Wednesday, October 7, 2015

7/10/15: Bubbles Troubles and IMF Spectacles


As was noted in the previous post (link here), IMF is quite rightly concerned with the extent of the global financial bubbles that have emerged in the wake of the years-long QE waves.

This chart shows the extent of over-valuation in sovereign debt markets:



















But the following charts show the potential impact of partial unwinding of the bubbles. First up: bonds:





















Then, equity:















Per IMF: “The scenario generates moderate to large output losses worldwide” as chart below shows changes in the output in 2017 under stress scenario compared to benign scenario:




















And here’s what happens to projected Government debt by 2018:



         Toasty!

7/10/15: On the Illusion of Financial Stability


IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report for October 2015 is out, titled, predictably “Vulnerabilities, Legacies, and Policy Challenges: Risks Rotating to Emerging Markets”.

It is a hefty read, but some key points are the following.

“Th e Federal Reserve is poised to raise interest rates as the preconditions for liftoff are nearly in place. This increase should help slow the further buildup of excesses in financial risk taking.” As if this is something new… albeit any conjecture that the Fed move will somehow take out some of the risks built up over years of aggressive priming of the liquidity pump is a bit, err… absurd. The IMF is saying risk taking will slow down, not abate.

“Partly due to con fidence in the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) policies, credit conditions are improving and credit demand is picking up. Corporate sectors are showing tentative signs of improvement that could spawn increased investment and economic risk taking, including in the United States and Japan, albeit from low levels.” So, as before, don’t expect a de-risking, expect slower upticks in risks. The bubbles won’t be popping, or even deflating… they will be inflating at a more gradual pace.

All of which should give us that warm sense of comfort.

Meanwhile, “risks continue to rotate toward emerging markets, amid greater market liquidity risks.” In other words, now’s the turn of EMs to start pumping in cash, as the Fed steps aside.

In summary, therefore, that which went on for years will continue going on. The shovel will change, the proverbial brown stuff will remain the same.

Still, at the very least, the IMF is more realistic than the La-La gang of european politicians and investors. Here are some warning signs:

  1. “Legacy issues from the crisis in advanced economies. High public and private debt in advanced economies and remaining gaps in the euro area architecture need to be addressed to consolidate financial stability, and avoid political tensions and headwinds to confidence and growth. In the euro area, addressing remaining sovereign and banking vulnerabilities is still a challenge.” You wouldn’t know that much, but the idea of rising rates and rising cost of funding has that cold steely feel to it when you think of your outstanding mortgage…
  2. “Weak systemic market liquidity… poses a challenge in adjusting to new equilibria in markets and the wider economy. Extraordinarily accommodative policies have contributed to a compression of risk premiums across a range of markets including sovereign bonds and corporate credit, as well as a compression of liquidity and equity risk premiums. While recent market developments have unwound some of this compression, risk premiums could still rise further.” Wait a second here. We had years of unprecedented money printing by the Central Banks around the world. And we have managed to inflate a massive bubble in bonds markets on foot of that. But liquidity is still ‘challenged’? Oh dear… but what about all this ‘credibility’ that the likes of ECB have raised over the recent programmes? Does it not count for anything when it comes to systemic liquidity?..
  3. The system is far from shocks-proof, again contrary to what we heard during this Summer from European dodos populating the Eurogroup. “Without the implementation of policies to ensure successful normalization, potential adverse shocks or policy missteps could trigger an abrupt rise in market risk premiums and a rapid erosion of policy con fidence. Shocks may originate in advanced or emerging markets and, combined with unaddressed system vulnerabilities, could lead to a global asset market disruption and a sudden drying up of market liquidity in many asset classes. Under these conditions, a signifi cant—even if temporary— mispricing of assets may ensue, with negative repercussions on fi nancial stability.”


In summary, then, lots done, nothing achieved: we wasted trillions in monetary policy firepower and the system is still prone to exogenous and endogenous shocks.

“In… an adverse scenario, substantially tighter fi nancial conditions could stall the cyclical recovery and weaken confi dence in medium-term growth prospects. Low nominal growth would put pressure on debt-laden sovereign and private balance sheets, raising credit risks.

  • Emerging markets would face higher global risk premiums and substantial capital out flows, putting particular pressure on economies with domestic imbalances. 
  • Corporate default rates would rise, particularly in China, raising fi nancial system strains, with implications for growth.
  • Th ese events would lead to a reappearance of risks on sovereign balance sheets, especially in Europe’s vulnerable economies, and the emergence of an adverse feedback loop between corporate and sovereign risks in emerging markets. 
  • As a result, aggregate global output could be as much as 2.4 percent lower by 2017, relative to the baseline. This implies lower but still positive global growth.”

Note, the IMF doesn’t even mention in this adverse scenario what happens to households up to their necks in debt, e.g. those in Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, and so on.

So let’s take a look at a handy IMF map plotting their own assessments of the financial systems stability in October 2015 report compared to April 2015 report. Do note that April 2015 report covers the period right before the ECB deployed its famed, fabled and all-so-credible (per IMF) QE.














Just take a look at the lot. Market & liquidity risks are up (not down), Risk Appetite is down. Macroeconomic risks improved, but everything else remains the same. That is a picture of no real achievement of any significant variety, regardless of what the IMF tells us. Worse, IMF analysis shows that risk appetite deteriorated across all 3 sub-metrics and as chart below shows, market & liquidity conditions have deteriorated across all 4 sub-metrics.


















Meanwhile (Chart below), save for household risks, all other credit-related risks worsened too.


















Meanwhile, markets are sustained by debt. That’s right: stock prices remain driven by debt-funded net equity buybacks and domestic acquisitions:















Meanwhile, Government bonds are in a massive bubble territory, especially for the little champions of the Euro:























You can see the extent of IMF’s thinking on the topic of just how bad the financial assets bubbles have grown in the following post.

The basic core of the IMF analysis is that although everything was made better, nothing is really much better. In the world of financial stability fetishists, that is like saying we have a steady state of no steady state. In the world of those of us living in the real economy, that is like saying all that cash pumped into the markets over the last seven years and across the globe has been largely wasted. 

7/10/15: Of Island of Scholars...


A very interesting set of interactive charts showing the impact of the crisis on third level funding and student numbers across various European states: http://eua.be/activities-services/projects/eua-online-tools/public-funding-observatory-tool.aspx.

One shocking conclusion: whilst Ireland experienced a robust increase in the number of students during the crisis, Irish public funding for universities fell at a second highest rate in the EU (after Greece). You can see where these comparatives put us in contrast to, say, Iceland.

7/10/15: Irish economic Activity & PMIs: 3Q 2015


Irish quarterly PMIs for 3Q 2015 posted a marginal improvement in growth conditions compared to 2Q 2015, further strengthening on the already fast pace of economic activity expansion. This overall momentum was driven solely by gains in growth momentum in Services sectors.

Manufacturing PMI averaged 55.2 in 3Q 2015, down marginally on 55.8 in 2Q 2015 and marking the slowest pace of activity expansion since 1Q 2014. 3Q marks second consecutive growth of weakening PMIs. Still, current running rate signals strong growth in the sector.

Services PMI posted a reading of 62.8 in 3Q 2015, up on already high reading of 61.8 in 2Q 2015. This is the highest reading since 2Q 2006 and marks second consecutive quarter of increases in the index. Overall activity signal from the 3Q PMI averages is for an outright boom in the sector.

Construction PMIs (with data only for July-August) fell in 3Q 2015 to 59.1 from 2Q 2015 reading of 62.1. Nonetheless, growth, as singled by PMI, remained robust in 3Q 2015.















Overall, PMIs continue to signal robust rates of economic activity growth in the Irish economy over the course of 3Q 2015. 

Usual caveats, however, apply to interpreting the links between PMIs and actual production and value added in the sectors. Historically Irish Manufacturing and Services PMIs exhibit statistically insignificant correlation with real activity in both sectors, as well as GDP and GNP growth. At the very best, Services PMI data is capable of explaining at most around 11 percent of total variation in GDP, while at the worst, Manufacturing PMI explains at most 5.6 percent of total variation in GNP.


7/10/15: Two Reports, One Ireland, Hundreds of Billions in MNCs' Profits


Two interesting headlines in recent days brought back the memories of recent hot-flash splashes of news regarding Ireland's position as a corporate tax haven. These are:

  1. Irish response to the completion of the OECD review of the options for addressing the imbalances in the global corporate taxation systems: http://www.independent.ie/business/world/new-oecd-global-tax-proposals-target-corporation-tax-avoidance-31583371.html, and
  2. A less publicised in Ireland study from the U.S. estimating to volumes of corporate tax optimisation/avoidance with honourable place reserved for Ireland in it: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/06/us-usa-tax-offshore-idUSKCN0S008U20151006
Have fun tying them together... but here are some choice quotes from the Citizens for tax Justice study referenced in the Reuters article:

"The Congressional Research Service found that in 2008, American multinational companies collectively reported 43 percent of their foreign earnings in five small tax haven countries: Bermuda, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Yet these countries accounted for only 4 percent of the companies’ foreign workforces and just 7 percent of their foreign investments."

"For example, a 2013 Senate investigation of Apple found that the tech giant primarily uses two Irish subsidiaries — which own the rights to some of Apple’s intellectual property — to hold $102 billion in offshore cash. Manipulating tax loopholes in the U.S. and other countries, Apple has structured these subsidiaries so that they are not tax residents of either the U.S. or Ireland, ensuring that they pay no taxes to any government on the lion’s share of the money. One of the subsidiaries has no employees."

"Google uses accounting techniques nicknamed the “double Irish” and the “Dutch sandwich,” according to a Bloomberg investigation. Using two Irish subsidiaries, one of which is headquartered in Bermuda, Google shifts profits through Ireland and the Netherlands to Bermuda, shrinking its tax bill by approximately $2 billion a year"

A handy graph:
And another one:

Do note that per above table, Ireland is a conduit for the U.S. corporates' tax activities that amount to 42% of our GDP, while Switzerland (the country we so keenly like to tell the world is a 'real' tax haven) facilitates activities amounting to 'only' 9% of its GDP. 

You can read the entire report and see associated data here: http://ctj.org/pdf/offshoreshell2015.pdf

And while you are at it, here is a little Bloomberg piece from back 2014 on another whirlwind of activities: corporate inversions. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-04/u-s-firms-with-irish-addresses-criticized-for-the-moves What is notable in this article is that we are now having inversions of inverted companies, whereby new re-domiciling firms buy into previously re-domiciled companies to land themselves a PO Box presence in Ireland.

So back to that OECD reform proposal, therefore, that involves addressing the issue of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) and is apparently of no threat to us in Ireland... You can try reading all the legalese here http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps-2015-final-reports.htm, or just give it a thought - tax optimisation by U.S. (only U.S.) MNCs via Ireland amounts to up to 42% of our GDP and likely less than 1-2% of the companies workforce is present here. How much of that 42% booked via Ireland is 'base erosion & profit shifting'? Ah, yes... let's not ask questions we don't want answered. Let's just have a breakfast at Tiffany's while repeating that "Ireland has a low rate transparent system and IDA insist on substance for any companies that it supports and I think those are the three pillars that supports our offering and I think Beps is about moving all international systems to a more transparent, clear system."

Don't laugh...


Tuesday, October 6, 2015

6/10/15: BRIC Quarterly Economic Activity & PMIs: 3Q 2015


Now, as promised, the summary of 3Q 2015 BRIC PMIs and the insights these give us into global growth trends. Note: series history refers here to data from 1Q 2006, since some countries in the group only started collecting PMI data from that period.

Brazil:

  • Brazil’s Manufacturing PMI averaged poorly 46.7 in 3Q 2015, which is… drum roll… an improvement on disastrous 46.1 recorded in 2Q 2015. All in, Brazil manufacturing sector contraction is now 6 consecutive quarters-long. Over the last two consecutive quarters, Brazil posted the worst Manufacturing sector performance of all BRIC economies. 
  • Meanwhile, Brazil Services PMI tanked to 41.9 on 3Q 2015 average basis from already abysmal 42.3 reading in 2Q 2015. This means that Brazil Services sectors are in a deep contraction over the last 6 months and the rate of contraction accelerated in 3Q 2015. This is the worst quarterly reading in all BRIC economies for Services sector for the second consecutive quarter running and the fourth consecutive quarter of recession in Brazil’s Services. 
  • While Manufacturing PMI in 3Q 2015 was the fifth lowest in history of the series, Services PMI hit its lowest level in history. In brief, Brazil is in deep trouble and is currently the worst performer across both manufacturing and services sectors of all BRIC economies. Brazil recorded now four consecutive quarters of sub-40 readings in both indices - the only economy in the BRIC group to have done so (in Russia case, such coincident sub-50 readings have occurred for the duration of only two quarters) in post-Crisis period.


Russia:

  • Russian Manufacturing PMI averaged 48.4 in 3Q 2015 unchanged on 48.4 reading in 2Q 2015. This is the lowest (tied with 2Q) reading since 1Q 2014 and marks the third consecutive quarter of sub-50 readings in the sector. The level of contraction singled by 48.4 reading is, however, not particularly remarkable, marking the 6th sharpest rate of activity decline in series history.
  • Russian Services PMI posted a reading of 50.7 in 3Q 2015, consistent with weak growth, following 51.0 reading in 2Q 2015 and marking two consecutive quarters of above 50 readings. Growth is still weak in the sector, with 3Q 2015 reading being 9th lowest in series history.
  • Overall, Russian economy is still in a recessionary scenario, judging by PMIs although some improvement is visible in the Services side of the economy. In my view, it is too early to call the bottom of the recession, yet, but there are some potentially encouraging signs emerging.
  • Russia remained the second weakest economy in the BRIC group, only marginally (by about 0.1 points) underperforming China when comparative is taken across both sectors of the economy.


China:

  • Chinese Manufacturing PMI fell off the cliff in 3Q 2015, declining to 47.4 compared to 49.2 in 2Q 2015. This marks second consecutive quarter of sub-50 readings for the index. 3Q 2015 index was 3rd lowest in the history of the series, highlighting just how sharp the deterioration was. Over the last 4 quarters, Chinese manufacturing failed to post a reading above 50.0 in all quarters, meanwhile, over the last 16 quarters, Chinese Manufacturing posted a statistically significant growth reading in only one quarter.
  • China Services PMI fell from 52.7 in 2Q 2015 to 51.9 in 3Q 2015. This is the 5th lowest reading in the history of the series and, although nominally above 50.0, statistically is not consistent with a signal of even moderate growth. 
  • In simple terms, China is getting dangerously close to statistically zero growth across the economy, which, in my view - given the low quality of Chinese official data - can be anywhere around 3-4 percent official GDP expansion for 2015. Potentially - lower. 


India:

  • Indian Manufacturing PMI continued to lead the BRIC economies indices, rising to 52.1 in 3Q 2015 from 51.7 in 2Q 2015. Still, the case of growth is 9th slowest in data series history.
  • Indian Services PMI posted a strong rebound from 49.9 reading in 2Q 2015 to 51.3 in 3Q 2015. Even with this rebound, latest indicator is signalling 10th slowest rate of growth in the Services side of the economy.
  • Overall, India returned to the scenario of broadly based (across both Services and Manufacturing) growth in 3Q 2015. However, considering past performance, growth across both sectors in India was anaemic in 3Q and it has been weak since the start of 2013.


Charts below illustrate key trends:
















Overall, BRIC group activity has been pretty disastrous in recent quarters, as shown in the Chart below















As the above illustrates, combined BRIC Manufacturing index is currently running at 48.5 down from 49.4 in 2Q 2015 and marking second consecutive quarter of sub-50 readings. This the third worst performance level for the indicator. Across Services sectors within the BRIC economies, activity also fell in 3Q 2015 (to 50.7) from already weak 50.9 in 2Q 2015. 3Q 2015 Services reading is 5th worst in history.

Table below summarises recent changes in quarterly PMIs:













Key conclusions: 

  • BRIC economies are in a sharp, structural slowdown across both manufacturing and services, with Brazil and Russia lingering in sustained recessions, China effectively falling off the growth cliff and India slowing down, but still generating positive growth. The rot is global - it is driving global trade and currencies imbalances and is also driven by global trade, demand and currencies imbalances. With the world’s largest EMs in deep trouble, one has to wonder how low can global GDP growth revisions go in months ahead.
  • The structural or longer-term nature of this rot is best highlighted in the last chart above, showing clearly the dramatic trend decline in Manufacturing activity starting with 2Q 2011, followed with the onset of decline in Services side of the economy in 2Q 2013.



Note: Monthly PMIs for September were covered in previous posts:
- For Services and Composite PMIs: here.
- For Manufacturing PMIs: here.

6/10/15: BRIC Services & Composite PMI: September 2015


BRIC Services PMIs and Composite PMIs are in for September. I covered Manufacturing PMIs for BRTIC economies earlier here.

Unlike Manufacturing sector, BRIC Services sector did much better, posting overall a shallow, but positive growth.

  • Russia Services PMI was covered in detail in this post. Overall, in the end Russia Services PMI reading for September ended up being tied for the highest position in the entire group alongside India’s
  • India’s Service PMI came in at 51.3, down from 51.8 in August and marking third consecutive month of above 50 readings. The rate of growth singled by the Indian PMI is, however, relatively weak. 
  • China Services PMI came in at 50.5, the second weakest reading for a BRIC economy and down on 51.5 in August. Statistically-speaking, just as with Russian and Indian Services indicator, Chinese Services PMI was not distinguishable from zero growth 50.0 marker. For the economy that never posted below 50 reading in its Services PMIs, however, current reading for China is probably consistent with a sector growth plummeting sharply. This is the lowest rate of activity since July 2014. September reading was also second lowest on record.
  • Brazil Services PMI was the only reading below 50 in the BRIC group and at 41.7 it is a very poor reading and is below August 44.8. Brazil has now posted the weakest of Services PMIs reading for all BRIC economies every month since March 2015.















As Chart above clearly indicates, Brazil weakness is sharp and sustained over some time now. In contrast, Russia has managed some stabilisation in the Services sector with very strong upward correction starting from February 2015 low. Overall, you can also see the extremely compressed and subdued growth activity in the Sector across the BRIC economies starting with 3Q 2013 on. 

Summary table below highlights recent changes in Manufacturing and Services PMIs for the BRIC economies:

















Now, let’s consider Composite PMIs.


  • Again, Russia Composite PMI was covered in the separate earlier post here. In comparative terms, Russian Composite PMI was the second highest in the BRIC group after India.
  • India Composite PMI came in at 51.5 in September compared to 52.6 in August, marking a deterioration in the rate of growth in the economy. 51.5 reading is border-line significant in statistical terms, suggesting possibly sharper downturn in the economic activity than simple decline of 1.1 points suggests. Still, India posted the best performing Composite PMI of all BRIC.
  • China Composite PMI came in at disappointing 48.0 in September, down from an already weak 48.8 in August. Last two months readings suggest negative growth in the Chinese economy, although it is hard to call what exactly is happening in the actual economy. Nonetheless, China was a negative drag on the BRIC growth for the second month in a row.
  • Brazil Composite PMI literally is tanking. It hit 42.7 reading in September, down from 44.8 in August. This marks a seventh consecutive month of composite PMI for the country signalling an outright contraction in output. 































Charts above plot BRIC Composite PMIs. Several things worth noting here are:

  1. There is continued divergence in Russian PMIs (to the upside) and BRIC ex-Russia PMIs (to the downside) driven by sharp deterioration in Brazil economic environment over the last 7 months. Local peaking of BRIC ex-Russia PMIs in February 2015 is now fully exhausted and in September, BRIC ex-Russia index took a sharp nosedive. Trendiness reflect this divergence and show that it is currently well-established. In other words, although Russian economy is performing poorly, ex-Russia BRIC economies are performing even worse, even if we include into this sub-grouping a relatively well performing India.
  2. Overall, BRIC Composite PMI is on a sustained downward trend since June 2014 and in July-September 2015 this downward trend accelerated sharply. BRIC Composite PMI now signals recessionary conditions across the whole group of four largest Middle-Income and Emerging Markets economies. On a longer time line, weak performance in the BRIC economies has been now a feature of the global growth environment since the end of 1Q 2013.

I will be covering quarterly PMI signals in the subsequent post, so stay tuned.

Monday, October 5, 2015

5/10/15: Manning Financial Q4 2015: Economic Update


My Economic Update for Manning Financial for 4Q 2015:





5/10/15: Russia Services & Composite PMI: September 2015


Having covered Russian Manufacturing PMIs earlier here. Now, let’s take a look at the Services PMI and Composite PMI next.

In a positive sign of some stabilisation in the economy in September, Services PMI came in at moderate growth reading of 51.3 - the highest reading since July 2015 and up on 49.1 in August.

According to Markit, there was an increase in new orders, although excess capacity persisted in September. Job cuts continued as well, on foot of reductions in backlog of work.

September reading signals fourth instance of growth over the last 6 months, which, in the past did not translate in de-acceleration in the rate of economic contraction, so the latest figure should be considered with caution when interpreting growth in the Services sector as a sign of economic stabilisation. We need several months of continued above 50 readings on both Manufacturing and Services PMIs side to call an economic turnaround.















That said, given we are still awaiting for release of other BRIC data for Service, Russian Services sector performance in September is encouraging. China’s Services PMI came in at 50.5, below Russian PMI last month. The latest data for other BRIC economies shows Russia likely moving from third position in sector growth in August to second in September.

Boosted by Services improvement, Composite PMI for Russia posted a reading over 50 in September, coming in at 50.9 compared to 49.3 in August. This beats China’s 48 reading for September.













Note: I use 100 scale as opposed to market 50 scale.

As chart above shows, Russian Composite PMI has been on an upward trend since February 2015 trough and is now in growth territory over three months for the last 6 months period. Again, this warrants only cautious optimism, however, as we are yet to have consecutive above 100 readings in the index.

The key point is that we need to see both manufacturing and services PMIs reading above 50 to call normalisation in the economy. Last time we had such a reading was in September 2014, right before the full-blown currency crisis erupted to derail fragile stabilisation in the economy. 

Sunday, October 4, 2015

4/10/15: IBM: Some Tough Numbers on Higher Education Success


IBM Institute for Business Value Higher Education Survey 2015 with results published in June 2015 has been quite an interesting read. The report “Pursuit of relevance How higher education remains viable in today’s dynamic world” is available here.

Take the following Question: “To what extent do you believe the current higher education system in your country is meeting the needs of the following groups?”

Chart below plots percentages of respondents by group across three core categories of ‘customers’: students, employers and society at large.


One thing that jumps out is that corporate recruiters are relatively more positive than education providers (excluding university staff) when it comes to assessing the education system performance.

Another conclusion that jumps out is that with exception of one sub-group in one category, overall assessment of education systems is pretty grim - no >50% support for the proposition that education system meets the needs of either students, employers or society.

Third conclusion is that, on average, higher education systems serve better the needs of students, followed by society, than industry.

More damning, “Survey results also point to higher education shortfalls in other areas. In terms of economic value, only 51 percent of industry and academic leaders believe higher education is providing value for money, and just 49 percent view it as contributing to economic growth and competitiveness.”

There is also a very interesting gap across respondents categories in terms of what is perceived to be the most important metrics of success of modern education system. Chart below illustrates:


As can be glimpsed from above, educators are literally falling over themselves in pursuit of jobs placements. While corporate recruiters and learning executives are less warm about this objective.

Very interesting findings, some counter-intuitive, some potentially arising from the sample selection biases (after all,  we don't have much to go by in terms of actual corporate leaders, and data reported is limited, as for example the chart above clearly shows). Nonetheless, the questions raised are of great importance.

4/10/15: Data is not the end of it all, it’s just one tool...


Recently, I spoke at a very interesting Predict conference, covering the issues of philosophy and macro-implications of data analytics in our economy and society. I posted slides from my presentations earlier here.

Here is a quick interview recorded by the Silicon Republic covering some of the themes discussed at the conference: https://www.siliconrepublic.com/video/data-is-not-the-end-of-it-all-its-just-one-tool-dr-constantin-gurdgiev.


4/10/2015: Budget 2016 and beyond: some priorities...


This is a summary of my speech at the local constituency meeting in Sandymount organised by Renua Ireland (October 1, 2015). Please note: I was invited to speak in a personal capacity as an independent, politically non-affiliated speaker, so all thoughts, arguments, errors and omissions in the below are mine.


Where we are?

1) Recovery in official figures:

  • GDP is up 6.9% y/y in 1H 2015.
  • GNP is up 6.6%
  • Some 60% of GDP growth in 1H 2015 was accounted for by Fixed Capital Formation - much of which is driven by assets sales to and by vulture funds, plus by reclassified R&D spending booked by MNCs into Ireland via our ‘knowledge development box’. 
  • But the aggregate data is dodgy. Our GDP is 19 percent ahead of our GNP and it is 25% over Domestic Demand, over 2000-2007 the latter gap averaged ‘only’ 10 percent.

2) Recovery in somewhat more real figures:

  • Personal expenditure is up 3.27% y/y in 1H 2015. 2Q 2015 was sixth consecutive quarter of positive y/y growth. But it is still down 9.9% on pre-crisis peak. Nonetheless, the numbers coming out on this side of National Accounts are positive.
  • Government expenditure on current goods and services was up 3.54% y/y in 1H 2015. But down 10.6% on pre-crisis peak. There is timing issue involved here, but for now, Government spending is rising faster than personal consumption.
  • Fixed Capital Formation rose 22% y/y in 1H 2015, but is still down 12.3% on peak.

By all measures of domestic economy, we are in an official recovery since 3Q 2013. And the rate of growth is relatively robust

  • Final Domestic Demand is up 7.7% in 1H 2015 on a yearly basis, although overall activity as measured by Domestic Demand is down 7.9% on pre-crisis peak. 
  • But, crucially, over the last 4 quarters, personal expenditure per capita was up only 1.62% on average (y/y per quarter) against total domestic demand rising 4.3%. Which shows the role played by Fixed Capital Formation (including Nama, vulture funds, R&D reclassifications and MNCs activities) in driving up domestic demand. 

Ditto for Unemployment figures:

  • Official unemployment rate (QNHS-based) has fallen from 16.3% in Q3 2011 to 10.3% in 2Q 2015. Which is a robust decline and undoubtedly good news. Other good news is that much of new jobs creation was in stronger quality category of full time employment. 
  • Still, current rate of unemployment is close to 1Q 2009 and is almost double 5.9% rate recorded in 2Q 2008, more than double 4.9% rate in 2Q 2007.

However, these figures mask several sub-trends that are worrying.

  • Per CSO own report: % of unemployed persons plus  others who want a job, plus part-time underemployed persons, plus those who want a job, who are not available and not seeking for reasons other than being in education or training stands at 18.3%.
  • Factoring in those in State Training Programmes (e.g. JobBridge) raises actual unemployment rate to 21.9%, comparable to 2Q 2009.
  • Adding in net emigration as reported through 1Q 2015 raises broadest measure of potential unemployment to 29.5 percent - a figure that puts our relative labour market performance back to 1Q 2011 levels. In other words, it took us twice longer to go from cyclical unemployment high back to 1Q 2011 levels than to go from 1Q 2011 to cyclical unemployment high. Road to recovery is, for now, twice longer than the road travelled through the collapse.
  • Worse: labour force participation rate has been averaging 59.8% in 1H 2015 down from 59.9% in 1H 2014. Both are still well below pre-crisis (2000-2007) average of 61.2%.

Top line: 

  • Our GDP - at the aggregate - is now above the pre-crisis peak levels. 
  • But our GDP per capita is still 0.8% below pre-crisis levels and our domestic demand per capita is 13.3% down on pre-crisis peak. Our personal consumption per capita is down 8% on pre-crisis peak. 
  • Much has been achieved, the Government deserves quite a bit of credit for facilitating these achievements, if only in a 'safe pair of hands' way, yet more remains to be delivered, still and this requires more than just a 'safe pair of hands'.


What are the risks to a sustained recovery and how do we deal with these?  We should focus not short-term risks, but on bigger themes:

  1. Global secular stagnation and demographic challenges
  2. Global interest rates (cost of debt) normalisation
  3. Our legacy debt problems and related issues of longer-term savings and investments
  4. Domestic imbalances on production side: MNCs v domestic economic activity
  5. Domestic imbalances on wealth distribution side (inequality, poverty, persistent and concentrated underinvestment in human capital, homelessness, debt distress, and cultural/systemic/institutional barriers to deployment of human capital).


  • All of these factors are cross-linked. The realisation of which at the top of Irish political elite is lacking.
  • All require a joined-up thinking to deal with.  A practice of which at the top of Irish political elite is lacking too.
  • Addressing them requires a new longer-term agenda or strategy for growth and development of the Irish economy. Which we have no institutional framework for preparing, let alone enacting.


In this environment, lacking big ideas, Budget 2016 or indeed any budgetary framework won’t be enough, no matter how good the intentions and execution can be. Neither will be piece-meal approach to development of public investment, as exemplified by what we know from the bits and pieces of the Capital Investment programme for 2016-2021 announced this week.

So what needs to be done to begin addressing these bottlenecks in leadership?

Let’s start from the big picture - policy formation and implementation mechanism. We need deep reforms of how we do business when it comes to policy formation.

Key principles here should be:

  1. Cross-party engagement
  2. Bringing in divergent voices from the outside (given lack of political culture to do so, this should be mandated for all public boards, agencies and policy formation bodies).
  3. Bringing in robust measures to stress-test all and any proposals.
  4. Doing away with token talking shops of policy formation: all the Diaspora Meet-ups, all National Forums and Working Groups that are dominated by vested interests, the Fiscal Council (which has neither teeth, nor independence in its composition), etc etc.
  5. Replacing the above fora with a functional National Task Force composed of both independent and vested interests-linked people with requisite expertise divided by key sectors of the economy: Domestic Economy, Internationally Trading Economy, Public Sector & Government, Households and Quality of Life. Each sectoral group should be tasked with generating & collating ideas for development of the broader sectors on the basis of counterbalancing measures applied to one sub-sector against other sub-sectors. Each group uses seconded public service assistance to cost/price proposals. All group proposals are to be published, publicly vetted and reviewed subsequently by the umbrella body based on the same principles of transparency, professionalism, factual analysis and contrarian view stress-testing. 


At the deployment level, we need to reform public sector systems and local authorities. This should at the very least involve:

  1. Dramatically reducing the number of local authorities, to eliminate extreme levels of non-coordination and empire-building in individual decisions;
  2. Empowering local authorities to create meaningful institutions for developing economic and social policies at a local level by providing them with full control over taxation in property sector and giving them a right to impose local prices for water delivery as well as supply water (Irish Water should be changed to a state-wide entity in charge / ownership of water infrastructure, while actual water provision should be decentralised to local authorities who can supply water into the distribution network on a competitive basis. Such system already works in electricity and gas distribution and can provide better services to consumers at lower cost, while giving local authorities more independent revenues to undertake provision of their own supports and services).
  3. Bringing in functional mechanisms to promote and reward managed risk-taking and informed decision-making in the public sector, as well as to support those who reach above the mean in terms of effort and output. Merit, not tenure, should guide public sector careers progressions. Whilst this objective is not easy to achieve, I am certain that a combination of best practices and good policy thinking can result in a significant (though probably imperfect) improvement on status quo.
  4. Bringing in functional measures to create a climate and culture of accountability. Not for mistakes made (and properly managed) in attempting leadership, but for lack of initiative, failure to carry out required work, any harm done by negligence and inaction.
  5. We need to reform the system of ministerial advisors and oversight over departments, state boards and bodies. Again, here, the key is to bring in professionalism and remove cronyism, instill culture of debate, independence and entrepreneurialism (measured and managed taking of risks).


Let’s go on to specifics of policy objectives.

Ireland is a demographically young country trading in global markets in higher value-added goods and services. This means we are a country based on human capital. And this also means we face global competition for human capital.

What is human capital? A sum total of skills, formal and informal education, aptitude to work, attitudes to risk, ability to manage risks and uncertainty, creativity, capacity to innovate and to adapt to innovation. It also includes health, emotional and psychological well-being, cultural capital, and so on.

So what do we need to do to shift our economic model firmly in the direction of relying on human capital?

The core principles of human capital-intensive economy are:

  • The need to attract human capital from outside
  • The need to retain human capital that is already present in the economy
  • The need to create new human capital within the economy, and
  • The need to enable human capital to add value in the economy.

I have a catchy name for this system: CARE.

Primarily, in the short term, we have to rebalance our tax system. This is something that can be started with the budget, but will require more effort than just altering tax rates.

We need to shift burden of taxation away from taxing individual returns on human capital - in other words, we need to cut tax burden on income from skilled labour and entrepreneurship, but also from other forms of human capital. Incidentally, because human capital is a very broad concept, human capital-intensive value added is being created across the entire economy: public and private, lower income and higher income and so on activities. Human capital economy is not about rich v poor, and it is not about unemployed v employed. Every person in any occupation should be encouraged to invest in their own human capital in whatever form suits them, and every person in every occupation should benefit from reaping the returns on such investments.

To do so, we have to shift some of the current taxation burden away from income tax arising from investing own effort and talents into work, and onto something else.

Best target for such a shifting of burden is to shift it onto those assets that have the least productive use (in terms of value added) in the economy and that, simultaneously, cannot be moved offshore. Such assets are land and fixed capital - buildings and distribution networks.

It is worth noting that in sectors where land plays significant role in overall production, such as agriculture, human capital matters too, and land occupies still lower importance in production chain than we tend to think. Agriculture producing commoditized goods (e.g. generic grains or milk) still accrues value added via types of production, quality of supply, etc. Which are non-land outputs. Beyond that, agriculture also involves increasingly higher value added production – e.g. specialist grains, processing of milk, production of organic and/or artisan and/or specialist types of dairy products, etc. A land tax does not mean a tax on agriculture, but a tax on those activities in all sectors, including agriculture, that use land less efficiently.

Budget 2016 can start on this path by eliminating two or three upper marginal rates under the USC. Or better yet, eliminating USC altogether. And introducing a land or site value tax.

We also need to eliminate all penalties on taxation of self-employed and, unless we bring in symmetric access to benefits, we need to stop charging self-employed for services they have no access to.

We also need to create a system of taxation that recognises that self-employed face high volatility of income year-on-year. A system of 3 year average minimum taxation can be developed to address this, providing self-employed with a limited, but meaningful temporary credit for taxes paid in the case their income dips below, say, 75% threshold for previous 3 year average. These credits can be recouped in subsequent years when their income exceeds, say 110 percent threshold. Numbers here are illustrative and can be estimated more precisely, but it is the principle that matters. As economy becomes more and more linked to the ‘Gig Economy’ principles of work, the volatility of incomes and asynchronicity of tax liabilities will wreck more and more havoc in the households’ ability to fund basic purchases and investments, savings and debt repayments.

But, real reforms will require simultaneously bringing in some sort of income transfer system that guarantees high quality of life for those in needs of social transfers, while not relying on excessively penalising those who invest in their own skills and labour. So longer term reforms should involve introduction  of basic income. This will, accidentally, retain progressivity of taxation under flat rate income tax. And it will assure that those who are well-off can not benefit from social transfers.

Parallel with this, we need to close all targeted incentive schemes within our tax codes. The state should get out of business of picking and choosing future ‘winners’ or ‘champions’ of Irish economy and get into business of administering payment for & provision of core public services.


We also need to stimulate enterprise formation and entrepreneurship. These are two different but adjoining concepts.


  • So we need to reform tax codes to allow entrepreneurs who exit their recent ventures to reinvest in new ventures. In other words, we need to recognise the reality of modern entrepreneurship: it takes more than one or two years to find and develop a suitable target for new investment, so tax exemption for reinvested proceeds of business sale should be stretched out to cover 3 years. A reduced rate of CGT for reinvestment over 3 years window can help here.
  • We need to empower entrepreneurs to incentivise their employees and key partners/advisers. Which means we should switch taxation of equity shares granted to employees and key contributors to new business from immediate tax liability on shares issuance to taxation at the point of shares disposal. When income arises, tax should arise. Until no income accrues, no tax should be levied.
  • We need to steer more funding toward risk capital or equity, away from preferentially-treated debt. Which means we should have symmetric tax applying to both capital gains on equity and gains realised from holding debt instruments (bonds), including Government bonds. There is no financial or ethical justification for exempting Government bonds from taxation net.
  • VAT threshold in Ireland is imposing too high of a burden on sole traders and self-employed. We should move this threshold to the levels found in the UK. Instead of EUR37,500, VAT should be levied from around EUR90,000. 


We also need to significantly reform our corporation tax policies. 

The headline rate is fine. But the loopholes are glaring and are damaging to our competitiveness through several channels:

  1. Tax loopholes are costing us in international markets by creating a perception that Ireland is a corporate tax haven
  2. Tax loopholes are funding the creation of a labour market that is severely skewed in favour of MNCs, inducing higher costs on SMEs and indigenous enterprise
  3. Tax loopholes are steering economic activity into non-productive areas where we have little chances to capture international comparative advantage (STEM areas of R&D, whilst our human capital base is better suited to develop sales, marketing, copyright and soft-innovation expertise).

One key loophole that has been introduced recently is the so-called ‘Knowledge Development Box’ that suits primarily (and almost exclusively) a narrow segment of MNCs, while providing no benefit for domestic enterprises. Another key loophole is treatment of foreign revenues domiciled into Ireland.

Shut them down.

The issue of reforming taxation system also goes to the heart of the ongoing debate about wealth inequality.

Except, contrary to what many (especially in the media) think, this debate is a bit more complex than our papers’ and TV programmes allow.

Economists Bill Gale, Peter R. Orszag and Melissa Kearney at the Brookings Institution recently showed that even a big increase in the marginal tax rate for top earners would have shockingly little effect on after-tax inequality in the U.S.

This covered such scenarios as raising the top individual income tax rate to 50 percent from its current level of 39.6 percent. Take the Gini coefficient is an index that ranges from 0, if everyone has the same earnings, to 1, if a single person has all the earnings and everyone else has none. When the authors calculated the Gini coefficient for after-tax income before and after the simulated tax change, they found that under the current tax schedule, the after-tax Gini coefficient is 0.574; raising the top marginal tax rate to 50 percent would reduce that only to 0.571. This difference is smaller than the effect of enlarging the share of the population with a college degree. Income inequality doesn’t change materially even if the revenue raised from a high-income tax increase is redistributed to households in the bottom income quintile, or if high earners are assumed to respond to the higher tax rate by reducing their work effort and taxable income.

For Ireland, the same measure would probably be even less productive in reducing income inequality. Why?  Because of our residency basis of taxation as opposed to the American citizenship-based system. And because our top earners (excluding public sector employed ones) are more mobile internationally than their U.S. counterparts.

Instead, in my view, reducing wealth inequality requires increasing wealth (not spending) of households that are currently below the top 20 percent of earners. This can only be done by simultaneously:

  • Increasing their after-tax incomes (to create savings surplus) by having lower tax burden at the upper margin of earnings, and
  • Increasing their investments in productive capital (not property) - e.g. business equity and entrepreneurship via incentives and behavioural nudging (for example, auto enrolment into pensions etc).


Now, let’s talk about capital investment side. 

I have some signifcant reservations about the new proposed capital investment 2016-2021 framework. Here they are.

1) ‘Something for everyone’ spatial development plan is an investment model followed by Irish banks in pre-2008 period: hosing cash wide in hope of striking a random pot of gold. Instead, what is needed is an in-depth, costed and scrutinised assessment of potential returns on investment. Project by project. And a tie-in of investment plans to a broader regional development scheme.

2) To give you an example: is our public capital priority to provide yet another link to Dublin airport? Or should it be to provide direct, quality train access to Ireland’s third largest city - Limerick?.. I don’t know. But I see nothing in the new framework analysing this. Should new priority development involve improving infrastructure links in parts of Ireland - e.g. Kerry to Limerick-Galway-Shannon links - or to sustaining & expanding public subsidies for transport provision? The point of investment is not to ‘give something to everyone’ but to prioritise areas where ROI is highest (social, economic, financial).

3) Prioritising investment must be based on factual analysis & scrutiny - both of which are lacking in the proposed framework. Examples of the contrary approach are Poolbeg Incinerator & Irish Water. Again, I see no change in the new plan on past modus operandi.

4) Any investment plan, based on prior experiences, should explicitly commit to capping a maximum percentage of total allocated expenditure going to auxiliary activities, such as consultancy fees, planning etc. Given the horrific track record of our public sector in securing value for money in capital investment structuring, eliminating waste should be a priority.

5) Why are new PPP rules going to be announced in 2017 when investment plan covers 2016-2021? Much of the projects will be allocated in 2016-2017, with expenditures happening later, but committed to under the old rules. If current PPP frameworks is not fit for purpose, how can we commit multi-annual programme to run under it. If current PPP framework does fit its purpose, why is it necessary to revise it in 2017?

6) Current cap spend is ~E3.5-3.7bn/pa. New plan E4.5bn/pa. So over 6 years the entire net new funding is just about enough to cover Dublin Airport link.

Truth is, Ireland needs to stop talking about State investments and State-run investment funds as a panacea for our economic problems. We need more productive, better managed private investment, more productive, better managed, better funded and more empowered public services, and more productive and better managed domestic private sectors.

There is much more that can and needs to be done within the context of structural reforms in Ireland, and within the context of the Budget 2016. My presentation today was neither designed to address all important aspects of both, nor has achieved a comprehensive coverage of all issues we face. This is not to say that the omitted considerations (for example relating to improving access for those in need to basic public services, improving the quality of all public services and so on) are less important than considerations I discussed above. No speech or presentation can aim to be comprehensive or perfectly complete.

The key point, therefore, of what I was focusing on today, is the need for dramatic, deep reforms of our policy formation and deployment systems and the need for new policies aimed to put Ireland onto the track toward human capital-intensive growth. So far, sadly, both of these objectives are missing from the Government and the main parties’ analysis.