involves geopolitical and political triggers that could hit Russian growth outlook hard, either directly or indirectly via increased political instability and adverse investors’ and entrepreneurs’ perceptions

Relating to both, imports substitution drive and the issue of geopolitical risks, the current sanctions regime (for both Russian sanctions vis-a-vis Western producers and Western sanctions vis-a-vis Russian economy) appears to be stable

Stay tuned for more transcripts

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25/4/17: Couple of Things We Glimpsed from KW Europe 'Deal'

Yesterday, an interesting bit of newsflow came in from Irish markets-related Kennedy Wilson Europe operations: http://www.independent.ie/business/commercial-property/1bn-worth-of-irish-property-assets-in-kennedy-wilson-discounted-takeover-deal-35650134.html. Setting aside the details of the merger between Kennedy Wilson Inc (U.S. based parent) and Kennedy Wilson Europe (UK and Ireland-based subsidiary), the news have several important disclosures relating to the Irish property markets, Nama and the Irish economy.

Consider the following: 

"Kennedy Wilson Europe Real Estate, which is tax resident in Jersey, pays 25pc tax on taxable profits generated in its Spanish subsidiaries, and it pays income tax at 20pc on rental income derived from its UK investment properties. But the qualifying investor alternative investment funds (QIAIFs) it uses in Ireland to hold its assets were until this year entirely exempt from any Irish taxation on income and gains. The group's total tax bill last year was £7.3m (€8.6m) on profits of £73.3m."

Which implies:

• Kennedy Wilson's Europe operations are running an effective tax rate of 10 percent. Not 12.5 percent, nor higher. Which shows the extent to which Irish operations tax exempt status drives the overall European tax exposures.
• Kennedy Wilson's merger across the borders is, it appears, at least in part motivated by changes in the QIAIF regime, imposing new "20pc withholding tax on distributions from Irish property funds to overseas investors".  Bringing the, now more heavily taxed, subsidiary under the KW wing most likely create more efficient tax structure, making Irish taxes paid offsettable against global (U.S. parent) income, without the need to formally remit profits from Europe. Beyond that, the merger will facilitate avoidance of dual taxation (of dividends). Finally, running within a single company entity, KW operations in Europe will also be likely to avail of more tax efficient arrangements relating to transfer pricing.

Another bit worth focusing on: "Kennedy Wilson Europe pointed out in its recently-published annual report that in 2014 it acquired a €202.3m Irish loan book for €75.5m". Yes, that's right, the discount on Irish properties purchased by the KWE was in the range of 62.7 percent, almost double the 33.5 percent average haircut on loans purchased by Nama. Assuming EUR 202.3 million number refers to par value of the assets, this implies that Nama has foregone around EUR59 million, if average discount/haircut was used by Nama in buying these assets in the first place. Look no further than the KW own statement: ""The enterprise will benefit from greater scale and improved liquidity, which will enhance our ability to generate attractive risk-adjusted returns for our shareholders. The merger significantly improves our recurring cash flow profile". The improved cash flow profile is, most likely, at least in part will be attributable tot ax structure changes for the merged entity.

Which is exactly how vulture funds' arithmetic works: pay EUR1.00 to buy an asset that Nama purchased for EUR2.68, which was on the banks' books at EUR 3.58. The asset devalued (on average) to EUR1.43-1.79 in the market at the crisis peak, and the fund is in-the-money on this investment from day one to the tune of at least 43 percent. Without a single brick moved or a single can of paint spent...

Of course, there are other reasons for the deal, including steep discounts on asset valuations in the REITs markets for UK properties, but the potential tax gains are hard to ignore too. Whatever the nature of the deal synergies, one thing is clear - vulture-styled investments work magic for deep pockets investment funds, while traditional small scale investors are forced to absorb losses.