5/4/2014: Russian Exports v Imports: composition and technological content

Another interesting chart showing the relative position for Russia in terms of technological intensity of the country exports and imports:

The core point here is that Russian exports-imports gap on technology side is not as large as one would have expected, but this is not due to higher intensity of exports. Instead, the apparently relatively benign (relatively is being used very very generously here) is down to quite low technological intensity of imports. 

This shows two things:

1) Highlighting the desperate need for massive technological upscaling of the Russian economy, and

2) Highlighting the desperate need for a (separately) massive diversification of Russian exports.

Note: the above is via BBVA Research

5/4/2014: World Market Power Index: G7 and G20

A side-note to my earlier post on G7 and G20 memberships: here is a chart showing market power index for top global economies. Note two sets of countries: the G7 and G20 as ranked by the index of their power in global markets:

Three out of current G7 states should not be anywhere near G7. You might argue about Saudi Arabia's place in the world's 'power by exports' rankings, but China and Russia certainly are diversified enough and have a strong enough sway to be in G7.

On a side note: this should settle the argument who can win from a Russia-Ukraine trade war...

5/4/2014: Mystery of exports-growth interconnections

An interesting piece of research from BBVA Research (April 2014) titled "The multifaceted world of exports: How to differentiate between export-driven strategies" dealing, in part, with explicit links between trade and growth across a large sample of countries (Ireland, unfortunately is not included, presumably because our exports are so massively dominated by the transfer pricing by the MNCs that even investment banks don't want to touch our data).

So one very important issue considered in the paper is the overall relevance of exports.

In summary: "Small and medium-sized East Asian economies lead on trade openness among emerging countries, while China outperforms in terms of the domestic connection of exports (i.e. related production generated by other industries). Latin American economies are below average in terms of openness, with Mexico additionally showing a very limited connectivity of trade, which is also the case of Indonesia. Poland outperforms in Emerging Europe as a more open exporter than Turkey and with better domestic connections than Russia."

Chart below summarises: (Fig 5)

Noteworthy feature of this chart is that with strong input from financial services, the UK is virtually indistinguishable from Russia and Canada. The curse of the City seems to be as bad as the curse of oil.

Couple other interesting takeaways:

1) Manufacturers tend to show more close links between exports and value added to the domestic economy (confirming my analysis from the PMIs for Ireland): "Domestic value-added in exports represents around 50% in manufactured goods, while this ratio is much higher for other activities, in which domestic natural resources, intermediation and labour intensity play a very important role. Among emerging economies, East Asian countries lag significantly behind in aggregate value-retention, while some commodity producers import a high share of final goods, which eventually drain the value-added generated at home due to the lack of manufacturing industries."

Chart below summarises: (Fig 8)

2) Diversification is a requirement for smaller open economies: "Product concentration is high for commodity exporters, as well as for specialised manufacturers, while China is the only emerging country with the global capacity to fix market conditions (not only from the supply side but also from the demand side). Saudi Arabia has that ability too for one very important sector: oil. In the case of small economies, for which world market power is much more limited, diversification is the remaining option for shelter from external turbulence."

I wrote about de-diversification of Irish trade that has been on-going with the switch in growth drivers from manufacturing toward ICT exports. But this is of far lesser concern or extent that what BBVA are noting for commodities-based economies. In some ways, we can even think of enhanced diversification happening in Ireland as pharma sector dominance is being eroded. Thus, the only concern in terms of future development is just how much concentration of trade will take place on foot of ongoing expansion of ICT services. For now, this is less of a structural problem than of the short term issue relating to distortions to our GDP and GNP.

3) Apparent technological content is not enough for success: This is a major kicker from our domestic point of view, as most of recent growth in our external trade came from expansion of technologically-intensive sectors. "Many emerging manufacturing countries have a significant share of exports with technological content rated as medium or high. However, none of them has a genuine surplus, as the majority of economies either also import a significant share of these products or just copy the technology or play an assembly role. On the other hand, India records a surplus in tech trade, with exports mainly comprising computer services."

Chart below summarises: (Fig 11)

3/4/3014: In the eye of a growth hurricane? Irish National Accounts 2013

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from March 23, 2014


Russian-Ukrainian writer, Nikolai Gogol, once quipped that "The longer and more carefully we look at a funny story, the sadder it becomes." Unfortunately, the converse does not hold. As the current Euro area and Irish economic misfortunes aptly illustrate, five and a half years of facing the crisis does little to improve one’s spirits or the prospects for change for the better.

At a recent international conference, framed by the Swiss Alps, the discussion about Europe's immediate future has been focused not on geopolitical risks or deep reforms of common governance and institutions, but on structural growth collapse in the euro area. Practically everyone - from Swedes to Italians, from Americans to Albanians - are concerned with a prospect of the common currency area heading into a deflationary spiral. The core fear is of a Japanese-styled monetary policy trap: zero interest rates, zero credit creation, and zero growth in consumption and investment. Even Germans are feeling the pressure and some senior advisers are now privately admitting the need for the ECB to develop unorthodox measures to increase private consumption and domestic investment. The ECB, predictably, remains defensively inactive, for the moment.


The Irish Government spent the last twelve months proclaiming to the world that our economy is outperforming the euro area in growth and other economic recovery indicators. To the chagrin of our political leaders, Ireland is also caught in this growth crisis. And it is threatening both, sustainability of our public finances and feasibility of many reforms still to be undertaken across the domestic economy.

Last week, the CSO published the quarterly national accounts for 2013. Last year, based on the preliminary figures, Irish economy posted a contraction of 0.34 percent, slightly better than a half-percent drop in euro area output. But for Ireland, getting worse more slowly is hardly a marker of achievement. When you strip out State spending, taxes and subsidies, Irish private sector activity was down by more than 0.48 percent - broadly in line with the euro area’s abysmal performance.

Beyond these headline numbers lay even more worrying trends.

Of all expenditure components of the national accounts, gross fixed capital formation yielded the only positive contribution to our GDP in 2013, rising by EUR 710 million compared to 2012. However, this increase came from an exceptionally low base, with investment flows over 2013 still down 28 percent on those recorded in 2009. Crucially, most, if not all, of the increase in investment over the last year was down to the recovery in Dublin residential and commercial property markets. In 2013, house sales in Dublin rose by more than EUR1.2 billion to around EUR3.6 billion. Commercial property investment activity rose more than three-fold in 2013 compared to previous year, adding some EUR1.24 billion to the investment accounts.

Meanwhile, Q4 2013 balance of payments statistics revealed weakness in more traditional sources of investment in Ireland as non-IFSC FDI fell by roughly one third on 2012 levels, down almost EUR6.3 billion. As the result, total balance on financial account collapsed from a surplus EUR987 million in 2012 to a deficit of EUR10 billion in 2013.

Put simply, stripping out commercial and residential property prices acceleration in Dublin, there is little real investment activity anywhere in the economy. Certainly not enough to get employment and domestic demand off their knees. And this dynamic is very similar to what we are witnessing across the euro area. In 2013, euro area gross fixed capital formation fell, year on year, in three quarters out of four, with Q4 2013 figures barely above Q4 2012 levels, up just 0.1 percent.

At the same time, demand continued to contract in Ireland. In real terms, personal consumption of goods and services was down EUR941 million in 2013 compared to previous year, while net expenditure by central and local government on current goods and services declined EUR135 million. These changes more than offset increases in investment, resulting in the final domestic demand falling EUR366 million year-on-year, almost exactly in line with the changes in GDP.

The retail sales are falling in value and growing in volume - a classic scenario that is consistent with deflation. In 2013, value of retail sales dropped 0.1 percent on 2012, while volume of retail sales rose 0.8 percent. Which suggests that price declines are still working through the tills - a picture not of a recovery but of stagnation at best. Year-on-year, harmonised index of consumer prices rose just 0.5 percent in Ireland in 2013 and in January-February annual inflation was averaging even less, down to 0.2 percent.

The effects of stagnant retail prices are being somewhat mitigated by the strong euro, which pushes down cost of imports. But the said blessing is a shock to the indigenous exporters. With euro at 1.39 to the dollar, 0.84 to pound sterling and 141 to Japanese yen, we are looking at constant pressures from the exchange rates to our overall exports competitiveness.

We all know that goods exports are heading South. In 2013 these were down 3.9 percent, which is a steeper contraction than the one registered in 2012. On the positive side, January data came in with a rise of 4% on January 2013, but much of this uplift was due to extremely poor performance recorded 12 months ago. Trouble is brewing in exports of services as well. In 2012, in real terms, Irish exports of services grew by 6.9 percent. In 2013 that rate declined to 3.9 percent. On the net, our total trade surplus fell by more than 2.7 percent last year.

Such pressures on the externally trading sectors can only be mitigated over the medium term by either continued deflation in prices or cuts to wages. Take your pick: the economy gets crushed by an income shock or it is hit by a spending shock or, more likely, both.

Irony has it some Irish analysts believe that absent the fall-off in the exports of pharmaceuticals (the so-called patent cliff effect), the rest of the economy is performing well. Reality is begging to differ: our decline in GDP is driven by the continued domestic economy's woes present across state spending and capital formation, to business capital expenditure, and households’ consumption and investment.


All of the above supports the proposition that we remain tied to the sickly fortunes of the growth-starved Eurozone. And all of the above suggests that our economic outlook and debt sustainability hopes are not getting any better in the short run.

From the long term fiscal sustainability point of view, even accounting for low cost of borrowing, Ireland needs growth of some 2.25-2.5 percent per annum in real terms to sustain our Government debt levels. These are reflected in the IMF forecasts from the end of 2010 through December 2013. Reducing unemployment and reversing emigration, repairing depleted households' finances and pensions will require even higher growth rates. But, since the official end of the Great Recession in 2010 our average annual rate of growth has been less than 0.66 percent per annum on GDP side and 1.17 percent per annum on GNP side. Over the same period final domestic demand (sum of current spending and investment in the private economy and by the government) has been shrinking, on average, at a rate of 1.47 percent per annum.

This implies that we are currently not on a growth path required to sustain fiscal and economic recoveries. Simple arithmetic based on the IMF analysis of Irish debt sustainability suggests that if 2010-2013 growth rates in nominal GDP prevail over 2014-2015 period, by the end of next year Irish Government debt levels can rise to above 129 percent of our GDP instead of falling to 121.9 percent projected by the IMF back in December last year. Our deficits can also exceed 2.9 percent of GDP penciled in by the Fund, reaching above 3 percent.

More ominously, we are now also subject to the competitiveness pressures arising from the euro valuations and dysfunctional monetary policy mechanics. Having sustained a major shock from the harmonised monetary policies in 1999-2007, Ireland is once again finding itself in the situation where short-term monetary policies in the EU are not suitable for our domestic economy needs.


All of this means that our policymakers should aim to effectively reduce deflationary pressures in the private sectors that are coming from weak domestic demand and the Euro area monetary policies. The only means to achieve this at our disposal include lowering taxes on income and capital gains linked to real investment, as opposed to property speculation. The Government will also need to continue pressuring savings in order to alleviate the problem of the dysfunctional banking sector and to reduce outflows of funds from productive private sector investment to property and Government bonds. Doing away with all tax incentives for investment in property, taxing more aggressively rents and shifting the burden of fiscal deficits off the shoulders of productive entrepreneurs and highly skilled employees should be the priority. Sadly, so far the consensus has been moving toward more populist tax cuts at the lower end of the earnings spectrum – where such cuts are less likely to stimulate growth in productive investment.

We knew this for years now but knowing is not the same thing as doing. Especially when it comes to the reforms that can prove unpopular with the voters.

Box-out: 

This week, Daniel Nouy, chairwoman of the European Central Bank's supervisory board, told the European Parliament that she intends to act quickly to force closure of the "zombie" banks - institutions that are unable to issue new credit due to legacy loans problems weighing on their balance sheets. Charged with leading the EU banks' supervision watchdog, Ms Nouy is currently overseeing the ECB's 1000-strong team of analysts carrying out the examination of the banks assets. As a part of the process of the ECB assuming supervision over the eurozone's banking sector, Frankfurt is expected to demand swift resolution, including closure, of the banks that are acting as a drag on the credit supply system. And Ms Nouy made it clear that she expects significant volume of banks closures in the next few years. While Irish banks are issuing new loans, overall they remain stuck in deleveraging mode. According to the latest data, our Pillar banks witnessed total loans to customers shrinking by more than EUR 21 billion (-10.3 percent) in 12 months through the end of September 2013. In a year through January 2014, loans to households across the entire domestic banking sector fell 4.1 percent, while loans to Irish resident non-financial corporations are down 5.8 percent. One can argue about what exactly will constitute a 'zombie' bank by Ms Nouy's definition, but it is hard to find a better group of candidates than Ireland's Three Pillars of Straw.

3/4/2014: Draghi's Put and Ireland's Woes

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from March 16, 2014


To those who lived through the tropical storms annually ravaging the Southern Atlantic coast of the US, calm is not always the tranquility beyond the storm. Often, it is the tranquility in the eye of a hurricane.

The current state of economic affairs in Ireland, the sunshine washing across the markets, the warm-ish glow of a recovery, the steady diminishment of the crisis rhetoric - all are the sign of a fragile state of affairs brought about by the extraordinary monetary policies of the ECB since the beginning of 2012. As such, the change in economic weather we have experienced to-date can be a temporary respite rather than a permanent rebound.

In October 2012, three months after declaring that the ECB will do whatever it takes to save the euro, Mario Draghi noted another worrying regularity - the problem of differential pricing of debt across the euro area. At first, he was referencing government debt markets. Later, he started to show concern for the same trends emerging in all credit markets, including those for corporate debt.

Ever since then, the ECB has signalled that the Central Bank's core policy in dealing with the crisis will remain accommodative. Historically low policy rates, the promises of the Outright Monetary Transactions and the structuring of the Banking Union – together constituting what is known as the Draghi Put – were the Frankfurt's attempts to break down the fragmentation across various euro area economies. These measures were successful in reducing the differences in sovereign bonds yields between the euro area member states. First Ireland, Italy and Spain, then Portugal and Greece, all peripheral countries have seen their bond spreads over the German benchmark 10 year bunds come down dramatically in the course of the last 20 months.

Since mid-2012, therefore, the Draghi 'Put' underwrote historically low policy rates. It is this 'Put' that has been credited by the researchers at the ECB and the IMF, as well as by a number of academics, as the main driver behind the decline in euro area peripheral countries cost of borrowing, saving Irish taxpayers billions in interest on Government debt, helping hundreds of thousands of Irish borrowers to lower tracker mortgages costs and supporting our exit from the Troika programme.

But, in effect, the Draghi Put has also thrown a veil of ignorance over the core problems still working through the euro area economies: problems of excessive legacy debts, lack of structural drivers for the recovery and the transfer of public and banking debts onto the households' balance sheets through fiscal austerity. ‘Whatever it takes' monetary policies might have been effective in alleviating the immediate pressures on European governments, but they did not cure the underlying disease.


In effect, the Draghi Put is not a solution to the crisis, but a potential problem of its own. It is a cure that is risking making the disease stronger.

Draghi Put has forced ECB rates (and with them the rates charged in the inter-banks markets) down to their historical lows.

Current repo rate, the main rate set by the ECB, is at 0.25 percent - the lowest since the ECB records began in January 1999. Over the period prior to the crisis, the already low (by individual nations' standards) ECB rates averaged 3.1 percent. And the duration of the ECB rates deviation from their historical norm is unprecedented: 62 months and counting. Prior to the current crisis, the longest period over which ECB rates deviated by more than 0.5 percent from their norm was 38 months. That happened in the period that created a massive financial bubble across the euro area – January 2003 through June 2006.

In general, the longer the rates rest below their long-term trend, and the further they deviate from the trend, the faster they tend to rise back toward trend levels. Exception to this norm is Japan, but hardly anyone would argue that Japanese scenario is even remotely desirable.

In simple terms, the current environment of historically low interest rates is not going to last forever. Indeed, it is unlikely to last for as long as the rates have been depressed to-date.

Alongside the above facts, there two more notable observations worth making. Darghi Put has led to a significant decline in the inter-bank lending rates. For example, Euribor 12 months contract rate has declined from the crisis-period average of 2.1 percent for the period prior to the Draghi Put to the average of 0.6 percent since July 2012. Similarly, there was a massive decline in the margin charged in the interbank markets relative to the ECB repo rate. At the same time, retail interest rates charged on new loans for Irish households and non-financial corporations have shut straight up to historical highs, when compared against the ECB policy rates. Ditto for the rates charged on existent loans.


All of this leaves our economy vulnerable to any normalisation in the interest rates policy.

Should Signore Draghi start reversing the policy rate, while Irish banks remain dependent on high lending margins to rebuild their balance sheets, Irish SMEs will face significant increase on the cost of financing their legacy loans, including the very same troubled loans that relate to property investments. Beyond triggering potential arrears and cost saving measures by the SMEs (involving layoffs), this will put strain on any growth in the SMEs sector. Capital investment costs will go up. Credit risk ratings will go down. Investment in the economy will be under severe pressure relative to the already exceptionally low rates.

Households currently working their way through arrears resolution process are likely to face high risk of relapsing into arrears. To-date, some three quarters of all restructuring deals done by the banks involve either temporary arrangements or ‘permanent’ deals that involve increases in debt carried by the households. They will face increases in the cost of restructured mortgages, impacting not only those on variable rate (the segment of the mortgage holders already heavily hit by the banks), but also trackers. Depending on how fast and at what time in the recovery process rates increases occur, the effect can be devastating. Households that are not in trouble with their lenders today will face a major hit on their incomes, depressing once again their consumption and investment and triggering a renewed bout of precautionary savings.

Counting existent loans alone, reversion to historical averages in ECB rates can take some EUR5.7 billion annually out of the real economy in higher interest costs. This would be roughly equivalent to a loss of double the annual contribution to our GDP by the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector.

The above factors can also pose a threat to the Exchequer in form of lower VAT, income tax, stamps and excise receipts, exacerbated by the potential increase in the cost of borrowing that goes hand-in-hand with higher policy rates.


The good news is that given Mr Draghi's current pronouncements, we are still months, or even years, away from higher interest rates. Better news, yet, Mr Draghi has communicated that he will provide 'forward guidance' on rates policy. This commits the ECB to supplying in advance clear signals as to its intentions. Even better news is that last week Mario Draghi clearly identified output gap (the shortfall in current economic growth relative to long-term potential rates of growth) as one of the parameters watched by the ECB. This strongly suggests that Frankfurt is likely to take into consideration structurally weak economic conditions prevailing across the euro area in setting its policy rates. Such a consideration further extends the period over which low rates are likely to remain in place.

The bad news is that the only way the rates can remain low is if the euro area core remains mired in a near-deflationary Japanese economic growth scenario.

In other words, we have a choice: either the economy remains in the doldrums, unemployment stays high and incomes growth remains subdued; or the rates will go up.

Mr. Draghi Put is not based on the smaller peripheral economies conditions, but on France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Finland and Austria as drivers of credit demand and low interest rates, and Germany as a break on low interest rates. Meanwhile, German lending constraints for non-financial companies have been at record lows for months now. There is a glut of credit in the euro area's largest economy. Thus, Germany will be ripe for rates hikes, as soon as inflation pressure picks up even moderately. The countries with shortages of credit supply are seeing their economies gradually pulling out of a recession. One can relatively safely assume that, barring new shocks, by the end of 2015 the ECB will start contemplating the end of Mr Draghi's Put.

Put conservatively, anyone with business loans or mortgages of duration greater than 5 years should be concerned. By last Central Bank of Ireland count, these loans amounted to 65 percent of all loans outstanding in the economy.


There is little we, in Ireland, can do about the direction of the ECB interest rates or the timing and the speed at which the rates increases will happen. About the only two things in our power are to ensure that current process of restructuring of SMEs loans and household mortgages is robust enough to withstand the shock of higher interest rates in the future, and that our households incomes retain the necessary cushion to absorb such increases. The former requires much more through and independently verified restructuring of our legacy debts. The latter requires lower tax burden, deep reforms and faster economic growth anchored in our real economy, not in the tax optimising MNCs-led sectors.

Absent these measures, Irish economy is a weak athlete swimming into a storm surge. The eye of the hurricane might make us feel better about our perceived strengths, but the clouds on the ECB’s horizon, no matter how distant, warn of a possible storm to come.

Box-out:

ESRI’s latest research paper on the impact of the banking sector competition on credit availability to the SMEs across the EU sheds some light on the urgency for Ireland to abandon the banking sector policy based on the Twin Pillars model.  “Does Bank Market Power Affect SME Financing Constraints?” published in an influential Journal of Banking & Finance argues that banking sector retrenchment across the Eurozone towards domestic markets and reduced competition between the banks “will lead to an increase in financing constraints for SMEs”. Such constraints “will inevitably lead to lower investment and potential output. “ According to authors, “the structure of the banking system has changed dramatically following crisis... This has substantially lessened competition for business credit in Ireland with only three main retail business banks remaining. This reduction in competition poses serious questions regarding the ability of the financial system to transmit credit to SME borrowers in a recovery scenario.” In short, given Irish SMEs’ heavy reliance on bank financing, we need more than a new pillar bank. We need a fully competitive financial system operating across the economy. This will be hard to deliver on. Irish Pillar banks continue to rely on state protection for even trivial market considerations, such as deposits rates setting by their competitors, e.g. An Post. And our regulators and policymakers are still clinging to the erroneous belief that competition in the banking sector in 2001-2007 has fuelled the boom and caused the crisis.

3/4/2014: Few links for this week...

Couple of recent media comments on a range of topics:

On Irish gas and oil exploration and production: http://monitorglobaloutlook.com/news-story/ireland-renews-push-for-offshore-oil-and-gas/

An interview (in Portuguese) on ECB's dilemmas: http://expresso.sapo.pt/o-mercado-espera-que-o-bce-acelere-a-politica-de-estimulos=f863259

On IMHO's latest initiative announced this week: http://www.irishexaminer.com/business/one-stop-shop-for-mortgage-customers-263976.html and http://news.ie.msn.com/business/they%E2%80%99re-back-bank-executives-to-face-tds-on-mortgage-restructuring

3/4/2014: Learning from the Irish Experience – A Clinical Case Study in Banking Failure

Our new paper on the future of banking based on Irish experience and lessons from the crisis:

Lucey, Brian M. and Larkin, Charles James and Gurdgiev, Constantin,

Learning from the Irish Experience – A Clinical Case Study in Banking Failure (September 23, 2013).

Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2329815

Abstract:  
 
We present a review of the Irish banking collapse, detailing its origins in a confluence of events. We suggest that the very concentrated nature of the Irish banking sector which will emerge from the policy decisions taken as a consequence of the collapse runs a risk of a second crisis. We survey the literature on size and efficiency and suggest some alternative policy approaches.

3/4/2014: Reforming Economics? Try Politics First...

This is an unedited version of my article for Village Magazine, February 2014


The Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession are actively reshaping the public discourse about the ways in which we analyse social phenomena, and how our analysis is shaping public policies choices.

In many ways, these changes in our attitudes to social inquiry have been positive. For example, more critical re-appraisal of the rational expectations-based models in macroeconomics and finance have enriched the traditional policy analysts' toolkits and advanced our understanding of choices made by various economic agents and governments. Shift in econometric tools away from those based on restrictive assumptions concerning underlying probability distributions and toward new methods based on more direct integration of the actual data properties is also underway. The result is improved analytical abilities and more streamlined translation of data insights into policy famework. The launching of the public debates about how we teach economics in schools and universities and how economic parameters reflect social and cultural values (as evidenced by the ongoing debate at the OECD and other institutions about introducing measures of quality of life and social well-being into economic policy toolkits) are yet more examples of the longer-term positive change. Absent such discussions, the entire discipline of social sciences risks sliding into complacency and statism.

However, in many areas, changes in our approaches to social studies have been superficial at best, and occasionally regressive. And these changes are not limited to economics alone, spanning instead the entire range of social sciences and related disciplines.

For the sake of brevity, let me focus on some comparatives between economic analysis and one other field of social policies formation: environmental policy. The same arguments, however, hold in the case of other social policy disciplines.

Prior to the crisis, environmental sciences largely existed in the world of mathematical modeling, with core forecasts of emissions paths and their effects on the environment relying on virtually zero behavioural inputs. These technocratic models influenced both public opinion and policies. The proverbial representative agent responsible for production of emissions, was not a human being requiring age, gender, family, income and otherwise differentiated supplies of energy, goods and services. In a way, therefore, environmental policy was further removed from the realities of human and social behaviour than, say, finance, monetary or macro economics. Where economists are acutely aware of the above differences as drivers for demand, supply and valuations of various goods and services, environmental policy analysts are focused on purely aggregate targets at the expense of realism and social and economic awareness.

The same remains true today. Over recent years, the thrust of environmental policies has drifted away from local considerations of the impact of pollution on quality of life and economic environment considerations. As the result, environmental policies and programmes, such as for example wind energy development or localised incineration of waste, are becoming more orthogonal, if not outright antagonistic to the  interests of consumers. Rhetoric surrounding these environmental policies considerations is also becoming more detached from the demos. For example, Ireland's attempt to make a play at European wind energy generation markets, replete with massive wind farms and miles of pillions, is now pitting our imagined (or mathematically-derived) exports potential, fuelled by nothing more than massive subsidies and consumer rip-off pricing for electricity, against all those interested in preserving the countryside's natural amenities, cultural heritage and other economically and socially meaningful resources.

Whereby behaviourally-rich analysis is now moving into the mainstream in finance and is starting to show up within the macroeconomic models, it is still wanting in the environmental policies research. The result is distortion of public responses and reshaping of political landscape around the environmental movements.


In most basic terms, there are three core problems with the current state of social sciences and policies formation mechanisms. None of these problems are new to the post-crisis world or unique to economics. In fact, in many case economics as a discipline of inquiry is years ahead of other social sciences in dealing with these shortfalls.  In summary the core problems are: insufficient modeling tools, poor data, and politically captive analytics and decision-making.


The first problem is the lack of rigorous modelling tools capable of handling behavioural anomalies. Put differently, we know that people often make non-rational choices and we occasionally know how to represent these choices using mathematical models. But we are far from being able to incorporate these individual choice models into macro-level models of aggregate behaviour. For example, we know that individually people often frame their choices in the broader context of their own and collective past experiences, even when such framing can lead to undesirable or suboptimal outcomes. Yet we have few means of reflecting this reality in economic models, although we are getting better in capturing it empirically. We can model habitual and referenced behavior of individual agents and we can even extend these models to macroeconomic setting, but we have trouble incorporating this behavior into explicit policy analysis. We also face mathematical constraints on our ability to deal with the more advanced and more accurate models extensions.

The problem of insufficient tools is often compounded by the problem of over-reliance on technocratic analysis that marks our policy formation. Put simply, we live in the world dominated by policy-making targeting aggregate performance metrics (such as global emissions levels or nation-wide GDP growth rates). This implies that we often aim to create policies that are expected to deliver specific and homogeneous outcomes across a number of vastly heterogeneous geographies – physical, cultural, political, social and economic systems, nations and societies. The only feasible approach to such policymaking is via technocratic reliance on ‘hard’ targets, often with little immediate connection to everyday life, and prescriptive policy designs. The core pitfall of this approach is that when a harmonised policy fails, it fails across all heterogeneous locations and environments. There is nothing more erroneous from risk management perspective than attempting to introduce a harmonised response to such systemic failures. Yet this is exactly what the policymakers strived to achieve in the setting of the euro area crises. The more reliance we place on technical models-driven solutions being right all of the time in all of the locations, the more harmonised and coordinated our responses to shocks are, the higher is the probability that a policy failure will be systemic, rather than localised.

The only alternative to this fallacy of reliance on technical analysis and hard targets-based modeling is to permit local innovation and differentiation. This historically-validated approach of the past, however, is not en vogue in the world where global institutions and aspirations dominate local objectives and systems, and where pseudo-scientific fetishism for technical knowledge dominates social sciences and policy making.


Beyond technocratic fallacy of over-reliance on mathematical models and the shortage of some key tools looms an even larger problem.

Consider the most recent example of a systemic failure by the economics profession to predict the current financial crisis. Instead of tools shortfalls, this failure rests with the problem of analysis and policy capture by political and economic interest groups that firstly determine the agenda for policy analysis and research, then define parameters and scope of such research and, finally, set bounds for measuring, monitoring and actioning data on policy outcomes.

With the onset of the financial crisis, economists working outside regulatory offices, ministries and central banks have gotten a much greater access to data than ever before. Still, even with data in public domain, analytical resources come at a cost premium, as anyone attempting to compete with, say the Department of Finance, finds out very quickly. By the time it takes an independent analyst to compile and analyse data, the Department of Finance can deploy dozens of staff to flood the media and public domain with own reports and papers. The asymmetry of resources drives the asymmetry of power in analysis and this fuels the asymmetry in policymakers’ perception of data insights. For example, lone voices of dissent or single pieces of contrarian analysis are pushed aside by the sheer magnitude of consensus, often representing little more than one agency replicating the insights of the other agency.

We might be able to produce better insights into the workings and risks of the banking sector today than before the crisis, but this does not mean that the actions of regulators and Governments are going to be any better informed or better tailored.

Even when independent analysis and scrutiny are available, regulatory and policy responses largely ignore empirical insights. In a recent study, myself and a co-author looked at asset prices across the number of advanced economies prior to and after the crisis. Using a very simple econometric model, we showed that data prior to 2006 was providing clear and loud signals as to the emergence of a number of crisis-level risks. However, to derive this result we had to calibrate the model using a parameter that was set at ten times the levels assumed to be likely by the banking regulators. Thus, by regulations, by own governance and remuneration standards, our public servants simply were not required to do this analysis. As the result, regulators around the world sleepwalked the entire financial system into the latest crisis and found themselves utterly unprepared for the fallout.

This is not unique to our study conclusions. Back in 2005-2006, inside the Irish civil service there were several senior voices raising concerns over the direction of our economy. These were echoed by a number of research papers and analysts warnings coming from the ranks of independent and academic economists. They were ignored not because they lacked empirical basis, but because the policymakers were captive to consensus view aligned with their own political objectives.

Nobel prize winners, Robert Shiller (2013), and Edmund Phelps (2006) economists such as Nouriel Roubini, Roman Frydman and Michael D. Goldberg repeatedly warned about systemic problems in the US property and financial markets back in 2004-2007. The NYU Stern School of Business research centre did the same for the banking sector. Last, but not least, in academic economics, research into non-rational, non-representative agent models has been on-going since the start of the 1990s, largely unbeknown to the general public and politicians. In fact, since the mid-1990s, majority of the Nobel Memorial Prize awards in economics went to researchers who pushed aside the bounds of rational expectations and/or representative agent frameworks.

Still, the problem of policy capture by the often poorly informed adherents to specific schools of thought is  hardly unique to economics. Let's take two examples of policies that have seized public imagination and policymakers' attention, while sporting only tenuous empirical foundations.

One is wind and wave energy. Although it appears that there is a near-consensus in academic and policy circles that these two sources of energy offer preferred alternatives to traditional fuels, in reality, such consensus can and should be questioned. The latent energy stored in water and wind is huge. However, wind energy harvesting is also subject to own externalities. One key one is the transfer of cost of pollution abatement from the commons relating to energy production and use, to the commons relating to land and natural amenities use. This externality was already mentioned above and its discovery credit goes to economics, not to environmental sciences. Another one is the transfer of the cost of energy-related pollution to consumers. In the real world, different consumers access energy through different channels. Some channels offer energy users a subsidy over the other. Some channels come with a choice that a consumer can make to substitute between different service providers based on environmental and economic costs considerations, other channels do not. Again, credit for pointing this out goes to economists; environmentalists are all too often simply opt to ignore these realities in pursuit of aggregate emissions targets over and above the consideration of their feasibility or their effectiveness in the face of social, cultural, political and economic realities.

For example, state-owned public transport is commonly priced differently from the privately-owned public transport and both are priced distinctly from private transport. Unless use of energy is explicitly and uniformly priced across all modes of transport and unless all modes of transport are perfectly substitutable, some consumers of public transport will receive subsidies at the expense of others and majority will be subsidized relative to private transport users. Thus, a suburban family is likely to pay a higher price for pollution per mile travelled than an urban one. The fact that in many cases a suburban family might have been forced (by planning, zoning, pricing and other systems operating in a heavily distorted markets) to make a choice of living outside the areas with dense cover by transport alternatives does not enter into the determination of pollution-linked taxes and prices. Any decent economist can be expected to understand this much. Yet the simplified worldview that public transport subsidies and private transport taxes are always good persists among our policymakers and within environmental lobby.

Another example of the policy that is empirically shoddy, yet politically heavily supported is electrification of transport. Recent research shows that in the US, even if electrical vehicles made up over 40 percent of passenger vehicles in the, there would be little or no reduction in the emission of key air pollutants. Now, consider the case of Ireland, where ESB has been running multi-billion euro investment programme aimed at developing EVs networks since the early days of the financial crisis. Just as the value of private sector investment shot through the roof, Irish semi-state sector, encouraged by policymakers and subsidized by high prices on consumers, launched into a major investment programme based on questionable benefits to the economy and society at large. The Government of the day even announced back in April 2010 (with the country rapidly hurtling toward an IMF-led bailout) a EUR5,000 grant to EVs buyers. That Ireland’s electricity supply comes from environmentally damaging sources does not phase the environmental policy advocates.


The debates about the current state of economics and social sciences in general are a welcome departure from the pre-crisis status quo, where such discussions primarily took place in the marbled halls of academia and beyond the scrutiny of public attention. However, it is worth remembering that the core problems faced by social policies analysts today are the ages-old ones problems of insufficient modeling tools, poor data, and politically captive analytics and decision-making. We might be able – with time and effort – to fix the first one. Fixing the other two will require a paradigm shift in the ways we collect and publish data, and in the ways our political and public service elites approach policy formation. Two thirds of economics and social sciences problems are political, not scientific.

3/4/3014: Tax or Not: Sunday Times, March 9, 2014

This is unedited version of my Sunday Times article from March 9, 2014


Speaking at last week's Fine Gael Ard Fheis, Minister for Finance, Michael Noonan, T.D. noted that "As a Government, we know that there are further opportunities in the years ahead for us to build upon the initiatives that have worked.  It is in this vein that …I will consider the introduction of targeted tax reductions that have a demonstrable effect on employment growth."

With these words, Minister Noonan finally set to rest the debates as to the Government intentions with respect to core policies for 2015 and thereafter. Whether you like his prior policies or not, he makes a good point: Ireland needs a tax-focused policy intervention. And we need an intervention that simultaneously addresses the declines in after-tax household incomes endured during the current crisis, and does not trigger rapid wage inflation and jobs destruction that can be associated with centralised wage bargaining. The window for an effective intervention is now, in part because as recent evidence shows, fiscal policy effectiveness is greater at the time of near-zero interest rates. But beyond an intervention, Ireland needs a longer-term reform of taxation system.


In general, any economic policy can be judged on the basis of two core questions. Firstly, does the policy offer the most effective means for achieving the stated objective? Secondly, is the policy feasible in economic and political terms?

Reducing income tax burden for lower and middle class earners yields an affirmative answer to all three of the above questions. No other alternative proposed to-date – a cut in VAT rate, a reduction in property tax burden, or an increase in public spending on core services to alleviate cost pressures on families – fits the bill.


Starting from the top, cutting income-related taxes in the current environment makes perfect sense from the point of view of economics.

The three stumbling blocks on our path to the recovery are anaemic domestic consumption, high burden of household debts, and collapsed domestic investment. All of them are interlinked, and all relate to low after-tax disposable incomes. But the last two further reinforce each other. High levels of household debt currently impede restart of domestic investment by both households and firms. They also act as partial constraints on our banks ability to lend. Meanwhile, low domestic investment implies depressed household incomes and high unemployment. In other words, reducing private debt and simultaneously increasing domestic investment should be a core priority for the Government.

On the other side of the national accounts equation, stimulating private consumption offers a weak alternative to the above measures. Due to high imports content of our average consumption basket most of the discretionary spending by Irish households goes to stimulate foreign exporters into Ireland. And it is this discretionary imports-linked spending, as opposed to consumption of non-discretionary goods and services, that has taken a major hit during the Great Recession. Beyond this, higher domestic consumption will do little to raise our SMEs exporting potential, in contrast with increased investment.

Take a quick look at the top-line figures from the national accounts. Based on data from Q1 1997 through Q3 2013, cumulative decline in personal consumption of goods and services over the current crisis amounts to roughly EUR5 billion, when compared against the already sky-high 2004-2008 trend. For gross fixed capital formation - a proxy for investment and capital spending - the cumulative shortfall is EUR50 billion against the 2000-2004 trend, which excludes peak of the asset bubble period of 2005-2007. Put differently, compared to peak, private consumption was down 12 percent in 2013 (based on Q1-Q3 data), while gross investment was down 65 percent. If in 2013 our personal consumption is likely to have returned to the levels last seen around 2005-2006, our investment will be running closer to the levels last witnessed in 1997-1998.

More significantly, lending to Irish non-financial, non-property SMEs has fallen 6.2 percent year-on-year at the end of 2013, as compared to 5 percent for the same period of 2012, according to the latest data from the Central Bank. Meanwhile, value of retail sales was down only 0.1 percent in 2013, according to CSO. Things are getting worse, not better, in terms of productive investment.

It is, therefore, patently clear that an optimal policy to support domestic growth in the economy should target increases in the disposable income of households and incentivise investment and savings ahead of stimulating consumption. It is also clear that such increases should be distributed across as broad of the segment of working population as possible.

To achieve this, the Government can reduce the burden of personal income taxation.

Alternatively it can attempt to target a reduction in the cost of provision of non-discretionary services, such as childcare, health, basic transport and education. In fact, the main arguments against lower taxes advanced by the Irish Trade Unions and other Social Partners are based on the idea that such costs reduction is possible were the state to invest taxpayers funds in further development of these services as well as provide subsidies to supply them to the broad public.

Alas, in practice, Irish public sector is woefully poor at delivering value-for-money. Since 2007 through 2013, inflation in our health services outpaced the general price increases across the economy by a factor of 5 to 1, in transport sector by 3 to 1 and in our education by 12 to 1. Pumping more money into provision of public services might be a good idea when it comes to achieving some social objectives. It is certainly a great idea if we want to stimulate public sector employment and pay, as well as returns to various consultancies and state advisers. But it is not a good policy for helping households to pay down their debts, increase their savings, investment and/or consumption.


Which brings us to the questions of economic and political feasibility of tax reforms.

This week, the Finance Minister confirmed that he will "try to begin the process of making the income tax code more jobs friendly" starting with Budget 2015. Most likely, the next Budget will consider moving the threshold for application of the upper marginal tax rate, currently set at EUR32,800. Minister Noonan described this threshold as being "totally out of line with the practice effectively all over the world, but particularly in Europe." And he's got the point. Across a sample of twenty-one advanced economies, including Ireland, the average effective upper marginal tax rate, inclusive of core social security taxes, currently stands at around 44.4 percent. In Ireland, according to KPMG, the comparable upper marginal tax rate is 48 percent. But an average income threshold at which the upper marginal tax rate kicks in is EUR136,691 in the advanced economies, or more than four times higher than in Ireland.

Widening the band at which the upper marginal tax rate applies to double the current Irish average earnings will mean raising the threshold to EUR71,500 per person per annum. This should be our policy target over the long-term, through 2019-2020.

However, given current income tax revenues dynamics delivering this target today will trigger significant fall-offs in income tax revenues. Data through February 2014, admittedly a very early indicator, shows effectively flat income tax receipts, despite large increases in employment in recent months. In other words, brining our upper rate threshold closer to being in line with the advanced economies average is, for now, a non-starter from fiscal sustainability point of view.

But gradually, over 2015-2016, increasing the 20% tax rate band to around EUR38,000-40,000 should be fiscally feasible, assuming the economy continues to improve as currently projected. This will leave those at or below the average earnings outside the upper marginal tax rate. But it will also provide relief to all those earning above average wages. In other words, widening the lower rate band will generate a broadly-based measure, with likely support amongst the voters.

At the same time, it will also yield significant gains in economic stimulus terms. At the lower end of the targeted band, such a measure would be financially equivalent to a tax rebate of around double the average residential property tax bill.

More importantly, widening the lower tax band will provide for an effective stimulus to the economy compared to all of the above measures. The reason for this is that unlike property tax and VAT, income taxes create economic disincentives to supplying more work effort in the market place. This effect is most pronounced for second earners, self-employed, sole traders and small business owners – all of whom represent core pool of potential entrepreneurs and future employers.

In addition, reducing income taxes, as opposed to consumption and property taxes provides both financial and behavioural support for investment, and savings for ordinary families. A number of studies of consumer behaviour show that savings achieved from the reductions in consumption taxes are commonly rolled up into higher consumption. On the other hand, higher after-tax labour incomes are associated with greater savings, investment and/or faster debt pay-downs.


Beyond widening the standard rate band, the Government can do little at the moment to stimulate disposable income of the households. Yet, in the longer term, we face the need for a more comprehensive and deeper reform of our tax system. Critical objective of such reform is to achieve a new system for funding the state that relies less on income tax and more on direct user-fees charges for goods and services supplied to consumers, plus taxes on less productive forms of capital, such as land, property and speculative assets. Changes in the underlying drivers for growth in the Irish economy will also necessitate tightening of corporate and income tax loopholes. This should lead to increased reliance by the state on corporate tax revenues, while freeing some room for the reduction in tax rates. In targeting these, the Government should focus on the upper marginal tax rate itself.

Designed with care and delivered with caution, such reforms can put Irish economy on the path of higher growth well anchored in the underlying fundamentals of our society: indigenous entrepreneurship, domestic investment and skills-rich workforce.

Box-out:

This week, the EU Commission published its 2014 Innovation Union Scorecard showing comparative assessment of the research and innovation performance across the EU. The good news is that Irish rankings in the area of innovation have improved from 10th to 9th over the last twelve months - not a mean task given our tight economic conditions and scarcity of funds across the economy. The bad news is that we are still ranked as 'innovation follower' and that our performance is still weak when it comes to developing a thriving innovation culture in the SME sector. As experience from the UK shows, just a couple of simple changes to Ireland's tax codes can help us enhance the incentives for SMEs to develop a more active innovation and research culture. We need to reform our employee share ownership structures to make it easier for smaller companies and entrepreneurs to attract key research personnel and promote innovation within enterprise. For example, in Ireland, employees securing an equity stake in the business employing them currently face an immediate tax liability, irrespective of the fact that they receive zero financial gain from the shares until these as sold. This applies also to smaller start-up ventures, particularly the Universities-based research labs. Thus, a researcher working in Ireland's high potential start-up or a research lab can face a tax liability on owning the right to a yet-to-be-completed research they are carrying out. This is not the case across the Irish Sea and in the Northern Ireland. In 2012-2013, the UK Government adopted 28 new policies aimed at promoting various forms of Employee Financial Involvement (EFI) in the companies that employ them. The UK has allocated £50 million through 2016 to promote public awareness of the EFI schemes and is actively working on reducing the administrative burden for companies and employees relating to EFI. It is a high time we in Ireland have followed our neighbours lead, lest we are content with remaining an 'innovation follower' in the EU for years to come.

3/4/3014: Latest Country Risk Updates: April 2014

Latest updates to ECR Euromoney Country Risk scores (higher score implies lower risk):

Two notable sets of changes:

1. Russia and Ukraine scores continue to fall, with Ukraine still leading Russia
2. Euro area 'periphery' scores continue to rise, with Portugal and Ireland showing biggest improvements.

2/4/2014: Global Manufacturing PMI in Two Charts: March 2014

Having posted on Irish Manufacturing PMI (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/04/242014-irish-manufacturing-pmi-march.html) here are two interesting charts plotting PMIs for a number of countries. Both via BusinessInsider:

and

2/4/2014: Irish Manufacturing PMI: March 2014

We now have Manufacturing PMI for Ireland for Q1 2014, so here are couple updated charts:

Few notable things in the above:

1. PMI now solidly above the 'statistical significance' range for the first time since October 2013. Also, March 2014 marks eighth consecutive month of PMI ahead of its post-crisis average (from January 2011).
2. The post-crisis average is still lower than pre-crisis average.
3. PMI continues to trend up with new short-term trend running from around June 2013.
4. 12mo average is at solid 52.1 and 3mo average through March (Q1 2014) is at 53.7 which is basically identical to 3mo average through December 2013 (Q4 2013) which is 53.6. 
5. Q1 2014 average is above same period reading for 2011 (49.8) and 2012 (50.1), but it is below same period 2010 average (56.1).

Key takeaway: solid PMI reading for Irish manufacturing - a good thing. As I noted before, Manufacturing PMI has stronger link to our GDP and actual industry output than Services PMI, so this is a net positive for the economy.