15/11/15: Ifo World Economic Climate Indicator 4Q

Ifo’s World Economic Climate Indicator for 4Q 2015 released recently shows further deterioration in global economic growth conditions, despite all the optimism talk in Europe and the U.S.

Ifo’s headline World Economic Climate index posted a reading of 89.6 for 4Q 2015, down on 95.9 in 3Q 2015 and below 95.0 rearing for 4Q 2014.This is the lowest reading since 4Q 2012 and is well below the 2012-present average of 94.7 and the historical average of 95.0. 4Q 2015 marks second consecutive quarter of declines in index reading.

In terms of key components of the headline index:

• Present Situation index fell to a low of 86.0 in 4Q 2015 from already unimpressive 87.9 reading in 3Q 2015. This marks the lowest reading since 1Q 2013 and the second consecutive quarterly decline in the index. 
• Expectations 6 months forward sub-index was down at 93.0 in 4Q 2015 from 103.5 in 3Q 2015 and is below 98.2 reading for 4Q 2014. The index reading is the lowest since 4Q 2012 and is down on 102.1 average reading for the period starting with 1Q 2012. Historical average for the sub-index is at 99.2 which is well above the 4Q 2015 reading.

In summary, global economic activity is once again showing signs of weakness with negative momentum not abating, but accelerating into 4Q 2015 despite massive glut of monetary liquidity and despite sharp reduction in energy costs.

14/11/15: My Comment on Portuguese Political Crisis

Two comments from myself on the topic of Portugal's political crisis effect on country macroeconomic and fiscal positioning:
http://expresso.sapo.pt/economia/2015-11-12-Divida-espanhola-e-portuguesa-sob-pressao and http://expresso.sapo.pt/economia/2015-11-11-Juros-da-divida-portuguesa-descem.-Mas-preco-dos-cds-continua-a-aumentar.

Full comment in English:

Do you think the financial markets and the debt agencies will move its focus from Greece to Portugal now and later on for Spain near or after theDecember 20 elections?

The latest euro area ‘periphery’ political crisis - the collapse of the Centre-Right Government in Portugal - sets the stage for a potential replay of the logistics of the Greek crisis of Summer 2015 scenario.

Both the markets and European leadership are likely to present the crisis as an isolated event, linked to the lack of ‘programme ownership’ in Portugal and not indicative of the broader political and policy trends across the EU. In other words, all official players in the sovereign debt markets will attempt to paint Portuguese situation as a ‘one-off’ event with no risk of contagion to other member states. As a result, rating agencies’ downgrades can be expected only if the crisis persists or if the new Government includes the elements of what is perceived to be ‘extreme Left’. At the same time, the rhetoric surrounding political crisis will be shifted into the discussion of domestic failures and the allegedly destructive role of populist politics. The key to this approach is the clear desire by the European leaders to contain the spread of political opportunism and limit the extent to which democratic politics can transmit public anger and dissatisfaction with post-crisis recovery from one ‘peripheral’ state to another, namely from Portugal to Spain and Italy, as well as, potentially, to Ireland which is likely to face elections in the first quarter of 2016. There are strong incentives for European authorities to send a warning message to Spanish electorate and political elites before December 20th elections, albeit it is difficult to see how such a warning can be structured in the case of Portugal. In my view, we are likely to see renewed talks about Portugal’s compliance with fiscal harmonisation rules and, potentially, a warning concerning the risk of the country running excessive deficits in 2016-2017 on foot of political realignment.


How do you evaluate the present risk of Portugal regarding the debt sovereign market? Yields will go for new highs in 2015?

Currently, CDS markets are pricing in 15.5% chance of sovereign default (under ISDA2003 rules) for Portugal, up on 14.5% a week ago, compared to 3.5% for Ireland, down from 3.8% a week ago. The trend to-date suggests some increased pressure on sovereign risk position for Portugal that has been priced in since the appointment of the Centre-Right Government and this is consistent with a view that relatively sharp increases in government debt yields represent possible overshooting of risk valuations. Two critical aspects of the crisis in the context of debt sustainability view are: how long the new political impasse will last and what signals a new Cabinet will send after appointment. If the crisis continues over a relatively prolonged period of time (more than a week) and /or if the new Cabinet is slow in clearly defining its position vis-a-vis the European policy direction toward sustained fiscal and structural reforms, bond yields are likely to continue rising, putting pressure on Portugal’s access to new funding. Absent significant worsening of the political crisis, Portugal’s debt sustainability dynamics are likely to remain hostages to economic fundamentals: the rate and the nature of economic growth over 2015-2016, rather than to political risks.

Most likely, given the degrees of uncertainty relating to the political nature of the latest crisis, DBRS will take a ‘wait-and-see’ position, issuing negative watch warning on its ratings, but staying out of moving for an outright downgrade this time around. However, the risk of the downgrade remains significant and the impact of such a downgrade can also be material. Given that all major rating agencies have already downgraded Portugal Sovereign ratings, a DBRS downgrade will force the ECB to either halt purchases of Portuguese bonds in its QE programme or to issue a waver for eligibility criteria. In the former case, pressures on sovereign yields are likely to be severe making new issuance of debt much more costly proposition.


Note: DBRS did take a 'wait-and-see' position on Friday (see here)

14/11/15: More Evidence U.S. Capex Cycle is Still Lagging

In a recent post (link here), I covered the issue of shares buy-backs and the lack of capex at the S&P500 constituents level. A recent report by Credit Suisse titled "The Capital Deployment Challenge" takes a look at the same problem.

Per report: "Companies in the US market are currently in great health as corporate profitability is approaching historical highs. This high level of profitability has produced record levels of corporate cash, and thereby has created a challenge for managers: how to allocate all of this excess cash. Companies may choose to reinvest in their businesses – organically or through M&A – or they may return the cash to capital providers, through dividends, share buybacks or by paying down debt..."

"Historically, companies have deployed an average of 60% of cash flows in capital investment (28% in organic growth and 32% in M&A) and have returned  26% to shareholders (12% dividends and 14% share buybacks). In the past several years, the capital allocation balance has swung away from growth towards buybacks and dividends: capital invested has dropped to 53% (27% organic growth and 26% M&A), while cash returned to shareholders has increased to 36% (15% dividends and 21%
buybacks)."

A handy chart to illustrate the switching:

So Credit Suisse divide the S&P500 universe into two sets of companies: reinvestors and returners. The former represents companies which predominantly direct their cash balances to organic reinvestment and/or M&A, whilst the latter are companies that prefer, on balance, to use cash surpluses for dividends and/or shares buybacks.

The report looks at three metrics across each type of company: underperformers within each group - companies that underperformed their peers average in terms of total shareholder returns, outperformers - companies that outperform their peers average, and average across all companies.

Chart below shows the extent of differences across two types of companies and three categories in terms of cash flow return on investment (CFROI):

The chart above "shows that the initial level of returns on capital is generally lower for reinvestors than for returners, with an average of 9% and 11%, respectively. The reinvestors and returners who outperformed their peers both improved their CFROI. However, the outperforming reinvestors generated a greater operating improvement (180bps vs 150bps for returners)."

Which is all pretty much in line with what I said on numerous occasions before: no matter how you twist the data, average returns to not re-investing outpace returns from investing. Meaning that: either companies are getting worse at identifying and capturing investment opportunities or investment opportunities are thin on the ground. Or both...

13/11/15: Dublin: Overpriced Office Space is Back... Any Wonder?

A neat set of charts from Knight Frank report showing commercial real estate mapping of Dublin relative to other European cities

To start with: returns over 10 years to December 2014:

Here are some more charts

The key point from the above is that historical valuations for Dublin property have been distorted to the upside by the pre-2008 boom, whilst subsequent collapse has driven prices back to below their fundamentals-determined valuations. However, forward expectations by the markets participants are now pricing in a significant medium- to long-term rebound in commercial property rents and values that are implying fundamentals well ahead of anything consistent with the ‘normal’ 4.5-5 percent yields. In other words, we are heading toward 2-2.5 percent yields, assuming current trends persist, or into another correction downward.

Absent robust supply increases, the former is more likely than the latter. With rates normalisation still some time away, the former is also more likely than the latter. And the longer the former goes on, the bigger will be the latter, eventually.

These dynamics, in return, underpin also residential markets, where credit supply tightness in house purchasing sector is pushing rents up to stratospheric levels, with rents currently in excess of October 2008 levels.

Welcome to the economy where largest land-owner - Nama - thinks developers are only good to attend horse races.

13/11/15: Fitch Survey of European Investors' Outlook

Fitch survey of European credit investors shows that “the risk posed over the next 12 months by adverse developments in one or more emerging markets was high” at 59% up from 45% in previous survey in July. European investors continue to see EMs as the key drivers of downside fundamentals risks for 2016, with 3/4rs (80%) of all respondents saying EMs sovereign (corporate) fundamentals are likely to deteriorate in 2016 compared to 2/3rds (60%) in July survey. Some more details:

• 29% of respondents see low commodity prices as the main risk to EMs, 
• 26% see the key driver as slower global growth, 
• 24% are expecting a Fed rate rise to be a key trigger for EMs risks amplification, and 
• 21% cite high debt levels as the main driver. 

Fitch global growth forecast of 2.3% for 2015. Table below supplies IMF forecasts and historical comparatives:

Strangely enough, much of this focus on the EMs for European investors is probably down to the European economy having settled into what appears to be its 'new normal' of around 1.2-1.4% growth pattern - sluggish, predictable and non-threatening, thereby shifting focus for risk assessments elsewhere.

12/11/15: Can't Get That Tax Haven Genie Back Into the Bottle

For the massive industry of Irish analysts, economists and experts working hard on denying that there is a problem with our corporation tax regime, behold this view: "Ireland ... is one of the world’s most important tax havens or offshore financial centres."

And as I noted on numerous occasions, our beggar-thy-neighbours policy or strategy for economic development is no longer a matter of esoteric academic considerations: "It is true that the tax offering did help attract large amounts of investment, ...and European membership helped keep Ireland off tax haven blacklists that apply to classic tax havens such as Cayman and Bermuda... ...What is more, Ireland has triggered ‘beggar my neighbour’ competition from other nations, meaning it has to constantly offer new and larger subsidies to mobile capital, just to keep up. ... [Ireland's] corporate tax haven strategy (and the financial centre strategy, below) have transmitted harmful spillover effects onto other countries, notably the U.S. which has seen Ireland help facilitate a massive transfer of wealth from ordinary taxpayers to mostly wealthy shareholders."

Read the full report here: http://www.taxjustice.net/2015/11/11/how-ireland-became-an-offshore-financial-centre/. And prepare for a choir of deniers to start their song again tomorrow, aided and funded by the lobby groups and, in some cases, by the state.

11/11/15: The Gig Economy: A Challenge

Last week, I spoke at CXC Corporate event “Globalization & The Future of Work Summit” in Dublin covering the topic of major economic disruption coming on foot of the evolving Gig Economy. I covered some of the background aspects of my presentation in an earlier blogpost here.

Here are my slides from the presentation (I will be posting a video link once it becomes available).

11/11/15: New Cost Estimates of European Refugees Crisis: Ifo

Back in September, German think tank, CESIfo estimated the cost of European refugees crisis to be at around EUR10 billion (Germany costs alone). Yesterday (with update today), the Institute released updated estimates:

Crucially, per above release, the Ifo pours some serious cold water on the commonly repeated in the media claims that refugees can provide a substantial boost to the German economy due to their alleged employability.

11/11/15: Take a Buyback Pill: U.S. Corporates Shy Away from Capex

As buy-backs of shares inch down as the drivers of U.S. stocks valuations (chart below), things are not going much smoother for the hopes of a capex cycle restart in the U.S. corporate sector.

As the following chart from Goldman Sachs research shows, 2015 has been shaping up as yet another year of decline in investment pipeline for U.S. companies. Capex and R&D investment share of aggregate cash holdings by S&P 500 companies is expected to hit 41% this year, down from 47% in 2014 and 2013 and marking the lowest reading since 2007. Worse, Goldman expects 2016 figure to be even lower at 40%.

Goldman figures relating to ‘Investment for Growth’ indicator include M&As, which in my opinion should not be considered in this context, as success rate of M&As is extremely low (historically at around 30%) and current M&A valuations are frankly bonkers. 

H/T to @prchovanec

Take a look at stripped out mix of real investment against buybacks in ratio terms, per Goldman’s reported data:

As shown above, relative weight of shares buybacks in terms of cash allocations by U.S. carpets has been on the rising trend now in comparison to Capes & R&D spending since 2009 and it has been flat since 2010 on for the ratio of buybacks to dividends. In fact, combined weight of M&As and buybacks ratio to Capex & R&D is now at 0.98, the highest since 2007.

In simple terms, there is little indication in the Goldman (and other) numbers of any restart of Capex cycle and all indication, major U.S. corporates are living in a world of surplus liquidity and shortages of investable strategies and opportunities. 

10/11/15: Keiser Report from Kilkenomics 2016

My interview with Max Keiser and Stacy Herbert in Kilkenny :

http://www.disclose.tv/action/viewvideo/216140/kilkenomics_where_comedy_meets_economics_constantin_gurdgiev__keiser_report/

Enjoy. (from 3:26 on).

10/11/15: The Miracle Pill of Rent Controls: San Fran

Rent controls are all the rage in Dublin kommentariate classes. But here is some evidence on their effectiveness in that centre of ‘egalitarianism’/‘tech elitism’ of San Fran:

Source: h/t to @ninjaeconomics 

You can see details https://www.sftu.org/rentcontrol/

Controls in San Fran have been a long running feature of the market, so one could have expected for these to at least induce lower volatility in rents. As the chart above shows, that is not the case and volatility - poor-cyclical - remains in place. As per levels of rents, why, San Fran rents are just plain insane.

So, Dublin's rationale for introducing rent controls is: we need more moderate rents to sustain growth of younger, innovation-focused enterprises. In San Fran, of course, rent controls have covered property market that sees younger, innovation-focused enterprises forced to pay 25-33% premia in wages terms to sustain hiring.

Over to the kimmentariate.

10/11/15: Debt and Deleveraging: European Corporates

Debt crises are long running things. Reinhart and Rogoff have said so before and continue to remind us about it often enough to think that by now, everyone would be cognitively aware of this aspect of the modern day economy. But, given the hopping and stomping associated with Europe's latest bout of 'fakecovery', some of our media do still require a reminder: debt crisis are long running things.

Want a picture to go with that? Why, here is a chart from BAML research note on the subject of European corporate deleveraging:

The above, really, says three things:

1. Deleveraging is still the rage: 2015 percentage of European companies continuing to deleverage is 57% - second highest over the entire time span between 2008 and today; 
2. Last time the rate of deleveraging fell was in 2011 and ever since, it continued to rise or stay put;
3. Taken 1 and 2 above, the entire narrative of 'credit-starved' companies in the European space is a bit questionable. As far as demand goes, only 43% of European firms are interested in increasing debt levels today, the second lowest since the start of the Global Financial Crisis.