8/12/15: Commodities Rot Runs Ahead

Commodities rot continues unabated, as Bloomberg Commodities Index fell to its lowest reading since June 1999:

Source: @Schuldensuehner

Which, of course prompted another repricing of the commodities-linked currencies:

 Source: @Schuldensuehner

As I noted few days ago (post here) for the Russian Ruble, there is some room to the downside from here on.

Here is an interesting discussion of the historical trend/cycles in commodities busts via Carmen Reinhart: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/commodity-price-decline-will-continue-by-carmen-reinhart-2015-11. And long-view chart of same:

Trend-wise, that is 160 years of deflation...

7/12/15: A new study on psychology of crisis response & the role of the media

This is a new study developed by an excellent young Irish psychologist - Seamus Power - at the University of Chicago. 

All Irish people, over the age of 18, are eligible to take part in this survey and all walks of life, ages, demographics etc are really needed. The survey should take under 15 minutes to complete.

Seamus is interested in your responses to a range of questions and your reactions to a randomly assigned media article covering the topics relating to policy responses to the recent crisis.

I can't really stress enough how important this topic is for Ireland and for social sciences, so please, take a few minutes to complete it. We need data-based evidence and Seamus will be sharing his findings with all of us.

Study link here: http://ssd.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bKESEHr6IXjkXGt .

7/12/15: CX Future of Work Summit: Dublin

Another excellent video from the CXC Corporate's "Future of Work" summit on the Gig Economy: https://vimeo.com/148042205.

You can see more on the event, including my slides here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/11/111115-gig-economy-challenge.html

7/12/15: Of Monetary Activism and Growth: CB Balancesheets vs Economies Balancesheets

There is much talk around two matters relating to the monetary policy expectations:

1. The 'normalisation' course allegedly pursued by the Fed (rates rises); and
2. The justification for (1) by references to the monetary policy-repaired economy, made wholesome once again thanks to the Central Banks' activism (see recent Janet Yellen speech on the subject here)

Except, of course, the second point is... err... questionable. For all the estimates of percentage points of growth uplifts and unemployment reductions delivered by the Fed-linked economics analysts, there are two simple facts stubbornly persisting out there:

Fact 1: U.S. (and European, and Japanese, and global) growth since the end of the Great Recession has been much slower than historical records for recoveries suggest; and

Fact 2: Fact 1 comes on foot of a historically unprecedented monetary expansions, that are, by far, not over yet.

Here are two charts on the second fact:

Now, observe: as of today, Big 4 CB balancesheets expanded almost 4-fold. By the end of 2017 (per BAML), projected balancesheets are expected to rise even further, by more than 4.5-fold. Both BOJ and ECB will be leading this latter stage of monetary easing - the two economies that are by far fairing the worst throughout the crisis, despite the fact that whilst the ECB adopted a more conservative stand in the earlier stages of the crisis, BOJ raced ahead of everyone else with Abenomics arrival.

In other words, since 2012 through 2015, CB balancesheets grew by more than 50 percent. Meanwhile, what happened to growth rates and growth expectations?

Which, sort of, suggests that all this 'normalisation' of growth under the monetary policies activism is... well... imaginary?..

7/12/15: Another "Nothing to See Here" Chart for M&As

I have written over the recent months about the over-heating present in the global (and especially N. American) M&A markets (see posts here,  here and here) so it is only reasonable from continuity perspective to post some more data on the subject. Here it is :

Source: @Jim_Edwards

Looking at the volumes of M&A deals since around the start of 2Q 2014 through today, one cannot escape a simple conclusion: absent organic growth in revenues, and with shares buy-backs now being discounted in the markets (belatedly awakening to the reality of unsustainable valuations in the equity markets), current levels of M&A (over at least 18-21 months period) are simply, certifiably, clearly bonkers.

5/12/15: Ruble converging to Urals... at last

After some strengthening in the second half of November, Russian Ruble continues to re-align with oil prices:

With current levels of Urals-Brent spread, Ruble has room to the downside still, at about 2-3 percent, taking it into 69.8-69.9 range. Which means the CBR has some room for raising foreign exchange reserves, but not much room...

3/12/15: Heard of Number26, yet?..

An interesting 'break-in' into Irish banking market via Number26 which uses:

• Fintech platform; and
• German license

to break the Central Bank of Ireland-led freeze on new entrants into the banking market here.

Details are here: http://techcrunch.com/2015/12/02/number26-launches-its-bank-of-the-future-in-6-new-countries/. Surprisingly low margin operation based on fees from transactions, rather than on direct customer charges. Presumably, accounts are insured by German system and are free from the Irish Government indirect tax extraction schemes, such as card duties etc... One, of course, will have to be compliant on Irish DIRT.

Of course, Fintech offers plenty of disruption potential in the sector that is inhabited by technology dinosaurs. Still, for all its promise, Fintech is yet to:

1. Achieve a significant breakthrough into traditional banking and insurance services (beyond aggregators and price optimising platforms) and
2. Deliver a viable (financially) margins model.

These two points mean that to achieve scale, Fintech offers today need deep pockets and customer bases of more traditional services providers, as I describe during this discussion: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/10/161015-financegoogle-2015.html.

3/12/15: Of Debt, Central Banks and History Repeats

Couple of facts via Goldman Sachs' recent research note:

1. Since the start of 2008, U.S. corporate debt has doubled and the interest burden rose 40 percent. Even as a share of EBITDA, debt servicing costs are up 30 percent, so U.S. corporations’ ability to service debt has declined despite the average interest rate paid by the U.S. corporate currently stands at around 4 percent, as opposed to 6 percent in 2008.
2. Much of this debt mountain has gone not to productive activities, but into shares buybacks and M&As. Per Goldman’s note: “…the changing nature of corporate balance sheets does raise the question, again, about the lack of organic growth and reinvestment post the crisis.”

And the net conclusion? “…the spectre of rising rates, potential global disinflation, declining operating profits and wider credit spreads continues to create near-term consternation for weak balance sheet stocks.”

Source: Business Insider

Oh dear… paging the Fed…

• Meanwhile, per IMF September 2015 Fiscal Monitor, Emerging Markets’ corporate debt rose from USD4 trillion in 2004 to USD18 trillion in 2014. Much of this debt is directly or indirectly linked to the U.S. dollar and, thus, Fed policy.

Oh dear… paging the Fed again…

And just in case you think these risks don’t matter, a quick reminder of what Jaime Caruana, head of the Bank for International Settlements, said back in July 2014 (emphasis mine):

• "Markets seem to be considering only a very narrow spectrum of potential outcomes. They have become convinced that monetary conditions will remain easy for a very long time, and may be taking more assurance than central banks wish to give… If we were concerned by excessive leverage in 2007, we cannot be more relaxed today… It may be the case that the debt is better distributed because some highly-indebted countries have deleveraged, like the private sector in the US or Spain, and banks are better capitalized. But there is also now more sensitivity to interest rate movements."

All of which translates, in his own words into

• "Overall, it is hard to avoid the sense of a puzzling disconnect between the markets’ buoyancy and underlying economic developments globally."

And as per current QE policies?

• "There is something strange about fighting debt by incentivizing more debt."

Which, of course, is the entire point of all QE and, thus, brings us to yet another ‘paging Fed moment’:

• "Policy does not lean against the booms but eases aggressively and persistently during busts. This induces a downward bias in interest rates and an upward bias in debt levels, which in turn makes it hard to raise rates without damaging the economy – a debt trap. …Systemic financial crises do not become less frequent or intense, private and public debts continue to grow, the economy fails to climb onto a stronger sustainable path, and monetary and fiscal policies run out of ammunition. Over time, policies lose their effectiveness and may end up fostering the very conditions they seek to prevent."

Now, take a look at the lengths to which ECB has played the Russian roulette with monetary policy so far: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/12/31215-85-v-52-of-duration-of-risk.html

3/12/15: 85 v 52: Of Duration of Risk Mispricing

One of the causes of the most recent crisis in the euro area is frequently linked to the superficially low interest rates set by the ECB during the period of 2002-2006. Taking historical average rates, the actual period of significant interest rates deviation from the ‘normal’ was between 38 and 52 months, depending on how you measure it.

Since then, of course we’ve learned the lessons… so the current period of ECB rates below their pre-crisis historical average (using 1/2 standard deviation around the mean to control for significance) is… err… 85 months and counting. Oh, and by magnitude, the current deviation is much much worse than the one that caused pre-crisis mispricing of financial assets and risks.

Just check the following chart, updated to today’s ECB call…

Eye popping, no?.. say 52 months to blow the bubble up… 85 months to… 

3/12/15: Irish Services & Manufacturing PMIs: November 2015

Markit released Irish PMIs for November. Here are the highlights:

Services Sector PMI for Ireland stood at 63.6 in November - a significant uplift on October 60.1 reading and the highest reading since September 2006. 3mo average through August 2015 stands at 62.9 while 3mo average through November 2015 is at 62.0. Irish Services sector activity has now been running PMIs above 60.0 (signalling an exceptionally high levels of growth) every month since February 2014. Which, basically, makes these numbers either unbelievable or reflective of heavy biases toward MNCs-led activities in the survey. Not that Markit seems to be concerned and certainly not its paying partners in releasing the survey - Investec.

Manufacturing Sector PMI for Ireland moderated marginally to 53.3 in November from 53.6 in October, pushing 3 mo average through November to 53.6 which is somewhat lower than 55.0 recorded over 3 months through August 2015 and 56.2 3mo average through November 2014.

As the chart below shows, Services and Manufacturing PMIs have both continued to signal strong growth in the economy, albeit the trends in two series have now diverged, starting around February 2015 when Manufacturing PMI trend turned toward toward signalling shallower rates of growth, while Services PMI trend turned more volatile and onto a relatively moderate upward path.

3/12/15: Ifo's Sinn on Draghi's Monetary Acrobatics

Ifo hans Werner Sinn on ECB decision:

Predictable, and entertaining as ever... My view is expressed here and a more in-depth view of the monetary activism effectiveness will be coming soon in my Cayman Financial Review column. Hint: not much of evidence it has been working anywhere... 

3/12/15: BRIC Composite PMIs: November

In two previous posts, I have covered November BRIC PMI (released by Markit):

• For Manufacturing Sector and
• For Services Sector.

Summary table of both here:

Now, consider Composite PMI readings:

Russian Composite PMI came in at 50.5 in November, which marks an improvement on 49.0 reading in October. Per Markit: “…the composite index for Russia returned to expansionary territory in November. At 50.5, up from 49.0, the latest reading was led by the manufacturing sector, which registered its strongest rate of growth in one year.” Composite employment activity contracted. Overall, the pattern since May 2015 has been for a one month of above 50 reading followed by a month of sub-50 reading. Thus, 3mo average through November is now at 50.2, while 3mo average through August is at 49.8. Both compare favourably to the 3mo average through November 2014 which stands at 49.2, but both 3mo averages are weak. In simple terms, Russian economy is bouncing along the bottom of the sub-cycle with no catalyst to the upside.

China Composite PMI came in at 50.5 in November, breaking three consecutive months of sub-50 readings, but posting, nonetheless an extremely weak expansionary reading. 3mo average is at 49.5 through November 2015, down on 50.5 3mo average through August 2015 and down on 51.7 3mo average reading through November 2014. All signs are of a major slowdown in the Chinese growth counting in November. Per Markit: “business activity in China increased for the first time in four months in November. That said, the rate of expansion was only marginal… The renewed increase in overall Chinese business activity was supported by a further rise in service sector activity in November. That said, the pace of expansion eased since October and was only modest. …Meanwhile, manufacturing production stabilised in November, following a six-month sequence of reduction. After a solid expansion in October, total new work placed at Chinese service providers rose only slightly in November. According to panellists, relatively weak market conditions had softened client demand in the latest survey period. Furthermore, September 2015 excepted, the latest increase in new work was the slowest seen in 16 months. In contrast, manufacturing firms saw a further decline in new business during November. Though modest, the decrease in new order volumes at manufacturers offset the increase at service providers, and led to a slight fall in composite new business.”

Indian Composite PMI fell sharply from 52.6 in October to 50.2 in November. On a 3mo average basis, reading through November 2015 is at 51.5 which is marginally better than 5.4 reading in 3mo through August 2015 and down on 51.7 reading in 3mo period through November 2014. Per Markit: “Posting a five-month low of 50.2 in November (October: 52.6), the seasonally adjusted Nikkei India Composite PMI Output Index was indicative of little-change in the level of private sector activity in India. Growth of manufacturing production softened to the slowest in the current 25-month sequence of expansion, while services activity broadly stagnated. …Indian services companies saw demand growth lose strength during November, leading to the slowest rise in incoming new work since July. …Order book volumes in the manufacturing economy increased for the twenty fifth straight month, although at the weakest pace in this sequence.”

Brazil’s Composite PMI remained deep into contraction territory at 44.5 in November, which is an improvement on an abysmal 42.7 reading in September and October 2015. On a 3 mo average basis, reading through November 2015 stands at 43.3, which is below the already weak 43.7 reading for the 3mo period through August 2015 and well below the 49.2 reading through November 2014. November 2015 marks 9th consecutive month of sub-50 readings in the series for Brazil making the Latin American economy the worst performer in the group of BRIC economies for the ninth month running. Per Markit: “Output, new orders and employment shrunk across the manufacturing and service sectors”, with downturn being more pronounced in manufacturing. Overall “weaker contraction in private sector activity” came on foot of “a softer reduction in services output, as manufacturing production dropped at the second fastest pace in 80 months.”

Charts to summarise the trends (note: charts use my own Composite BRIC index based on 100=zero growth line):

The above chart clearly shows that Russia is currently acting as a positive driver for BRIC Composite PMI dynamics. The core downside driver is Brazil.

Summary: per chart above, BRIC economies continued to exert negative pressure on global growth rates in November for the fourth consecutive month running. More importantly, BRIC economies posted growth conditions consistent with slower (than global ) growth since July 2014.  This scenario - of negative impact of BRIC growth on global growth conditions - is likely to remain in place in months to come as all BRIC economies continue to face downside risks to their growth rates.