10/11/2012: 'Special' case redux?

Just in case Angela Merkel reads EU Commission research... here's a chart summarizing the 'structural' adjustments to-date courtesy of JMP Research:

And the chart shows that 'special' Ireland:

• Delivered second largest drop in unit labour costs in the periphery (much of that, as in Greece's case and Spain due to massive spikes in unemployment)
• Produced 4th largest (or second lowest) improvement in current account dynamics and had 3rd highest increase in unemployment.

In other words, as with fiscal adjustments, our 'structural' gains are far from being 'special' or exemplary, but rather represent below average levels of achievement compared to other 'peripheral' economies.

And in case you need more, here's a bit on wages 'moderation' in Ireland:

The chart above shows pretty clearly that while Ireland claims to have achieved tremendous gains in labour costs competitiveness, in reality our gains are only spectacular if we forget the rapid inflation experienced in 2000-2009. Let's run some maths: between 2000 and 2012:

• Greek nominal labour costs relative to EU average fell 0.37%
• Irish rose 7.69%
• Portuguese fell 4.21%
• Spanish rose 6.4%
• Dutch rose 8.9%
• Italian rose 1.97%
• French rose 1% and
• German fell 16.36%

In other words, Ireland's labour costs still are up more than for any other peripheral state and, in fact, are only lower relative to the EU average against the Netherlands. Spot anything 'special' here?

10/11/2012: Dublin's Shame

This week saw perhaps the most important FT article on Ireland's crisis (link) titled Dublin's Shame, the article highlights the issue of grotesquely over-exaggerated pensions of Irish failed bankers. The point it touches upon - by itself - is not a minor one. But what is most important is the fact that FT takes a clearly only feasible ethical position on the issue and, put frankly, throws it in the face of not only the Irish banking establishment (on which the article focuses), but the Irish Government that is sheepishly incapable of any response to the issue that would have been congruent with the normal tenets of morality in any normal society.

"Public shaming may be the only recourse available to the government. Some argue that the pension funds should stop paying these executives, daring them to sue. Alternatively, Dublin could raise a levy on the richest pensions. But, however justified the resentment, either step would be wrong. Governments should not tear up contracts or tweak laws just to target a few. If the directors are to be penalised for their acts, this should happen in the civil courts."

Alas, public shaming is something our Government refuses to engage in, judging by the statement made this week on the issue by the AIB owner - Minister Noonan. And, sadly, in Ireland, there is not a chance the civil courts will see the face of the vast majority of the reckless, incompetent and entitlement-driven elites.

10/11/2012: GS on Fiscal Cliff

Earlier this week I posted few assorted analytical thoughts from various source on the US Fiscal Cliff and earlier today I posted on Goldman Sachs summary of 3 core global risks.

Here are four snapshots from Goldman Sachs on US key risks:

Fiscal cliff:

Tax hikes:

Debt ceiling:

Updated: Merrill Lynch note on US elections outcome is a superb read: here.

And Citi detailed forecasts out to 2020 from the 'cliff': here.

10/11/2012: Shorter-term divergence for Europe?

For what it is worth:

Shorter-term divergence again disfavors Europe... and even worse... UK:

10/11/2012: Age of Great Rotation?

Merrill Lynch calling the turn from the Age of Deleveraging to the Age of Great Rotation: "History shows that the beginning of every great bull market in equities (1920s, 1950s, and 1980s) has coincided with a major inflection point in the trend of long-term bond yields (see Chart 3)."

"If in 2013 jobs and credit validate Bernanke’s success in his “War against Deflation,” an era of rotation out of fixed income and into equities could begin."

That's a load of 'ifs' and 'cans'. In reality, there will be such a shift at some point in time. Only question is the following one: will the Age of Deleveraging (not called 'Great Deleveraging' by the ML, note) going to be so short-lived that by the end of 2013 Ben's cash printing will be sufficient to drive down real economic debt in the US down significantly enough to generate a new upswing in consumer credit (after all, there will be no US growth absent credit growth).

ML are pretty darn optimistic on this:
"The strong performance of US real estate, bank stocks, and distressed European assets this year suggests to us that a stealth rotation has actually begun. The fiscal cliff may temporarily derail the journey, but in our view the destination remains a favorable one for financial assets. Our core asset allocation is bullish equities and credit, bearish bonds and neutral commodities."

ML own view is a bit dented by the evidence in the chart above on the 1920s-1930s markets transitions relative to Treasury yields... Of course, as today, the 1920s-1930s period is precisely characterized by a long-term Great Deleveraging dynamics. Denying that the current state of the economy is characterized by potentially the same forces is a bit reminiscent of the Greenspan's 'over-exuberance' view.

Link to the ML research note: here.

10/11/2012: Three core risks: via Goldman Sachs

Neat summary from Goldman Sachs on 3 core risks:

10/11/2012: Euro area households feeling the pain?

Couple interesting charts from the Goldman Sachs research note on French consumption woes - link):

Euro area household disposable income is now under water in the Euro area steadily since 2008, which marks 5 years of sustained contraction. More interestingly, the chart shows abysmal performance of the RDI in Germany since roughly 2004.

The next chart maps gross savings rates for households - which are falling in the Euro area, just as disposable income is falling. Given the double dip recession, this suggests that tax hikes and cuts to income are now severe enough to knock households out of precautionary savings motive. And the latter would imply that households consumption is unlikely to rise even when income growth returns.

10/11/2012: Euro Area bonds supply - November 2012

Five weeks forward bonds supply calendar from Morgan Stanley:

And aggregates:

10/11/2012: Big Data made visible by UBank

Another interesting article: here. UBank in Australia has put some billion transactions records into public domain, allowing customers to run comparatives on spending patterns etc. (H/T to @moneyscience ).

"Users may input their gender, age range, income range, living situation, post code and whether they rent or own their home. The site uses that data to serve up average spending habits of people in that demographic, including detailed information on restaurants, housing costs and travel destinations. Users may also choose to input more detailed data to perform a “financial health check”, comparing their monthly shopping, utilities, housing and communication costs with “people like you” and the average Australian."

The idea is to make Big Data work for both clients and the bank - reducing the overall costs of risk pricing and in the long run helping the customers to lower their risk profiles and cash flow management. This has to be good for the bank and  for its clients. 

Next step would be for the bank to capture actual interactions within the database and correlate these to changes in spending patterns of customers (within the sample of those who engage with the system and outside the sample) to see what changes are generated.

This type of 'actioning' big data has been discussed at a recent round table on disruptive innovation in finance that I chaired in Dublin (here).

10/11/2012: What a laugh: Noonan backing out?

This fine article outlining the latest back-pedaling by the Government on the 'seismic deal' strategy for dealing with banks legacy debt carried by the taxpayers is full of priceless pearls of wisdom. Certainly worth reading, if only for a laugh.

8/11/2012: A quick look at the 'fiscal cliff'

So with US elections over and status quo confirmed as the preferred option by the American voters, it's time to look at the 'fiscal cliff'. Not my favourite reading at night, but... here are some factoids and opinions:

Pictet's 'rough estimate':

And Barclays summary of alternative scenario forecasts:

Their analysis prior to the elections:
"The Congressional Budget Office has noted9 that if the fiscal cliff hits, ie, the stipulations under the current law are not changed or pushed forward (referred to as a “punt”), the fiscal tightening could lead to economic conditions in 2013 that would probably be considered a recession, with real GDP declining 0.5%, a 2.5-2.7% swing from 2012 GDP. This scenario is not our base case; we see 2012 and 2013 GDP at roughly 2.2% and 2%, respectively, as we expect new legislation to address broader fiscal concerns in the context of near-term stability. That being said, we believe the chances of going of the fiscal cliff temporarily are higher if President Obama is elected ...This supports the view that near-term risk-off (ie, breakeven steepener) sentiment is more likely in a Democratic win. In any case, the ultimate outcomes under both administrations are likely to be similar."

And: "The final question relates to the approach each administration would take to put the US on a sustainable medium term fiscal path. Here again, there are two very different plans. That passed by the Republican House focuses heavily on spending cuts ($6trn vs. the CBO alternative scenario), while the president’s plan relies more on revenue increases. The House plan pushes debt/GDP down to 62% by 2022 but implies heavier fiscal tightening than the president’s budget, which takes debt/GDP to 76%".

Note that the US is likely to face much steeper impact of the fiscal cliff than other countries:

Source: Goldman Sachs Research

JP Morgan: 

" Overall, we now see cliff-related fis- cal issues subtracting about 1%-pt from growth next year, up from our prior assessment of 0.5%-pt. The table ... summarizes our expectations regarding fiscal cliff outcomes. ...There are other important non-cliff fiscal issues, such as declining defense spending, which are not the topic of this note. (We estimate these non-cliff fiscal measures have subtracted about 1%-pt from growth relative to trend over the past year, and will sub- tract a similar amount in the coming year.)"

In contrast, here's the IMF view: "On the fiscal cliff in the United States, we believe that it must be avoided. It would entail a tightening of fiscal policy of roughly 4 percent of GDP and would plunge the American economy back into recession, with deleterious consequences for the rest of the world. You mentioned that fiscal adjustment has to happen in the U.S. to avoid a downgrade. Indeed, what we are advocating is a fiscal withdrawal, an adjustment of about 1 1/4 percent of GDP, which would entail that a number of the so-called Bush tax cuts could be prolonged, and that other measures that have helped support the economy can be prolonged too. But in the end, there would still be an adjustment, a reduction in cyclically adjusted terms of the fiscal deficit of 1 1/4 percent of GDP, and this puts the U.S. economy on track toward better public finances. What is much more important in all of this is that in the end there is a medium-term plan that is being developed that explains very clearly how the deficit is then brought down further over the next five years, and beyond, from the still high level that it would have next year."

Which is consistent with the IMF earlier Article IV assessment: "Ongoing political gridlock could block an agreement on near-term tax and spending policies. If all temporary tax provisions were to expire and the automatic spending cuts to take effect, the 2013 fiscal contraction would be very sizable
(over 4 percent of GDP). This “fiscal cliff” would reduce annual growth to around zero, and the economy would contract in early 2013. Even if the “fiscal cliff” were quickly unwound, the damage to the economy could be substantial, especially if consumers and businesses were faced with continued uncertainty about tax and spending policies. These strong negative growth effects would in part reflect the limited effectiveness of monetary policy at the zero interest rate bound. Some anticipatory effects from the cliff could be felt already in late 2012, with spending held back by policy uncertainty—subtracting perhaps ½ percent from (annualized) growth in the second half of 2012 according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)."

8/11/2012: World Bank Doing Business 2013 report

Last night I posted in the data from the World Bank Doing Business 2013 report (link here).

More from World Bank Doing Business Report for 2013:

In the above, SOEs are 21 advanced Small Open Economies that Ireland competes with.

The folowing things jump out:

1. Ireland scores very positively overall in the sub group, ranking the country at 4th best to do business in this group of peer economies. We perform well in Getting Credit (see caveat below), Protecting Investors (another caveat below), Paying Taxes (third caveat below), Resolving (business) insolvency, Starting a Business and enforcing Contracts. We perform poorly-to-horrendously in categories relating to market regulation (Dealing with Construction Permits, Getting Electricity Permits, and Registering Property) and poorly in core exports-linked category of Trading Across Borders.
2. According to the World Bank metric, Ireland ranks as 2nd in the group of Small Open Economies in Getting Credit (business)... unchanged 2006-2013. Let me get this straight: the country experiences wholesale collapse of its banking sector, so spectacular it makes the Government insolvent virtually overnight and is unprecedented in historical terms according to researchers like Carmen Reinhart, our private sector credit contracts dramatically and remains unavailable to SMEs and consumers, Irish banks are now the biggest mess in modern economic history... and World Bank thinks our 'Getting Credit' situation has not changed since 2006 when Ireland was at a height of credit boom?
3. According to the World Bank rankings, Ireland is a much better platform for carry trade and other speculative investment than it is for exporting. This should really, really, really be of some concern to Irish Government, no?
4. After more than 15 years of incessant talk about reforming our energy sector, Irish electricity market remains in the dark ages. As our competitors improve their own domestic energy supply systems, we are sliding in ranking.
5. Despite a wholesale collapse in property markets activity, building and registering property in Ireland still requires navigating a medieval level of bureaucracy. One would have thought that the Government can sort this out. Do note that the improvement (in 2013 rankings) in Registering Property rank is due to 2012 tax incentives passed in the Budget 2012 and expiring in 2013.