29/10/2012: BAML note on Ireland's Troika Review

A glowingly positive, albeit un-detailed, under-researched and rather tenuous on the subject covered, note from BA Merrill Lynch on Ireland's latest quarterly Troika review (link). This suggests that (1) all that matters for Ireland is 'exiting' Troika bailout, (2) OMT take up of a whooping €24bn of banks debts is just a matter of technicality, to be resolved in early 2013 (oh, we wish) and (3) the ECB is somehow going to find it plausible to support the banking-fiscal systems tie up that according to ECB and the rest of Troika is performing well without ECB/OMT/ESM support.

Now, what logic can lead BAML to conclude any of the things above remains a mystery.

My own view on the Troika review is provided here.

28/10/2012: Long term investor risk perceptions

Blackrock research on risk attitudes of long-term investors:

So within 1year we have a massive flip on perceptions concerning pensions decisions, amidst a relatively robust markets performance.

28/10/2012: BNP note on Spanish Bonds risks

A neat summery from BNP on (1) current bond ratings, and (2) links between ratings and eligibility for inclusion in bond indices:

And a few words on the importance of Spanish ratings risks to ESM/OMT etc:

"As has been demonstrated throughout the EU debt crisis, credit ratings can have a material impact on sovereign bond markets. ...However, not all downgrades have the same effect on bond yields. More specifically, the loss of an AAA rating (S&P on France and Austria, for example) and, more importantly, the loss of investment-grade status (Greece, Portugal) matter more than other downgrades and may have dire consequences for sovereign bonds, because of the significance of those two ratings levels as critical thresholds for investors."

"The downgrade to sub-investment grade, in particular, is linked to the eligibility criteria for various global bond indices, i.e. the minimum rating required for a sovereign bond to be included in an index. Fund managers tend to track the performance of major bond indices and, as a result, when a country’s sovereign bonds drop out of an index due to ratings ineligibility, investors have to adjust their portfolios and offload the country’s bonds. So, any downgrades to sub-investment grade could lead to massive selling flows and have a huge impact on the bond yields of the country in question. More than that, quite often, markets tend to front-run the ratings agencies and start to offload the bonds of the country they suspect may be downgraded to sub-investment grade in the near-term future."


"... Currently, Spanish ratings are getting extremely close to those same [as Portugal in 2011 downgrade case] eligibility thresholds. In general, BBB- is the critical limit for bond index eligibility, but different indices have different rules on calculating a single rating for each country (they can use, say, the average, middle, best of all, or specific ratings). For Spain, currently rated BBB-/Baa3/BBB, any trio of one-notch downgrades is going to push the average rating below the eligibility threshold."

"Credit ratings are important not only with respect to eligibility for the major bond indices, but also in calculating the haircut the ECB applies to collateral posted by European banks. According to the ECB’s graduated haircut schedule, an extra 5% haircut is applied to ratings in the BBB+/BBB/BBB- range (the ECB uses the best rating of S&P, Moody’s, Fitch and DBRS). This extra 5% haircut applies only to category 1 assets, which include government bonds. For other assets, like bank, corporate and agency debt, this extra haircut can reach up to 23.5%, creating severe additional collateral requirements for banks."

"This is particularly important for Spanish banks, which tend to absorb around EUR 400bn of liquidity from ECB’s open market operations. The ECB recently announced that it is suspending the application of the minimum credit-rating threshold to its collateral eligibility requirements for the purposes of the Eurosystem’s credit operations for marketable debt securities issued or guaranteed by the central government of countries that are eligible for OMTs or are under an EU-IMF programme and comply with the associated conditions. However, this does not affect the application of the previously mentioned graduated haircut approach."

"So, focusing on Spain, a one-notch downgrade by DBRS would mean that marketable securities issued by Spain would fall into the higher haircut range and Spanish banks would have to post additional collateral with the ECB. A trio of one-notch downgrades by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch would push the Spanish average rating below BBB- and Spanish bonds out of those bond indices that use the average rating as the threshold for eligibility. For those bond indices that use the middle rating of S&P/Moody’s/Fitch (or the better of the first two), a one notch downgrade by each of Moody’s and S&P would be enough to push the single rating below the eligibility threshold, too. Because of this, any upcoming developments in relation to (1) direct bank recapitalisation by the ESM, (2) a Spanish request for a precautionary programme, (3) economic and social developments in Spain and (4) funding rates are going to be critical, as they could prompt further downgrades, with severe implications for the Spanish bond market."

"If any of these downgrade combinations takes place before Spain has made an official request for a programme, we believe a request would, in effect, become inevitable. At the same time, if Spain asked for a programme tomorrow, this would not necessarily mean that any further downgrades would be off the cards. Almost all of the ratings agencies have said that they will have to assess whether ESM intervention is likely to become a complement to or a substitute for market access. If it turns out to be the latter, this would be in line with a downgrade to the sub-investment-grade category."

"At this point, we should mention that if Spanish bonds are removed from the global bond indices, this could have an impact on Italian bonds as well. The reason is that some investors may have replaced their Spanish bond holdings with an Italian bond proxy in order to benefit from better liquidity and protect themselves from panic selling, should Spain be downgraded further. As a result, if Spanish bonds’ drop out of various indices, these investors could suddenly find themselves overweight Italy versus the index, so they would have to sell some of their Italian bonds to re-adjust their weightings and track the index."

"We saw this kind of move when Portugal was downgraded to junk by Moody’s in July 2011 (taking into account that this was not completely expected by the markets and PGB liquidity had already dried up). In the five days after Portugal’s downgrade, 5y Italian and Spanish yields jumped by 95bp and 65bp, respectively."

Nasty prospect, albeit the risks are diminishing, in the short run, imo.

28/10/2012: ECB and technocratic decay?

Some interesting comments from BNP on ECB and Mr Draghi's tenure to-date. The note is linked here.  But some quotes are enlightening [comments are my onw]:

"While the ECB justifies the OMT as being to improve the functioning of the monetary system, the fact it has done nothing to help the monetary system in Ireland or Portugal suggests the scheme is about fiscal financing." [I fully agree]

"The balance-sheet implications of buying in the secondary market are the same as if bonds had been bought in the primary market. Mr Draghi’s adherence to the spirit of the Treaty is in question. We support his flexibility, however." [In the short run - yes, Draghi's flexibility is a necessary compromise. Alas, in the long run it is of questionable virtue. Hence, as I remarked ages ago, it's not the measures the ECB unrolls in the crisis that worry me, but the impossibility of unwinding them without wrecking havoc on the economy.]

"...Mr Draghi did [cut rates] in November and December [2011], taking rates back to where they started the year before the two misguided mid-2011 hikes. Mr Draghi cut rates again in July 2012, not only taking the refi rate below the 1% barrier (to 75bp), but also cutting the deposit rate to zero, apparently in an attempt to reinvigorate the interbank market (so far, fruitlessly). Mr Draghi should be praised for cutting rates and for overcoming the 1% barrier, in our view." [I agree.]

"However, he seems to be reluctant to take the deposit rate below zero, which looks timid. Moreover, he has failed to stimulate private credit supply. The LTRO has facilitated the expansion of credit to governments, but to some extent, this has crowded out private-sector credit, where growth is now down 0.8% y/y (-0.4% adjusted for sales and securitisation). The line that this is due to weakness in credit demand is a feeble excuse for the ECB failing to do enough to stimulate supply or to circumvent the lack of credit supply, for example, through credit easing. This has been the major failure of Mr Draghi’s tenure." [I am not so sure on BNP rejecting the idea of weak demand. Most likely, both weak supply and demand are reinforcing each other. More on this once we have our paper on SMEs access to credit published in working paper format, so stay tuned].

And the last blast, the potent one: "If central bankers don’t want politicians to mess with central banking, central bankers would be wise not to mess with politics. Mr Draghi was intimately involved in Italian politics and the demise of former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s tenure in the summer of 2011. More recently, his plans for the OMT were reportedly shared with the German chancellor’s office well in advance. The ECB is a very political animal under Mr Draghi. As the only institution with pan-eurozone power, a prominent role for the ECB in crisis resolution and a strong link to politics
may be unavoidable, and even desirable. But ultimately, such links may return to haunt it." [Yep, I agree. Mr Draghi's competence in office comes with a typical European price tag - get a technocrat and surrender checks and balances. This both signifies to the sickness at the heart of Europe (technocracy displacing democracy) and the inability of the 'patient' to develop institutional path for dealing with this sickness (with EZ potentially/arguably facing either a collapse in the hands of democracy or decay in the hands of technocracy).]

28/10/2012: Some more EZ forecasts from Citi

Two more charts from Citi Research highlighting some growth differentials within the Euro area (note second chart - Ireland position).

As I mentioned before, these are not my views, these are Citi forecasts. Where I broadly agree with Citi on: 1) Ireland is likely to outperform EZ average growth in longer term (I am not sure about 3.0 and 3.1 percent growth in real terms in 2015-2016); and 2) EZ growth is likely to average around or below 1% in 2014-2016. More short-term, I doubt EZ will stay in a recession territory in 2013 (full year) and in 2014.

27/10/2012: Ireland, Euro Area and US 2013-2016

Another interesting set of data from the Citi Research:

Table 1: These are Citi forecasts for real GDP growth. Two pints of interest:

1. Ireland v Euro area: 2.4 v 0.3 average rates of growth forecast for 2013-2016
2. US v Euro area

On the second point, chart below clearly shows support for my long-held thesis (since 2002 at leas) that in the long run, it is not the US that is decoupling from the World economy, but Europe...

Note: these are not my forecasts. My outlook differs from Citi outlook.

27/10/2012: Irish Exports to Emerging Markets

Some good news (via Citi Research):

The above shows the sizable extent of Ireland's trade with Emerging Asian economies.

However, not all is great in the field of Irish trade diversification:

If you look closely in the chart above (here's a snapshot):

It is pretty clear that Ireland's exports as a share of GDP have declined in 2000-2011 period for Asia, Mid East, Africa and Latin America. This represents a worrying trend, since these are the regions of future growth and, more importantly, these are also the regions more suited for our indigenous exporters. Much of the decline, in my view, is probably driven by exits of some MNCs from servicing these markets via Ireland.

27/10/2012: UK Q3 2012 'Growthology'

So UK is out of the second-dip recession? But, seemingly not out of the Great Recession:

via Citi Research.

At this speed of a 'recovery' UK folks can look forward to a down-cycle peak-to-peak of 5.5 years this time around, as compared to 4 years in the 1930s, 3 1/4 years in the 1970s and 1980s and 2 3/4 years in 1990s.

Never mind... it was so all curable by the Olympics & the Jubilee... Or as Citi put it:
"The rebound from the Jubilee in Q2 probably added about 0.5% to Q3 growth, while the direct effects of Olympic ticket sales added roughly 0.2%, and the ONS notes that there may have been wider positive effects from the Olympics on service sector growth (and this is the sector which was much stronger than we expected). So underlying growth in Q3 may have been 0.2-0.3% QoQ. In our view, the underlying path of the economy has been fairly flat throughout the last four quarters, with erratic swings in individual quarters: GDP fell in Q1 and Q2, reflecting weakness in construction in both quarters plus the adverse effects on activity of the Queen’s Jubilee, and the Olympics plus rebound from the Jubilee played a major role in the positive Q3 figure. The more that Q3  benefited from temporary Olympics-related positives, the more likely that Q4 GDP growth will disappoint as that boost fades."

27/10/2012: UBS on Irish banking debt restructuring

UBS' European Weekly Economic Focus is dealing in detail with the prospects of Ireland getting a deal out of the EU Summits promises to break the links between the banks liabilities and sovereign liabilities. Comments are mine.

"Taking the June 29th statement at face value, there is a strong case for supporting Ireland by breaking the link between the government and the financial system." 

[I wholeheartedly agree - the case can be made across a number of points: (1) Ireland de facto underwritten the euro system in the early stage of the crisis; (2) the cost of (1) to Irish taxpayers is unprecedented in modern history; (3) Irish banking fallout is partially based on absolutely mis-shaped monetary policy pursued by the ECB; (4) Ireland is the only country in the euro periphery, in my view, that has potential to organically grow out of the current Great Recession, assuming the country gets a significant (€40-45 billion) writedown on the banks debts; and more]

"There are two potential routes for euro zone support to the Irish state. The direct route involves the ESM acquiring all or a part of the government’s stake in the banks, thereby assuming responsibility of the Irish lenders and absolving that liability of the Irish state. The alternative, less generous, approach is a relief on the promissory note/ELA commitments by the ECB."

[I disagree - the impact from both of these measures taken individually will be minor. What is needed is a combination of the two measures, with ELA commitments writedown of at least €30 billion. The reason for this is simple: the ESM will not be able to take on IBRC liabilities even in theory as IBRC is not a functional bank. Hence, route 1 outlined by UBS can amount to ca €5-6 billion in maximum potential recovery to the Irish state. Route 2 take by itself alone will simply see marginal relief on the net present value of promo notes liabilities, something close to €3 billion yield. Hence, even combined, such measures are unlikely to generate more than €10 billion, or roughly 1/8th of the assumed current and future liabilities.]

"In our view, there is very little chance that the ESM will acquire a stake in Irish lenders any time soon, for the simple reason that a direct ESM intervention requires the establishment of a euro area bank regulator and that would take a long time, in our view." [I agree. And worse, not only ESM has to be fully established, it also has to be fully operational and, potentially, have a track record of sorts before it can be used to underwrite banking sector directly.]

"What’s more, Ireland will need to remain a programme country for longer. Depending on the potential scale of the intervention, the first argument is likely more important that the second, but either way this route is not likely to be available for a long time." [I fully agree and this is the reason why I argued earlier this week that the Irish Government push to 'exit' the programme is rushed and unwise.]

"How about a recapitalisation via the sovereign? To start with, this approach does not help sever the link between the sovereign and the banks, one key driver for euro area intervention. More importantly though, it is not clear to us that Ireland will qualify for that sort of intervention even if it tried, for the simple reason that ESM funds can only be provided to limit ‘the contagion of financial stress’. The financial sector in Ireland is no longer a threat to the rest of the euro area and, as such, it would not qualify for ESM intervention. 

[I spoke about this factor for a number of years now. As long as Ireland continued replacing private liabilities to bondholders and inter-bank funding sources with sovereign obligations, it continued to dilute its own power in the bargaining game. I warned years ago that once we complete this process, we will be left alone. No tramp cards in our hands. Fully exposed to carrying the weight of banking debts on taxpayers shoulders. This Government and the previous one have failed to listen. Now, its a payback time.]

"The only way around this is if the ESM facility is made available retrospectively, but that is unlikely if the statement from the Dutch, Finnish and the German finance ministers where they rejected ESM assistance for ‘legacy assets’ is true." 

[At the time of June 29th summit I wrote about the cumulative potential exposures that such retrospectively can yield. It was clear then, as it is clear now, that ESM will not be able to absorb all potential calls on such a measure. Hence, Fin Mins statement breaking retrospectively clause is fully rational and expected.]

The rest of the note is based on a superb and must-read analysis by Karl Whelan of the promo notes.

In summary - and this is my view - Irish policymakers have carelessly forced the country into a corner: we worked hard to assure some stabilization in fiscal space, which in turn undermined our ability to get meaningful relief. Congratulations to our policy makers who seemingly traded the interests of the longer term debt crisis resolution for friendly pats on the back from Europe.

26/10/2012: Sectoral breakdown of Retail Sales

In the previous post I looked at the Retail Sales dynamics from the point of view of whether September and Q3 2012 data show any really exciting change in trend to warrant exceptionally upbeat headlines. There were, basically, none.

But what about all the 'sales increases' rumored and even discussed in the analysts' reports?

Let's take at annual growth rates for Q3 by broad categories of sales:

As chart above clearly shows, majority of the categories are under water when it comes to y/y comparatives for Q3 2012.

And the same applies for Volume of sales:

Now, let's take a look at each category individually:

• Books, Newspapers, Stationery & Other Goods: down 4.8% in Value and down 4.5% in Volume y/y in September, down 4.5% y/y in Q3 2012 in Value and down 4.3% y/y in Q3 2012 in Volume. No good news here.
• Hardware, Paints and Glass: down 3.8% y/y in Value and down 4.3% y/y in Volume in September 2012, also down 4.8% in Value and 5.3% in Volume for Q3 2012 compared to Q3 2011. No good news here.
• Other Retail Sales: down 3.3% in Value and down 3.1% in Volume, same down 4.2% in Q3 2012 y/y in Value and down 3.8% in Volume. No good news here.
• Furniture & Lighting: down 2.3% in Value and up 2% in Volume in September in y/y terms, which means that the sector is trading down on revenues amidst a deflation. In Q3 terms relative to Q3 2011: the sector is down 3% in Value and up 0.8% in Volume - again, deflation and falling revenues. I wouldn't call this a good news.
• Clothing, Footware and Textiles: down 1.7% in Value and down 0.6% in Volume in September, down 2.3% in Value and 1.4% in Volume in Q3 2012. No good news anywhere here.
• Food, beverages & Tobacco: down 0.3% in Value in September and down 0.9% in Volume. In Q3 terms the sector is down 0.9% and 1.5% in Value and Volume respectively. All signs are, therefore, flashing red. Alongside the trends in Food and Beverages (below), the above suggest significant contraction in legal sales of tobacco, possibly due to increased tax evasion and smuggling.
• Household Equipment: up 0.8% in Value and 5.6% in Volume, which means that deflation is erasing some 86% of the revenues out of the increased activity. In Q3 2011-Q3 2012 terms, the sector is up 0.1% in Value and up 5% in Volume. In effect, revenues standing still, while volumes of activity rising. Last time I checked, the revenues pay for staff, while volume sales pay for warehouses.
• Pharmaceuticals, Medical & Cosmetic Articles: the less elastic in demand category of goods saw September sales rise 1.2% in Value and 2.7% in Volume, while Q3 sales saw increases of 1.2% in Value and 2.3% in Volume. This is a sector that did well out the recent data both in terms of value and volume of sales rising. All of these sales are, however imports.
• Motors and Fuel sales rose 2.9% in Value and fell 0.5% in Volume in September. Q3 change y/y was -1.1% in Value and -4.1% in Volume. Here's an interesting thing: Fuel sales - the coincident indicator for economic activity - were up 3.5% in Value and down 5% in Volume in Q3 y/y, which means that once we strip the inflation (which goes to fund Irish Government and foreign producers at the expense of the real economy here), the sales are down and this does not bode well for Q3 economic activity.
• Food business: is booming, rising 3.8% in value and 2.4% in Volume (suggesting inflation in food sector) in September, rising 3.1% in Value and 1.9% in Volume (confirming inflation) in Q3 2012 y/y. Now, food sales, especially in rainy July-August, could be strongly influenced by people staying at home. The same is true for the expected effects of reduced travel during summer months as fewer of us can afford trips out of Ireland and those who still can taking shorter breaks.
• Bars had a cracking September on foot of a number of higher profile events - rising 3.9% in Value and 2.3% in Volume. However, Q3 figure confirms what is suggested by the food sector performance (above): sales are down 1.9% in Q3 y/y in Value and down 3.4% in Volume. In other words, controlling for one-offs, there is no good news in the sector.
• Lastly, Electrical Goods. Given the switch to digital TV this month, it can be expected that sales were up 5.5% in Value and 11.2% in Volume in September, while Q3 figures were up 6.7% in Value and 12.7% in Volume. Interestingly, these sales rose 4.9% y/y in Value in Q2 2012 and 11.3% in Volume. But in Q1 the same sales were down 5.3% y/y in Value and up only 1.6% y/y in Volume. Overall, during the Great Recession the sector did better than any other sector: in Q3 2012 the index for the Value of Sales in the sector stood at 76.3 (100=2005), which is the fourth highest in the overall sectors categories. For the Volume of sales, index stood at 141.1 - the best performance by far of all sectors. 

So the key summary: Non-food retail sales excluding motor trades, fuel and bars: down 0.6% in Value and up 1.5% in Volume in September - aka deflation and falling revenues. In Q3 2012 compared to Q3 2011: down 0.7% in Value and up 1% in Volume - again, deflation and shrinking revenues. Care to suggest this is 'good'? It is better than outright y/y drop of 3.3% in Q2 2012 in Value and a decline of 1.6% in Volume, and better than -5.6% in Value and -4.3% in Volume recorded in Q1 2012, but it is comparable in Value terms to Q4 2011 (down 0.6% y/y), although still better in Volume terms (-0.7% y/y). 

Still, getting worse at a slower rate is not equivalent to getting better. And it is most certainly not a 'solid retail sales in Q3' result that is being claimed by some analysts.

26/10/2012: Retail Sales in September

In the last few days we have been treated to a barrage of the 'sell-side research notes' extolling the virtues of Ireland's economic 'comeback'. Property markets are now, allegedly, on the mend (never mind, the 'mending' bit is just about sizable enough to matter statistically and economically returns property valuations to... err... April 2012 levels). Unmeasurable 'investor confidence' is back at play - never mind that 'investors' are really a handful of buyers of the Irish Government bonds, usually with maturity range well within the cover by the Troika / ESM. Latest twist - cheerful analysis of the Retail Sales data. One note I received on today's Retail Sales figures for September 2012 was issued minutes after CSO published the data, suggesting that the author had absolutely no referencing to actual data published, but simply plucked headlines and strung them up into an analysis.

Having done some more sober analysis of the house prices data (see here), let's take a look at the Retail Sales data.

Value Index:

Core retail sales (ex-motors) value index rose (preliminary estimate - so subject to future revisions) in September to 96.5 from 96 in August. The index is now 2.88% ahead of where it was three months ago in June 2012. Month on month the index is up 0.52%, or statistically indifferent from zero increase. Current level of activity is comparable to May 2012 hen the index stood at 96.4. Year on year index is up 2.22%.

More dynamics in Value Index:

• Q3 2012 average index reading was 96.0 against the previous quarter average of 95.1 (+0.91%).
• In September, rate of growth in retails sales value actually declined: in June m/m rate of growth was -2.7% due to poor weather, this was reversed partially in July with a m/m rise of 1.8%. Since July, growth rate fell to 0.6% m/m in August and to 0.5% in September. This is hardly the 'good news'. 
• Y/y growth rate in September (+2.2%) was robust, but it is driven more by a contraction in sales in August and September 2011 than by an expansion of sales in September this year.
• Overall, core driver for July performance that determined Q3 results is the rapid fall off in Value of sales in June, not a robust growth in August and September.
• 6mo average through September is now at 95.6 which is only 0.7% ahead of 6mo average through March 2012. September reading is below 2010-2011 average by 0.13% and is down on crisis period average by 4.9%.

Volume Index:

Core retail sales Volume Index rose from 99.2 in August to 99.8 in September, up 0.6% m/m and 1.42% y/y. The index is now 1.84% ahead of where it was at the end of Q2 2012.

Dynamics in  Volume Index:

• Q3 2012 average index was 99.4 up on 98.6 for Q2 (+0.81%), so volume performance here is even less impressive than already underwhelming performance for Value index.
• 6mo average through September is 99.0 against 99.3 in 6 months through March, meaning that on half-yearly basis we are still under water.
• In 2010-2011 the Volume index averaged 101.24 against Q3 2012 average of 99.4. Make your own conclusions here. During the whole crisis, the index averaged 103.66, which means that September index is 3.73% below the crisis period average.

Now charts:

Now, onto my own index: the Retail Sector Activity Index:

Driven by a combination of weak increases in actual volume and value indices and a substantial drop off in consumer confidence (which fell from 70.0 in August to 60.2 in September), the RSA Index has fallen from 110.11 in August to 106.8 in September. During the current crisis, my RSA Index lagged 1 month actually has much stronger correlation (and positive) with retail sales volume and value (ca 83-84%) than consumer confidence (which has a negative and weak correlation with both value and volume indices - ca -30-34%). Hence it acts as a better predictor of the forthcoming activity. The RSAI is now down m/m, but is up y/y and Q3 average is up on Q2 average. 

This means that I can't call the new trend confirmation on the basis of positive monthly rises in Q3 2012 nor can I call the return of the downward trend. Put differently, real data suggests that things are bouncing along flat trend so far. Unlike the claims by some Irish 'analysts' who see "solid retail sales" data.

26/10/2012: Few interesting links

Some links on recent studies of interest

Two hugely important studies from the Kauffman Foundation on the role of immigration in entrepreneurship and human capital as a driver of future economic growth.

Iceland's assessment of financial stability for 2012 Q1 covering in detail household debt dynamics (from page 23) and detailing the success of the Iceland's systemic debt restructuring arrangements.