Friday, June 12, 2015

12/6/15: Anglo Overcharging Saga: Ganley Affidavit of 2013


Here are some select quotes from the Affidavit, filed by Mr. Declan Ganley on August 12, 2013 with respect to his knowledge about the share interest rate rigging practices at the Anglo Irish Bank as covered in my earlier posts here:
http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/06/1062015-bombshell-goes-off-on-anglo.html
http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/06/11615-full-letter-concerning-ibrc.html
and implications of which are discussed here:
http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/06/11615-anglos-toxic-legacy-it-is-still.html

Per Mr .Ganley's Affidavit: he met Mr. R.K. - former executive in Anglo Irish Bank in October 2010 and during the course of his discussion with Mr. R.K., Mr. R.K. "told me that one of several areas that should be pursued should be the opportunistic over charging of interest rates targeting multiple customers of Anglo. He said that it wasn't a great secret within Anglo and that it had been standard practice for many years. He said that the skim on these loans was jokingly known as "TIBOR" after a Mr. Tiarnan O'Mahoney, who he said oversaw this practice at the bank. He explained that TIBOR was the fake rate that Anglo would apply, pretending that it was the daily DIBOR rate. He said that it would be easy to check, by just looking into what the actual DIBOR rate was on a given day and then checking what Anglo had reported it to be to various customers. The resulting mark up would go to Anglo's coffers."

Now, take a slightly different angle on this. Suppose you go to a Bank and ask for a tracker mortgage loan. Suppose you get a quote of "ECB rate plus 1%". You take the loan and subsequently receive a statement that your interest rate charged in the past month was 1.35%. Except that 1.35% = ECB rate of 0.05% + 1% declared margin + 0.3% clerk-own make up margin. You contracted to pay 1.05%. You paid 1.35%. The clerk pocketed 0.3% as personal gain. How fast would the law be brought down on that clerk's case? Oh, in a nanosecond.

In Anglo's DIBOR case, there is no law being brought down on anyone. Because a bank engaged in defrauding customers is not the same as a clerk engaging in defrauding customers.

"I expressed a certain degree of disbelief that such a practice could run for more than a year or two without someone spotting it, a regulator, auditor, a professional investor (e.g. a bond investor) or other. I also said it was hard to imagine that the practice was well known."

"Mr. R.K. then said that not only was it the case but that he even had a copy of internal Anglo Irish Bank minutes where it was covered as a matter of fact practice."

Now, note, the above alleges explicitly that the fraud was conducted repeatedly, regularly, knowingly and was approved by the bank.

"He offered to show me a copy, I said "yes" and he proceeded to produce a copy of a document that appeared to be minutes of an Anglo Irish Bank meeting covering TIBOR. I then made arrangements to forward a copy of the document to a media outlet in London, who proceeded to use their documents as part of their basis for a report on the "TIBOR" story…

One of the pages was a schedule of "TIBOR" rates that the bank has charged to their clients as genuine DIBOR rates over a provisos period. I checked these rates against the official rates for the same period and confirmed that none of the rates replicated the actual published DIBOR rates. It appeared from the documents that, per Mr. R.K.'description, the official DIBOR rates had all been randomly and substantially loaded by differing amounts by Anglo Irish Bank."

Now, let us return to that clerk in your local bank example. Suppose that there is evidence showing that the said clerk perpetrated the same fraud time after time after time with all borrowers who came to his office to secure a mortgage. And that he notified his superior of this fraud and arranged to report regularly on his progress of defrauding banks' clients. How long will it be, in your view, before the weight of law is brought down onto the bank clerk's superior?

We had several cases in the past when bank employees would engage in stealing clients funds. These cases were prosecuted, wrong was addressed and clients were compensated. But when it comes to "TIBOR", even after two courts establish evidence that Anglo Irish Bank engaged in sharp practices, and years after this is notified to the Irish authorities by the likes of Mr. Ganley and John Morrissey and John Flynn and others, there is static silence in the air on the topic from all Irish authorities concerned.

And this is a simple, established, evidence-backed case. What can we expect from a much more complex inquiry into business dealings of IBRC? And more importantly, what can we expect from any attempt by the State to even look into how Nama has been running its business?

Nope, I don't have much of conviction we will see a definitive conclusion to this Anglo/IBRC saga any time soon.

Note: Mr. Ganley's affidavit references the fact that in late 2010 the TIBOR scandal was made public in international press and through other media channels. In other words, Irish Government and authorities were aware of the problem since then. They are yet to reply on how it can be rectified.

12/6/15: IMF Tells Kiev: "Default"


Things are getting really testy Friday night in Ukraine. As I noted earlier today (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/06/12615-ukraine-debt-haircuts.html), IMF gave Kiev a bit of strong-man-behind-me support in negotiations with private sector bondholders.

Later today, IMF head had the following to say on the subject: "To ensure economic and financial stability, [programme] objectives need to be achieved in a manner consistent with maintaining a strong international reserves position over the medium term, in line with projections under the program. In this regard, the NBU’s international reserves cannot be used for sovereign debt service without the government incurring new debt, which would be inconsistent with the objectives of the debt operation. Ultimately, Ukraine’s debt repayment capacity is limited by its fiscal capacity."

De facto, Ms. Christine Lagarde means the following: forex reserves held by the National Bank of Ukraine will not be used to fund debt repayments or servicing. IMF loans cannot be used for debt redemptions or servicing. Which means Kiev can only pay out on bonds out of current revenues left or via new borrowing in the markets. Kiev has none of those funds available, so Ms. Christine Lagarde effectively gave Kiev an order to default, as "Ukraine lacks the resources under the program to fully service its debts on the original terms."

"...in the event that a negotiated settlement with private creditors is not reached and the country determines that it cannot service its debt, the Fund can lend to Ukraine consistent with its Lending-into-Arrears Policy."

Ms. Lagarde effectively said in Ukraine, IMF will act differently than it did in all European programme countries and differently from pretty much every other case in its history.

In addition, Ms. Christine Lagarde has gone as far as ordering the bondholders to accept Kiev deal or face a forced default. Ms. Lagarde qualified this order being in the interest of the bondholders, explicitly linking that interest to the IMF 'conviction'. This is a major point, because IMF is now indirectly dictating - via Kiev - to the private markets terms and conditions of their surrender.

Note: I tend to agree with Ms. Christine Lagarde on the necessity of a write down, but this is one of these rare (if not unique) occasions where the IMF is effectively ordering a default and expropriating private property of third parties.

Final note: private sector investors have based their proposal for haircuts on the premise that Ukraine will be able to use forex reserves at NBU as a source of repayments post-restructuring. Ms. Lagarde now cancelled that position in one go.

All of this means two things - beyond the immediate consideration of Ukrainian situation:
1) IMF is trying to hedge the risk of future (not current) slippage in the programme and insulate the funds it supplies from being exhausted on debt servicing and repayments. This means the IMF is seeing Ukraine as a huge risk engagement at this stage and is doing preemptive damage control. All the talk about debt sustainability under the IMF programme is a fig leaf of decorum: even if haircuts are delivered as planned, IMF sees big risk of programme being derailed and wants its money ring-fenced.
2) IMF is also trying to re-establish some sort of an independent agency reputation, post-European experience.

Ukraine's default is now a matter of days, unless private bondholders surrender. Prepare for a wild ride…

12/6/15: Ukraine Debt Haircuts


Important article today in the FT on the issue of write downs on Ukrainian debt: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/949628a4-102a-11e5-bd70-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cg6nwFC9

In my view, the write down should take into the account discounts at which current debt holders have taken their long positions, so that vulture funds and distressed debt speculators take a larger haircut than someone who held debt over longer term and bought it at lower discounts. This will put heavier penalty onto distressed debt speculators and reduce penalty on investors who acquired Ukrainian debt before the crisis started.

Meanwhile, Ukraine's probability of default is climbing. Here are two sources: implied bonds probability of default at >95% and Credit Default Swaps implied probability of default at almost 82%.


Source: @Schuldensuehner
Source: CMA

The latest spike in default probabilities took place following IMF comments (see:  http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2015/tr061115.htm) that effectively altered markets expectation as to whether or not the IMF will allow Kiev to default on private debt. It now appears that the IMF has little problem with Kiev using strong-arm tactic of threatening (and enacting) a default on private sector debt. Prior to this week, the understanding was that the IMF will not lend to Ukraine if it goes into a default - a position that allowed private debt holders to argue that their intransigence is supported by the pressure from the IMF on Kiev to conclude a deal. Now, that pressure is gone and IMF seemingly is giving green light to Kiev to default, as long as such a default does not take place after any deal conclusion.

Update: The strategy deployed by IMF in the case of Ukraine - the strategy of actively forcing a default as a credible threat to private sector holders of debt - is not new. It was outlined in this document from 2002 (see page 28 of http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/sdrm.pdf): "There may be a risk that creditors would withhold an extension of the stay in the hope that the IMF would provide more financing or call on the member to make additional adjustment efforts. For example, even in circumstances where the member is implementing good policies and negotiating in good faith, creditors may refuse to extend the period of the stay as a means of persuading the member to turn to the IMF for financing that could enhance the terms of any restructuring. The creditors could threaten to lift the stay to force the debtor to agree to more adjustment than contemplated under the IMF-supported program. Such risks could be reduced, however, by the resolute application of the IMF’s policy of lending into arrears, under which it signals its willingness to continue to support a program, even if the member has interrupted payments to its creditors."

12/6/15: Did Ireland Abandon Homeowners in Need?


An short, but informative article on the issue of mortgages arrears in Ireland:
http://www.herald.ie/news/state-has-abandoned-mortgage-holders-31296163.html

The article correctly points to the lack of state engagement with the issue of long term arrears and the banks' strategy of extend-and-pretend in hope that rising house prices will maximise their returns on future foreclosures.

But the real, the main, point here is whether the Irish state has abandoned the homeowners in need. In my view - the Irish State was never concerned with the interests of homeowners. To think otherwise is to delude oneself once again into a fallacy of seeing the State as an agent concerned with the interests of the people.

Here are the excerpts from the recent study commissioned by the EU Parliament on changes in core rights accruing to individuals across a number of European nations in the wake of the post-crisis austerity programmes. The selection addresses the view of the reporters on Ireland in the context of the right to housing.

"Right to housing was affected in Belgium, Cyprus, Ireland and Spain in two
principal ways: with the increase of foreclosures and evictions and by the
interventions into the allocation of social housing and rental allowances." (page 15)

Note: this is not 'new' as in being indicative of an 'abandonment' of homeowners - rather, this is an assessment of systemic, long-term changes enacted by the State. And it covers both: private structure of homeownership and rental markets, and public provision of social housing.

"At the same time, in Belgium, Cyprus and Ireland, rental allowances or the
availability of social housing are inadequate and insufficient to respond to the needs of people in the wake of the crisis" (page 123)

"The Irish social housing budget was cut by 36% in 2011 and by another 26% in 2012. At the same time, with the loss of jobs and turbulence in the labour market, it is not surprising that the number of households on waiting lists for social housing increased by 75% between 2008 and 2011, i.e. from 56,000 to 98,000. Moreover, it is estimated that in 2011, approximately 5,000 people were homeless in Ireland compared to 3,157 people in 2008. The continued rise in rents, particularly in the last 12 months, is seen as contributing to the problem498, while rent supplements, having been reduced by 20% to 25%, are becoming increasingly inadequate with the severe budget cuts. Certain vulnerable groups have been adversely affected in Ireland. Travellers have
experienced 85% spending cuts on housing since 2008. Moreover, resource allocations for asylum seeker accommodation were reduced by 13% in 20115. In 2008, 36% of all single-parent households were on the waiting list for social housing and one fifth of all people who relied on a rent supplement to meet their rental costs were single parents. The capital assistance scheme, which used to house people with disabilities, was also reduced from EUR 145 million in 2010, to EUR 50 million in 2012" (page 125)

So here you have it - the EU report does not document an act of abandonment as a departure from past policy. It suggests systemic, long term trend toward such abandonment. In other words, the report findings imply a lack of concern or interest on behalf of the State to secure rights to housing from the start of the crisis, not a sudden change of heart.

Full EU report is available here: EUP (2015: PE 510.021) "The impact of the crisis on fundamental rights across Member States of the EU Comparative analysis". Study for the Libe Committee, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, European Parliament. February 2015: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/510021/IPOL_STU(2015)510021_EN.pdf 

Thursday, June 11, 2015

11/6/15: Full Letter Concerning IBRC Overcharging


Yesterday, I posted about Deputy peter Mathews' speech in the Dail concerning the egregious sharp practices in the Anglo Irish Bank and IBRC (link here). Today, I posted my point of view taking these practices to the macro level in relation to the remaining legacy of Anglo/IBRC (link here).

In his speech, deputy Mathews quoted from the Black & Company Solicitors' letter on behalf of Mr. John Morrissey and I quoted from the same some more in my post (linked above).

Here is the actual copy of the letter (I had to break it into segments in order to post on this platform). All sections are sequential and reproduce the letter in its entirety. You can click on each segment to enlarge.









I provide no comment beyond what has been already provided in the two posts linked above.

11/6/15: What Markets Are Pricing in Greece-Troika ex-IMF Standoff


Head on collision warning 1: IMF has now left the 'political dialogue' room where Greece and Troika (pardon, Institutions) have been pretending to negotiate a pretence at a solution: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/06/11/uk-eurozone-greece-chance-idUKKBN0OR13020150611

Which brings us to the markets.

CDS-implied probability of default for Greece is now at 82.04%, ahead of Ukraine:
But bond markets seem relatively cool:
Which suggests two things:

  1. Markets still anticipate a deal; but
  2. Markets also push down expected duration / longevity of the deal and, in case of the deal unraveling, they expect lower recovery rates.
This, amidst continued 'warnings' and 'dire warnings' and 'ultimatums' and 'take-it-or-leave' offers and the rest of warring rhetoric is not a good omen for the crisis resolution.

Even Jean-Claude 'The Rubber Chicken of European Politics' Junker seemed to have given his last push to this: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/06/11/uk-eurozone-greece-juncker-attempt-idUKKBN0OR23V20150611?mod=related&channelName=businessNews and failed...

11/6/15: FT on IBRC Inquiry


Financial Times on IBRC Inquiry: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/295fdf8a-0f4e-11e5-897e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3chjkDlNH with comment from myself amongst others.

11/6/15: Anglo's Toxic Legacy: It Is Still Around Us, Today...


Here is an edited version of a note from 4Q 2014 that I provided to a non-commercial party interested in the matters of the Anglo Irish Bank that outlines my view of the sharp practices at the bank and the spillover from these practices across Irish banking, economic and political systems.

"As you know, Ireland was forced by the ECB and the EU to bail out its banks. The most egregious case involved Anglo Irish Bank - a mono-line property lender that was nationalised on January 21, 2009 and bailed out using Irish Government funding to the tune of EUR29.3 billion.

Funds for this bailout came from a combination of the Troika loans and taxpayers-owned National Pension Reserve Fund and thus, de facto, amounted to taxpayer financing of the bank.

Nationalisation of the Anglo Irish Bank, as we now know, came on foot of the bank, the auditors and regulators failing to report egregious sharp practices in the bank when it comes to the regulatory rules that date from the early 1990s through 2008 and include systemic and wilful overcharging of customers, breaches of liquidity rules, bank providing funding for its own directors on the basis of preferential treatment of public disclosures in collusion with another bank, INBS, bank engaging in misclassification of loans as deposits, and bank providing funding to its own customers for share price support schemes.

Any one of these sharp practices would have resulted in either a bank closure in a properly regulated regime, such as, for example, the U.S., and/or a complete wipeout of the equity value of the bank in the markets.

Two Examples

Take one example of one such practice. The overcharging problem at the Anglo Irish Bank continued from 1990 through 2004, with clients billed on average 0.3% concealed margin on their loans without notification of the customers charged and without disclosure to the auditors. Bankcheck review of the large number of loans revealed that 80% of these were involving overcharging. More importantly, from the point of view of the current situation, the Irish Government agencies, such as the IBRC and Nama, as well as the purchasers of distressed loans from Anglo borrowers, continue to charge the rates that include the original fraudulent mark ups, despite at least one official judgement on the matter issued by the Irish court. Taken in perspective, the overcharging - officially and on the record exposed in Irish and US courts - represents a quantum of estimated EUR1 billion of overstatement of publicly recorded and audited profits declared by Anglo through the period of 2004, and although we have no means for ascertaining the quantum of overcharging since 2004, the figure of at least around EUR2 billion total over the span of 1990-2014 is most likely a conservative estimate. This overcharging was notified to the Irish authorities repeatedly and on the record, with no action taken in response to notifications by the current Government, the Financial Regulator and/or the Central Bank.

In another sharp practice, the bank lent money to a single customer to cover margin calls on CFDs held against the bank own shares and, subsequent to the accumulated loans in excess of EUR2 billion, the bank arranged and funded a buyout facility for 10 investors (also clients of the bank) who were lent funds by the bank predominantly on unsecured basis to purchase shares underlying the said CFD positions. In simple, most basic terms, the bank used its lending book to prevent a share price collapse that could have resulted from the disclosure to the markets of the cumulated CFD positions.

Impact

In effect, thus, Irish taxpayers were compelled by the European component of the Troika, the EU and the ECB, in contravention of the IMF advice, to underwrite losses in a bank that was neither systemic to the Irish economy (it had basically no retail deposits and conducted virtually no retail business) nor operated within the confines of banking regulations and laws. On foot of the Anglo Irish Bank rescue, we were compelled to rescue an equally egregious Irish Nationwide Building Society - a counterpart to some of the sharp practices carried out in the Anglo Irish Bank.

Between 2007 and 2013, Irish Government debt rose by EUR155.8 billion - the largest jump in debt relative to GDP of any country in the euro area, including Greece. More than 22 percent of this increase is down to Anglo Irish Bank and irish Nationwide Building Society rescues. 

The damage runs deeper than that, however. If the Irish Government was allowed by the ECB to shut down Anglo Irish Bank prior to nationalisation, Irish Government debt today would have been around 93% of GDP as opposed to the current level of 112%. But this does not take into the account the potential contagion that resulted from the Anglo Irish Bank collapse to other banking institutions in the country. At the time of the September 2008 banking Guarantee, the State and its advisers have argued that not rescuing Anglo Irish Bank would have spread market panic to other Irish banks. 

This claim is, in my opinion, dubious. It could have been as likely, if not more so, that shutting down a rogue institution (or, with INBS - two rogue institutions) in a public and transparent manner could have resulted in more confidence in the systems and procedures present within Irish regulatory and supervisory regime. By opting to preserve and secure Anglo Irish Bank and INBS, Irish Government at the time sent a signal to the markets that any institution, including that with questionable business model, strategy and practices will be preserved and protected. In turn, such a signal was consistent with telling the markets that Ireland has no will to or cannot (due to the limited regulatory abilities) distinguish rogue operators from legitimate and functional ones. The effect of this could have been undermining confidence in all Irish banks, in order to protect a rogue one.

Ireland opted for a solution of shoring up and covering up the structural vulnerabilities exposed by the Anglo Irish Bank practices in the system of our regulation and supervision, as well as governance. This is neither a sustainable strategy, nor is a markets-securing strategy.

Legacy

The legacy of the Anglo Irish Bank-related debt remains with us. Currently, Irish Central Bank holds some EUR25 billion worth of long-term Government bonds issued to offset Emergency Liquidity Assistance credit line extended to the bank liquidators. Ireland is mandated by the EU and ECB to gradually sell these bonds into private markets. As we do so, the burden of this debt is befalling Irish people who will have to fund interest and principal on these bonds into perpetuity. 

There is an easy solution to this problem that ECB can enact within a minute: the bonds should be left in the Central Bank and cancelled at maturity. This implies no cost for European taxpayers and no new issuance of money by the ECB.

In ethical terms (moral hazard etc), such a move is warranted due to the sheer scale of deception and concealment of the facts of the Anglo Irish Bank operations that have been exposed to-date and are still being exposed and that were not disclosed at the time of the September 2008 Guarantee or, indeed, at the time of the 2010 Troika 'Bailout'. In other words, the argument can and should be made that both the Guarantee and the Bailout involved Irish commitments to lenders and lenders agreements that were not reflective of the full informational disclosures by the Anglo Irish Bank and the INBS.

In moral terms and economic terms, Irish people have paid a huge price for the crisis - far more than their fair share, given the fact that in rescuing Irish banks, we have underwritten a rescue of private bondholders and banks across the EU, the US. Irish people are paying for the crisis with dramatically higher rates of suicide, destroyed families, lost or endangered family homes, decimated health care system, devastated pensions, underfunded education and childcare, and an economy that in per capita GDP terms has sustained the third biggest drop across all Euro area countries. A large share of these costs is attributable to EU and ECB decision to force Irish Government to accept full losses in the Anglo Irish Bank and INBS - two rogue banking institutions that were not systemic to Ireland - which itself was predicated on incomplete information and misleading information being supplied to the Irish authorities at the time of decision making.

Furthermore, it is my opinion that the legacy of the Anglo and INBS - embodied in the continued process of disposal of the residual bonds on the insistence of the EU and ECB - is toxic to the democratic institutions of Ireland, from the point of view of the future. As long as Irish political elites are forced to deal with the legacy of the bonds disposals, there will remain an incentive for the Irish establishment to stay mute on the issues of systemic breaches in regulatory, supervisory and legal frameworks around the operations of the two rogue institutions. In return, official refusal to deal with the legacy fuels public mistrust of the core democratic institutions of the State, increasing the appeal of the extreme ideologies and political positions. 


The legacy of Anglo and INBS is so toxic that it prevents a rational, informed discovery of facts and debate of these facts as relating to the regulatory and supervisory breaches within Irish financial system. The only way we can functionally deal with this malfunctioning of the state systems is if the European authorities allow Ireland to move beyond the cost of carrying the repayments accruing from these liabilities on the State balance sheet. Only after shedding the immediate burden of having to finance their legacy can we, as a nation, move to the stage of addressing deeper, more structural problems exposed by the crisis.


Note: Details of overcharging sharp practices at Anglo Irish Bank that allegedly continued into IBRC and Nama are discussed here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/06/1062015-bombshell-goes-off-on-anglo.html. Details of Mr. Morrissey letter quoted in the Dail (Irish parliament) are available here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/06/11615-full-letter-concerning-ibrc.html. Details of the affidavit filed by Mr. Declan Ganley with Irish authorities concerning overcharging allegations are available here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/06/12615-anglo-overcharging-saga-ganley.html. Details on evidence of Nama value destruction and other systemic problems are covered here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/06/14615-why-read-wallaces-speech-on-nama.html.


Wednesday, June 10, 2015

10/6/2015: A Bombshell Goes Off on Anglo, IBRC & Nama


Here are the excerpts from the very important speech delivered today in the Dail by Deputy Peter Mathews. And I urge you – the public and professional readers of this blog – to read through the length of this.

My focus here is one core aspect of the IBRC scandal that remains largely ignored by the Government and the media and that Deputy Mathews raises. For those inclined, full official transcript is available here. In the quotes below, bold and italics are emphasising points of major importance and are added by me.


… I want to talk about how the so-called profits of IBRC were inflated for a period starting in 1993 and travelling forward to the present date. There were two ways this was done.”
Note, the word ‘inflated’ in relation to reported profits. If such inflation indeed take place, it would imply that Anglo reported profits were fraudulent. And this covers years from the early 1990s through 2003. That is a lot of years of potential major corporate fraud – fraud that (if proven such) would involve deliberate overcharging of clients, concealment of such overcharging and reporting this overcharging on the revenue and profits side of the company accounts.


The Act
“First was the direct manipulation of interest charges and the concealment of loaded interest, which happened in the majority of cases. An extensive exercise carried out by Bank Check revealed this. … Some 494 separate DIBOR-EURIBOR rates were reconciled and found to be loaded to a degree ranging from 0.5% in the early 1990s to between 0.03% and 0.05% in 2002 and 2003. Some 80% of all the loans examined, relating to many clients, were found to have this loading.” So the [alleged] fraud was systemic, not sporadic.


The Concealment
And it was actively concealed from the clients: “The statements which clients received never showed the breakdown of the base rate and the DIBOR 3-month rate plus a margin, which had been agreed by loan agreements, plus the reserve asset cost, RAC, if and when it applied.” Does this show an intent? For one has to ask if not intent, then how could this ‘error’ or ‘omission’ be perpetuated across 80% of examined cases?


The Size
The [alleged] fraud was also on a large enough scale to makes it material. “The quantum of the loaded overcharging was in the order of 0.3%. A margin of 1.5% would comprise two elements, namely, the amount that goes to cover overheads, which is usually about 0.9% of the 1.5%, and the remainder, 0.6%, which is the profit of the bank. A loaded secret dark pool profit of 0.3% would represent one third of the overall profits, including that dark pool profit.”

The letter from Mr. Morrissey’s solicitors that Deputy Mathews cites states the following: “Bankcheck has advised Mr. Morrissey that, in total, approximately EUR1 billion has been overcharged by you, the Special Liquidators, Nama, private equity and institutional buyers of former IBRC loans, IBRC and its predecessors. This is very material sum and represents a most material proportion of the bank’s declared profits over the past 25 years. You have been made aware of this on several occasions.” Note: “you” references in the above quote joint special liquidators of IBRC. And further note Nama mentioning in the above.

Boom! Remember the case against the Anglo directors that alleges wrongdoing relating to manipulations of the company accounts by means of loans and interbank deposits? Well, that is chips compared to the juicy chunk of meat contained in the above statements: thanks to over-billing of the customers, Anglo might have been over-inflating its margin by a third! Year, after year, after year. 

And, even more importantly, this information was known and is known to the current authorities and liquidators. Who did nothing with it.

Should former shareholders, current investors in ex-IBRC debt, former borrowers from Anglo, and possibly even auditors who were not given pertinent information by the Anglo and IBRC call in the legals now, the hit will be on the state.

Deputy Mathews went on: “That means the market valuation of Anglo Irish Bank in the 14 years up to 2002 when this was going on was overstated by one third. If it had been discovered by proper auditing the market would react with a collapse, …of at least one third of the value of the bank and this would affect the shareholders, creditors and depositors. That would happen irrespective of whether there was an international credit bust and a freeze of credit.


Systemic Failure that Continues Today
This has been brought to the attention of the NTMA, NAMA and others but it has been ignored to date. I have the evidence here and it is shocking.” Let us stress the fact that Irish authorities were and are aware of this.
  • An Irish court ruled on the matter in favour of Mr. Morrissey.
  • Mr Morrissey notified this to the bank.
  • Mr. Morrissey also notified this to Nama and the Department of Finance in early January 2015. It was notified to the Central Bank in late January 2015, and to the Minister for Finance in early March 2015, and subsequently again to the Central Bank in early March 2015. And the case is being ignored. Per Mr. Morrissey, he received no reply to his notifications from any official body.
  • Per Mr. Morrissey letter cited by deputy Mathews today, Mr. Morrissey notified the then Chairman of IBRC, Mr. Alan Dukes of overcharging as far back as in mid-January 2013. Simultaneously, he notified of the same matter the Department of Finance, the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator. 

Mr Morrissey has been ignored since then, according to the record set forth by his solicitors.

It gets worse. Recall that the liquidation of IBRC was undertaken under the procedure that all claims against IBRC were to be notified before the end of 1Q 2015. And again, the notifications in the case of Mr. Morrissey were filed on time. We are at the end of 2Q 2015 and he received no response on these notifications. So the deadline established by the IBRC liquidation procedures has now expired. And the IBRC and by extension the State have not replied to Mr. Morrissey before the expiration of that deadline, effectively undermining the very process of liquidation they themselves set out.
Is this a collusive behaviour? In economics, such actions would be viewed as potentially collusive: all parties responsible and empowered knew, none responded, the wrong remains unaddressed.


The Legal Bits
Mr Morrissey solicitors letter cited by Deputy Mathews has this to say on the matter: “It appears numerous illegalities have been carried out by Anglo Irish Bank and its successors over these 25 years [from 1990 through today]. You, Mr. Wallace, have acknowledged under oath in the US Court proceedings the overcharging of interest by the bank. As the overcharging has continued under your watch, you are jointly and severally liable for same, together with the Minister and Department of Finance, the Central Bank of Ireland and the Financial Regulator.

And per official behaviour in response to the evidence presented: “we most strongly object to this glib attempt to absolve yourselves from responsibility and liability both for historic and current interest overcharging, or the consequences thereof, including the sustained misstatement of the bank’s publicly released annual accounts since 1990.”


The IBRC Inquiry
Deputy Mathews spoke in the context of the upcoming IBRC inquiry. But what he said is more important than an inquiry itself. Here is why. The inquiry is supposed to provide and independent and objective view of alleged, potential, possible wrongdoing at the IBRC. Deputy Mathews statement shows that in an actual, tangible, established and courts-confirmed case of misdeeds by the Anglo and IBRC, the State is unwilling to do anything to address these misdeeds. Thus, one has to ask a simple question: what’s the point of an inquiry into alleged wrongdoings, when actual wrongdoings are not being dealt with.

Now, take a trip through theory. An inquiry can come back with two possible outcomes: One: nothing found. Two: something worng is identified. In outcome One, under the above revelations about the Anglo overcharging case, one can be pretty certain that no one will believe the inquiry findings. There is no trust in our systems, there is no trust in our processes. No matter how well the inquiry works, its findings, were they to deliver inconclusive verdict, will always be subject to mistrust. In outcome Two, nothing will happen. Just as nothing is happening in the overcharging case. The outcome will be ignored. And so the inquiry, given the context of the cases such as cited by Deputy Mathews is hardly an exercise in building trust. For all its possible merits in design and execution, it is more likely going to be an exercise in further chipping at the little trust still left in this system.


Other Players in the Penalty Box
Deputy Mathews quotes from the letter from the Black solicitors, “following the John Morrissey case:It appears numerous illegalities have been carried out by Anglo Irish Bank and its successors over these 25 years. You, Mr. [Kieran] Wallace, have acknowledged under oath in US Court proceedings the overcharging of interest by the bank. As the overcharging has continued under your watch, you are jointly and severally liable for same, together with the Minister and Department of Finance, the Central Bank of Ireland and the Financial Regulator.””

But remember, there are other players beyond Mr. Morrissey who might want to ask few questions from the Government now that the word is getting out. As Deputy Mathews notes: “This is serious stuff. There are loans that are being operationally processed by the originators of those loans. Now those loans are owned by third parties, including hedge funds, and they are calculating interest on an unlawful basis, even though it has been brought to their attention. This is shocking.

Yes, we have on the line now:
  1.  Borrowers who were [potentially] defrauded of billions in false charges;
  2.  Investors in Anglo shares who were potentially defrauded by over-valuations of the bank;
  3. Investors in distressed loans purchased off Anglo-IBRC who are holding hot paper with [potential] fraud written all over it – the loans of the borrowers potentially defrauded;
  4. Potentially, the auditors of Anglo/IBRC who were possibly misled by non-disclosure of overcharging;
  5. And on top of all of them are the underwriters of the IBRC liquidation: taxpayers, who are facing huge bills for this.


And Another Bombshell
Deputy Mathews did not end just there. 

Here is another bombshell that exploded loud and clear in the Dail today, even through the repeated interruptions: “There is other evidence that NAMA knowingly----- allowed the information memorandum ----- -----for the Chicago Spire ----- to be negligently misleading, which has resulted in unnecessary huge losses for both the Irish people and the developer. I have the evidence for that.” That’s right – you’ve read it here. There are now allegations that Nama – not subject to the inquiry – has ‘mislead’ the markets participants to the tune of [potentially] hundreds of millions on just one, repeat, just one, asset sale.


Conclusion

These are mind-blowing revelations that expose more than just a systemic fraud [potentially] being perpetrated by a rogue bank. These are the revelations that show the current system wanting in respect of acting on the established legal case judgement in addressing the systemic [potential] fraud. And the worst bit is that even that is a tip of an iceberg, for Deputy Mathews statement about potential misrepresentation of the Chicago Spire case by Nama opens up the EUR77 billion can of worms over the Grand Canal. In this context, the current planned inquiry into 2009-2013 IBRC dealings is nothing more than a fig leaf of fake decorum on a rotten corpse of the Irish Solution to an Irish Crisis.


Still feel like the IBRC inquiry over 2009-2013 deals is going to be enough? Or should we not start systemically reviewing all post-crisis dealings and pre-crisis wrong still unaddressed by all agencies involved?

Sunday, June 7, 2015

7/6/15: Updating America's Scariest Charts... The Ones You Forgot About


Remember the Old America's Scariest Chart (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/06/662014-king-of-scariest-charts-is-dead.html) and my own New America's Scariest Chart (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/11/16112014-americas-scariest-chart.html). Well, a year ago, the formal one officially 'died'... as in disappeared from the mainstream media.

Question is: did it? Really?

So here is updating the Old America's Scariest Chart (and improving on the original) to current data:

Summary of the lessons from the above: America's jobs recovery in the current cycle is the worst on record for post-WW2 period in terms of recovering the jobs lost. It is second worst on record in terms of post-recovery jobs growth (the worst case being 1953 recession, which simply run into 1957 recession, but taking the two recessions jointly actually delivers better performance than the current recovery period).

And updating the New America's Scariest Chart:


Summary of the lessons from the above: yep, this cycle is also the worst in history for average duration of unemployment.

Happy recovery, U.S. of A. and a happier one, yet, to Europe.

7/6/15: Another 'friend' bites the dust: Juncker on Greece


Despite all the warm and fuzzy feelings for Jean Claude Juncker's allegedly 'humanitarian' view of the Greek crisis, it is now apparent that Athens indeed does not have any friends left in the top echelons of European leadership. Per Reuters reports, Juncker's response to the Greek proposals for dealing with the crisis involved warning that "time was running out to conclude a debt deal to avert a damaging Greek default."

One has to wonder, though, what did Reuters mean (see full report here) by the reference to concluding 'a debt deal', since the Institutions (aka Troika) proposals last week included no deal on debt, as in none, nada, zilch. Only one proposal from last week covered the issue of debt - the Greek Government proposal that Juncker has rejected.

Of course, this is yet another iteration in the crazy game of chicken (or a game of crazy chicken) being played by the Institutions and Greece.

Not surprisingly, the EU dragged out its most 'happy to be seen as doing anything' leader, the EU Council President Donald Tusk, who went on to accuse the government of Greece of not playing fair with the lenders. Note: Poland, from which Tusk hails, did not lend Greece any funds (check the information here: http://www.bloombergbriefs.com/content/uploads/sites/2/2015/01/MS_Greece_WhoHurts.pdf and here: http://www.bruegel.org/nc/blog/detail/article/1557-whos-still-exposed-to-greece/), though of course, Tusk speaks for Europe (or rather the European Council Presidency he holds).

Things are getting dense now, as we head into the second quarter of June and the jumbo payment to the IMF gets closer and closer and closer.

7/6/15: Greece: How Much Pain Compared to Ireland & Italy


Today, I took part in a panel discussion about Greek situation on NewstalkFM radio (here is the podcast link http://www.newstalk.com/podcasts/Talking_Point_with_Sarah_Carey/Talking_Point_Panel_Discussion/92249/Greece.#.VXPx-AJaDJQ.twitter) during which I mentioned that Greece has taken unique amount of pain in the euro area in terms of economic costs of the crisis, but also fiscal adjustments undertaken. I also suggested that we, in Ireland, should be a little more humble as to citing our achievements in terms of our own adjustment to the crisis. This, of course, would simply be a matter of good tone. But it is also a matter of some hard numbers.

Here are the details of comparatives between Ireland, Italy and Greece in macroeconomic and fiscal performance over the course of the crises.

Macroeconomic performance:

Fiscal performance:

All data above is based on IMF WEO database parameters and forecasts from April 2015 update.

The above is not to play down our own performance, but to highlight a simple fact that to accuse Greece of not doing the hard lifting on the crisis response is simply false. You can make an argument that the above adjustments are not enough. But you cannot make an argument that the Greeks did not take immense amounts of pain.

Here are the comparatives in various GDP metrics terms: