4/4/19: BRIC Manufacturing PMIs for 1Q 2019: In Line With Global Growth Slowdown

Q1 2019 Manufacturing PMIs for BRIC economies came in as effectively flat on 4Q 2018 and relatively in line with the collapsing Global Manufacturing PMI.

Brazil Manufacturing PMI averaged 53.0 in 1Q 2019, a gain on 52.1 in 4Q 2018, and the highest quarterly reading since 1Q 2011. 

Russia Manufacturing PMI average for 1Q 2019 was at 51.3, down from 51.9 in 4Q 2018, but still the second highest in 5 quarters. 

China Manufacturing PMI was at 49.7 in 1Q 2019, the first sub-50 reading for a quarterly average since 2Q 2016, and the fourth consecutive quarter of declining PMIs.

India Manufacturing PMI was at 53.6 - a gain on 53.4 in 4Q 2018, and the highest reading since 4Q 2012.

GDP-weighted BRIC Manufacturing PMI averaged 51.0 in 1Q 2019, marginally down on 51.2 in 4Q 2018 and singling slower growth than 51.5 reading for 1Q 2018.

Meanwhile, Global Manufacturing PMI averaged 50.7 in 1Q 2019, down significantly on 51.8 in 4Q 2018 and marking the fourth consecutive quarter of declining growth in global manufacturing. 

CHART

4/4/19: BRIC PMIs for March Show Improved Growth Conditions

With March PMIs reported by Markit in, here are the monthly frequency trends for the BRIC economies activity, based on composite PMIs:

Overall BRIC activity as signalled by PMIs remains range-bound in the tight, low activity range over the last 6 years (second chart above). However, the composite activity is running close to the upper bound of the range, implying overall stronger performance in the recent month. This is confirmed by the first chart above, showing that both Russia and ex-Russia BRIC economies activity is accelerating on trend since July 2018.

More analysis, based on smoother quarterly data forthcoming, so stay tuned.

2/4/19: Brain Drain Reversed or Inverted?

Generally, we associate skilled emigration with the phenomenon of 'brain drain' or a zero sum game - the loss of human capital from the country of origin and a corresponding gain to the recipient country. However, as common, the real nature of these effects is more complex than the first order analysis implies.

A new paper by Fackler, Thomas, Giesing, Yvonne and Laurentsyeva, Nadzeya, titled "Knowledge Remittances: Does Emigration Foster Innovation?" (CESifo Working Paper No. 7420) accessible via https://ssrn.com/abstract=3338774, looks at the issue of knowledge flows relating to emigration. The authors find that based on "industry-level patenting and migration data from 32 European countries," "...emigration in fact positively contributes to innovation in source countries. ... While skilled migrants are not inventing in their home country anymore, they contribute to cross-border knowledge and technology diffusion and thus help less advanced countries to catch up to the technology frontier."

More specifically, authors show that "one percent increase in the number of emigrants increases patent applications by 0.64 percent in the following two years. This result is statistically significant at the one percent level and robust to controls, fixed effects, and varying lags. The effect is quantitatively more pronounced when we consider only the flows of migrants with patenting potential."

A picture worth a 1,000 words:

Notice, the above suggests that the positive effect of opening up migration channels on technological convergence is evident as early as two years prior to the EU Accession of 2004. The same is confirmed in the following chart:

In line with their findings, the authors suggest that

• The EU "could benefit from further facilitating migration within Europe", by focusing on reducing cultural and social barriers to migration, such as "language and administrative barriers, ...ensuring the recognition of foreign qualifications and the promotion of language courses at all age levels."
• "Another policy implication is to ease skilled migration to Europe from outside the European Union. This could be achieved by easing the access to European labour markets and the recruitment of highly qualified foreign workers. While the Blue Card has been a step in this direction, its scope could be increased to obtain a higher impact and administrative barriers should be reduced." 

Update: Similar findings are reported in Kim, Jisong and Lee, Nah Youn, High-Skilled Inventor Emigration as a Moderator for Increased Innovativeness and Growth in Sending Countries, East Asian Economic Review Vol. 23, No. 1 (March 2019) 3-26: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3360938. Their paper uses data from 154 countries to show that high-skilled inventor emigration rate has a positive growth effect on the country of origin (COO) by spurring "knowledge diffusion and technology transfer back to their COOs, which in turn affects innovation and growth in their home countries. The result indicates that the direct negative impact of the brain drain can be mitigated by the positive feedback effect generated by the high-skilled inventor emigrants abroad. When coupled with an active trade policy that reinforces growth, countries can partially recoup the direct effect of the human capital loss."

2/4/19: Capital Markets Union: An Action Plan of Unfinished Reforms

Our paper on the progress of the EU Capital Markets Union reforms is now available on SSRN:

Capital Markets Union: An Action Plan of Unfinished Reforms (March 21, 2019). with Tracy Lee Lyon, Alexandra Cohen, Margaret Poda and Matthew Salyer (Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS); GUE/NGL Group, European Parliament, Policy Analysis Paper, March 2019. Available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3357380.

2/4/19: World Economic Conditions and Yield Signals

Global divergence...

... until global convergence?

More likely, the latter: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecb-policy-rates-idUSKCN1R81B3. 

2/4/19: Spending your way into oblivion?

As Donald Trump talks about forcing UK NHS to pay higher prices for U.S. pharmaceutical companies' output, an amazing chart from the Our World in Data project (link to more interactive charts on health expenditure: https://ourworldindata.org/the-link-between-life-expectancy-and-health-spending-us-focus) plotting life expectancy against health expenditure for all OECD countries:

Source: https://ourworldindata.org/the-link-between-life-expectancy-and-health-spending-us-focus

This data is dire. The U.S. vastly outspends other countries in terms of health spending, yet it also vastly underperforms in terms of life expectancy. Yes, in part, the latter feature is down to violence (not ineffectiveness of healthcare), and in part it is down to horrific diets and sedentary life-styles of Americans. But controlling for all this, Americans still live shorter lives and get less preventative healthcare and lower quality medical interventions. All for a higher price.

1/4/19: Hollowing out of the American Middle Class: the High Earners, and the 1-percenters

An interesting and insightful 2016 paper from John Komlos of CESIfo, titled "Growth of Income and Welfare in the U.S. 1979-2011" (CESifo Working Paper No. 5880), paints the pretty dire picture of the post-1980s dynamics in the U.S. labor markets, that laid the foundations of the current acceleration and deepening of political populism and opportunism not only in the U.S., but also in Western Europe.

Kolmos estimated growth rates in real incomes in the U.S. from the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) post-tax, post-transfer data. Kolmos also adjusts the real income data to improve the accuracy of the measures. The result is striking: "... the major consistent findings include what in the colloquial is referred to as the “hollowing out” of the middle class. According to these estimates, the income of the middle class 2nd and 3rd quintiles increased at a rate of between 0.1% and 0.7% per annum, i.e., barely distinguishable from zero. Even that meager rate was achieved only through substantial transfer payments." Of course, given that we have experienced positive growth in the aggregate economy in excess of these figures and well above the demographic change, this "hollowing out" of the middle class had to be accompanied by the "fattening up" of some other income classes, either the rich or the poor or both. Per Kolmos, it was the former one: "the income of the top 1% grew at an astronomical rate of between 3.4% and 3.9% per annum during the 32-year period, reaching an average annual value of $918,000, up from $281,000 in 1979 (in 2011 dollars)." Predictably, "...the post-tax, post-transfer income of the 1% relative to the 1st quintile increased from a factor of 21 in 1979 to a factor of 51 in 2011."

But what about the poor? Again, per Kolmos, "...income of no other group increased substantially relative to that of the lowest quintile. Oddly, the income of even those in the 96-99 percentiles increased only from a multiple of 8.1 to a multiple of 11.3."

Kolmos id this exercise for 'high' and 'low' ranges of income (depending on specific assumptions that were less and more conservative ratline to the CBO's raw data.

The results of the two calculations are shown in the chart below

Source: Kolmos (2016: 14)

In simple terms, this chart shows two interesting things:
1) The dramatic growth differential between income estimates for all quintiles compared to the top quintile is fully accounted for by the massive growth in income of the top 5% of the populations and especially by the growth in income of the top 1%.
2) The gap between high and low estimates for income growth are massive for the second and third quintiles (the middle class), and are relatively comparable for the first (low income earners) and 4th quintile (upper middle class). The gap becomes much smaller for the 5th quintile (high earners) and turns negligible for top 1%.

Kolmos attempts to convert income into more meaningful 9albeit harder to pin down) measure of well-being. To do this, he estimates the logarithmic utility function for the quintiles (logarithmic utility function preserves the property of the diminishing marginal utility - the idea that as our incomes continue to increase, each percent increase in our income results in progressively smaller gains in satisfaction/utility). Here is what he finds: "A logarithmic utility function yields a growth in welfare for the middle class of roughly 0.01% to 0.07% per annum, which is indistinguishable from zero. With interdependent utility functions only the welfare of the 5th quintile experienced meaningful growth while those of the first four quintiles tend to be either negligible or even negative." Chart below shows these estimates.

Source: Kolmos (2016: 15)

Focusing on the Percentiles section, markers 6-9 disaggregate the last 5th quintile into the ranges of top 81-90%, 91-95%, 96-99% and top 1%. It is quite evident that only top 5% (segments 8 and 9) experienced welfare gains of more than the 4th quantile cohorts.

This strongly implies that, contrary to some left-leaning policymakers' proposals and preferences, the problem of 'hollowing out' of the American middle class is not driven by the incomes of the top 81-90th percentiles, nor even by those in 91st-95th percentiles. The real source of the problem starts somewhere within the 96-99th percentile and most certainly extends to the top 1%.

The same is confirmed by looking at each cohort income relative to that of the top quintile, shown in the chart below

Source: Kolmos (2016:27)

In summary, thus, the problem with the 'hollowing out' of the middle class is not within theta 20% earners, nor within the top 10% earners. It starts much higher than that.

30/3/19: The Art of Trade Fudge: USMCA

Much-lauded Trump's Nafta 2.0, officially known as the United States – Mexico – Canada Agreement (USMCA) came to being on November 30, 2018. In his State of the Union speech on February 5, 2019, President Donald Trump claimed that the USMCA will replace “the catastrophe known as NAFTA” and “deliver for American workers like they have not had delivered to for a long time.” In a brief summary of the USMCA, Vox (see https://www.vox.com/2018/10/3/17930092/usmca-nafta-trump-trade-deal-explained) has effectively argued that the new Agreement is largely a rehashing of the original Nafta - a step in no new direction, with only minor modifications of the Trump-hated agreement.

Last week, the IMF piped in with its own analysis of the Agreement. The new IMF paper (see: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/03/26/NAFTA-to-USMCA-What-is-Gained-46680) provides "an analytical assessment of five key provisions in the new agreement, including:

• tighter rules of origin in the automotive, textiles and apparel sectors, 
• more liberalized agricultural trade, and 
• other trade facilitation measures." 

So how good is the USMCA in driving forward trade and investment flows between the three economies? Per IMF, the "results show that together these provisions would adversely affect trade in the automotive, textiles and apparel sectors, while generating modest aggregate gains in terms of welfare, mostly driven by improved goods market access, with a negligible effect on real GDP. The welfare benefits from USMCA would be greatly enhanced with the elimination of U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Canada and Mexico and the elimination of the Canadian and Mexican import surtaxes imposed after the U.S. tariffs were put in place."

So, repealing the problem created by Mr. Trump - steel and aluminum tariffs - has more potential for welfare gains for Mr. Trump's electorate, than the new Nafta agreement that Mr. Trump claims to be one of his Administration's major achievements.

Mr. Trump has referenced, on many occasions, the need for reducing U.S. trade deficits with Mexico and Canada as the core justification for altering Nafta. IMF analysis of the USMCA shows that under the most welfare-enhancing scenario of USMCA introduction, accompanied by normalization of trade in steel and aluminum, U.S. trade deficit with Mexico can be expected to improve by only USD576 million per annum (0.58%), and with Canada by USD 1,781 million (4.31% improvement). However, U.S. trade balance with the rest of the world is expected to worsen by USD 2,698 million (a deterioration of 0.375%), more than offsetting the gains from Canada and Mexico trade.

Worse, U.S. workers will see no material gains from USMCA, as the IMF estimates presented in Table 9 (below) show:

As noted above, IMF projects no material growth boost from USMCA. More detailed analysis - by sector - shows that under the scenario involving repeal of Trump tariffs (the only scenario with positive welfare impact of USMCA), only two non-agricultural sectors of the U.S. economy can expect gains in output: food manufacturing and Other Manufacturing. In contrast, six sectors are likely to see their output decline:

All in, the IMF research shows the extent of economic fudge that is the current Administration's trade and investment policy. The art of the deal seems to be the art of faking soundbites and slogans, while delivering nothing new.

12/3/19: S&P500 Concentration Risk over 10 years

More on increasing concentration risks in the U.S. equity markets: Goldman Sachs estimates that almost 1/4 of total return to S&P500 over the last 10 years came from just 10 stocks:

Of these, Apple alone accounted for almost 1/5th of total return to S&P500. 22% of total return was accounted for by ICT sector.

10/3/19: Irish Residential Construction Sector 2018: A New 'Recovery' Low

It has been an ugly decade for Ireland's building and construction industry. especially for housing. Following a historically massive bust in 2009-2012, indices of total production in the housing sub-sector fell from the pre-crisis high of 751.7 for value and 820 for volume, attained in 2006, to their lowest cyclical points of 57.9 and 59.5, respectively, in 2012. In other words, from 2006 through 2012, Irish residential building and construction production fell a massive, gargantuan, non-Solar-System-like 92.3% in value terms and 92.74% in volume terms. That was bad.

The recovery has not been any better. Since the lowest point of the cycle in 2012, through 2018, based on the latest figures from CSO, value of production in residential construction sector rose to 186.6, an uplift of 222.3% and volume rose to 176.9 (a rise of 197.3%). Still, compared to pre-crisis peak, current value of production in Ireland's residential building and construction sub-sector is down 75.2%, still, and in volume terms it is down 78.4%.

Of course, comparatives to the peak production year would be subject to criticism that things should be benchmarked by something 'other' than the levels of activity achieved during the bubble. I disagree. Back in the days of the bubble, Ireland experienced rampant house price inflation, as demand was still lagging behind supply. But, let me entertain, as in the above chart, an argument about averages over two periods: the period of the pre-bust activity and the period of the recovery activity.

Ireland today has an acute crisis in the supply of homes. There is no question about that. What 2018 figure shows, however, is far worse. In 2018, value of production in residential construction sector in Ireland grew by only 6.88% y/y - the slowest pace of growth since the recovery started in 2013. By volume, activity grew only 3.75% y/y in 2018 - also the slowest pace for the recovery period. As the crisis in supply of homes get worse, the rates of growth in the 'recovering' sector get shallower. This suggests that Irish residential construction is nowhere near the trajectory needed to achieve the rates of growth required to fill the gap in the housing supply.

In all 12 years of positive growth (between 2000 and 2018), last year marked the worst rate of growth in Value and the second worst year of growth in Volume terms. To put things into perspective: under 2018 growth rates, Irish residential building and construction production won't reach its 2000-2007 average levels until mid-2033 in value terms and mid-2052 in volume terms.

6/3/19: Expectations Sand Castles and Investors

As raging buybacks of shares and M&As have dropped the free float available in the markets over the recent years, Earnings per Share (EPS) continued to tank. Yet, S&P 500 valuations kept climbing:

Source: Factset 

As noted by the Factset: 1Q 2019 "marked the largest percentage decline in the bottom-up EPS estimate over the first two months of a quarter since Q1 2016 (-8.4%). At the sector level, all 11 sectors recorded a decline in their bottom-up EPS estimate during the first two months of the quarter... Overall, nine sectors recorded a larger decrease in their bottom-up EPS estimate relative to their five-year average, eight sectors recorded a larger decrease in their bottom-up EPS estimate relative to their 10-year average, and seven sectors recorded a larger decrease in their bottom-up EPS estimate relative to their 15-year average."

Bad stuff. Yet, "as the bottom-up EPS estimate for the index declined during the first two months of the quarter, the value of the S&P 500 increased during this same period. From December 31 through February 28, the value of the index increased by 11.1% (to 2784.49 from 2506.85). The first quarter marked the 15th time in the past 20 quarters in which the bottom-up EPS estimate decreased while the value of the index increased during the first two months of the quarter."

The disconnect between investors' valuations and risk pricing, and the reality of tangible estimations for current conditions is getting progressively worse. The markets remain a spring, loaded with the deadweight of expectations sand castles.

4/3/19: BRIC Manufacturing PMI: January-February Trend

In January-February 2019, Global manufacturing PMI sunk to its lowest reading since 2Q 2016 averaging 50.7 over the first two months of the year. With it, the slowdown has also been impacting the BRIC economies, overall BRIC Manufacturing PMIs average 41.2 in 4Q 2018 based on each country share of the global GDP for 2018, below 51.83 average for Global Manufacturing PMI over the same period. In the first two months of 2019, BRIC Manufacturing PMI was around 50.8, statistically indistinguishable from the 50.7 Global PMI average.

As the chart above clearly indicates, poor BRIC performance was driven by a contraction-territory reading for China (49.1 in January-February 2019 as opposed to stagnation-signalling 50.0 in 4Q 2018), and Russia (50.5 for the first two months of 2019, against 4Q 2018 average of 51.9). In contrast, both Brazil and India outperformed BRIC and Global PMI readings. Brazil's Manufacturing PMI averaged 53.1 in the first two months of 2019 against 52.1 in 4Q 2018, while India's PMI rose to 54.1 in January-February this year against 53.4 in 4Q 2018.

All in, Manufacturing sector leading indicator suggests a major slowdown in the Global growth momentum, and some spillover of this slowdown to Russia and China.  Brazil's robust reading so far marks the fastest pace of expansion since 1Q 2010, on foot of a recovery from a very long and painful recession. India's reading is the highest since 2Q 2012. If confirmed over March and over Services PMI, this implies a major diversion of growth momentum within the BRIC group.