Saturday, February 8, 2014

8/2/2014: Economics of Olympic Games: Part 3: Cost Overruns


In Part 1 I covered the macroeconomic impact of Olympics (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/02/822014-economics-of-olympic-games-part.html) while Part focused on labour market impact and the effect of the games on the host city (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/02/822014-economics-of-olympic-games-part_8.html)

So now, on to business case (cost-benefit and cost) estimates

Remember all the cost overruns in Sochi? Spectacular, right? Unprecedented, right?

Flyvbjerg, Bent and Stewart, Allison, Olympic Proportions: Cost and Cost Overrun at the Olympics 1960-2012 (June 1, 2012. Saïd Business School Working Papers, Oxford: University of Oxford, 23 pp: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2238053) looked at whether "different types of megaprojects have different cost overruns?

"In this study, we set out to investigate cost overruns in the Olympic Games. To do so, we examined the costs of the Games over half a century, including both summer and winter Olympics. We looked at the evolution of final reported costs and compared these to the costs established in the Games bids, submitted to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) up to seven years before the Games occurred. In so doing we established the largest dataset of its kind, and documented for the first time in a consistent fashion the costs and cost overruns for the Olympic Games, from 1960 to 2012."

So the findings are: "We discovered that the Games stand out in two distinct ways compared to other megaprojects:

  1. The Games overrun with 100 per cent consistency. No other type of megaproject is this consistent regarding cost overrun. Other project types are typically on budget from time to time, but not the Olympics. 
  2. With an average cost overrun in real terms of 179 per cent – and 324 per cent in nominal terms – overruns in the Games have historically been significantly larger than for other types of megaprojects, including infrastructure, construction, ICT, and dams." 
Or more succinctly: "The data thus show that for a city and nation to decide to host the Olympic Games is to take on one of the most financially risky type of megaproject that exists, something that many cities and nations have learned to their peril."

But, of course, London 2012 Games were different, right, cause that what is being claimed vis-a-vis Sochi 2014 experience… Err… "For the London 2012 Games, we find that:

  1. With sports-related real costs currently estimated at USD14.8 billion, London is on track to become the most costly Olympics ever. 
  2. With a projected cost overrun of 101 per cent in real terms, overrun for London is below the historical average for the Games, but not significantly so. 
  3. The London cost overrun is, however, significantly higher than overruns for recent Games since 1999. London therefore is reversing a positive trend of falling cost overruns for the Games."



Sochi 2014 cost-benefit estimates are actually provided here: Pilipenko, Igor V., The Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics: The Cost-Benefit Analysis and Ways to Improve the Project Efficiency (September 25, 2013. Electronic Publications of Pan-European Institute, 4/2013, (ISSN 1795-5076), 52 p: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2333902)

8/2/2014: Economics of Olympic Games: Part 2: Labour Market & Host City Impacts


In Part 1 of the post I covered macroeconomic impact of Olympic Games:  http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/02/822014-economics-of-olympic-games-part.html

Here, let's take a look at labour market impact and the effect of the games on host cities. As before, emphasis is mine.


Labour markets outcomes?

Feddersen, Arne and Maennig, Wolfgang, Mega-Events and Sectoral Employment: The Case of the 1996 Olympic Games (March 2010. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1868805) used the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, "which are also outstanding as one of the very few large sporting events where ex post academic analysis found significant positive effects." The study looked at 16 different sub-sectors of the economy, extending previous studies econometric methodology.

Key finding: "Regarding the Olympic effect, hardly any evidence for a persistent shift in the aftermath of or the preparation for the Olympic Games is supported. We find a significant positive employment effect in the monthly employment statistics exclusively during the staging of the Olympic Games (July 1996). These short-term effects are concentrated in the sectors of 'retail trade', 'accommodation and food services', and 'arts, entertainment, and recreation', while other sectors showed no such effects."


And worse: Willner, Jonathan and Aravantinos, Elias, Impact of the 1996 Summer Olympic Games on Unemployment in Georgia. (Southwestern Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2004: http://ssrn.com/abstract=761825) find negative effects.

"Atlanta's 1996 Olympic Games were considered the most successful Olympics in the history of the event. Success in this case is based on financial considerations. There is no doubt that there was a tremendous economic activity associated with not only the city but much of the state of Georgia. Additionally it is well known that the Olympic Games are not a typical sport event, but a social event with several economic and financial extensions."

However, "At issue is whether the Olympic Games constitute a consumption or investment activity. We look at multiple measures of labor market changes in Georgia around the Olympics. We find limited positive effects on employment levels in counties close to but that did not have Olympic venues. Further we find that some measures of Olympic effects on labor market measures are startlingly negative."


But what about the fabled host city impact?

Nitsch, Volker and Wendland, Nicolai, The IOC's Midas Touch: Summer Olympics and City Growth (August 30, 2013. CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4378. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2319870) show that "Hosting a mega-event is a costly activity of short duration. Still, cities frequently compete to become host of all types of events."

So for Summer Olympics, using a difference-in-differences methodology, the authors looked at "the rates of population growth of Olympic cities, candidate cities and other large cities in host and candidate countries over the period from 1860 to 2010. We find that, following the Games, host cities experience a measurable decline in population growth relative to cities in the control group. Our results indicate that being awarded the Summer Olympics has, on average, a negative impact on cities."



How on earth can this be the case if there are alleged cultural, marketing etc opportunities presented by the Olympics? Right, may be it is due to the sole large benefit the games provide? Yep, the old-fashioned property boom.

Kavetsos, Georgios, The Impact of the London Olympics Announcement on Property Prices (June 9, 2012. Urban Studies, Vol. 49, No. 7, 2012: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1552322) "estimates the impact of the London 2012 Olympics announcement on property prices. Using a self-constructed dataset of a sample of property transactions, it is estimated that properties in host boroughs are sold between 2.1 and 3.3 per cent higher, depending on the definition of the impact area. A similar investigation based on radius rings suggests that properties up to three miles away from the main Olympic stadium sell for 5 per cent higher. It is estimated that the overall impact on the price of properties in host boroughs amounts to £1.4 billion, having substantial social and financial implications for existing residents."

So property becomes more expensive... what do you think happens to larger families with kids? And to potential would be migrants who would have moved into the city?


Never mind macroeconomic effects (negative) and labour market effects (negative) and host cities impact (negative)... may be there is a business case to be made for hosting Olympics? Tune in to the next post...

8/2/2014: Economics of Olympic Games: Part 1: Macroeconomic Impact


Part one of the series of posts summarising some economic evidence on the effect of Olympics on host economy. Emphasis within quotes is mine.


Cost-Benefit of Olympics in macroeconomic context:

McHugh, Darren, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of an Olympic Games (August 2006. http://ssrn.com/abstract=974724) estimated "the net benefit to Canada of the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic Games. Two particular classes of problems in Olympic CBA are studied in detail":

  1. "the unique nature of project dependency in an Olympic Games, and this is surmounted by the classification of Olympic-related costs and benefits as "Event-related" or "Infrastructure-related", with rules for handing each in the context of a CBA for an Olympic Games."
  2. "the estimation of net benefit of three types of "Olympic Outputs", namely the Olympic Spectacle, the Olympic Halo (the feelings of pride engendered in the residents of the host city), and the tourism induced by an Olympic Games."

Key results:

  • "a correct accounting of induced Olympic tourism shows that the net benefit of this tourism is substantially less than its widely touted "economic impact". 
  • "Although a detailed estimation of infrastructure costs and benefits is outside the scope of the paper, their contribution to the net benefit of the Games under the proposed project accounting rules is clearly negative."
  • "The net benefit of the Olympic Games is therefore also substantially negative when the estimates of Olympic benefits from this paper are combined with published estimates for event costs."



Long-run v short-run outcomes from macroeconomic perspective:

Ferris, Stephen P. and Koo, Sulgi and Park, Kwangwoo and Yi, David T., Gold, Silver, Bronze or Tin? The Short and Long Term Effects of Mega Sporting Events (July 1, 2012. KAIST Business School Working Paper Series No. 2012-005. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2104963)

"This paper examines the short and long term effects of the Summer Olympics, Winter Olympics, and the World Cup on the economy of the host country."

The core finding: "selection for hosting the Summer Olympics only produces a significant positive announcement period effect in the host country’s domestic equity market. This effect however resides solely in the construction and building materials industry."

Beyond this rather shallow impact, "the Summer Olympic game hosting nations generate significant positive economic performance up to 3 years prior to hosting the event, while this positive economic performance disappears 1 year after hosting such an event."

Overall: "Our results suggest that contrary to the conventional claims by mega sports organizers, it appears that there are no significant long-run economic gains from hosting such mega sporting events."



Only positive impact discovered to-date is via exports channel:

Rose, Andrew K. and Spiegel, Mark M., The Olympic Effect (April 2009. NBER Working Paper No. w14854. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1376157)

"Economists are skeptical about the economic benefits of hosting "mega-events" such as the Olympic Games or the World Cup, since such activities have considerable cost and seem to yield few tangible benefits. These doubts are rarely shared by policy-makers and the population, who are typically quite enthusiastic about such spectacles." Obviously, rarely there is a surprise to be found in a discovery that politicians and public tend to disagree with economics... but...

"In this paper, we reconcile these positions by examining the economic impact of hosting mega-events like the Olympics; we focus on trade. Using a variety of trade models, we show that hosting a mega-event like the Olympics has a positive impact on national exports. This effect is statistically robust, permanent, and large; trade is around 30% higher for countries that have hosted the Olympics."

Is that it, then? Not really. "Interestingly however, we also find that unsuccessful bids to host the Olympics have a similar positive impact on exports."

Why? "We conclude that the Olympic effect on trade is attributable to the signal a country sends when bidding to host the games, rather than the act of actually holding a mega-event."


Note: couple other papers were profiled earlier on this blog: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2012/10/18102012-some-tough-love-from-stats-for.html
http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2012/08/282012-bit-of-olympic-bubble.html


Stay tuned for labour market impact and local regional impact studies summaries...

8/2/2014: BlackRock Institute Survey: EMEA, February



BlackRock Investment Institute released its latest Economic Cycle Survey for EMEA region. Emphasis is mine.

"With caveat on the depth of country-level responses, which can differ widely, this month’s EMEA Economic Cycle Survey presented a bullish outlook for the region.

"The consensus of respondents describe Slovenia, Croatia, Turkey and, the Ukraine to be in a recessionary state, with an even split of economists gauging South Africa to be in expansion or contraction. Over the next two quarters, the consensus shifts toward expansion for South Africa and the Ukraine."


Note: Red dot represents Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Hungary, Romania, Poland, Slovakia

And out 12 months: "At the 12 month horizon, the positive theme continues with the consensus expecting all EMEA countries to strengthen or remain the same with the exception of Turkey."


"Globally, respondents remain positive on the global growth cycle with a net 88% of 43 respondents expecting a strengthening world economy over the next 12 months – an 6% increase from the net 82% figure last month. The consensus of economists project mid-cycle expansion over the next 6 months for the global economy."

Note: these views reflect opinions of survey respondents, not that of the BlackRock Investment Institute. Also note: cover of countries is relatively uneven, with some countries being assessed by a relatively small number of experts.

8/2/2014: Irish Mortgages Crisis: More of a crisis, less of a solution


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from January 19, 2014.



With Dublin property prices and rental rates on the rise optimism about bricks and mortar is gradually re-infecting our living rooms and feeding through to the government and banks' expectations concerning the mortgages arrears.

The good news is that, per latest data, there has been a decline in the arrears reported by the Department of Finance. Across the six main lenders tracked by the department, mortgages in arrears were down by 1,903 in November 2013, compared to September.

The bad news, however, is that the very same figures show that the banks continue to focus on largely cosmetic debt relief measures. In many cases such restructuring tools are potentially pushing distressed borrowers deeper into debt. The fact that Official Ireland lauds such measures as 'permanent' also indicates a lack of serious consideration of the risks faced by the distressed borrowers in the future.


Let's take a look at the latest mortgages numbers, reported by the Department of Finance. To caveat the discussion below, these numbers exclude smaller, predominantly sub-prime lenders, whose borrowers are currently nearly all in arrears.

As of November 2013, there were 116,481 principal residences mortgages accounts in arrears, comprising 17 percent of all principal residences accounts. Counting in buy-to-lets, 148,727 accounts were behind on their contractual repayments, which represents 18 percent of all mortgages. The Department does not report the amounts of mortgages or actual cumulated arrears involved, but based on the data from the Central Bank of Ireland, at the end of Q3 2013, mortgages in arrears amounted to 26 percent of all housing loans.

Of the above, 20,325 principal residences mortgages in arrears over 90 days have been restructured representing just over a quarter of all arrears in this category of mortgages. This number is only 1,812 higher than in September 2013, and is down 89 on August 2013.

We do not know what exactly happened to the mortgages that were reclassified as no longer in arrears nor restructured. The omens are not great, however. Based on the Central Bank data, around half of all previously restructured mortgages relapse into arrears. Some properties have probably gone into repossessions or were voluntarily surrendered.

This lack of clarity signals a deep state of denial by our policymakers and civil servants of the true causes and extent of the crisis. Overall, figures supplied by the Department of Finance classify mortgages into ‘permanently restructured’ and ‘temporarily restructured’. There is no methodological clarity as to what these designations mean. The data reported is not audited and the process of restructuring to-date is not being independently tested by anyone. A systematic registry of various solutions applied by the banks simply does not exist and no one can see the models used in structuring these solutions and their underlying assumptions. The fog of secrecy surrounding mortgages arrears resolution process is thick.

Everyone involved in the process of mortgages arrears resolution knows that the real problem faced by distressed borrowers is the level of debt they carry. But restructuring data reported by the Department of Finance tells us nothing about total debt levels of the households before and after restructuring. Adding insult to the injury, our data excludes unsecured debt – a major barrier to mortgages sustainability and a huge obstacle to banks offering borrowers forbearance. No secured lender can be expected to agree a debt reduction plan for a mortgage, when unsecured lenders are expecting to be made whole.

The official data also separates principal residences from buy-to-lets, despite the fact that a large number of households with arrears on the latter also face difficulties funding the former. Are risks being shifted from one side of the household balancesheet to another?

We are living through a debt crisis of historically unprecedented proportions and yet we are still refusing to threat household debt in a holistic approach. Instead, the overarching belief in the system is that once a mortgage account is restructured, the borrower is no longer at risk. To achieve such an outcome, the bank can offer a household anything between extending temporary interest-only arrangement to offering a split mortgage.  A term extension, or arrears capitalisation, or a fixed repayments scheme in excess of interest-only repayments, or a hybrid of all of the above, is all that is officially available.

The strategy for dealing with distressed borrowers, therefore, is to roll the arrears into either a top-up to the existent mortgage or set up a future claim against the property, and forget the problem ever existed. In medical terms, the analogy is to removing a person off the hospital patients’ list, once she is transferred out of the emergency.

This treatment is problematic because it assumes that the distressed borrowers who went into the arrears will be able to service their new mortgages until full repayment. It further assumes that any future shocks to household finances and to the economy can be covered under the new arrangements.

None of these assumptions have been tested by the independent analysts. All of these assumptions can raise significant questions, when one considers what sort of arrears resolution deals are being offered by the banks.

Suppose a bank makes a mistake in its risk assessment of the proposed solution and, after years of making due payments, the household slips into financial difficulties once again. There is nothing in the system to address such a risk. The household will face the cost of the new crisis, plus the residual cost of the current one, plus the loss on all payments made between now and the moment the new crisis materialises.  In contrast, the bank faces lower cost. The officials responsible for the present system face, of course, no risks at all.

How likely is the above scenario? Per official data, 60 percent of all 'permanent' restructurings involved rolling up accrued arrears and/or stretching out repayments over longer time horizon. In other words, including interest payable, the debt levels associated with such restructurings are greater than those incurred under the original mortgage. This begs a question – how will these households deal with higher future interest rates that are likely to materialise given the longer horizons and larger life-cycle debts of their restructured mortgages? Another question worth asking is how can capitalisation of arrears address the original causes of the financial distress that has led to arrears accumulation?

At most, less than one in six of all mortgages in arrears have been ‘permanently’ restructured without risking an increase in the overall life-time debt levels. Only one in twenty five of all defaulting mortgages were modified on the basis of some risk sharing between the banks and the borrowers. The vast majority of Ireland’s distressed borrowers are expected to pay the full price of their own and bank’s errors. Instead of restoring debt sustainability to Irish households’ finances, the system appears to be aiming to provide only a temporary cash-flow relief.


The key stumbling blocks to the successful resolution of mortgages arrears are, unfortunately, the cornerstones of the personal insolvency regime reforms and of policies aimed at dealing with distressed borrowers.

These include the fact that Irish homeowners are facing the full cost of dealing with the banks without any support from the state. This stands in contrast to the UK model where these costs are usually in part or fully covered by the banks. High costs and cumbersome bureaucracy deter many homeowners from engaging with the banks and from seeking professional and independent advice in restructuring their debts. So far, only one bank, the AIB Group, has voluntarily committed to helping its distressed borrowers to access independent support. The rest of the Irish banking system, including the regulators, are happy to make borrowers pay.

The pilot scheme designed by the Central Bank to deal with the problem of unsecured debt has now run its course. There is a complete silence across the official channels about its successes or failures, or about its potential renewal. Which suggests that the scheme was a flop. Meanwhile, the banks are refusing debt reductions to mortgages arrears, often citing lack of cooperation from unsecured lenders. We will never know how many of the 59,620 ‘permanently’ restructured borrowers could have availed of some debt relief but were failed by the dysfunctional system.

More ominously, we have effectively no regulation over the resolution schemes advanced by various banks. For example, through November 2013, there were 6,090 split mortgages solutions extended. Vast majority of these involve lower cost of borrowing offset by a delay in debt claim realisation. In contrast, one of the major banks currently is in the process of developing a split mortgage product that will offer borrowers an option of converting the capitalised portion of the split back into normal mortgage at some point in the future. In exchange, the borrowers will be offered a sizeable debt write-off for a portion of their mortgage.  Such a product is vastly superior to all other split mortgage arrangements in place, but it will be treated as identical to them in future reports.

The latest data on mortgage arrears resolutions clearly shows that the Irish State is unwilling to forgive those who fell into debt distress under the hardship of the Great Recession.  Instead of helping families to overcome the debt problem, our system is designed to help the debt problem to gain control over the debtor.



Box-out:

With the first issue of post-Troika Irish bonds safely away, it is time to reflect on the NTMA's opening gambit in the markets. Whatever one might say about the agency, its timing of this month's sale was impeccable. In the global markets, investment funds have been migrating out of fixed income (bond markets) and into equity markets pretty much throughout most of 2013. This trend is now accelerating. Usual bulk buyers of sovereign bonds are also starting to slow their appetite. Sovereign Wealth Funds, especially those located in Asia and the BRICS, are facing slowing domestic economic activity, reduced funding inflows from their exchequers and increased political pressures to reinvest domestically. Euro area banks, other large buyers of government bonds, are continuing to repay ECB-borrowed funds. They too are unlikely to demand significant amounts of Government bonds. And, looming on the horizon, large euro area issuers are about to swamp the market with fresh supply. Spain and Italy alone are planning to sell some EUR712 billion worth of new bonds to fund maturing debt and new deficits. All of this suggests that both supply and demand pressures later in 2014 can make it tougher for smaller euro area countries to tap the markets. Which makes NTMA's this month's timing so much wiser.

8/2/2014: Yahoo's Tax Base (err… Optimisation) is Moving to Ireland


Some slowdown in the tax haven news for Ireland recently and now a return back: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/07/us-yahoo-europe-tax-idUSBREA160Y420140207

Yahoo! Inc will shift its European tax base to Ireland from Switzerland, due to mounting pressures on Swiss tax codes.

Aptly, French authorities, already rather irate about Irish tax loophole known as Double-Irish are fuming: http://www.irishtimes.com/business/sectors/technology/yahoo-move-a-blow-to-france-1.1682566

And of course our own leaders are denying… citing our tight to have a low tax rate... as if someone is challenging the rate. Nothing like 'deflect and deny' strategy at work.

You can track some of the top stories on Irish tax regime in the news starting from here:
http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/01/2112014-no-special-ict-services-tax-but.html
or by searching this blog for 'tax haven'.


As an aside: 

There is an interesting dichotomy being played out across Irish policy and state institutions and the MNCs when it comes to the Double Irish loophole in the tax code.

The dichotomy is based on the argument that since Double Irish is not illegal, there is nothing wrong with it.

Let's quickly consider this argument: MNCs and the Irish State promote good corporate 'citizenship' via extensive deployment of and support for Corporate Social Responsibility programmes. So far so good.

Via Double Irish, the same MNCs with the blessing of the Irish State are at the same time reducing tax payments in the countries where the MNCs use public infrastructure, institutions and benefit from returns to social capital that are paid for, in large, by taxes. When this is done by locating actual value-added activities in a country, like Ireland, with low tax rate, there is a reduction in demand for the above resources in other countries (e.g. MNCs employees use these services and returns in Ireland instead of, say, France). But when it is done via loopholes and transfer pricing, the employees of MNCs are staying in the locations where the value-added is created (e.g. France), while their tax base is partially migrating to an arbitrary and unrelated to value-added activities jurisdiction (e.g. Ireland).

Thus, the function of these loopholes is to transfer resources from the activity-linked jurisdiction to Ireland. It is a zero sum game (no new value is created) and it is a beggar thy neighbour system (one jurisdiction gains at the expense of the other). In simple terms, whether it is legal or not, it is wrong.

So how come the executives of the companies and the State officials who so loudly extol the virtues of corporate citizenship so quickly forget the said virtues and run for the cover of legal codes when it comes to tax regime? Is ti because the price of doing things right is different from the price of doing things legally?

8/2/2014: Irish Services Sector Activity: FY 2013


In the previous posts I covered:
Monthly data for Irish Services Index for December 2013: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/02/822014-services-index-monthly-series.html, and
Quarterly series:
http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/02/822014-q4-2013-data-on-services.html

Now, time to update full year figures for 2013.

First, y/y changes between 2012 and 2013:


Main point - even with 5.7% annual growth in ICT services and 22.3% growth in Administrative and support services, overall services sectors expanded by only 0.9% in 2013. Do note, this is a value index, so inflation is factored in too.

But what about longer term growth? Sadly, we only have comparable data from 2009 on. So here are the changes between 2009 and 2013, cumulative:


And two main drivers in the above are ICT services (remember those MNCs that book activity taking place across Europe into Ireland, as if Irish operations produced them?) and Wholesale Trade services (now exhausted and falling 6% y/y in 2013). In other words, nothing really is growing over the long range.

And with this, over the last 4 years, cumulated growth in all services recorded was just 3.5%. Inflation alone exceeded this by almost double.

But things are getting better, right? Growth is returning? Right? Here's a chart comparing growth in 2012 compared to 2011 and in 2013 compared to 2012. The positive values are where growth conditions improved, negative - where they deteriorated:


No comment.

8/2/2014: Q4 2013 data on Services Activity in Ireland


In the previous post I covered some top-level data for Irish Services Index for December 2013: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/02/822014-services-index-monthly-series.html

As promised, we now shall take a look at the data on quarterly basis, stripping out some volatility in the monthly series. Note, all data below references seasonally-adjusted series.

In Q4 2013, compared to Q3 2014:

  • Wholesale Trade activity shrunk 1.71%, pushing y/y drop to 5.85% which is worse than the 4.54% annual drop recorded in Q3 2013. The sector reading is the lowest since Q4 2010.
  • Wholesale and Retail Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles sector activity fell 5.89% in Q4 2013 compared to Q3 2013, and there was an annual drop of 7.95% in Q4 2013, much worse than 0.19% decline recorded in Q3 2013. The sector is at the lowest reading for any quarter since Q3 2011.
  • Transportation & Storage sector activity fell 5.73% in Q4 2013 compared to Q3 2013, and there was an annual drop of 4.47% in Q4 2013, much worse than a rise of 1.34% recorded in Q3 2013.
  • Accommodation and Food Services sector activity rose 3.73% in Q4 2013 compared to Q3 2013, and there was an annual rise of 1.34% in Q4 2013, much better than a 3.6%% decline recorded in Q3 2013. The sector reading is at the highest level since Q3 2012
  • In the above, Food services sector activity rose 4.89% in Q4 2013 compared to Q3 2013, and there was an annual rise of 5.27% in Q4 2013, much better than 0.99% decline recorded in Q3 2013.
  • Also in  the above, Accommodation services activity rose 6.29% in Q4 2013 compared to Q3 2013, and there was an annual rise of 0.83% in Q4 2013, much better than 6.93% decline recorded in Q3 2013.



In the above chart:
  • ICT sector activity rose 1.96% in Q4 2013 compared to Q3 2013, and there was an annual rise of 1.96% in Q4 2013, much worse than 4.45% rise recorded in Q3 2013.
  • Professional, Scientific and Technical services sector activity fell 3.26% in Q4 2013 compared to Q3 2013, and there was an annual drop of 12.38% in Q4 2013, much worse than 5.16% decline recorded in Q3 2013. The sector hit its historical low in Q4 2013.
Now, to the last bit:
  • Administrative and support service activities sector rose 0.96% in Q4 2013 compared to Q3 2013, and there was an annual rise of 20.94% in Q4 2013, compared to 21.77% rise recorded in Q3 2013
  • Overall services activity fell 2.23% in Q4 2013 compared to Q3 2013, and there was an annual fall of 2.69% in Q4 2013, compared to a rise of 2.19% y/y recorded in Q3 2013.
And summary of q/q changes for Q4:


So decent news on Accommodation and Food sector side, poor growth on ICT services side and for Admin and backoffice side, and outright shrinking on all other sectors...

Annual data summary next.

8/2/2014: Services Index: Monthly Series December 2013


CSO released cheerful headlines for Irish Services Index, measuring activity in the largest part of the Irish economy.

Here's from the CSO release: "The seasonally adjusted monthly services value index increased by 1.3% in December 2013 when compared with November 2013 and there was an annual decrease of 1.5%."

Oops… things are up m/m and down y/y. But obviously the headline reads only the former, none of the latter.

"On a monthly basis, Information and Communication (+5.4%), Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities (+3.5%) and Administrative and Support Service Activities (+2.3%) showed increases when compared with November 2013.    Other Service Activities (-3.2%), Transportation and Storage (-1.6%), Accommodation and Food Service Activities (-1.1%) and Wholesale and Retail Trade (-1.0%), decreased when compared with November 2013."

Spot the problem? Controlling for ICT services (wait till Yahoo washes all its tax arbitrage through Dublin next) the only tangible, value-added activity that rose was Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities. We have no idea what drove this, but a rise here, excluding insolvency and mortgages arrears-related services and collection agencies would be helpful.

You really have to look at annual basis decomposition to see what is happening in the economy, though: "On an annual basis, Administrative and Support Service Activities (+27.7%), Information and Communication (+4.0%) and Accommodation and Food Service Activities (+2.4%) increased when compared with December 2012." That was is for increases: more paper pushing across tables, more back office supports and more adjoining ICT services. On the other hand, the rest of services are tanking: "Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities (-9.1%), Wholesale and Retail Trade (-8.2%), Transportation and Storage (-6.8%) and Other Service Activities (-6.5%) decreased when compared with December 2012."


So let's illustrate the above 'trends' in a few charts.




 Do keep in mind that, ex-ICT services, the Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities are our 'knowledge economy'. The trend here is down, down and down.

But now for the services sector overall:


The trend above is clearly showing a marked slowdown in activity in Q3-Q4 2013, just when we were being fed a steady diet of 'Things are Only Getting Better'. Am I missing something here? With all the ICT Services booming and all the Admin and Backoffice activities rising, we were supposed to get a strong retail season and a hopium-filled boost to domestic services too... But, apparently, we are having trouble recording these magnificent increases in the data?.. Oh, and do note, the data is in value terms, so inflation here is helping to push 'activity' up.

And the PMIs were booming too, for Services, just as the services activity was slipping?..


Next post will take a deeper look at the dynamics, controlling for monthly volatility. Stay tuned.

Friday, February 7, 2014

7/2/2014: US Labour Force Participation Rate


Illustrating the disaster that is US Labour market:


via Ioan Smith @moved_average

The latest reading is 62% for January 2014. We are in the late 1970s, just after the infamous bouts of stagflation have ravaged the US economy, setting stage for the Reagan's 'revolution'…

In trailing news, of course, the Non-Farm Payrolls report for January was a massive miss on expectations, with only 113,000 new jobs actually recorded against the analysts' hopium fuelled 180,000 expectation.

With that, employment to population ratio (the one I track for Ireland and the one many Irish economists and media talking heads are saying I should not track - cause they don't like it) rose to 58.8%.

Unemployment fell from 6.7% to 6.6%, getting dangerously close to the Fed's imaginary 6.5% bound (the promise of Fed hiking rates at/after 6.5% is about as real currently as the promise of Mario Draghi to 'activate' OMT). But on a big positive side: unemployment rate for those with only a high school education fell from 7.1% to 6.5% as construction industry started hiring once again skill-less workers.


Note: for Ireland, participation rate currently stands at 60.7% (Q3 2013) down from 64.7 in Q3 2007 so proportionately, Irish decline is slightly smaller than the US decline...

Thursday, February 6, 2014

6/2/2014: What Does the Future Hold for Ukraine: ECR Comments


ECR published four expert comments about the state of the Ukrainian economy: http://www.euromoneycountryrisk.com/Analysis/ECR-Forum-What-does-the-future-hold-for-Ukraine-

Here are the comments (including my own) for those who have no access to ECR site (click on image to enlarge):





6/2/2014: Rip-Off Ireland: Alive and Kicking… Courtesy of the State


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from January 26, 2014.


Ninety five years ago, in his book The Economic Consequences of Peace (Chapter VI, pg.235-236), John Maynard Keynes observed that "By a continuing process of inflation, governments can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens."

This week's announcement of price hikes by VHI serves as a timely reminder of the salience of Keynes' analysis.  As are the CSO release of comparative data for the cost of living and income per capita for Ireland and the rest of the EU.

The former shows the extent of the ongoing confiscation of households’ wealth through targeted price increases – a core feature of Irish response to the crisis. The latter highlights the combined effects of inflation and income declines on Irish consumers. In 2012, Ireland was the fifth most expensive state in the European Union in terms of the cost of final consumption by private households. At the same time, Irish per capita pre-tax national income, adjusting for purchasing power differentials, was only 11th in the EU.

Irish recovery from a deep fiscal and financial crisis has been a tale of financial repression. Since 2008, our successive Governments have underwritten the status quo of inefficiencies in public services, as well as the cost of recapitalizing the failed banks using the sweat and blood of Irish consumers and taxpayers. As a by-product of this, the state transferred vast amounts of wealth and income from the Middle Ireland and the less well-off households to state-protected and often state-owned producers of goods and services.


Significant parts of these transfers took form of targeted inflation.

Per CSO data, released earlier this month, average annual consumer inflation in 2013 fell to just 0.5 percent, less than one quarter of the average annual inflation recorded in 2011-2012. However, underlying these figures, there is a growing disparity between price trends in the sectors dominated by the state and the sectors where private enterprises compete directly for consumer demand. Not surprisingly, the highest inflation over 2013 was recorded in state-priced and state-owned sectors, such as Education, where prices rose more than nine times faster than across the whole economy.

Looking at the longer-range data reveals an even greater divergence between the state-controlled and market prices. Since the beginning of 2008 through December 2013, aggregate consumer prices rose by slightly more than 3 percent in cumulative terms. Over the same period of time, state-controlled prices were up 22 percent. These sectors cover goods and services that account for around one third of all household consumption in Ireland. Meanwhile, private sectors prices are up only 0.2 percent.

Take the Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas and Other Fuels category, where cost of services to Irish consumers, on aggregate, fell 3.7 percent between 2007 and 2013. This decline was driven by a 25 percent drop in Mortgage Interest costs and 13 percent decline in Private Rents. Costs also fell across virtually all maintenance and repair services associated with housing. In contrast, Local Authority Rents and state-controlled gas prices rose almost by one fifth over the same period. Cost of electricity was up 26 percent. All state-controlled or regulated prices within this group are on the rise, with majority posting double-digit inflation.  Price inflation in the energy sector is now so far divorced from underlying costs that a single new entry into the market by Energia is expected to drive prices down by some EUR 300 per annum, potentially erasing two thirds of the price hikes introduced over the last two years.

None of the above services, however, come close to the rampant inflation in Health and Education.

Since the onset of the crisis, costs of Hospital Services in Ireland rose more than 36 percent, over three times the rate of inflation for Outpatient Services. The very same policies that purposefully drove up the cost of Hospital Services are also responsible for a whooping 117 percent cumulative rise in Health Insurance costs since 2007. These policies forced health insurance purchasers to cover the shortfalls in funding available to the HSE, despite the fact that their insurance premiums and general taxes already fund state healthcare. As the result, the cost of health insurance rose at more than three and a half times the rate of inflation in home insurance costs and eleven times faster than inflation in motor insurance.

Tertiary education charges are up 60 percent since 2007. Private-sector dominated secondary and vocational education services meanwhile saw costs rise at roughly one third of the rate of inflation registered in our ITs and universities.

Based on CSO-estimated weights of different goods and services in a standardized consumer basket, inflation in controlled sectors is responsible for confiscating, using Keynes’ terms, just over 10 cents out of every euro spent on consumption of goods and services by an average household in Ireland since the beginning of the crisis. CSO and IMF reported producer prices and international exchange rates and inflation comparatives show that majority of these losses had nothing to do with increased costs of raw materials, intermediate goods and capital used in production. Put simply, they represent a crisis levy designed and imposed by the State and its semi-state companies.


Grim as they are, official inflation statistics, however, tell only a part of the story of wealth destruction imposed onto Irish consumers.

The above costs of inflation are compounded by the declines in Irish households’ disposable incomes due to various tax measures since 2008, combined with decreases in earnings and working hours. All in, Irish households’ today have around 12-15 percent lower disposable incomes than prior to the crisis. Factoring in the effects of unemployment and inflation, in terms of real purchasing power, Irish households are now down some 28 cents on the euro since the beginning of the crisis. Only around 2 cents of this decline is due to private sectors’ inflation with the rest taken up by changes to taxes, regulatory and pricing policies, plus by the monopoly power awarded to state-protected sectors.

Real Ireland - our lower-, middle and upper-middle classes - is paying the full price of the banking, fiscal and economic crises. Meanwhile, the State elites - senior public sector and semi-state officials, managers, politicians, state services executives and affiliated professionals - are ripping the benefits in form of jobs security, pensions and quality of life.


The economics of state confiscation of income through inflation and taxation do not end there, however. The real impact of these measures of financial and fiscal repression can only be dealt with in the context of their distribution across various households and demographics.

Normally, in response to price changes, consumers have an option to alter their demand for goods and services. In the case of ordinary consumption goods, this means that we switch away from more expensive alternatives.  Overtime, adjusting for quality of supply, our demand favors lower cost producers and suppliers, who gain market shares at the expense of more expensive, less-efficient ones. Thus, more elastic or more responsive demand helps not only to offset the painful costs of inflation in the short run, but also engenders innovation and competition in the longer term.

For example, during the current crisis, Irish consumers showed strong willingness to opt for discount stores when it comes to shopping for groceries and basic household items. Per latest reports from the retail sector, this Christmas, Tesco’s share of the Irish groceries markets shrunk by 6.2 percent at the expense of Aldi and Lidl which increased their share of the Irish market by double digits. A by-product of this is that the discounters are now offering increasingly more goods tailored to Irish tastes and are widening the breadth of offers in their stores across various segments of consumers. Another upside is that indigenous Irish competitors, such as SuperValu, are gaining the ground in this competition.

In contrast, consumers have little choice in switching away from the state-controlled or monopolised sectors. In 2013, Water Supply and Miscellaneous Services prices were up 64 percent on 2003 levels. More price hikes will come once Irish Water starts issuing charges under the state license to raise prices unabated for the first six years. All without any alternative of a different supplier being available to consumers.

Indirect effects of inflation are also stronger for consumers of goods and services with habitual or long-term demand. Healthcare and education are multi-annual commitments with little room for changing consumer behaviour in response to prices. Patterns of transport demand, linked to choices of location where one lives, are also less responsive to price changes, offering few options for trading out of the adverse effects of inflation. In all of these sectors, consumers have no choice but to pay for price increases. Demographically, younger households, usually heavily indebted via mortgages and struggling financially are the prime targets of this inflation.

Keynes had more to say about the role inflation pays in destroying households’ wealth and income. “… By this method [of inflation, the Governments] not only confiscate, but they confiscate arbitrarily; and, while the process impoverishes many, it actually enriches some. The sight of this arbitrary rearrangement of riches strikes not only at security, but at confidence in the equity of the existing distribution of wealth."

In the case of Ireland during the current crisis, all of the above rings true, save for one important correction: Irish state-sanctioned inflation confiscates wealth and income by transferring money from productive private savings, investment, and consumption to shore up inefficient and often wasteful state services and semi-state sectors. There is little that is arbitrary in the context of the Rip-off Ireland ca 2014.





Box-out:

"You cannot corral a company to go to a particular part of the country unless it will make sense for their business ‐‐ particularly when the company's alternative location may be Amsterdam, Barcelona or Munich”. With these words the IDA spokesperson this week explained why agency-supported multinationals have been largely staying out of the regions, while flocking into Dublin. IDA made a perfectly valid point. Manufacturing exports, even stripping out patent cliff-hit pharmaceuticals, are barely expanding. Remote back office services – the bread-and-butter of so-called ‘call centres economy’ – are on decline across the advanced economies. This leaves what economists call human capital-intensive sectors – the ones largely dominated by jobs for highly-educated 22-35 year-olds coming choosing Ireland as their career stop-over. Working for Google, Facebook, Twitter and other internationally networked globally-trading multinationals, these employees do not want to live in the suburbs, let alone move to the countryside. They require cultural, social and economic amenities of large cities. Whether we like it or not, the MNCs of the 21st century inhabit the world where human capital defines productivity growth, profitability and value added. Bricks and mortar attractions of an IDA Park somewhere in the middle of nowhere do not. Time to bin Bertie’s Era Spatial Development Plans and to think how to transition our regional economic development model to a new and more sustainable basis.