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overall Irish Stock Exchange market capitalization (measured by ISEQ Overall Index Cap) lost €4.1bn since January 1, 2009 and €54.3bn since the arrival of this Government. Thus, losses in consumption out of wealth alone over the latter period can be estimated at more than €2.7bn. For Tobin-q induced losses, the figure is a whooping €39.7bn.
This is the total risk premium differential on the Irish shares. Suppose that ca 40-50% of this is due to the Government policies in the markets and on economy. Recall that in the Anglo case it was 69%, while in Bloomberg estimate for the US - a country where the Government and Monetary Authorities were much quicker and proactive in policy formation and implementation than our 'Don't Panic' Brians&Mary. Thus, my 40-50% assumption is a conservative one.
Source: CSO
Source: CSO
Source: InterTradeIreland, 2009
Although the company is forecasting USD18bn in profits this year (on the back of its industrial arm), GE shares have now dipped below USD6.50, their lowest level since 1991. All due to the GE Capital exposure in the risky commercial and residential lending.Since October, GE sold USD15bn in new shares and USD31bn in new bonds, cut down its loan book and reduced its reliance on short-term debt funding. GE has cut its dividend by 68% to generate additional USD4.4bn.
Sounds good? Not really. GE has set aside roughly USD10 billion in provisions for losses on its USD380 billion in receivables at the finance unit. The company loans total USD680bn against equity cushion of USD34bn in cash and USD36bn in assets. The latter is taking a hit in the current markets, implying today's equity cushion of only ca USD63bn and falling.
It would take a USD9bn hit to earnings and equity for GE were to write down its real-estate portfolio by 25%, according to UBS analysts. GE has transferred some of its real-estate holdings, into real-estate lending. As a result, its total real-estate assets increased USD6 billion, or 8%, last year.
But let us get back to the USD10bn provision. Here is my view on the share price going forward:
Assume they set aside cash (otherwise this set-aside is itself open to downward revaluations over time). This implies expected impairment provision is 2.63% of receivables. Globally, AAA rated CDOs carry the recovery rate of only 32% on face value, while for mezzanine vehicles the recovery rate is only 5%.
So, suppose GE gets a 25% boost on that via higher debt seniority and tighter loans management, etc. Assume the recovery rate of 40% on higher quality junk (hqj) and 8% on lower stuff. Take a blend on the book at 90% hqj, 10% 'stuff', this gives us an average - across-the-book - expected recovery rate of 37%. Suppose 12% of loans are under threat (rather generous in this commercial and residential real estate markets), allowing for some earlier writedowns that already took place. You have a required impairment provision of 12%*(1-0.37)=7.56% or almost 3 times more than the USD10bn they provided for.
This level of provisioning - if set in cash - will take us into a set-aside of an additional USD18.7bn on top of USD10bn set aside today, bringing equity down to USD17.3bn cash and USD34bn in assets or total equity of USD44.3bn - some 30% haircut. Assume deterioration in the assets part of equity pool at 1/4 of the rate of deterioration in broader assets, i.e. 3%pa, you have additional shave-off of 2% on equity, implying equity cushion fall will depress the overall share price by at
least 30% from today's level.
Now, I suspect that when they quote USD34bn cash equity today, they actually include the USD10bn provision into that as well. If so, the total haircut should be based on USD34.3 equity, implying a cut of 45.6% (provisions) + 2.5% (asset deterioration on equity side) = 48% on
today's share price.
So you have USD3.5USD as the equity-underpinned price target. And that is where the stock heading next, in my humble opinion...



And this is the day of rates cuts: ECB down 50bps (should have been down 75-100bps, but hey, when was the last time Germans had any guts for serious actions?) and BofE down to 0.5%... If anyone needed a proof that the markets are not treating Irish banks shares as a part of the broader world, preferring instead to price them as sick puppies, here it is:
So is the next stop for this train of sorrow 'Nationalization II: Bank of Ireland'?


The last chart of course shows that Ireland is a absolute under-performer in its peer group. Davy do not analyse earnings in this context, but the above valuations are hardly making the shares cheaper. Earnings declines are now precipitous for all companies and my suspicion is that P/E ratios are falling. In other words, there is a question to be asked if there are any bargains out there given the earnings projections?
Lastly, Davy provide a good snapshot of the bond markets dynamics in the chart reproduced above. Spot the odd-one-out? Note the timing of our departure to the Club Med of Near-Insolvent States - bang on coincident with Mr Lenihan's Budget... This should be a warning to everyone who is desperate for this Government to do something about the crisis: doing 'something', as opposed to doing the right thing, will make matters worse. Clearly, the markets are not seeing higher taxes and a lack of spending cuts (Budget 2009) as 'doing the right thing'.
Thus, under benign Scenario 1 assumptions, overall income contraction in Ireland over the recessionary cycle is expected to reach 13.5%, while under more severe Scenario 2 the contraction can result in a fall in real income of 16.1%. My personal view - we are going to see the latter rather than the former.Forecast date: 6 Dec 2006 - €56.3 billion
Forecast date: 5 Dec 2007 - €51.8 billion
Forecast date: 14 Oct 2008 - €42.8 billion
Forecast date: 9 Jan 2009 - €37.0 billion
Current figures: Ulster Bank - €34.0 billion, my - €33.3-34.5 billion
As of today, we are some €22-23bn ahead of DofF-forecast for the shortfall. This, as McArdle rightly points out (I produced the same figure back in February) is approximately what we have to find to plug the hole in the side of our public spending Titanic.
Think about it: the hole is almost 70% of the entire revenue projected for this year. Can we plug the hole with a Gruffalian (draconian) 50% income tax increase?
Here is the breakdown of the revenue figures (again from Ulster Bank note):
I've said time and again that the Laffer Curve and tax minimization will imply that the revenue will fall as taxes rise or at the very least it will not rise in 1-to-1 relationship to tax rates increases. We have evidence of this. VAT receipts have fallen at more than 4 times the rate of fall in national income and in line with retail sales. Income tax receipts are down at ca 1.5 times of income contraction (and this is before self-assessment returns come in).
And as far as tax minimization goes - many of those on both high and low incomes are sole traders or business proprietors. These categories of workers do not pay income tax on a regular basis, bunching much of their payments into October. They do pay more regular VAT and this smooths quarterly VAT returns. Comes October, they will do everything legally possible to make sure Biffo-the-Gruffalo, Bromidic-Brian and Mary-the-Lottery-Winner don't get their paws on hard earned cash. In addition, the sole-traders on lower earnings will never be brought into the tax net, no matter how much the Government widens it, because they will 'adjust' their income to just below any feasible new threshold.
I did some crude maths on the two effects and here are my estimates.
First the assumptions. I assume that both Laffer Curve and Tax Minimization effects will reduce 1% increase in the rate of:
Income tax to a 0.68% increase in underlying revenue (with Laffer effect reducing tax rate increase contribution by 20% and a Tax Minimization effect reducing it by further 15%),
The drivers for the latest slide are clearly the renewed pressure on financials and the fact that the Obama Honeymoon is over - the markets are now turning sceptical about the new administration's ability to push the economy out of a depression spiral. Concerns are mounting as to the inflationary effects of the current policies amidst a general conviction that there will be no upside to economic growth. The traditional partisan Democrat policies are now being seen as setting the stage for a return to the dark ages of Jimmy Carter in the near future.
Notice that although the downgrades are much steeper today than in the 1970s, the trajectory of the most current downgrades (slope) is virtually identical to the 1973-1974 crisis. A fellow in the US investment community (thanks for the question HM) just asked me how this can happen, given oil is scrapping the bottom of the barrel in price terms while inflation is yet to rear its ugly face - the opposite of the stagflationary 1970s scenario. Here is an explanation.
Then again, the US has had it easy so far, compared to Ireland... Chart above illustrates.