Tuesday, April 17, 2012

17/4/2012: GIPS vs Default Countries

New IMF forecasts are out for the WEO April 2012 database and so time to update some of the charts. This will happen over a number of posts, but here is the chart I used in today's presentation on the future of Irish banking and financial services.

The chart shows the impact of the current crisis in GIPS against Russia, Argentina and Iceland post their defaults. It sets pre-crisis income expressed in US dollars at 100 and then traces back years of crisis.


17/4/2012: EU27 - Minimum wages v unemployment

A very good infographic on relationship between minimum wages and unemployment from one of the blog readers linked here. Please keep in mind: correlation does not mean causation. There is much of a debate in economics as to the causal links (or their absence) between minimum wages and unemployment (general unemployment, rather than age-specific and skills-specific).

Monday, April 16, 2012

16/4/2012: Italian debt is going up, not down

John Langdon Down - a descendant of an Irishman and a British psychiatrist was, reportedly, the first person to use the French term 'idiot savant' to describe a specific condition in which a brain injury can lead to a person with 'developmental delays' of the brain is being able to demonstrate "profound and prodigious capacities and/or abilities in excess of those considered normal". I am no psychiatrist, but the cheerful reports with today's news that Italian Government debt has declined month on month in February were met suggests to me a manifestation of the similar nature.

Here are the facts. Italian public debt is down €6.8bn in February to €1,928 billion - a drop of 0.35% month-on-month. With a borrowing requirement down €1.4bn yoy in February, but flat at €12.7bn for two months January-February, compared to 12mos ago. It is the latter part - the static nature of Government borrowing requirements, not the former part - the reduction in debt, that matters most. The reason is simple - see charts below:


You see, in January-February 2011, tax receipts were €56,370mln, against €53,940mln in Government expenditure, yielding 2mos cumulated balance surplus of €5,072mln. In 2012, same period tax receipts were €55,931mln or €439mln below 2011 figures, with Government spending at €54,290mln or €350mln ahead of same period last year. January-February 2012 Government balance was in surplus €5,302mln. So the debt 'repayments' are not a sign of any improvement in the fiscal dynamics.

Now, there is a bit more to consider here, folks. The stated reduction in the Government debt is month-on-month and the statement above syas nothing about year-on-year comparison. Ok, so let's take Table 10 from April 16th Banca d'Italia data release. Column 1... errr... General Government Debt:
February 2011 at €1,875,010 mln, against February 2012 at €1,928,211 mln. Contrary to the cheerful view of 'debt falling €6.8bn', Italian debt went up year on year €53,201mln.

Sunday, April 15, 2012

15/4/2012: Some recent links

Few links to chase:

An absolute hero: Sheila Bair (of ex-FDIC fame) ripping into the Fed here.

On the other note - I guess this is the first time I am to mention 'de book' or 'de debt book': What if Ireland Defaults? Sold out of the first print within a week of its launch.

I am talking about the book on Max Keiser here. Recorded during my trip to Moscow in the studio with "Press" helmets - well worn. I had to tip my hat to the real journalists who covered Afghanistan, Tunisia, Beslan siege, etc. Real honor to be in their company!

I am also talking about the core idea behind the book here.

In all, judge the book as you read it - here's the link to amazon order page and Kindle order page. But keep in mind - the credit goes to 22 authors of essays it contains - all equally. And thanks go to the Orpen Press team that put it all together.

My Sunday Times article - mentioning the book - will be up on this blog in a couple of days.



Saturday, April 14, 2012

14/4/2012: An interesting data on Europe's capital flight

Capital flight continues within Europe out of the periphery and into core, according to this article from Bloomberg. If you must see a chart today, see this one


One feature worth considering is the data for Ireland, which appears to conflict with the CBofI data. Although outflows have abated in the chart above, they are certainly pronounced. According to CBofI, deposits are flat and according to the Government, other forms of capital are inflowing into the country like there is no tomorrow (which is disputed by Ireland's own BOP data).

14/4/2012: Latest data on EU27 ICT skills

In a recent (April 1, 2012) article for the Sunday Times (link here) I wrote about the results of the Eurostat computer skills survey across the EU27 member states. The report this was based on is E-Skills Week 2012: Computer skills in the EU27 in figures (http://eskills-week.ec.europa.eu/).

Quoting from the article:

“One core metric we have been sliding on is sector-specific skills. This fact is best illustrated by what is defined as internationally traded services sector, but more broadly incorporates ICT services, creative industries and associated support services.

Eurostat survey of computer skills in the EU27 published this week, ranked Ireland tenth in the EU in terms of the percentage of computing graduates amongst all tertiary graduates. Both, amongst the 16-24 years olds and across the entire adult population we score below the average for the old Euro Area member states in all sub-categories of computer literacy. Only 13% of Irish 16-24 year olds have ever written a computer programme – against 21% Euro area average. Over all survey criteria, taking in the data for 16-24 year old age group, Ireland ranks fourth from the bottom just ahead of Romania, Bulgaria and Italy in terms of our ICT-related skills.”

So here are the details of my analysis of the Eurostat data. Note, ranks reference EU27, plus Norway, Iceland and 3 averages treated as countries – EA12 (old euro area states), EU27 and Small Open Economies of EU27. In other words, ranks are reported out of 29 countries and 3 averages.

In terms of the overall proportion of computer graduates amongst all graduates, Ireland performs close to the mid-range of the overall EU27 distribution. In 2005, 2.9% of graduates were in CS disciplines against the EU27 average of 4% and EA12 (old euro area) average of 4.12%. By 2009 this number rose to 3.8% for Ireland, and fallen to 3.4% for EU27 and 3.37% for EA12. However, the averages conceal rather wide dispersion of scores across both the EU27 and EA12. Ireland’s overall performance in this category ranked 12th in 2009 data, below Greece, Spain, Malta, Austria, UK and Norway.



In terms of percentage of population who have ever used a computer as percentage of all individuals, the survey identifies results for two cohorts: aged 16-24 and aged 16-74. In Ireland, 98% of the population 16-24 years of age have used computer, against 81% for those aged 16-74. This compares against: 96.25% for EA12 and 96% for EU27 for those aged 16-24, and 79.2% for EA12 and 78% for EU27 for those aged 16-74. Despite this, Ireland ranks only 19th for 16-24 year old cohort in this parameter.




Now, we should expect a generational effect of higher (statistically) percentage for those of 16-24 years of age. And the gap appears to be present in the case of Ireland – 17 percentage points spread. The gap is consistent with the EU27 and EA12 averages of 18 and 17.8 percentage points. In other words, Ireland’s population computer usage is not exactly stellar to begin with and is not improving at a faster pace than European average with generations.

The survey also assessed what percentage of relevant population used basic arithmetic formulas in a spreadsheet. For EU27 and EA12 the corresponding percentages were: for cohort aged 16-24: 66% and 67% respectively. For Ireland the percentage was 54%, assigning to us rank 30th in the sample, with only Romania and Bulgaria scoring below us. For the full population (16-74 years of age), the EU27 and EA12 averages were 43% and 45.5% respectively, while for Ireland the corresponding percentage was 44%. Again, our inter-generational gap was lower than average either for EA12 or EU27, suggesting that not only we are extremely poorly scoring in this category as a whole, but that our inter-generational change in skills is working against us in comparison to the averages.



As per percentage of those who created electronic presentations, for EU27 and EA12 the averages were 59% and 63.1% for cohort of those aged 16-24 against Ireland’s 36%, earning Ireland 30th rank, ahead of only Bulgaria and Romania. The inter-generational gap for EU27 is 28 percentage points, while for EA12 it was 28.5 percentage points and for Ireland 15 percentage points. Again, we are falling behind and doing so from the weak position to begin with.



In terms of those who have written a computer programme, Ireland’s 16-24 year olds reported 13% of population against EA12 20.5% and EU27 average of 20%. For overall population (16-74 year olds), EA 12 average was 11.6%, EU27 average 10% and Ireland’s 9%. We are ranked 27th in the table in terms 16-24 year olds who have written a computer programme.



In terms of overall score for the younger cohort of 16-24 year olds (summing up percentages for all categories, plus third level CS education proportion multiplied by factor 10), Ireland total score comes in at 321, well below the total score for EA12 (368.5) and EU27 (365). Ireland ranks 28th in the league table in terms of overall computer literacy score, ahead of only Bulgaria, Italy, and Romania. In summing up all ranks, Ireland’s combined rank is 148 against 120 for EA12 and for EU27.



In the last chart above, higher gap signals more advanced skills for the younger cohort compared to general population: Ireland has low rank and low gap, implying that younger cohort skills are advancing at a slower speed than in other countries from already low skills base. In contrast, Finland has relatively low gap combined with high overall rank, implying that Finland's younger cohorts have faster than in Ireland rate of growth in skills compared to much higher overall level of skills already in place for the general population. Slovenia and Latvia are examples of countries where skills are relatively high for the younger cohorts compared to other countries and are growing fast compared to older cohorts.

14/4/2012: Sunday Times 8/4/2012 - Irish banks: The Crunch is Getting Crunchier

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from 08/04/2012.

A year has lapsed since the much-lauded publication of the first set of the Prudential Capital Assessment Review results – the stress tests – by the Central Bank of Ireland.

Covering the four core banking institutions subject to the State Guarantee, AIB, Bank of Ireland, Irish Life & Permanent and EBS, the tests were designed to be definitive. Once recapitalized by the Exchequer in-line with the PCAR, Irish banks were supposed to be returned to health – recommencing lending to the SMEs and households, returning to normal funding markets around 2013, while continuing to shed loans to improve their balance sheets.

The PCAR made some major predictions with respect to the banking sector performance over 2011-2013 that were not subject to Nama-imposed losses and, as such, are expected to continue into the future. Chiefly, the Central Bank allowed in its stress scenario for the lifetime losses of €17.2 billion on the residential mortgages books of the four institutions. Only €9.5 billion of these were forecast to hit in 2011-2013. Owner-occupier mortgages losses provided for 2011-2013 amounted to just 60% of the above. Post-2013, it was envisaged that the Irish banking system will be able to fund remaining losses out of its own operations with no recourse to the Exchequer assistance.

Having published the PCARs, the Irish Government proceeded to take a break from the banking crisis. Throughout the second half of 2011 there was a noticeable ‘We’ve sorted the banks’ mood permeating the refined halls of power.

Fast-forward twelve months. Annual results for the four domestic State-guaranteed banks for 2011 are, put frankly, alarming. Set aside for the moment the entire media spin about ‘lower 2011 losses compared to 2010 records’. Once controlled for Nama effects on 2010 figures, the data shows acceleration, not an amelioration of the crisis on the mortgages side.

Excluding IBRC, total amount of owner occupied mortgages that remain outstanding on the books of AIB and EBS, Bank of Ireland and PTSB comes to €71.8 billion or 63% of all such loans held by the banks operating in Ireland. According to the Central Bank of Ireland, 12.3% of all mortgages held in Ireland were 90 days or more in arrears – some €13.9 billion. Of these, the four State-guaranteed banks had €7.7 billion owner-occupier mortgages in arrears, representing 10.8% of their combined holdings. Given banks’ provisions, by the end of 2012, the expected combined losses on mortgages, can add up to 60% of the total 2011-2013 losses allowed under PCAR.

And this is before we recognise the risks contained in a number of mortgages restructured in 2009-2010 that will come off the forbearance arrangements. Many are likely to go into arrears once again in 2012 and 2013. Recall that the entire Government strategy for dealing with mortgages defaults rests on the extend-and-pretend principle of delaying the recognition of the loss by giving borrowers some relief from repayments, e.g. via interest-only periods. This approach is patently not working.

Looking at EBS and AIB results tells much of the story behind the forbearance risk factor. In 2010, the two banks had 16,992 restructured residential mortgages amounting to €3.7 billion. Of these, residential mortgages amounting to €3 billion were interest-only. Of all forbearance mortgages, 92% were classed as performing. By 2011, AIB and EBS held 32,266 forbearance residential loans totalling €6.2 billion – almost double the levels of 2010. Total amounts of mortgages in forbearance arrangements that went into impairment or arrears over the course of 2011 jumped more than seven-fold. One third of the forbearance mortgages are now in arrears.

While Bank of Ireland data is not as comprehensive on 2010 and 2011 comparatives, current (end of 2011) levels of restructured mortgages run at €1.25 billion, of which €249 million were impaired or past-due more than 90 days. This means that €999 million worth of restructured mortgages remain at risk of future arrears. PTSB report for 2011 shows restructured mortgages rising from €1.7 billion in 2010 to €2.1 billion, with those in arrears rising three fold to €524 million.

Taken together with the aforementioned 2010-2011 dynamics, changes to the insolvency regime imply that mortgages losses can exceed Central Bank’s forecasts for 2011-2013 period. Of all four banks, Bank of Ireland remains the healthiest, and the likeliest candidate when it comes to mortgages-related losses. Of course, the banks can continue extending recognition of the losses past 2013, but that will mean no access to non-ECB funding at the time when ECB is increasingly concerned about extending more loans to Irish banks. Worse, with the first LTRO maturing in 2014, Irish banks will be staring into a new funding storm, when their healthier competitors all rush into the markets to fund their exits from LTRO.

Which, of course, means that the entire Government exercise of shoving taxpayers cash into insolvent institutions is unlikely to resolve the crisis. The core banks will continue nursing significant losses well into 2014-2015, with capital buffers remaining strained once potential losses are factored in. And this, in turn, will keep restrained their lending capacity.

Recent Central Bank estimates show that Irish economy will require up to €7 billion in SMEs lending and €9 billion in new mortgages in 2012-2014, while banks are to accelerate deleveraging of their loans books to meet lower loans to deposits standards. At the same time, there will be huge demand for Irish banks lending to the Exchequer, once some €28 billion of Government debt come to mature in 2013-2015. As we have seen with the Promissory Notes ‘deal’, so far, the Government has difficulty getting Irish banking system to buy into Government debt in appreciable amounts.

In other words, we are now staring at the basic conflict inherent in running a zombie banking system that continues to face massive losses on core assets. At the very best, the choice is: either the banks’ will lend to the real economy, while foregoing their support for Exchequer post-2013; or the state uses banking sector resources to cover its own bonds cliff, starving the real economy of credit. The first choice means at least a shot at growth, but the requirement for more EFSF/ESM borrowing (Bailout 2). The second choice means extending domestic recession into 2015.

It is also likely that we will see amplifying politicization of the banking system, with credit allocated to ‘connected’ enterprises and politically prioritized sectors, at the expense of overall economy. Reduced competition – from already below European average levels, judging by the ECB data – will continue to constrain credit supply.

The lesson to be learned from the 2011 full-year results for Irish banks is a simple, but painful one. Banks going through a combination of a severe asset bust and a massive debt overhang crisis are simply not going to survive in their current composition. We need to carry out a structured and orderly shutting down of the insolvent institutions, in particular, IBRC, EBS and PTSB. We also need to restructure AIB. At the same time, we should use the process of liquidation of the insolvent banks to incentivise emergence and development of new service providers.

This can be done by using assets base of the insolvent institution to attract new retail banking players into the market. This process can also involve enhancing the mutual and cooperative lenders models.

Given current funding difficulties, it is hard to imagine any significant uptick in lending in the Irish economy from the traditional banking platforms. Thus, we need to create a set of tax and regulatory incentives and enablers to support new types of lending, such as facilitated direct lending from investors to SMEs. Such models already exist outside Ireland and are gaining market shares around the world, in particular in advanced Asian economies.


The State Guaranteed banking model is, as the 2011 results show, firmly bust. Time to rethink the strategy is now.


Charts:



Box-out:

On the positive front, Q1 2012 Exchequer results released this week showed total tax take rising to the levels, not seen since 2009. Total tax revenues came in at €8,722 million, just below €8,792 in 2009. Year on year tax take is up 16.2%. But hold that vintage champagne in the fridge for a moment. Tax revenues for Q1 this year include reclassified USC charges which used to count as departmental receipts instead of tax revenues. The department of Finance does not provide estimates for how much of the income tax receipts is due to this change, but based on 2010 figures it is close to ca €525 mln. They also include €251 million of corporation tax receipts from 2011 that got credited into January 2012 figures. Netting these out, tax revenues are up 8.2% year on year – still appreciable amount, but down 7.6% on 2009. Compared to Q1 2008 – the first year of the crisis, we are still down in terms of tax receipts some 26.2%. Even at the impressive rate of growth, net of one-off changes, achieved in Q1 this year, it will take us through 2017-2018 before we get our tax take to 2007-2008 levels. As the Fianna Fail 2002 election posters used to say “A lot done. More to do.”

Friday, April 13, 2012

13/4/2012: Short-selling - more evidence that restriction hurt, not help financial stability

Keeping up with some old topics of interest, here is another paper studying markets efficiency within the context of short-selling bans of 2007-present. The study, titled “Price Efficiency and Short Selling” by Pedro A. C. Saffi and Kari Sigurdsson, forthcoming in Review of Financial Studies covers a unique, large set of stocks across a number of countries for the period of January 2005 - December 2008. Data is daily, covering lending and borrowing transactions in 12,621 stocks in 26 countries. The study covers more than 90% of global stocks in terms of market capitalization.

The core questions the authors attempted to answer are:
  • What is the impact of short-selling constraints on financial markets?
  • Do they make markets more or less efficient?

After Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in September 2008, in the US, SEC and the UK FSA restricted the short selling of particular stocks. The emergency order enacting the short-selling restrictions in 2008 by the SEC recognized the usefulness of short-selling for market liquidity and price efficiency, but it also claimed that: “In these unusual and extraordinary circumstances, we have concluded that, to prevent substantial disruption in the securities markets, temporarily prohibiting any person from effecting a short-sale in the publicly traded securities of certain financial firms, (...), is in the public interest and for the protection of investors to maintain or restore fair and orderly securities markets. This emergency action should prevent short selling from being used to drive down the share prices of issuers even where there is no fundamental basis for a price decline other than general market conditions.” Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-58952 (September 18th, 2008). Following the US and UK, Germany banned short-selling in June 2010 for eurozone sovereign bonds and credit default swaps, claiming that short-selling “had led to excessive price shifts, which could have led to significant disadvantages for financial markets and have threatened the stability of the entire financial system.”

The study considers whether short-sale constraints affect price efficiency and characteristics of the distribution of stock returns of firms around the world. The study defines price efficiency “as the degree to which prices reflect all the available information, both in terms of speed and accuracy.”

The study finds that:
  • Lending supply influences price efficiency so that “stocks with limited lending supply are associated with lower efficiency.”
  • Higher level of lending supply is “associated with a greater degree of negative skewness and fewer occurrences of extreme price increases, but is not linked with extreme price decreases.” In other words, absence of restrictions on short-selling is not associated with significant presence of extreme downward pressures on stocks – something the bans on short-selling were designed to reduce.
  • In the presence of short-selling restrictions, the decrease in skewness is “due to less frequent extreme positive returns, in line with the view that arbitrageurs cannot correct overvaluation as easily when short selling constraints are tighter.” Or put differently, presence of a short-selling ban reduces volatility – if at all – via reducing upward movements in the stocks, not the downward ones.
  • Limited lending supply – consistent with short-selling restrictions – “does not affect downside risk and total volatility. We actually find that less lending supply and higher loan fees are associated with greater downside risk and total volatility.” In other words, the short-selling restrictions act in exactly the opposite direction to their intended objectives.

“These findings do not support the view expressed by regulators that unrestricted shorting can destabilize prices, while simultaneously supporting the academic findings that short-sale restrictions generally make market less efficient.”   

“The negative relationship between short-sale constraints and stock price efficiency is found at a stock level all over the world, and equity lending supply is an important driver of differences in price efficiency.”

Interestingly, the findings are robust to membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, and to endogeneity concerns.

13/4/2012: Ireland's Green Economy

Wading through some old (relatively) papers, I came across the Cleantech innovation study: “Coming Clean: The Cleantech Global Innovation Index 2012”. The study ranked 38 countries across 15 indicators that relate “to the creation and commercialisation of cleantech start-ups, …measuring each [country] relative potential to produce entrepreneurial start-up companies and commercialise technology innovations over the next 10 years.”

Overall, expectedly, North America and northern Europe “emerge as the primary contributors to the development of innovative cleantech companies, though the Asia Pacific region is following closely behind.”

Top-line results:
  • Denmark leads the global rankings, “with its unique combination of a supportive environment for innovative cleantech start-ups, evidence of those start-ups gaining momentum, as well as a strong track-record of companies commercialising their cleantech innovations and scaling them up to widespread market adoption, particularly in wind.”
  • Scandinavian (or Nordic countries more broadly) “performed notably well, as Sweden and Finland also placed third and fourth respectively. These countries … are behind [Denmark and Israel] on their ability to scale-up entrepreneurial cleantech companies to wider commercial success. (A pattern shared by fifth place country the United States.)”
  • “China and India placed 13th and 12th respectively, but stand out as having a strong potential to rise through the ranks in the coming years. While not currently creating innovative cleantech companies in great numbers relative to the size of their economies, they are already strong centres for cleantech production, and have increasingly supportive governments, large sums of private money ready to be invested, and massive domestic markets.”
 


I am not going to pass a judgment on the viability or sustainability of the cleantech activities, but it is clear that the Irish Government continued the rhetoric of prioritizing the ‘Green economy’ ideals it inherited from its predecessor. In this light, how did Ireland score in the cleantech rankings for 2012? It turns out not too bad for a Small Open Economy and that our strong performance is driven by what we are actually good at: selling stuff. Which, in my opinion, risks making this a strong positive in terms of sustainability of cleantech activity.

Per study: ‘Ireland scores especially well on general innovation drivers [e.g. policy and legacy enterprises in innovation-intensive sectors, such as services MNCs and some domestic exporters, but not specific to cleantech] and commercialised cleantech innovation [e.g. MNCs activities], but falls below average on cleantech-specific innovation drivers [e.g. policies supporting innovation in energy and green-IT and IT-for-Green]. Ireland has very strong general innovation inputs, yet lacks public R&D spending, and has only average scores for supportive government policies and access to private finance [which is surprising, given significant VC funds and incubation centres we have deployed via EI and universities system]. Ireland stands out less for emerging cleantech innovation due to its low output of environmental patents and lack of high impact cleantech start-ups. In contrast, the country scores well for commercialised cleantech innovation, with a large percentage of the population working in cleantech, and good numbers for private equity and M&A deals. Ireland falls just ahead of the neighbouring UK.”

Ireland ranks 9th in the world in the global cleantech tables and its scores, compared against peer economies, per categories, are shown below.


What is revealing, perhaps, is that globally there is only a weak positive relationship between cleantech-specific innovation and commercialized cleantech innovation and in Ireland this relationship is stronger than average. This is most likely due to the more advanced MNCs and exporting base in the Irish economy in general, whereby domestic innovation activities, including those booked by the MNCs into Ireland for tax purposes, is aligned with commercialization via exports. Worldwide, the weak relationship suggests continued non-commercial nature of much of cleantech – serving as a proxy for subsidies dependence of the industry. In which case, Ireland overall is a good stand-out again.

Wednesday, April 11, 2012

11/4/2012: Irish Construction Sector PMI for March

Irish construction PMI for March 2012 (published by Ulster Bank) posted a 58th consecutive monthly contraction with a reading of 46.7 against 45.8 in February 2012. In other words, construction sector activity has now been below 50.0 reading every month since June 2007.




Commercial sector activity showed accelerating decline at 47.4 in march 2012 against 49.1 in February 2012. This puts to a test some of the assertions made in recent months by sector analysts and in the media that commercial construction activity is showing a rise on the foot of robust FDI investments.


Engineering sector activity - primarily driven by public projects - was showing decline at 37.0 in march, slower rate of decrease than consistent with 35.6 reading in February. Housing sector activity remained on a relatively constant rate of decline at 42.3 in March compared to 42.4 in February.


Desperate reports of some analysts have decided to focus "positive" attention on allegedly broadly unchnaged new orders sub'index and improved business sentiment. However, actual data release stated that (emphasis and commentary mine):

  • New orders were broadly unchanged in March, having declined solidly in the preceding month (thus unchanged in March means unchanged from the losses sustained previously). Some firms indicated that small contracts had been secured during the month, but others indicated that a reluctance among clients to commit to projects had prevented a rise in new orders. (If this is a net positive, I should be probably joining the Russian Ballet)
  • Business sentiment was at its highest since January 2007 in March and, as such, was the strongest since the current downturn in activity began (in June 2007). Exactly 46% of respondents  predict that activity will increase over the next 12 months, with signs of improving economic conditions and a forecast rise in new orders supporting optimism. (Alas, the Ulster Bank release fails to give us any data on business sentiment sub-index. In fact, this is the only indicator missing in the charts supplied by the Markit note).


What no report that I have seen so far mentions is that, per Ulster Bank-Markit note: Construction sector "workloads remained insufficient to generate a rise in employment in the sector during March. That said, staffing levels decreased at a rate that was much weaker than seen throughout much of the current downturn." So employment continues to drop. And profit margins are also continuing to fall: "The rate of input cost inflation accelerated for the third consecutive month in March, and was the fastest since April 2011. Higher prices for fuel and other oil-related products were reported by panellists."

On the foot of this information, and presumably with an aid of some tealeafs floating in a cuppa, one respectable analyst concluded (emphasis and commentary mine): unchanged new orders and unverifiable "spike" in business sentiment "...may tentatively signal that the Irish market is approaching stabilisation, albeit at a very depressed level." Ok, then, Bolshoi School is recruiting for Junior Infants... I am off for an audition.

Thursday, April 5, 2012

Live Register for March 2012 - additional trends

In the previous post on live Register headline figures, I suggested that March 2012 data paints a mixed picture of some changes that might be consistent with early improvements in the trends (although it is too early to tell) and the continuation of the overall high level of unemployment and Live Register supports demands.

In this post, let's take a look at couple sub-trends.

First, consider LR by age - all seasonally adjusted figures:

  • At the end of Q1 2012 there were 360,400 individuals 25 years and older on the Live Register, down from 361,900 (-1,500 or -0.4%) mom and up marginally on 360,200 at the end of Q1 2011. This represents an improvement on February 2012 when yoy there were 3,300 more LR signees age 25+. Q1 2012 average is now 1.07% below Q4 2011 average, however, Q1 2012 average is 0.74% ahead of Q1 2011 average.
  •  At the end of Q1 2012 there were 74,400 individuals age less than 25 on LR, representing a decline of 1,500 (-2.0%) on February 2012 and a drop of 8,400 on March 2011 (-10.1%). This too represents an acceleration in annual decline rate in march, compared to February when yoy decline was 8.4%. Quarter on quarter, average LR participation by under-25 year olds has fallen 4.6% and year on year it is down 9%. Much of this is, most  likely, accounted for by the younger workers' participation in various State training programmes and emigration.

Next trend to consider is for Casual and Part-time workers LR participation:
  • In March 2012, there were 87,716 part-time and casual workers on LR, up 502 (+0.6%) mom and 2,561 (+3%) yoy. This is down from the February 2012 annual growth rate of 3.7%. Quarter on quarter, March 2012 numbers are up 2.1% and year on year average Q1 2012 LR participation by this group is up 3.7%.


Live Register breakdown by nationality:

  • Number of non-Irish nationals on the Live Register fell 675 mom in March 2012 (-0.9%) and it is now down 514 (-0.7%) yoy. However, monthly results conceal the reality of return of the upward (albeit relatively weak) trend in LR participation by non-nationals since September 2011 local trough.
  • Number of Irish nationals on the Live Register is down 4,693 in March 2012 (to 355,974) relative to February and it is down 6,625 year on year (-1.8%)


As the result of the above changes, relative share of non-Irish nationals on the LR has risen for the third moth in a row, reaching 18% in march 2012. This is the highest reading since April 2009.



5/4/2012: Live Register for March 2012 - headline figures

Live Register figures released yesterday provide the evidence for continued flat trend in unemployment with mild volatility to the downside. There are some mixed news coming out of data, worth highlighting - both positives and negatives.

On the neutral side: Live Register implied unemployment rate slipped to 14.3% in March from 14.4% in January and February. This marks a decline from the peak of 14.6% in November 2011. There has been little volatility in the series along the trend since the beginning of the crisis (in part due to subsequent revisions of LR to closer align with QNHS) and this means that 0.1 percentage point move mom is statistically significant. However, given future revision of the data, there is little economic significance to the change. Overall level of unemployment remains elevated. Adding to the Liver Register those who are excluded because they participate in State-sponsored training programmes (see more on this below) would have seen implied unemployment rate closer to 16.6%, instead of 14.3%.


Total number of Live Register signees, seasonally adjusted, stood at 434,800 in March 2012 against 437,800 in February 2012 and 443,100 in March 2011. As I noted before, seasonal adjustment is starting to look slightly off to me - perhaps due to changes in methodology and partially, most likely, due to change in the longer-term trend - the establishment of the relatively flat trend within a narrow band at around 430K-450K since H2 2010 that replaced robust upward trend late 2007 through H1 2009. Nonetheless, if we are to have some goods, here it is:

  • Year on year March 2012 decline in LR is now at 8,300 or -1.87% and this is an improvement on February year on year decline of 3,700 or -0.84%
  • Month on month March Live Register numbers declined 3,000 - the fastest pace of declines since 3,700 drop in December 2011.
  • Q1 2012 average LR is 1.08% below that for Q1 2011.
The CSO also published numbers for February 2012 participation in the Government-run training programmes. Participants in these are not included in Live Register, despite the fact they clearly are in receipt of state benefits. Here, the story is not great - in terms of what I would call 'hidden' unemployment, or perhaps the things are wonderful, given at least some of those in training are getting marketable skills and might be able to transition into jobs. Let's be neutral. 


In February 2012 there were 71,393 individuals engaged in Live Register Activation Programmes of various types. This represents an increase on 62,346 in same programmes in February 2011. The CSO supplied data for similar participants from February 2008. Using rather crude means of taking average increases in 2008-2010 and reversing the data from 2008 back into 2006, chart above plots the 'estimated' (inverted commas are to highlight the fact that for 2006-2007 this data is just purely illustrative, although from 2008 it is reflective of CSO actual figures) Live Register inclusive of those in Activation Programmes.

Here's the unpleasant bit:
  • While seasonally adjusted Live Register fell 8,300 in a year through March 2012, the Live Register with Activation Programme Participants rose over the same period of time by 747. In other words, more people went off the Live Register into Activation Programmes (+9,047) than went off the Live Register (-8,300) in the twelve months to March 2012.
  • The above dynamic, however, is an improvement on February 2012 when Live Register declined 3,700 year on year, while Live Register with Activation Programme Participants rose 5,347.
  • Same is evident in rates of change. Q1 2012 Live Register fell 1.08% yoy, while Live Register with Activation Programme Participants rose 0.85% yoy.
  • Overall, Live Register with Activation Programmes Participants stood at 506,193 in March 2012 against Live Register of 434,800.

On a positive note, monthly decline in the Live Register in march was 6th largest since the beginning of the crisis:




So, as I usually say, some things to cheer about, but let's keep it real - unemployment problem is not going away. One has to keep in mind that LR benefits do run out and people drop off the LR. In addition, rampant emigration is clearly playing a factor here. Unfortunately, CSO does not provide reliable and timely data on jobs creation and destruction to make any determination as to whether the small changes in the Live Register are signifying improved labour markets trends or not.

Next post - some details on nationalities on the LR, part-time employment and other sub-trends.