Monday, October 4, 2010

Economics 4/10/10: Exchequer receipts

High level view of Exchequer receipts paints a continuation to the depressing picture. If there is any stabilization in the economy, this stabilization is yet to be seen on the tax receipts side of things.
Income tax above is tracing neatly below the returns for the last year. Good news, September 2009 slight slowdown was avoided so far. But the real direction of tax receipts on income side is in going to be revealed in the current Q4. Same is true for VAT:
September 2010 VAT receipts are even more disappointing given all the noises about the pick up in retail sales. Going back to school, while yielding a small uptick in volume of sales, clearly was erased in terms of value of sales as deflation in core retail sectors continues.

Corporation tax is struggling to stay above 2008 - a clear sign that economy is still sick:
Core months here are however ahead of us.

Excise and Stamps taxes are almost bang on with 2009, which isn't much of an achievement.

Capital taxes clearly showing no improvement in investment in this economy:

Customs duties moving upside - in part clearly on the back of exporters robust performance so far, plus car imports mini-boom (well, relative to previous years)
Total tax receipts are therefore running well below their levels in 2009:
I never was a fan of the "receipts to target" metrics, primarily because real numbers/levels speak to me much more than imaginary numbers DofF produces our of its excel spreadsheet forecasts. However, to keep up with the fashionable 'economists' from our banks and brokerages - stay tuned for that analysis to follow.

Sunday, October 3, 2010

Economics 3/10/10: Construction sector - destruction continues

Nothing exemplifies the collapse of the Celtic Tiger than the fate of our indigenous 'flagship' sectors: Banking and Construction. The two fates, linked at the hip, got some very different treatment in the media this week. Banks received all the attention, yet Construction suffered a total neglect. Yet, last week CSO published Q2 2010 data for Construction sector.

Undoing any damage to the Construction sector's reputation as the 'leading newsflow' sector of Ireland Inc, let's update the data. Here are the charts, most of which, as often is the case, speak for themselves.

First volume and value in all sectors ex-Civil Engineering:
Next: Civil Engineering:
Interestingly, if you recall, since Budget 2009, this Government has consistently claimed that Ireland is getting a significant stimulus in the form of public investment - which, of course, in Government's parlance always means 'building stuff'. In fact, even after the imposition of the latest cuts in the Budget 2010, Civil Engineering spend (ok, investment) declined at the rates greater than the Government has planned for.

Residential and Non-Residential:
To see the real extent of our crisis in the Construction and Building sector, compare ourselves to the European counterparts:
And what about our previous claims that we don't belong to PIIGS?
What's amazing, of course is that despite this massive contraction, our housing and property markets continue to free-fall while employment in the sector continues to contract.

Economics 3/10/10: The real stress in Euro area banks

"A picture's worth a 1,000 words" an old proverb goes. So here's a couple of pictures from the latest GFSR analytical papers issued by the IMF last week:

Remember the favourite EU leadership myth: "The Americans caused this crisis". Ok, if so, one would assume that EU banks are in a better position through the crisis than their US counterparts.
If the assertion above was correct, why would the demand for CB financing be so much greater in the EU both in terms of banks demand for liquidity prior to the crisis and after the crisis?

Charts above are confirmed by the even more dramatically divergent case of the banking sectors exposure to the repo operations:
The magnitude of European banks internal sickness in structuring funding - from their chronic dependence on CB funding even at the times of plentiful liquidity, to their massive exposures to repo operations in general is stunning.

If you want to see the really frightening summary of this analysis, here it is, courtesy of the GFSR:
Notice the disproportional over-reliance of Euro area banks on short-term funding (the infamous maturity mismatch) and non-deposits-based long-term funding (the infamous liquidity and counterparty risk-linked bit). Now, check out the healthy US side of deposits finance - you'd think that the picture should be inverted, given Europe's demographics, but no - heading into the massive explosion of retirement age population in EU, our savings play so much smaller of a role in funding our banks, one must wonder: What happens when German consumers start drawing down their deposits to finance their retirement consumption? Will there be anything else left for the future of the continent other than sales of Mercs and BMWs to China?

Saturday, October 2, 2010

Economics 2/10/10: Brian Lucey's comment on Minister Lenihan's statement

In rare occasions, I re-print here some comments made available to me by other economists and analysts. This is the full text of Professor Brian Lucey's comment in yesterday's Irish Examiner (not available on the newspaper website):

"THE Government yesterday engaged in a series of interventions, announcements, and actions which in my opinion have brought the prospect of an intervention from the IMF or the European Union significantly closer.

The major announcements were threefold: the announcement of the losses of Anglo, the bombshell in relation to Allied Irish Banks, and the startling admission that the Government was voluntarily withdrawing from international markets. Let us examine all three of these.

In relation to Anglo Irish Bank, we finally begin to see clarity and reality from the Government; for the first time in two and a half years estimates begin to overlap. The worst-case scenario that the Government has put forward is that Anglo will lose €35 billion. This is the average estimate. We must take this government figure with a very large pinch of salt. The Government over the last two years has given us at least four “final” figures for the total cost of Anglo. God be with the days when it was only 4.8bn. It remains highly likely in my view and in the view of independent analysis external and internal to the country, that the Anglo losses could stretch towards €40bn.

That
is an eye-watering amount of money, equivalent to nine months’ total government expenditure. While this on its own is bearable, what is unbearable, and should not be borne, is that once again bondholders take precedence over citizens.

The only rationale for having such an extensive guarantee in 2008 was that over the period of time the banks would be cleaned of their bad loans, the banks would be cleaned of their bad management, and the bondholders would be dealt with. Subordinated bondholders should get nothing, senior debt holders should have been faced with a stark choice; either take an offer of perhaps 30 cent on the euro or take their chances on the market place. A debt-for-equity swap should also have been considered.

On all three of these issues the Government has failed. We are told that instead of NAMA taking loans in excess of €5 million, it will only take loans in excess of €20m; this leaves a large amount of impaired and toxic loans on the balance sheet of the banks. It is these very toxic loans that imperilled the banks in the first place and which will make it next to impossible for the banks to engage in any meaningful credit creation.

As if Anglo were not enough, we are also told that AIB will require an additional 3bn. The state will end up with 70%+ ownership of AIB; this will rise as AIB will find it difficult to raise the required funds from the markets or from asset disposals and will consequently have to ask the taxpayer to invest further. The ludicrous situation is that the taxpayer will be taking ownership of a much weaker bank than had this been done two years ago. AIB has sold the jewel in its crown, the Polish operation, and is actively selling its US and British operations. We will own a bank which has sold off its profit-making arms and will be left with a carcass.

Finally, it appears, in so far as one can glean from the gnomic and somewhat confused utterances of Eamon Ryan, that the Government were told that the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) did not feel they could raise funds in the markets. The Government has therefore locked itself out of the markets until early 2011. Presumably, the hope is that by 2011 a miraculous change in Irish and world economic conditions will have occurred.

What remains absolutely unclear is what plans, if any, the Government has for a situation where in 2011 the NTMA finds it either impossible to raise funds or finds that those funds are prohibitively expensive. There are in excess of 5bn of Irish government bonds maturing in 2011, these will have to be rolled over or repaid. What if we cannot raise these funds?

In that case the Irish Government will have to raise funds from the International Monetary Fund or from European funds, and this of course ignores the tens of billions of debt which the banks have to roll over on a regular basis. In my view we have moved closer to the end game of losing national economic sovereignty.

Brian Lucey is associate professor in finance at Trinity College Dublin. "

Irish Examiner 1/10/2010

Economics 2/10/10: EU Commission official view of Minister Lenihan's plans

Much debate has been thrown around about the EU Commission position on the latest Government announcements concerning banks recapitalizations. Here is the fact (linked here) - note comments and emphasis are mine:

Full quote: MEMO/10/465, Brussels, 30 September 2010 "Statement by Competition Commissioner Almunia on Irish banks"

"European Competition Commissioner Joaquin Almunia welcomes the comprehensive statement issued by the Irish Finance Minister on banking. Commissioner Almunia said:

"I welcome the statement on banking which brings clarity with regard to the remaining transfer of assets to NAMA and the capital needs of some banks and building societies. [Note there is no finality assertion here on the estimates]. Regarding NAMA, the announced changes to the way it manages loans are in line with the Commission's approval of the NAMA scheme.

"Concerning Anglo-Irish Bank, from a competition point of view, it is clear that the foreseen restructuring and resolution of the bank addresses competition distortions created by the large amounts of aid at stake. Once the Commission receives the details of the plan, it will proceed rapidly towards taking a final decision. [The gombeens haven't yet supplied the Anglo Plan to the Commission, despite the claims made today on RTE Radio by Minister Hanafin to the contrary]

"I also welcome the announcement that subordinated debt holders will make a significant contribution towards meeting the costs of Anglo. This is in line with the Commission's principles on burden sharing since it both addresses moral hazard and limits the amount of aid, with benefits to the taxpayers. [So Commission operates under the direct assumption that subbies will be soaked. And that this will correspond to the spirit of the European common markets.]

"I note that Allied Irish Bank will need to receive further capital in the form of State aid, which will have to be notified to the Commission for approval. I will of course follow this process very closely. I have no doubt that, as in all previous cases, the collaboration between the Irish authorities and the European Commission will be satisfactory. [No blanket endorsement of new AIB capital injections]

"I note positively that Bank of Ireland will be able to continue the restructuring process without further recourse to State resources. The Commission in July 2010 approved the aid and the restructuring plan of Bank of Ireland, and is monitoring its implementation."

"With regard to building societies INBS and EBS, the Commission remains in close contact with the Irish authorities. For INBS, the Commission will await the notification of the additional capital as well as the details on the institution's future, and will assess them thoroughly and swiftly. For EBS, the Commission is in the process of finalising its initial assessment of the restructuring plan submitted end May 2010. "

So let's recap Commission's official opinion:
  • Anglo subs must be haircut;
  • No Anglo plan delivered to the Commission;
  • No Anglo recapitalization additions endorsed;
  • No AIB recapitalizations (announced by Minister Lenihan) are endorsed
  • No INBS and EBS measures endorsed

Friday, October 1, 2010

Economics 1/10/10: External Debt

Yesterday, CSO published Q2 2010 data on our International Investment Position.

Here are some highlights:

"At 30 June 2010, the gross external debt of all resident sectors (i.e. general government, the monetary authority, financial and non-financial corporations and households) amounted to €1,737bn." So Irish total gross external debt rose €63bn qoq.

Our total foreign liabilities stood at €2,643bn and are offset by €2,500bn of foreign assets.

The liabilities also include €1,218bn of equity and derivative liabilities that do not form part of external debt.

Liabilities of the Monetary Authority (to ECB) that consist almost entirely of short term loans and deposits, amounted to €66bn, an increase of €28bn on Q1 2010, but down €38bn on Q2 2009.

General government foreign borrowing decreased by over €3bn to €80bn between end-March and end-June 2010.

The liabilities of other sectors (financial intermediaries and non-financial corporates) increased by €17bn from Q1 and at €657bn represented 38% of the total debt, a similar share to the
previous quarter.

Direct investment liabilities increased by €17bn to €262bn in Q2

Liabilities of monetary financial institutions (credit institutions and money market funds) consisting mostly of loans and debt securities were €672bn, an increase of over €5bn on Q1, but down €18bn on Q2 2009.

Few charts. Starting with levels of assets and liabilities:
Next, balance:
Notice declining surplus in Other Sectors.

Combining assets and liabilities:
Lastly, removing Government from the equation:
Clearly, a sign of expanding liabilities and rising assets, with net balance on the negative side slightly worse than in Q1.

Summarizing these in tables:

Economics 1/10/10: Retail sales data

Oh, let's cut the bull, folks. The retail sales data is making rounds the banks 'economists' notes with all the hoopla of the 'positive news' arguments. So things are turning corners?.. Actually, not really.

With motors:
  • Value of sales rose 1.3% mom in August and a re down 1.7% yoy;
  • Volume of sales was up 1.1% mom and 1.3% yoy

Conclusion, with motors included, we are still selling more stuff at ever-lower prices, though this time around declines in prices did not outpace increases in volume. Which means that no jobs are being created. If we take on board the fact that Euro remains relatively weak compared to last year vis-a-vis our main trading partners outside the Euro zone, implying we are buying imports at a higher price, the margins in retail sector gotta be shrinking even more than the volume/value gap above suggests. Which, in turn, implies that there aren't any new jobs being created in the retail sector on the back of the latest 'turnaround'. The whole thing about 'great news on retail sales front' is a damp squib.


And if you want to see even deeper into the official spin, take a look at ex-motors retailing:
  • Value of core sales was flat mom in August and is down 3.6% yoy;
  • Volume of core sales was up 0.2% mom and 1.4% yoy
So declines outpacing volume increases is clearly operative here.

Dig deeper and take a look at the breakdown of sales across main business lines.
  • The largest increases in value took place in Books, Newspapers & Stationary (+4.7%). Given all the great news we've heard about Ireland in August, this is hardly surprising.
  • Second largest value increase (ex-motors) mom took place in... errr... Fuel (+4.5%). That wouldn't be an indicator of our consumer confidence in the future, but the price increases in the sector where prices are controlled by the Government.
  • Durables continued to tank: Electrical goods (-3.2% value and -2.5% volume mom), Furniture and Lighting (-1.% and -0.7% respectively) - again, not a great sign.
The worst part of this data is that it continues to show that there is no restart to household investment in sight. Before the households begin investing, they will usually start consuming more durable goods. This is clearly not happening.

Wednesday, September 29, 2010

Economics 29/9/10: IMF or EFSF hypotheticals

Hypothetical discussion of options for external assistance for Ireland in today's Irish Examiner - here, text link - here, associated publicity - here.

Economics 29/9/10: Agricultural prices

Last month I made a number of warnings concerning the price increases in some food sectors, specifically - milk and milk products. These warnings were based on my analysis of the figures for global commodities price trends and the newsflow from Russia and Central Europe. I also warned that Ireland is not insulated from these price changes due to the open nature of our trade.

The latest data from CSO today shows that my predictions are turning out to be right.

Per CSO (emphasis is mine): "Comparing July 2010 unadjusted sub-indices with July 2009 shows that:
  • Milk, potatoes, sheep, vegetables, cattle and pig prices increased by 38.0%, 32.4%, 17.8%, 3.0%, 2.9% and 2.2% respectively, while cereal and poultry prices decreased by 28.9% and 2.8%.
  • Energy prices increased by 15.5%, while seeds, feeding stuffs, fertilizers, plant protection products and veterinary expenses decreased by 9.3%, 8.1%, 5.2%, 0.9% and 0.1% respectively.
Of course, energy prices increases (driven by a 20.1% hike in motor fuels, year on year, but offset - before introduction of the new electricity price hikes and levy - by a -3.1% decline in the price of electricity) are reflective of our wonderfully consistent economic policies that see simultaneous:
  • increases in state-controlled inputs prices and
  • deflation of wages,
thereby undoing competitiveness gains in the private sector by overcharging in state-controlled sectors.

In monthly terms, unadjusted output prices in July were:
  • Milk down -0.1%
  • Cereals no change
These numbers are not yet pricing the full extent of August events, so expect uptick in Q3 figures to be significant.

Economics 29/9/10: Live Register

Live Register figures are out for September with the latest CSO numbers showing both an improvement and a deterioration in the labour market. Here are the details.

"On a seasonally adjusted basis there was a monthly decrease of 5,400 in the Live Register in September 2010. The number of persons on the Live Register now stands at 442,417 which represents an annual increase of 22,563 (+5.4%) in the unadjusted series. This compares with an increase of 30,198 (+6.9%) in the year to August 2010."

It is worth noting that the latest decline in the LR is not a "new event", in so far as there have been other events of declining LR (mom in seasonally adjusted series). It will require more than 1 month move down to establish any sort of confidence about the underlying trends reversals:

In terms of weekly and monthly changes, the latest results are certainly welcome:
But the underlying causes of the decline in LR are certainly continuing to point to further pressures in the job market. Per CSO (comments and emphasis are mine):
"In September there were 39,960 new registrants on the Live Register, which compares with 36,194 in the previous month [new registrants to LR rose significantly month on month in September, implying clearly that decline in overall LR was not driven by improvement in the labour market, but by exits from LR by workers who run out of benefits].

"New registrants consisted of 16,952 JB claims (42.4%), 21,276 JA applications (53.2%) and 1,732 other registrants (4.3%). It should be noted that the number of new registrants is not the same as the overall change in the number of people on the Live Register which is affected by
closed claims and the movement of people between schemes. [It is also worth noting that training schemes increases imply reduced LR, but hardly lead to actual jobs gains]

"On average 9,990 new registrants joined the Live Register each week in September, comprising 5,905 males (59.1%) and 4,085 (40.9%) females. By comparison, in March 2010 9,935 new registrants joined the Live Register each week, consisting of 6,340 males (63.8%) and 3,595 (36.2%) females."

These trends - reflecting in my view exits from LR, rather than new jobs gains - is reinforced by the data that in September there was a monthly decrease of 2,412 (-3.1%) in the number of non-Nationals on LR, which suggest strong outflow of workers due to net emigration.

Implied unempoloyment rate now stands at 13.7%, down from 13.8% in August.
This means I will not be changing my forecast for Q3 unemployment to reach 13.9%.

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Economics 28/9/10: Live Register v QNHS measures of unemployment

As promised last night - here are comparatives on Live Register and QNHS measures of unemployment.

First raw data:
Pretty close?
Actually 98.8% close. But recall, QNHS is quarterly, LR is monthly, so what about average quarterly numbers for LR and QNHS?

So 99.2% close.

Economics 28/9/10: Anglo's bondholders must go

Reuters say Ireland should abandon the Anglo seniors

(emphasis mine)

"The Irish government will reveal the full horror of the cost of rescuing Anglo Irish on Sept. 30. It has already signaled bad news for the 2.5 billion euros of subordinated debt, but it is desperately trying to draw the line and support the 14.1 billion euros of senior debt.

"It's cosseting the bondholders because it fears further damage to its own creditworthiness if it walks away. But if the Anglo bill is as big as outsiders fear, its support will have the opposite effect. Even as the Irish prime minister talked on Sept. 28 of a "manageable plan," the spread on Irish sovereign debt widened to a record 475 basis points.

"The last official estimate of the rescue bill, 25 billion euros, looks hopelessly optimistic. Ratings agency S&P estimates it at 35 billion euros, while BarCap says 48 billion for the sector, or over a quarter of Ireland's 163 billion euro GDP. [My own estimate of 38.6bn on the upper side is now patently below external consensus, despite being branded 'outrageous' and 'outlandish' by several insiders in the past]

"The Sept. 30 statement is expected to contain a best estimate and a worst case. If the best estimate is near S&P's figure, further downgrades of Ireland's sovereign debt are likely. However, if the government were to abandon the senior bondholders, the saving -- equivalent to a tenth of Ireland's GDP -- would give the state the chance to work its way out of its economic hole."

Here we have: S&P, RBS, Barclays, Reuters, WSJ, FT, Sunday Times (Irish edition - hat tip to F.F.) and all genuinely independent analysts are now saying - shave the seniors, burn the subordinates. Government still resisting. For how long can it afford demolishing our own economy to prolong the inevitable?