Showing posts with label ESM. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ESM. Show all posts

Thursday, May 18, 2017

18/7/17: Greece in Recession. Again.



Per recent data release, Greece is now back in an official recession, with 1Q 2017 growth coming in at -0.1%, following 4Q 2016 contraction of 1.2%. Worse, on seasonally-adjusted basis, Greek economy tanked 0.5% in 1Q 2017. The news shaved off some 0.9 percentage terms from 2017 FY growth outlook by the Government (from 2.7% to 1.8%), with EU Commission May forecasting growth of 2.1% and the IMF April forecast of 2.15%, down from October forecast of 2.77%.


Greece has been hammered by a combination of severe fiscal contractions (austerity), rounds of botched debt restructuring, and extreme fiscal and economic policy uncertainty since 2010, having previously fallen into a deep recession starting with 2008. Structural problems with the economy and demographics come on top of this and, at this stage in the game, are secondary to the above-listed factors in terms of driving down the country growth.

In simple terms, this - already 10 years long - crisis is fully down to the dysfunctional European policy making.


In real terms, Greek economy is now down almost 3 percentage points on where it was at the end of 2000 and even if we are to assume that the economy expands 2.15% in 2017, as projected by the IMF, Greece will still end 2017 some 0.76 percentage points below where it was at the start of its tenure in the euro area.

Meanwhile, the 2.1-2.15% forecasts are likely to be optimistic. Past record shows that, so far, since the start of the crisis, IMF’s forecasts were woefully inadequate in terms of capturing the true extent of the crisis in Greece.


As chart above shows, with exception of just two forecasts’ vintages, covering same year estimates (not actual forward forecasts), all forecasts forward turned out to be optimistic compared to the outrun (thick grey line for April 2017).

Another feature of the more recent forecast is that 2017 IMF outlook for Greece factors in worse expectations for 2018-2021 growth than ALL previous forecasts:


The key driver for this disaster is the EU-imposed set of policies and the resulting policy and economic uncertainty. In fact, if we were to take the lower envelope of growth projections by the IMF - projections that were based on the Fund’s assumptions that the EU will live up to its commitments to accommodate significant debt relief for the Greek economy from around 2013 on, today’s Greek real GDP would have been around 20-21 percent higher than it currently stands.


All in, Greece has sustained absolute and total economic devastation at the hands of the EU and its institutions, including ESM, ECB and EFSF. Yes, structurally, the Greek economy is far from being sound. In fact, it is completely, comprehensively rotten to the core and requires deep reforms. But this fact is a mere back row of violins to the real drama played out by the Eurogroup, the ESM and the ECB. The nation with already woeful demographics has lived through sixteen lost years, going onto seventeenth. Several generations are either face permanently damaged prospects of future careers, or have to deal with demolished hopes for a dignified retirement from the current ones, and a couple of generations currently in lower and higher education are about to join them.

Friday, July 17, 2015

17/7/15: Eurogroup tightens screws on Greece: Bridge v MoU


Eurogroup statement on Greece (h/t @FGoria):
Key:

  • Bridge finance via EFSM (as rumoured, so no surprise here);
  • Bridge finance security cushion via SMP profits being moved to an escrow account (unexpected) clearly to ensure Denmark's and UK agreement to use EFSM. Bad news: SMP profits should be rebated back to Greece to alleviate debt burden, not 'securitised' to increase debt burden;
  • Good bit - SMP profits are to be returned to Greece unless used as EFSM bridge loan cushion. So at some point in time, Greeks will get these funds to, presumably, cover a part of bridge finance funding;
  • The bit "...he risks of not concluding swiftly the negotiations with the ESM remain fully with Greece" (emphasis mine). This amounts to setting pressure very high on Greek Government to basically accept MoU conditions unaltered, as presented to them and, thus, makes the very idea of 'negotiations' a farce. Given that EFSM cover (bridge) is only for July, at most for first week of August, this statement basically puts Greece on notice: either agree immediately to ESM (Bailout 3.0) conditions or face a loss of SMP funds on top of everything else.
In effect, Eurogroup is driving home the tactical advantages gained by over-extending Bridge loan negotiations into the last minute and from Tsipras' total surrender at July 12-13 meetings. Greece has no where to go, but to ESM at this stage, so my suspicion is that MoU will be tougher than Bailout in Principle position of July 12-13.

Monday, July 13, 2015

13/7/15: Sit Back and Watch That Eurogroup Unanimity Evaporate


Following the marathon meetings (14 hours-long Eurogroup followed by 17 hours-long Euro Council) the Greek 'deal' was heralded in the media and the markets as some sort of the Great Revelation - a solution to fix all prior non-solutions, a final fixing of the Greek economy and the end to all the endless bailouts of the past.

Of course, cynics noted that solving debt overhang (already officially recognised by the IMF as unsustainable) by issuing more debt may not be a good idea… but cynics are here to be ignored by the Euro optimists who define their own reality.

But never mind all the 'long run' stuff. Five hours into a 'unanimous' Eurogroup decision on Greece, there is neither much of a unanimity, nor much of a decision left.

Eurogroup agreed, amongst other things, that:

  • Greece will be - in principle - granted new funding of some EUR82-86 billion. The future is preliminary and will have to be finalised to fully reflect the economic conditions deterioration since January, as well as other factors. In addition to fiscal funding, these money will also be used to recapitalize Greek banks (current running estimate is for EUR10-25 billion in recaps, but the actual amount will not be known until there is a full and 'comprehensive' assessment of the banks books (to be carried out in September-December 2015).
  • While nothing is certain about this 'longer term' EUR82-86 billion package, there are immediate needs for funds that Greece has to meet. With today's missed IMF repayment, there's EUR4.934 billion due in the rest of July. There's EUR1.544 billion overdue from June. And there's EUR4.188 billion due in August. Total of EUR6.477 billion is due to the ECB alone. There is no expectation that the 'long term' package will be ready before much of this comes due, so Greece will clearly need a 'bridge financing' arrangement. There is an added 'complication': before ECB can be paid (a default on ECB will trigger a cascade of cross-defaults and a closing of the banks' oxygen line, the ELA), the IMF arrears have to be cleared in full. 


The 'bridge financing' should be a walk in the park, right? After all, there is a unanimous agreement to set new funding for the longer term, and a part of this is the recognition that before such an agreement is struck, there is a unanimous (one assumes) agreement that Greece needs to be helped through the intermediate period.

Unanimity bit

Today, there was a shorter Eurogroup meeting to sort that little bit of 'unanimity' out. And the conclusion was: err… no unanimity and:

  1. A new delay in sorting out longer-term financing (from today's morning expectation of 2 weeks to more realistic 4 weeks); and
  2. There is no agreement on bridge financing. Worse, per Dijsselbloem: "We looked at the issue of bridge financing because there are urgent needs and this process of finalising an agreement will take time… This is very complex, we looked at a number of possibilities, but there are technical, legal, financial and political issues to consider, so we have tasked an ad-hoc working group of technical experts to look into that".

Finland's Fin Min Alexander Stubb said that "Greek Bridge Financing Still an Open Question. I foresee those negotiations being very difficult because I don't see many countries having a mandate to give money without any conditions." Oops… as they say in Helsinki. Slovakia's Government has stated they oppose any lending to Greece, including both bridge and long term financing. Austria, Estonia, The Netherlands and a number of other countries will need to approve every move via their parliaments. All three been pretty sceptical on 'bridge financing' from July 6th on. Slovenia is set against the bridge funding too.

And then there's Germany - which is, for now, sitting pretty quiet on the topic, but don;t expect an easy push over from Merkel - Schäuble duo. After all, the latter has managed to square off with Mario Draghi on the topic of ECB operations in a nasty exchange yesterday.


Beyond the unanimity bit... logistics

Beyond the unanimity bit, there's a technicality or logistics of structuring the deal… bridge financing is hard to construct, given the Byzantine (actually far worse, by now) European institutions.

There are basically two possible options.

Option 1: Using EFSM bailout fund to loan money to Greece. The option is easier, as it does not require unanimity, but can be passed on the basis of QMV. The fund, however, does not have enough money to finance July-August liabilities due on the Greek side. Reportedly, the EFSM only has EUR11.5 billion available (although some reports put the figure at EUR13.2 billion). And EFSM is no longer an active lender, since it is superseded by another fund, the ESM. Even when the EFSM was operative, it was limited to co-funding bailouts with IMF involvement. IMF is not a party to any bridging loans arrangements, and indeed is not a party to the entire Bailout 3.0 package agreed 'in principal' this am. Added complication: EFSM can be activated by a qualified majority, but a QMV of EU28, not euro area alone. Back in 2011, Britain voted against the use of the EFSM to bail out Greece for a second time.

Option 2: Greece funding itself via issuance of T-bills, selling these to the banks with the banks using ECB ELA to finance these purchases. Which carries two problems with it. One, ECB is yet to hike ELA. Two, T-bills are short term bonds and Greece is constantly rolling over substantial quantity of them in the markets. Issuing more will clearly impair Greek Government ability to secure short term funding. And it will also likely trigger serious discontent within euro area 'core' states - the hawks that 'guard' ECB's prohibition on 'monetary financing'.

Option 3: A combination of Option 2 and bilateral loans. The problems, in addition to Option 2 is that some countries (Finland and Slovakia - explicitly, Germany and the Netherlands, for now implicitly) have ruled out participating in the scheme. Which makes such lending a tough sell for other member states. Italy stated already that it will only supply bilateral loans if all other euro area states do so.

Option 4: Using SMP profits accumulated at the ECB and in the national central banks from Greek bonds coupon payments to lend to Greece from ECB to repay ECB and IMF loans. Problem here is that 2014 profits still retained amount to EUR1.9 billion, while 2015 profits yet to be paid amount to 1.4 billion. Clearly not enough to close the gap.


Update 14/7/2015: FT blog on the Eurogroup technical paper outlining options for Greek bridge financing is here: http://www.ft.com/intl/fastft/359551


Saturday, July 4, 2015

4/7/15: Timeline for Greece and Some Anchoring


Greece timeline for the weekend:

Greece has missed the IMF and ECB payments this week with both non-payments having potential for triggering a mother of all defaults for Greece: the ESM/EFSF loans call-in (EUR145bn worth of debt).

The EFSF/ESM decision so far has been to 'ignore' the arrears, noting that non-payment to IMF qualifies as "an event of default":

"The Board of Directors of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) decided today to opt for a Reservation of Rights on EFSF loans to Greece, after the non-payment of Greece to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Following the IMF Managing Director's notification of the IMF Executive Board, this non-payment results in an Event of Default by Greece, according to EFSF financial agreements with Greece."

Greece owes the EFSF EUR109.1bn in "Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement" loans, plus EUR5.5bn in "Bond Interest Facility Agreement" loans and EUR30bn more in "Private Sector Involvement Facility Agreement" loans.

For now, EFSF decided not to call in loans, preferring to wait for Sunday vote outcome. Per EFSF statement: "In line with a recommendation by the EFSF's CEO Klaus Regling, the EFSF Board of Directors decided not to request immediate repayment of its loans nor to waive its right to action – the other two possible options. By issuing a Reservation of Rights, the EFSF keeps all its options open as a creditor as events in Greece evolve. The situation will be continuously monitored and the EFSF will consider its position regularly."

A 'No' vote in the Sunday referendum can change that overnight.

This adds pressure on Greece to pass a 'Yes' vote - a pressure that is most publicly crystallised in the form of ECB refusal to lift ELA to Greek banks. Athens imposition of capital controls (limiting severely cash withdrawals from the banks) has meant that the current level of ELA (CHART below) is still sufficient to hold the bank run, but the ELA cushion remaining in Greek banks was estimated at EUR500mln at the start of this week. Even with capital controls in place, this would have dwindled to around EUR250-300mln by the week end.

Again, a 'No' vote in the referendum risks crashing Greek banks as ECB will be unlikely to lift ELA any more. In an indirect sign of this, the ECB appears to be setting up swap lines and euro credit lines for EU member states outside the euro area. For example, as reported by Bloomberg, "European Central Bank is set to extend a backstop facility to Bulgaria and is ready to assist other nations in the region to ward off contagion from Greece, according to people familiar with the situation". Such a move is a clear precautionary measure to put into place firewalls around Greek system.


Meanwhile, here is a report suggesting that Greek banks are preparing for an aggressive bail-in of deposits in the case of a 'No' vote (assuming ELA cut off):


The Government denied the reports of preparations of bail-ins, and continues to insist that the banks will reopen on Tuesday, a day after the referendum results are published, but it is hard to imagine how this can be done (unless the banks start trading in drachma) without ECB hiking ELA, and it is even harder to imagine how ECB can hike ELA in current conditions.

Source: TheodoreZ

So far, public opinion polls in Greece show very tight vote for Sunday. The latest GPO poll has the "Yes" vote at 44.1% and "No" at 43.7%. Alco poll puts the “Yes” figure at 41.7% against 41.1% for “No”. All together, four opinion polls published yesterday put the 'Yes' vote marginally ahead, another poll fifth put the 'No' camp 0.5 percent in front. All polls results were well within the margin of error. At the same time, majority of polls also show Greeks favouring remaining in the euro by a roughly 75 percent margin.

REFERENDUM TIMELINE
Sunday 5th July:
Polls open – 0500BST/0000EDT
Polls close – 1700BST/1200EDT

First exit poll – Shortly after 1700BST/1200EDT

~20% of votes counted – 1900BST/1300EDT
~50% of votes counted – 2100BST/1600EDT
~70% of votes counted – 2200BST/1700EDT (markets open)
~90% of votes counted – 0000BST/1900EDT

Timeline source: Trading Signal Labs

The build up of tension ahead of the Sunday poll has been immense. Even international bodies are being convulsed by the potential for a 'No' vote. So much so, that, as reported by a number of media outlets, there was a major cat fight between European members of the IMF and other IMF board members.

As reported by Reuters at Wednesday board meeting of the IMF, European members of the board attempted to block IMF from publishing its analysis of debt sustainability for Greece.

Quoting from the report: ""It wasn't an easy decision," an IMF source involved in the debate over publication said. "We are not living in an ivory tower here. But the EU has to understand that not everything can be decided based on their own imperatives." The board had considered all arguments, including the risk that the document would be politicized, but the prevailing view was that all the evidence and figures should be laid out transparently before the referendum. "Facts are stubborn. You can't hide the facts because they may be exploited," the IMF source said."

If only European members of the IMF Board were as concerned with the reality of the Greek crisis on the ground as they are concerned with the appearances and public disclosures of that reality.

A neat reminder of how bad things are in Greece today, via @RBS_Economics

Source: @RBS_Economics

As numbers tell, Greece has posted one of the worst collapses in economy for any advanced economy since 1870, fourth worst for periods outside WW1 and WW2.


So what to expect?

  • In the event of a 'Yes' we are likely to see a significant bounce in the markets from the current levels, with euro strengthening on the news in the short run. But real re-pricing will only take place when there is more clarity on post-referendum bailout agreement. The key risk to that outlook is that a 'Yes' vote can trigger early elections - which will (1) extend the current mess for at least another 1-2 months, and (2) put new sources of uncertainty forward - as outcome of such elections will be highly unpredictable. I do not expect the EU to re-start new deal negotiations until after the elections, which means that there will be mounting, not abating pressures on the Greek voters to vote in 'the right' Government, acceptable to the Troika.
  • In the event of a 'No' we are likely to see serious run on the markets in Greece and some 'peripheral' states, especially Italy. Greek capital controls will have to be stepped up significantly. Euro is likely to weaken in the short run, especially if ECB aggressively moves to monetise risks via both accelerated QE purchases and lending to non-euro banks.

Beyond these two possible scenarios, everything else is in the realm of wild speculation.

Wednesday, September 3, 2014

3/9/2014: R.I.P. That Seismic Game-Changer...

Remember June 29, 2012? No? But you do remember this:

"Speaking as he left the European Council building, Mr Kenny described the new deal as a seismic shift in EU policy, and said it would allow Ireland to re-engineer its overall debt level, which would reduce the burden on Irish taxpayers. "What was deemed to be unachievable has now become a reality and that principle has been established, decided and agreed upon by the council and heads of government," he said."

Following in Mr Kenny's footsteps, then Tanaiste Eamon Gilmore : "described last night’s deal as a "major game changer" for Ireland that will ease its path back to financial markets. "When the details are worked out between July and the end of the year, it will have a real impact on our debt level and will greatly improve our ability to get back into the market and not to need a second bailout," he told RTE’s Morning Ireland."

And so the saga of the 'Deal' promised by the 'For Jobs, For Growth' EU 'Partners' to struggling Ireland is now no longer needed... http://mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-03/noonan-says-esm-deal-on-bank-debt-no-longer-as-attractive.html Some 796 days after the seismic game changer rolled into town, the idea is all but abandoned to focus instead on 'early repayment of the IMF loans' or in other words, another not-restructuring of government debts.

Yes, the latter will save us some significant dosh and should be pursued. No, abandoning the former means abandoning a hope of still saving more cash, as ESM valuations mechanism is neither determined nor precludes payment of current market consideration/valuation. And no, Minister Noonan still has no solution in sight to the problem of EUR24 billion worth of Government bonds sitting in the Central Bank that will continue burning an ever widening hole in our finances as we proceed to sell them.

The seismic game changers of Europe, the come and go and jobs and growth remain the objective of the economy thrown onto the rocks, in part, with the help of Brussels and Frankfurt...

Saturday, July 26, 2014

26/7/2014: Of Germans Bearing the Ugly Truth?..


German experts and analysts have an un-Irish capability of speaking their own mind... and when they do (and they do it anywhere, including when visiting this country of ours), they don't mince words. Behold the latest 'visitor' from the land of 'Nein!': Dr. Joachim Pfeiffer, the economic policy spokesman for the parliamentary group of the ruling Christian Democrats. Dr. Pfeiffer was in Dublin this week. Somewhere between a nice dinners and customary ritual of witnessing the Irish 'craic' in a pub, the learned Doktor sneaked a few minutes to tell us that "Ireland has “no chance” of securing a deal on its legacy bank debt" and that "the euro zone’s new bailout fund had not been established for nor would be it used for retroactive bank recapitalisation."

Quoted in the Irish Times: “There is no chance Ireland’s legacy assets will be paid by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). This instrument is only an instrument for emergency.”

R. Pfeiffer was in Dublin to speak at the German-Irish Chamber of Industry and Commerce, the same Chamber that recently sponsored a cheerful book on Ireland & Germany being the best pals in economic and policy terms. The best pals, alas, do not help each other all too much, and one of them has no problem telling the other that 'your mess is your mess': "Dr Pfeiffer said the financial meltdown in Ireland “did not fall from heaven . . . there were bubbles in the real estate sector, there were bubbles in the banking sector and all of this was home-made”."

As to the reasons why ESM cannot be used for retroactive assistance to the Irish state, Dr Pfeiffer evoked the same logic that I advanced for some years now: "If the ESM was to be used retroactively to compensate Ireland, he said other countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal and potentially Italy would want similar compensation."

Needless to say, Department of Finance immediately chipped in with a denial of denial that denial is possible as a denial. I am certain Dr. Merkel in Berlin was all ears...

Friday, July 11, 2014

11/7/2014: Notes on German ESM vote

Here are some of my briefing notes on last night's programme on TV3 covering the latest 'seismic' news on retroactive banks recapitalisations and ESM.


Eurogroup meeting on 20th June 2013 agreed on the main features of the European Stability Mechanism's (ESM) Direct Recapitalisation Instrument (DRI).  I covered the fallout from that meeting here  and here  and here.

Note in the first post above, there is a link to Irish Government-set target of 17% of GDP for retroactive recapitalisation.
  • The objective of the ESM's DRI will be to preserve the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member States in line with Article 3 of the ESM Treaty, and to help remove the risk of contagion from the financial sector to the sovereign by allowing the recapitalisation of institutions directly.
  • This does not decouple banking sector from the sovereign, but weakens the links.
  • There is a specific provision included in the main features of the DRI, which states: "The potential retroactive application of the instrument should be decided on a case-by-case basis and by mutual agreement."
So do note: it is 'potential' (not assured access) and it is to be decided on case-by-case basis (so no 'symmetric' or 'equal' treatment) and it is 'mutual agreement' (allowing states to block any potential case-by-case deal). There is so much conditionality around this statement, one has to view it as being aspiration rather than prescriptive.

But, on a positive side, June 2013 agreement kept open the possibility to apply to the ESM for a retrospective direct recapitalisation of the Irish banks. I covered this here and the fallout from the second round deal here. The last link covers persistent opposition from Germany to retroactive recapitalisations. And if you thought this has gone away, here's the latest on that.

On June 10, 2014 the euro area member states reached a preliminary agreement on the operational framework for the ESM's direct recapitalisation instrument, DRI.
  • This framework does not guarantee that we will get our case approved.
  • It does not stipulate how retrospective recapitalization can take place (crucial detail).
  • It requires unanimous vote of ESM board of governors (which is basically Council of Ministers).
All of this was forthcoming. See my article from March 2014 on this here.

The above is also confirmed by Minister Noonan on July 3 in the Dail. Minister further stated that: "However, it will not be possible to make a formal application to the ESM for retrospective recapitalisation before the instrument is in place. It would, therefore, be premature to make any submission, be it a technical paper or otherwise, in advance of the instrument being in place."

Incidentally, Minister Noonan's pronouncements on the topic have by now converged to repeating the same statement on every occasion. compare this and this.

So a reminder: After June 2012 summit, Minister Noonan went onto "Today with Seán O'Rourke", and said he expected the retrospective recapitalization agreement to be concluded by November 2012. Now, we are looking at the earliest possible application date or application consideration date of November 2014. But even this application date is uncertain. Methodology for valuation or even structuring recapitalisations is uncertain. In the mean time, we are getting less and less certain if it makes any sense for us to even apply for this measure.

Minister Noonan on the topic again: "When one thinks through the recapitalisation retroactive option, it was always envisaged that there would be some form of exchange of shares in the banks for capital upfront, and that this capital would be used to reduce the debt. While the technical work has been done on it, there is a question of value, price and judgment in all these matters. I certainly do not wish to talk ourselves into a position where just as the banks are becoming valuable, we give them away for the second time." This was stated on July 3 this year in the Dail.

Meanwhile, Bank of Ireland shares we hold have already yielded returns that are EUR1 billion in excess of original recapitalization, excluding the cost of the Bank of Ireland-related measures to the Exchequer via higher borrowing costs in 2009-2013 period.

Value of AIB currently is around EUR11 billion, value of PTSB is virtually nil, which is less than ca EUR23.5 billion we put into the bank and PTSB.

Our borrowing costs are low, and are lower than those of other peripheral states - why would they approve a recapitalization for Ireland? See, for example, most recent pressure points on borrowing costs here.

Another pesky issue: ESM is EUR500 billion fund. But only EUR60 billion is set aside to cover all future and any potential retrospective recapitalisations of banks. Eurostat estimates Irish Government banks stake at EUR16 billion in terms of its future potential value, which means that Ireland's retroactive recapitalization will either have to be so small as to make no difference to us, or so large as to swallow some 20% or so of the entire DRI fund.

Do we seriously expect to get anything substantial from the ESM?

Let us remember that until June 2013, Germany resisted not only retroactive recapitalisations, but even forward recapitalisations. The reason German leadership changed its mind is that EU has substantially reduced any potential exposure of ESM to such recaps in the future and loaded more, not less, burden onto national banks and sovereigns. These are covered here and here.

In short, the latest news from Berlin are not a 'step forward toward retroactive recapitalisations of the Irish banks' - at the very best these are simply re-affirmations of the already taken steps and the muddle they left behind.

Meanwhile, there are 3 major points of pressure relating to Irish banks:

  1. Recaps we put in are weighing on our debt levels: 25.3 billion against 13-14bn value. There is little we can hope to get from the ESM in this context.
  2. Government bonds from Promo Notes conversion: 25 billion against nothing. There is nothing in the ESM that allows us to swap these bonds for anything that is cheaper. Instead, the real impact can be achieved by significantly delaying sales of these bonds to private markets, which is not related to the ESM but is rather an ECB action.
  3. State of banks balance sheets - arrears and tracker mortgages (EUR36 billion in AIB and PTSB). Professor Karl Whelan has an excellent note on trackers here.

Wednesday, December 11, 2013

11/12/2013: Will Europe Have Any Firepower for Banks Bail Outs?


The Banking Union debate drags on and on and on and the further we travel in time into this debate, the more apparent is the pathetic nature of the undertaking, and with it, the pathetic state of leadership across Europe... Here's the latest instalment:
http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/2013/12/eu-bank-bailout-fight-more-leaked-documents/

Key quotes in this latest instalment:

"Both the European Commission and the European Central Bank – along with most eurozone finance ministries – believe a “break in case of emergency” backstop needs to be in place to provide a safety net for the bank rescue fund since, even when it’s completely full, it will only have €55bn in it. Given the recent crisis experience, that might only be enough to bail out two or three mid-sized European banks."

Laugh! or Cry! or both. The entire circus is about EUR55 billion. Not enough to backstop another Ireland (based on the 2008-2010 crisis dimensions). Not enough to backstop the retail division of the Deutsche Bank alone (based on 5% loss over capital cushion). Not enough to backstop anything, really. Administration, compliance, enforcement and other bureaucratic functions associated with this backstop (and the necessary Banking Union spoking it to the ECB and the eurosystem) will be running at somewhere around 5-10 percent of the entire fund, annually. If this is a form of insurance, you might getter better quote on insuring Titanic in its current state for passenger traffic.

"In addition, the fund will take 10 years to completely fill through levees on European banks, meaning some kind of backstop needs to be in place in the interim. The “SRF Backstop” paper basically says: we need a backstop, but we’re still not sure what it should be or how it would work."

Two things. Unless euro area hopes to remain in the Great Stagnation for the next 10 years, we shall see growth in banks balancesheets. Over 10 years horizon (even if balancesheets grow at 1.5% = real GDP growth expectation for euro area + HICP target, so 3.5% nominal growth pa in balancesheets), the banking assets side (covered liabilities from the SRF perspective) will have expanded by 41 percent. In other words, to provide the same cover as today's EUR 55 billion the fund will require EUR 78 billion. Forget the idea that in its current vision SFR will only be sufficient to bailout two or three mid-sized European banks. We'll be lucky if it can bailout 1 or 2 of mid-sized European banks in 10 years time.

Thursday, October 17, 2013

17/10/2013: To Deal or Not To Deal? ESM and Irish Banks


Few interesting signals coming out of Europe in recent days. All relate to the fallout from the German elections.

I suggested that the outcome of the German elections will result in coalition talks in which Ireland's bailout (or rather the feasibility of our ex post bailout unloading of banks legacy debts onto the ESM or some other European fund) will be demoted (link here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/10/8102013-german-voters-go-for-status-quo.html). Further more, I recently wrote about the pressures building up in Germany and the ECB on this issue as well (link here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/10/11102013-whats-new-in-german-coalition.html )

Now, another set of pronouncements on the same topic.
1) German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble restated German opposition within the Euro finance ministers meeting to using the ESM fund to directly recapitalise Irish banks. link: www.irishtimes.com/business/sectors/financial-services/schäuble-pours-cold-water-over-idea-of-esm-relief-for-ireland-1.1561748

2) In a separate report, the Irish Independent reported that SPD - Germany's second largest party and one currently acting as a king-maker in coalition talks with Angela Merkel - staunchly opposes banks recapitalisation roll over from Ireland to ESM and continues to insist that Ireland must raise corporate tax rate. Link here: www.independent.ie/business/irish/germanys-coalition-talks-snagged-on-irish-issues-29658771.html. Do note, the statement is about raising the actual rate, not closing off the loopholes.

Not exactly encouraging, eh?..

But never mind, Minister Noonan thinks none of the above counts for much: http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/noonan-insists-esm-money-for-banks-still-possible-1.1562772 I mean, why on earth would anyone listen to anything that Schäuble or Draghi or Merkel or SPD or leaders of CDU/CSU or Asmussen or the Dutch, Austrian, Finnish governments or anyone else for that matter has to say on the topic?

Run by me this: if Minister Noonan is so certain he can get the ESM to pay us cash for banks equity we hold, then:

  • Why do we still talk about 'regaining our independence'? Seems like Minister Noonan already has loads of it - enough to tell Schäuble to pack it; and
  • Why don't we have the ESM 'deal' yet? Who's holding it up? Surely not Mr Schäuble who's opinion doesn't quite matter...

Of course, there is a major problem in Minister Noonan's selective referencing of memory. As I recall, the reductions in our interest rates or the extensions to maturity of our debt were granted to us because Portugal demanded them on foot of Greece receiving its own bailouts. As per Minister Noonan's claim on the Promo Notes debt swap 'deal', may be it was made possible by the fact that it wasn't much of a 'deal' in the end? We gave up quasi-sovereign debt for full-blown sovereign debt and got few shillings up front in cash flow relief... The equivalent of such a 'deal' for banks would be what? Allowing to repo our banks equity at the ECB for more loans?..

I am uncertain as to whether any ESM deal on retrospective recapitalisation of Irish banks via European funds is possible or not. It might be or it might be not. I am uncertain as to whether such a deal is even desirable, since we do not know the feasible terms and conditions of the deal. All I know is that over two years of negotiations and seismic announcements behind us, Minister Noonan so far:

  • Has not a single open supporter of the idea of Ireland getting such a deal anywhere in the EU's upper echelons of power; 
  • Has secured not a single open supporter for such a deal in the EU Parliament or the Commission (it seems that folks from Ballyhea-Charleville SaysNo campaign got more mileage on this); and
  • Has plenty o very weighty opponents to such a deal all on public record.
I am sure Minister Noonan is working very hard attempting to secure a good deal for us with ESM. I hope he succeeds.


Updated: A related set of news out of Germany: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/macht-der-eu-kommission-widerstand-gegen-merkels-europa-plaene-a-928918.html
In basic terms, Merkel is pushing for more oversight over national budgets for Europe... which, of course, means it is a good thing that Angela is such a close friend for Minister Noonan, right?

Friday, October 11, 2013

11/10/2013: What's 'new' in German Coalition talks... what's Ireland...


So today's report in the Irish Times on German Government coalition talks and demands by the Social Democrats (SPD) on Germany blocking use of ESM to cover Irish Exchequer debt exposures arising from the banking crisis and for Germany to adopt a tougher stance on irish corporate tax regime are news... Read them here: http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/irish-debt-linked-to-angela-merkel-talks-on-coalition-1.1556845

Now, recall this: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/10/8102013-german-voters-go-for-status-quo.html where all of this fall-out from the German elections was foretold...

Monday, June 17, 2013

17/6/2013: ESM Rules Book Draft


Reuters recently reported [Updated: link is here http://pdf.reuters.com/pdfnews/pdfnews.asp?i=43059c3bf0e37541&u=2013_06_17_11_43_b16e8d8f95d140d2a6693737fcd98885_PRIMARY.pdf  H/T to @Taleof2Treaties] on a document prepared for the Eurogroup meeting in Luxembourg that puts forward more detailed set of rules for ESM deployment in recapitalising the banks.  The rules, as seen by Reuters, involve:

  • A private sector bail-in to be required before any ESM contribution can be made. More on this below; and
  • The ESM will apply a two-tier test in deciding whether recapitalisation can be carried out: the capital must fall below critical adequacy levels, and the bank must be considered systemic for the eurozone as a whole, not a national system. Which means in the case of Ireland - no recapitalisations of ANY irish bank, neither BofI, nor AIB, nor Anglo. Per ESM rule book, the whole country can go insolvent, as long as Deutsche Bank or Credit Agricole are still floating.

When a bank gets into trouble, the Euro-Troika: ECB, the European Commission and the ESM,

  • Will stress-test / value bank’s assets. Euro-Troika will set the required level of capital the bank will require, thus opening the process to the transfer of foreign-held liabilities onto the shoulders of the country taxpayers. For example, suppose an Irish bank X holds 10% of its liabilities against external foreign subordinated lenders. In normal case, these would be forced to take a haircut first. But Euro-Troika can determine that is must make good on full 10%, thus transferring liability fully to the sovereign of bank X domicile via the first requirement that the sovereign must step in ahead of any ESM recapitalization. 
  • After determining the amount of capital required, the ESM will also determine if the bank has the minimum legal common equity Tier 1 ratio, currently at 4.5%. If the bank does not meet the minimum, the government would inject between 10% and 20% of the funds shortfall. The ESM will provide the residual.
  • If the government cannot meet the demands for 10-20% injection, the ESM will not step in to recap the bank
  • Once the bank is recapitalised using ESM funds, ESM will take equity in the bank and will engage in setting bank strategy and business model. The ESM will also track bank performance to targets and will also have power to change bank management and board. This will be a major departure from the modus operandi of the Irish authorities, but to what extent it will be effective / significant remains to be see. After all, pro forma changes can be put in place with minor alteration to the pre-crisis status quo.

The document says ESM will deal with legacy assets, which is an ambiguous statement, but potentially holds some hope for Ireland.

Tuesday, May 28, 2013

28/5/2013: That Cracking Success of the Troika Programmes


Some 'stuff' is coming out of the EU nowdays to greet the silly season of summer newsflow slowdown:

The loose-mouthed Eurogroup head Jeroen Dijsselbloem [http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130527-702547.html?mod=googlenews_wsj] is striking again. This time on Portugal's 'progress' on the road to recovery:
""If more time is necessary because of the economic setback, that more time might be considered" as long as the country is being "compliant" with the program, Mr. Dijsselbloem told reporters after meeting with Portuguese Finance Minister Vitor Gaspar."

Of course, Dijsselbloem is simply doing what is inevitable - acknowledging that the EU/Troika programme for Portugal is as realistic as it was for

  • Ireland (which undertook two extensions, one restructuring, one expropriation round vis-a-vis pensions funds, and two rates cuts to-date on its 'well-performing programme' and is looking for more), 
  • Greece (which received three extensions, three restructuring, PSI - aka outright default, deficit and privatizations targets adjustments),
  • Spain (which so far got only banks bailouts, but has already secured two rounds of deficit targets extensions),
  • Cyprus (which hasn't even received full 'support' package yet, and already needs more funds).


It is worth noting that Portugal itself has already seen debt restructuring by the Troika in two rounds of loans extensions and two rounds of interest rates cuts.

So in the world of EU logic: if loans restructuring => success.

Please, keep in mind loans restricting ⊥ <=> success (for those of you who tend to argue that my above argument can mean that absence of EU restructuring implies success).


Oh, and while on the case of Ireland, Herr Schaeuble has stepped in to put a boot into Minister Noonan's dream of ESM swallowing loads of Irish banks' legacy debts [http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2013/05/27/business/27reuters-germany-schaeuble-banks.html?src=busln&_r=0]:"European countries should be under no illusion that they can shift responsibility for problems in their national banking sectors to the bloc's rescue mechanism". Now, recall that Minister Noonan is having high hopes riding on ESM taking stakes in Irish banks to ease burden on taxpayers. See point 1 links here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/05/26052013-ireland-hard-at-work-on-troika.html

So it looks like another round of loans restructurings is in works, just to underpin the immense success of the Troika programmes in Euro area 'periphery'.

Saturday, April 27, 2013

27/4/2013: Sunday Times : March 31, 2014

The first of three consecutive posts to update on my recent articles in press.

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from March 31, 2013.

What a difference a week, let alone nine months, make. 

Nine months ago, on June 29th, 2012, the eurozone leaders pledged "to break the links between the banks and the sovereign" prompting the Irish Government to call the results of the euro summit 'seismic' and ‘game-changing’. 

Fast-forward nine months. The number of mortgages in arrears in Irish banks rose at an annualised rate of 25%, the amounts of arrears have been growing at 65%. The number of all mortgages either in arrears, or temporarily restructured and not in arrears, or in repossessions is up 23% per annum. 
Deposits held in Irish ‘covered’ banks have fallen 13.9% between June 2012 and January 2013. In three months through January 2013 average levels of Irish residents' private sector deposits was down 2.34% on three months through June 2012, clocking annualised rate of decline of 4%. Over the same period of time, loans to Irish private sector fell 1.54% (annualised drop of 2.7%).

Smoothing out some of the monthly volatility, average ratio of private sector loans to deposits in the repaired Irish banking system rose from 145.8% in April-June 2012 to 147.0% in three months through January 2013.

Put simply, in the nine months since June 29th last year, the urgency of implementing the eurozone leaders' 'seismic' decisions on direct recapitalization of the banks and on examining Irish financial sector programme performance has been rising. 

Yet, this week, in the wake of yet another crisis this time decimating the economy of Cyprus, a number of EU officials have clearly stated that the euro area main mechanism for funding any future bailouts - the European Stability Mechanism fund - will not be used for direct and/or retrospective recapitalization of the banks. The willingness to act is still wanting in Europe.

First, chief of the euro area finance ministers group, Jeroen Djisselbloem, opined  that the ESM should never be used for direct capital supports to failing banks. Mr Djisselbloem went on to add that Cypriot deal, imposing forced bail-in of depositors and bondholders, is the template for future banks restructuring programmes. This pretty much rules out use of ESM to retroactively recapitalize Iriosh banks and take the burden of our past banks’ supports measures off the shoulders of the Irish taxpayers.
On foot of Mr Djisselbloem's comments, the EU Commission stated that it too hopes that direct recapitalisation of the banks via ESM will be avoided. In addition, the EU Internal Markets Commissioner Michel Barnier, while denying Mr Djisselbloem's claim that Cypriot 'deal' will serve as a future template for dealing with the banking crises, said that "Under the current legislation for bank resolution . . . it is not excluded that deposits over €100,000 could be instruments eligible for bail-in". Finnish Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen weighed in with his own assertion that the ESM should not be used to deal with the banking crises, especially in the case of legacy banks debts assumed. Klaus Regling, the head of the ESM, made a realistic assessment of the viability of the June 29, 2012 promises by stating that using ESM to directly recapitlise troubled banks will be politically impossible to achieve.  German officials defined their position in forthcoming talks on ESM future as being consistent with excluding legacy banks debts from ESM scope.

All of this must have been a shocker to the Irish Government that presided over the Cypriot bailout deal structuring which has shut the door on our hopes for Europe to come through on June 2012 commitments. After last weekend, uniqueness of Ireland is surpassed by the uniqueness of Greece where sovereign bonds were thrown into the fire and Cyprus where depositors and bondholders were savaged and not a single cent of Troika money was allocated to support the banks recapitalisations. 
The slavish conformity to the EU diktat that prompted the Irish Government to support disastrous application of the Troika programmes in Greece and Cyprus is now bearing its bitter fruit.

Which means that three years into what is termed by the Troika to be a 'successful adjustment programme', Ireland is now facing an old question: absent legacy banks debts restructuring, can we sustain the current fiscal path to debt stabilisation and avoid sovereign insolvency down the road?

Let’s look at the banking sector side of the problem.

Latest reports from the Irish banks show lower losses for 2012 compared to 2011, prompting many analysts and the Government to issue upbeat statements about the allegedly abating banking crisis. Such claims betray short foresight of our bankers and policymakers. Even according to the Central Bank stress tests from 2011, Irish banks are not expected to face the bulk of mortgages-related losses until 2015-2018. Latest data from CSO clearly shows that residential property prices across the nation were down for three months in a row through February. Prices have now fallen almost 23% since the original PCAR assessments were made. Even at the current levels, prices are still supported to the upside by the banks' inability to foreclose on defaulting mortgagees. Meanwhile, there are EUR45.3 billion worth of mortgages that are either in repossessions, in arrears or restructured and performing for now. Taken together, these facts mean that at current rates of decline in property values from PCAR valuations, we are already at the top of the envelope when it comes to banks ability to cover  potential mortgages losses. Add to this the effect of increasing supply of distressed properties into the market and it is hard to see how current prices can remain flat or rise through 2014-2015. 

All of the above suggests that before the first half of 2014 runs its course we are likely to see renewed concerns about banks capital levels starting to trickle into the media. Thereafter, the natural question will be who can shoulder any additional losses, given the entire Euro area banking system is moving toward higher capital ratios and quality overall. The answer to that is, of course, either the ESM or the Irish State.  The former is being ruled out by the euro area core member states. The latter is already nearly insolvent as is.

The headwinds to Irish debt sustainability argument do not end with the mortgages saga. 

Take a look at the economic growth dynamics. Back at the end of 2010, when Troika structured Irish ‘bailout’, our debt sustainability depended on the 2011-2015 forecast average annual growth at 2.68% for GDP.  By Budget 2013 time, these expectations were scaled back to 1.76%, yet the Troika continued to claim that our Government debt is sustainable. To attain medium-term sustainability, defined as declining debt/GDP ratios, between 2013 and 2017, IMF estimates that to stay the course Ireland will require average nominal GDP growth of 3.9% annually. To satisfy IMF sustainability assumptions, Irish economy will have to grow at 4.5% on average in 2016-2017 to compensate for slower rates of growth forecast in 2013-2015. So far, in 2011-2012 recovery we managed to achieve average growth rate in nominal GDP of just under 2.25%  - not even close to the average rates assumed by the IMF.

And the real challenge will come in 2015-2017 when we are likely to face sharp increases in mortgages-related losses. In other words, growth is expected to skyrocket just as banks and households will engage in massive mortgages defaults management exercise. 

There are additional headwinds in the workings, relating to the shifting composition of our GDP in recent years. Between 2007 and 2012, ratio of services in our total exports rose from 44.8% to 51.2%, while trade balance in services went from EUR2.75bn deficit to EUR3.1bn surplus. Trade in services is both more imports-intensive (with each EUR1 in services imports associated with EUR1.03 of services exports, as opposed to EUR1 in goods imports associated with EUR1.73 in exports) and has lower impact on our real economy. Irish tax system permits more aggressive, near-zero taxation of services trade against higher effective taxation for goods trade. This implies that while services-exporting MNCs book vastly more revenue into Ireland, most of the money flows through our economy without having any tangible relationship to either employment here or value added or any other real economic activity. In recent years, a significant share of our already anemic growth came from activities that are basically-speaking pure accounting trick with no bearing on our economy’s capacity to sustain public debt levels we have. If this trend were to continue into 2017, we can see some 5-7 percent of our GDP shifting to services-related tax arbitrage activities. 

Which, of course, would mean that the ‘sustainability’ levels of nominal growth mentioned above must be much higher in years to come to deliver real effect on our government debt mountain.
Take these headwinds together and there is a reasonable chance that Ireland will find itself at the point of yet another fiscal crisis with reigniting underlying banking and economic crises. Far from certainty, this high-impact possibility warrants some serious consideration in the halls of power. Maybe, continuing to sit on our hands and wait until the euro area acts upon its past promises is not good enough? Is it time we start building a coalition of the states willing to tackle the Northern Core States’ diktat over the ESM and banks rescue policies?



Box-out: 

Following the High Court judgment in the case involving rent review for Bewley’s Café on Dublin’s once swanky now increasingly dilapidated Grafton Street, one of the premier commercial real estate brokerages issued a note to its clients touching upon the expected or potential fallout from the case. The note mentions the stress the case might be causing many landlords sitting on ‘upward only rent review’ contracts and goes on to decry the possibility that with the Court’s decision in some cases rents might now revert to open market valuations. One does not need a better proof than this that Irish domestic sectors are nowhere near regaining any serious competitiveness. Instead of embracing self-correcting supply-demand reflecting market pricing, Irish domestic enterprises still seek protection and circumvention of the market forces to extract rents out of their customers. That’s one hell of a ‘the best small country to do business in’ culture, folks.

Monday, April 15, 2013

15/4/2013: About that orchestra on Titanic's deck...

In a telling sign of total disconnect with reality, last week we heard two bizarre comments from the European 'leaders' all made in the context of Dublin Ministerial dealing with Cyprus.

First, "Klaus Regling, managing director of the ESM, told reporters that the fund had had its "most successful week". The statement can on foot of ESM selling EUR10bn worth of new debt in heavily oversubscribed markets. Alas, the said claim was made in the week when ESM became the sole vehicle for handling EU side of the Cyprus 'bailout'. In other words, Regling, like rest of EU 'leaders' measures success by how high he can pile on debt (EUR8bn worth of bonds here, EUR2bn worth of notes there), not by real economic outcomes (which can see Cypriot economy shrinking 15% in one year - some 'success').

However, the weekly prize for detachement from reality goes, as it often does, to Olli 'The Delusional' Rehn - the EU Commissioner for Something-to-do with Economy - who was forced to concede that Cypriot bailout can lead to the island economy shrinking up to 15% in 2013. Never, mind, says Rehn, as "I don't deny that there is uncertainty about the precise figure whether it will 10 percent, 12.5 percent or 15 percent."

Indeed, 'never mind'. You'd think he would make it his job knowing. But, of course, why bother, since 10-12.5-15 percent range clearly might reach into 20-22.5-25 percent range as easily and Mr Rehn wouldn't bat an eyelid. Especially since the host nation's Government - aka Ireland's 'best pupils in the EUssroom' - were there to cheer Mr Rehn in exchange for getting a handful of platitudes from important foreigners. Behold Jeroen Dijsselbloem's claim that Ireland is "a living example that adjustment programmes do work". Cyprus, presumably, will be the EU's roadkill of history... joining Greece and Spain, with Italy and Portugal in the waiting wings.

In short, we are now going verifiably gaga this side of the Atlantic, begging for a comparison with the orchestra that played through Titanic's sinking. Alas, the orchestra, as historian tell, was rather competent one - unlike Messrs Rehn, Regling, et al.


Sunday, February 24, 2013

24/2/2013: EU's Banking Union Plan Can Amplify Moral Hazard It Is Designed to Cure



In a recent note, Germany's Ifo Institute (Viewpoint No. 143 The eurozone’s banking union is deeply flawed February 15, 2013) thoroughly debunked the idea that the European Banking Union is a necessary or sufficient condition for addressing the problem of moral hazard, relating to the future bailouts.

Per note (emphasis is mine), "Largely ignored by public opinion, the European Commission has drafted a new directive on bank resolution which creates the legal basis for future bank bailouts in the EU. While paying lip service to the principle of shareholder liability and creditor burden-sharing, the current draft falls woefully short of protecting European taxpayers and might cost them hundreds of billions of euros."

Instead of directly tackling the mechanism for bailing-in equity and bondholders in future banking crises, "the new banking union plans may... turn out to be another large step towards the transfer of distressed private debt on to public balance sheets..."

Here's the state of play in the euro area banking sector per Ifo: ECB "has already provided extra refinancing credit to the tune of EUR 900 billion to commercial banks in countries worst hit during the crisis... These banks have in turn provided the ECB with low-quality collateral with arguably insufficient risk deductions. The ECB is now ...guaranteeing the survival of banks loaded with toxic real estate loans and government credit. So the tranquillity is artificial."

I wholly agree. And worse, by doing so, the ECB has distorted competition and permanently damaged the process of orderly winding down of insolvent business institutions, as well as disrupted the process of recovery in terms of banking customers' expectations of the future system performance. Per Ifo, "Ultimately, the ECB undermines the allocative function of the capital market by shifting the liability from market agents to governments."

The hope - all along during the crisis - was always that although the present measures are deeply regressive, once the current crisis abates and is reduced from systemic to idiosyncratic, "the European Stability Mechanism (the eurozone’s rescue fund – ESM) and the banking union plan [will impose] more [burden sharing of the costs of future crises on] private creditors".

The problem, according to Ifo is that neither plan goes "anywhere near far enough" to achieve this. "..the “bail-in” proposals suggested by the European Commission as part of a common bank resolution framework [per original claims] “should maximise the value of the creditors’ claims, improve market certainty and reassure counterparties”".

Nothing of the sorts. Per Ifo: "Senior creditor bail-ins are explicitly ruled out until 1 January 2018, “in order to reassure investors”. But if bank creditors are to be protected against the risk of a bail-in, somebody else has to bear the excess loss. This will be the European taxpayer, standing behind the ESM."

"The losses to be covered could be huge. The total debt of banks located in the six countries most damaged by the crisis amounts to EUR 9,400 billion. The combined government debt of these countries stands at EUR 3,500 billion. Even a relatively small fraction of this bank debt would be huge compared to the ESM’s loss-bearing capacity."

Ifo see this four core flaws in "institutional architecture" of the bail-in mechanism:

  • "First, the write-off losses imposed on taxpayers would destabilise the sound countries. The proposal for bank resolution is not a firewall but a “fire channel” that will enable the flames of the debt crisis to burn through to the rest of European government budgets." 
  • "Second, imposing further burdens on taxpayers will stoke existing resentments. Strife between creditors and debtors is usually resolved by civil law. The EU is now proposing to elevate private problems between creditors and debtors to a state level, making them part of a public debate between countries. This will undermine the European consensus and replicate the negative experiences the US had with its early debt mutualisation schemes." 
  • "Third, asset ownership in bank equity and bank debt tends to be extremely concentrated among the richest households in every country. Not bailing-in these households’ amounts to a gigantic negative wealth tax to the benefit of wealthy individuals worldwide, at the expense of Europe’s taxpayers, social transfer recipients and pensioners."
  • "Fourth, the public guarantees will artificially reduce the financing costs for banks. This not only maintains a bloated banking sector but also perpetuates the overly risky activities of these banks. Such a misallocation of capital will slow the recovery and long-run growth."
Note that per fourth point, the EU plans, while intended to address the problem of moral hazard caused by current bailouts, are actually likely to amplify the moral hazard. In brief, "...the proposal for European bank resolution exceeds our worst fears."


Note that the Ifo analysis also exposes the inadequacy of the centralisation-focused approach to regulation that is being put forward as another core pillar of crisis prevention. "A centralised supervision and resolution authority is necessary to address the European banking crisis. But that authority does not need money to carry out its functions. Instead bank resolution should be subject to binding rules for shareholder wipeout and creditor bail-ins if a decline in the market value of a bank’s assets consumes the equity capital or more. If the banking and creditor lobbies are allowed to prevail and the commission proposal passes the European parliament without substantial revision, Europe’s taxpayers and citizens will face an even bigger mountain of public debt – and a decade of economic decline."

I couldn't have said it better myself.

Friday, November 30, 2012

30/11/2012: Moody's downgrade ESM and EFSF


Moody's downgrade of ESM and EFSF: here.

The downgrade was driven by two factors:

  1. Moody's downgrade of France - the second largest provider of callable capital in the case of the ESM and as a guarantor country in the case of the EFSF.
  2. "Moody's view that there is a high correlation in credit risk among the entities' supporters is consistent with the evolution to date of the euro area debt crisis and the close institutional, economic and financial linkages among the major euro area sovereigns. As a result, the credit risks and ratings of the ESM and the EFSF are closely aligned to those of its strongest supporters."
Another point of interest: "Moody's acknowledges that the ESM benefits from credit features that differentiate it from the EFSF, including the preferred creditor status and the paid-in capital of EUR80 billion. However, in Moody's view, these credit features do not enhance the ESM's credit profile to the extent that it would warrant a rating differentiation between the two entities."

Update: here's a good take on some of the issues involved in the downgrade: http://dealbreaker.com/2012/11/efsf-conveniently-downgraded/

Saturday, November 10, 2012

10/11/2012: What a laugh: Noonan backing out?


This fine article outlining the latest back-pedaling by the Government on the 'seismic deal' strategy for dealing with banks legacy debt carried by the taxpayers is full of priceless pearls of wisdom. Certainly worth reading, if only for a laugh.

Sunday, October 28, 2012

28/10/2012: BNP note on Spanish Bonds risks


A neat summery from BNP on (1) current bond ratings, and (2) links between ratings and eligibility for inclusion in bond indices:



And a few words on the importance of Spanish ratings risks to ESM/OMT etc:

"As has been demonstrated throughout the EU debt crisis, credit ratings can have a material impact on sovereign bond markets. ...However, not all downgrades have the same effect on bond yields. More specifically, the loss of an AAA rating (S&P on France and Austria, for example) and, more importantly, the loss of investment-grade status (Greece, Portugal) matter more than other downgrades and may have dire consequences for sovereign bonds, because of the significance of those two ratings levels as critical thresholds for investors."

"The downgrade to sub-investment grade, in particular, is linked to the eligibility criteria for various global bond indices, i.e. the minimum rating required for a sovereign bond to be included in an index. Fund managers tend to track the performance of major bond indices and, as a result, when a country’s sovereign bonds drop out of an index due to ratings ineligibility, investors have to adjust their portfolios and offload the country’s bonds. So, any downgrades to sub-investment grade could lead to massive selling flows and have a huge impact on the bond yields of the country in question. More than that, quite often, markets tend to front-run the ratings agencies and start to offload the bonds of the country they suspect may be downgraded to sub-investment grade in the near-term future."


"... Currently, Spanish ratings are getting extremely close to those same [as Portugal in 2011 downgrade case] eligibility thresholds. In general, BBB- is the critical limit for bond index eligibility, but different indices have different rules on calculating a single rating for each country (they can use, say, the average, middle, best of all, or specific ratings). For Spain, currently rated BBB-/Baa3/BBB, any trio of one-notch downgrades is going to push the average rating below the eligibility threshold."

"Credit ratings are important not only with respect to eligibility for the major bond indices, but also in calculating the haircut the ECB applies to collateral posted by European banks. According to the ECB’s graduated haircut schedule, an extra 5% haircut is applied to ratings in the BBB+/BBB/BBB- range (the ECB uses the best rating of S&P, Moody’s, Fitch and DBRS). This extra 5% haircut applies only to category 1 assets, which include government bonds. For other assets, like bank, corporate and agency debt, this extra haircut can reach up to 23.5%, creating severe additional collateral requirements for banks."

"This is particularly important for Spanish banks, which tend to absorb around EUR 400bn of liquidity from ECB’s open market operations. The ECB recently announced that it is suspending the application of the minimum credit-rating threshold to its collateral eligibility requirements for the purposes of the Eurosystem’s credit operations for marketable debt securities issued or guaranteed by the central government of countries that are eligible for OMTs or are under an EU-IMF programme and comply with the associated conditions. However, this does not affect the application of the previously mentioned graduated haircut approach."

"So, focusing on Spain, a one-notch downgrade by DBRS would mean that marketable securities issued by Spain would fall into the higher haircut range and Spanish banks would have to post additional collateral with the ECB. A trio of one-notch downgrades by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch would push the Spanish average rating below BBB- and Spanish bonds out of those bond indices that use the average rating as the threshold for eligibility. For those bond indices that use the middle rating of S&P/Moody’s/Fitch (or the better of the first two), a one notch downgrade by each of Moody’s and S&P would be enough to push the single rating below the eligibility threshold, too. Because of this, any upcoming developments in relation to (1) direct bank recapitalisation by the ESM, (2) a Spanish request for a precautionary programme, (3) economic and social developments in Spain and (4) funding rates are going to be critical, as they could prompt further downgrades, with severe implications for the Spanish bond market."

"If any of these downgrade combinations takes place before Spain has made an official request for a programme, we believe a request would, in effect, become inevitable. At the same time, if Spain asked for a programme tomorrow, this would not necessarily mean that any further downgrades would be off the cards. Almost all of the ratings agencies have said that they will have to assess whether ESM intervention is likely to become a complement to or a substitute for market access. If it turns out to be the latter, this would be in line with a downgrade to the sub-investment-grade category."

"At this point, we should mention that if Spanish bonds are removed from the global bond indices, this could have an impact on Italian bonds as well. The reason is that some investors may have replaced their Spanish bond holdings with an Italian bond proxy in order to benefit from better liquidity and protect themselves from panic selling, should Spain be downgraded further. As a result, if Spanish bonds’ drop out of various indices, these investors could suddenly find themselves overweight Italy versus the index, so they would have to sell some of their Italian bonds to re-adjust their weightings and track the index."

"We saw this kind of move when Portugal was downgraded to junk by Moody’s in July 2011 (taking into account that this was not completely expected by the markets and PGB liquidity had already dried up). In the five days after Portugal’s downgrade, 5y Italian and Spanish yields jumped by 95bp and 65bp, respectively."

Nasty prospect, albeit the risks are diminishing, in the short run, imo.

Tuesday, September 25, 2012

25/9/2012: Some questions on foot of latest ESM statement


From today's Joint Statement of the Ministers of Finance of Germany, the Netherlands and Finland (link here):
"Specifically, we discussed the governance, independence, decision making and accountability of the new Single Supervisory Mechanism involving the ECB. The new framework has to ensure that the ECB can continue to conduct effectively and independently its current tasks, and it has to take into account the concerns of non euro area Member States regarding governance of the new supervision. This requires appropriate governance structures and a clear division of responsibilities between a new ECB Supervisory Council, which may include representatives from all Members States, and the Governing Council of the ECB. To ensure the accountability of the new Supervisory Council, it should report on the stability situation and its decisions to European Finance Ministers (Ecofin Council or Eurogroup ) as well as provide reports to the European Parliament and national Parliaments."

Key points in my view are:

  • Core problem is the coordination of regulatory systems for euro area banks and non euro area banks is now further fractionalized into the space of 'supervised Euro area banks', 'non-supervised Euro area banks' (assuming the new Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) applies only to systemically important banks), 'non-Euro area banks in countries under mechanism', 'non-Euro area banks outside mechanism but inside the mechanism-covered countries', 'non-Euro area banks in countries outside the mechanism'.
  • The role of the Supervisory Council vis-a-vis the Governing Council of the ECB
  • The extent and nature of reporting by the Supervisory Council as well as the extent of the Ecofin / Eurogroup and EU Parliament oversight (if any) over the Supervisory Council activities.

"Regarding longer term issues, we discussed basic principles for enabling direct ESM bank recapitalisation, which can only take place once the single supervisory mechanism is established and its effectiveness has been determined. Principles that should be incorporated in design of the instrument for direct recapitalization include: 
1) direct recapitalisation decisions need to be taken by a regular decision of the ESM to be accompanied with a MoU; 
2) the ESM can take direct responsibility of problems that occur under the new supervision, but legacy assets should be under the responsibility of national authorities; 
3) the recapitalisation should always occur using estimated real economic values; 
4) direct bank recapitalisation by the ESM should take place based on an approach that adheres to the basic order of first using private capital, then national public capital and only as a last resort the ESM."

Points of note here are:

  • ESM recapitalization of the banks can only take place after the SSM is both established and proven in its effectiveness. Time scale for this? Anyone's guess. While time scale for Spanish economic meltdown is pretty well in front of our eyes.
  • Full and formal MoU will be required - a political no-go territory for some countries, though in fact the EU can fudge this requirement by simply re-printing as an MoU already ongoing 'reforms' processes.
  • Legacy assets should remain under the responsibility of national authorities, which means there is no coverage under the ESM for crisis-related assets. One can interpret this, possibly, as a de facto no to any removal of the Irish banks assets off the hands of the Irish state. One can also read this as a potential for restructuring some of the Irish Government liabilities relating to banks, but only to the extent of altering the cost of funding these liabilities (e.g. ESM loan with no change in actual liability risk, so that Irish banks-related debts will remain Irish Government liability).
  • Point (3) implies no 'future economic value' in computing ESM-available funding. In other words, losses incurred will not be covered. Which opens the question - who will cover the losses?
  • Point (4) is clear with respect to equity holders (these take the hit first, then the state owned equity is wiped out, only after that - ESM), but what about lenders to the banks (private bondholders and official lenders, including ECB)?


Saturday, July 21, 2012

21/7/2012: Sunday Times July 8 - ESM deal for Ireland


An unedited version of my Sunday Times column for July 8, 2012.



Last week’s Euro zone rush to make some sort of a deal on the common currency debt crisis was originally heralded as a ‘path-breaking’ event. A week on, and the markets have largely discounted the deal, while internal disagreements between the member states are tearing it to shreds.

Within a few days following the summit, heads of Bundesbank, Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank came out opposing the core premises of the deal, including the banking union. Finnish, Dutch and Estonian governments strongly disagreed with the ideas of ECB engaging in direct purchases of sovereign bonds, and equal treatment of ESM debt alongside private bondholders. German and Slovak leaders have pledged to respect these countries positions. Austrian parliament’s approval of European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM) fund came with some severe conditions attached, also altering the June summit conclusions. Lastly, the ECB’s Mario Draghi was clearly guarded about the deal implications for the ECB independence during his press-conference this Thursday.

Meanwhile, the markets have moved from an euphoric reaction to the deal last Friday back to shorting the euro zone by Thursday, despite the ECB interest rate cut.

Despite these, and other developments, the Irish Government continues to put much hope on the June 28-29 deal. Rhetoric aside, the new deal can, at the very best, allow Ireland to convert some of our government debts into the debt held against Irish consumers and mortgage-holders.

The Government assumes that under the deal, ESM will be allowed to retrospectively cancel government debts relating to banks bailouts and convert these into debts held against the banks themselves.

Assuming this is correct, even though the actual agreement does not mention any retrospective actions, Ireland will be able to move some unknown share of its €62.8 billion total exposure to the banking crisis off the government debt account. The Government has already admitted that it is unlikely to recover any of the NPRF funds ‘invested’ in the banks. Which leaves us with roughly €30-35 billion of promissory notes and other debts that can be in theory restructured via ESM.

On the surface, this looks like a great opportunity, to reduce our official Government debt from 117% of GDP to just over 100% of GDP.

However, the problem with this proposition is that it ignores the actual nature of the deal and the likelihood of such a deal going through.

Let’s start from the latter point.

For Ireland to restructure such a large amount of debt, will require one of the following two options. Either all of the states involved in ESM should be given similar retrospective considerations of past sovereign recapitalisations of the banks , or Ireland must be deemed to be a special case, warranting special intervention.

The former will mean that Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, not to mention Spain, Portugal, Greece and Cyprus will all have to be granted access to the same restructuring process as Ireland. These states have collectively pumped some €400 billion worth of taxpayers’ funds into their own banking systems during the crisis. ESM’s lending capacity is €500 billion. In other words, ESM will effectively have not enough funds to cover the second bailout for Ireland and extensions of bailouts for Portugal and Greece, let alone provide any backstop for Italy and Spain.

Italy has just raised its forecast budget deficit for 2012 by some 50%, while Spain will require €7-10 billion of additional fiscal cuts to meet its 2012 target. Greece has been lax on tax collection during May and June elections. The likelihood of these countries needing additional funds in 2013-2014 is rising, just as ESM lending capacity is shrinking.

The latter possibility would require making a convincing argument that Ireland’s case is unique when it comes to the hardships of recapitalising the banks. In addition, it will require proving that we desperately need special help. This can only be done by admitting that our deficit and debt adjustments, as envisioned in the multiannual programme with Troika, are not sustainable. This would contradict all Troika assessments of the Irish fiscal stabilization programmes to-date.


Now, let’s take a look at the more important point raised above – the point about the actual nature of this deal. In a nutshell, even if successful, the restructuring of our banks-related debts via ESM, as envisioned by the Government, will accomplish little in terms of lifting the burden of unsustainable debts off the shoulders of the economy.

The reasons for this conjecture are numerous.

Firstly, ESM will still require repayment of all the debts transferred from the Government to the fund. Except, instead of the taxpayers, the onus for repaying these debts will fall on Irish consumers.

Even an undergraduate student of economics knows that when the market power is concentrated in the hands of a small number of players, any taxes and charges imposed onto them will be passed directly to consumers. Now, recall that under the Irish Government plans, Irish banking system is moving toward a Bank of Ireland, plus AIB duopoly. In such an environment, the repayment of banks debts to the ESM will simply involve higher banking services costs to mortgagees and bank accounts holders.

Only a regulated duopoly, under certain conditions, can be prevented from gouging consumers to pay charges, and even then imperfectly. Yet, under the deal, the Government will be ceding control over the banking sector to the ESM (who will own the banks and their debts) and the ECB (who will act as the pan-Euro area supervisor of the banks). This means we can expect mortgages and banking costs to rise and with them, foreclosures, personal insolvencies and business liquidations to accelerate.

Secondly, per Irish Government statements, last week’s deal will allow for relieving the burden of the banks debt and promises to restart our economy back to growth. If the former proposition, as argued above, is questionable, the latter is outright bogus.

Ireland’s crisis is not driven by who owns the banks debts. It is driven by too much debt accumulated in all of the corners of our economy: households, companies, Government, and the banks. But the swap of banks-related debts from the Government to the ESM will not reduce the volume of this debt.

And the Irish economy will have an even lower capacity to repay these debts after the swap.

The Government is already committed to taking €8.6 billion out of the economy between 2013 and 2015. Most of it - €5.7 billion – is officially earmarked for ‘cuts’ to the Government expenditure. However, majority of the expenditure cuts are really nothing more than a concealed tax, as these cuts reallocate the costs of services to the households. In the Budget 2012, single largest expenditure reduction measure was a hike on private insurance costs of medical services.

On top of this, further €1.5-1.8 billion will have to be clawed out of the economy due to changes in the EU funding and reductions in state revenues from banks guarantee and support schemes.

In short, put against the reality of Ireland’s struggling economy and battered by the internal disagreements within the euro zone, the so-called ‘seismic’ deal is now turning into a storm in a teacup.



Box-out:

Ireland’s much-awaited ‘return to the bond markets’ on Thursday was greeted in the media by a number of erroneous reports. The truth is simple as are the questions surrounding the NTMA motives for the auction. Firstly, Ireland returned not to the bond markets, but to a short-term T-bill market. Very short-term, in fact. The two markets are significantly different to pretend the auction was a major breakthrough. Greece, in May this year – amidst the on-going collapse of its economy and political turmoil, also ‘returned’ to the T-bill market. As did Portugal in April when it faced an unexpected need for banks supports. Ireland itself last dipped into this market back in September 2010, while facing an impending bailout. T-bills auctions, therefore, are not exactly the vote of confidence. Secondly, 3 months-dated bills are effectively risk-free and do not constitute a recognition of Irish economic revival. Instead, they are backed by the Troika funds. As per questions raised, one that stands out is why did NTMA need this auction to take place in the first place? There is no need for the Government to borrow any money short-term, as our receipts of the Troika funds are regular, fully funded and without any uncertainty. It appears the whole exercise was about a public and investor relations management by the Government. Thus, the only apparent net positive from the auction is that we did not get rejected by the markets. Then again, neither did Greece in May or Portugal in April.