15/5/16: Don't Rush the Cheers for Eurozone Growth, Yet

Remember record-busting 0.6% preliminary flash estimate of the first estimate GDP growth figure for Euro area released back in April? Well, it sort of was true, sort of...

Eurostat now puts 1Q 2016 growth at 0.5% q/q in its updated estimate released today - 0.1% lower than the April estimate. This figure is tied jointly for highest q/q growth figure since 1Q 2011 when it hit 0.8%.

Sounds good? Brilliant - the euro area outperformed both the U.S. and the UK. But when one looks at annual rates of growth... things are not as shiny.

In annual terms, growth rate actually fell in 1Q 2016, from 1.6% in 2Q 215 through 4Q 2015 to 1.5% in 1Q 2016. You won't be jumping with joy on that. And as the euro area lead growth indicator, Eurocoin suggests, rates of growth have been declining over the last three months through April 2016, dropping from cyclical high of 0.48 in January 2016 to a 13-months low of 0.28 in April 2016:

There is a strong smell of smoke from the Eurostat figures. Demand side of the economy is apparently booming. Despite the fact that retail sales are tanking:

Meanwhile, external trade is also underperforming (on foot of euro appreciation from November 2015 lows against both the US dollar and British pound):

Euro bottomed out at around 1.057 to the dollar at the end of November, and steadily gained against the USD every month since, with current valuation around 1.13-1.14 range. This hardly supports European exports to the U.S. Controlling for volatility, similar trend is against British Pound. About the only thing going the euro way today is yen and it is immaterial to the Euro area’s economy.

So euro zone economic growth appears to be loosing momentum since the start of 2Q 2016. And there are both short term drivers for this and long term ones.

Short term drivers, as outlined above suggest that current risks environment appears to be titled to the downside:

• Eurozone Composite Output Index by Markit posted 53.0 in April against March 53.1. Statistically-speaking, the rate of growth effectively remained static. 
• German Composite PMI was at 53.6, which is an 11-months low, French Composite index reading was 50.2 (barely above the 50.0 line, but still at 3mo high), while Italian Composite PMI in April came in at 53.1, also 2 months high. 
• Importantly, the euro zone PMI indices have been moving out of step with the Global PMI readings. In April, while eurozone PMI declined marginally compered to the end of 1Q 2016, Global PMI reading marginally picked up, rising from 51.5 in March to 51.6 in April. 
• The ongoing stagnation in France continued, while solid expansions were noted in Germany, Italy, Spain and Ireland.
• Developed markets saw all-industry output rise at the fastest pace in three months during April. However, the rate of increase still one of the weakest registered during the past three years. Growth remained only modest in both the US and the UK (UK growth slowed to its weakest pace since March 2013). This puts pressure on demand for eurozone exports and, in turn, pressures profit margins and investment.
• Given 1Q growth estimate at 0.5% (q/q growth) from the Eurostat, current level of Eurocoin suggest quarterly growth slowdown to around 0.4%. 
• Ifo’s Economic climate indicator for the Euro area has now been on a clear declining trend since mid-2015 and is now at its lowest levels since 1Q 2015 and second lowest reading in two-and-a-half years.
• In Germany, consensus estimates put gross domestic product growth at 0.3 percent in the current quarter and 0.4 percent in 3Q and 4Q, with full year growth of around 1.5 percent.

My view: we might see 2Q growth coming in at 0.3-0.4 percent, if April trends continue into the rest of 2Q. Overall, I expect 2016 growth to be around 1.4-1.5 percent which is just about to the downside on current consensus estimate of 1.5 percent.


Long term drivers for structural euro zone growth weakness: Even with positive 1Q 2016 print on growth side, it is fairly clear that euro zone lacks serious growth catalysts.

Everyone is talking about Brexit referendum and the renewal of the Greek crisis as key threats. Put frankly - this is a smokescreen. When it comes to longer term euro zone growth prospects both are irrelevant. Growth within the euro area has nothing to do with the UK. And Greece has been effectively removed from the markets and economic agents' considerations - the country is no longer commanding any serious media attention (with markets fatigued by the never-ending 'crises'). With ESM / EFSF /ECB now seemingly the sole bearers of Greek debt (with IMF likely to take back seat in the Bailout 3.0 as per http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/05/11516-71-steps-guide-to-greek-crisis.html) Greek funding issues and any risk of a default are unlikely to trigger Grexit. Put more directly, even if Greece were to exit the Euro, no one will bat an eyelid over such an event.

Meanwhile, the real long term problems for the euro area are:

• Capex remains subdued across the entire euro area, including Germany, Italy, France. 
• Fiscal policy is currently largely neutral and it is hard to see how the euro area can find any significant capacity to increase fiscal spending. 
• ECB stimulus is working in the financial markets, but not on the ground - there is still too much debt and too little prospect for a return on capital. Quality borrowers are not rushing to take on loans for capex. And the banks are not too eager to lend to borrowers with legacy leverage problems. 
• Eurozone banking is still a mess: capital and loans restructuring is sporadic, rather than systematic, negative rates taking a bite out of margins, but even if this headwind is taken out, markets volatility is not helping. 

And there are even bigger structural headwinds:

1. Lack of agility in the structurally over-regulated and sclerotic economy: technological innovation is weak, adoption of technological innovation is weak, labour force quality is deteriorating, so productivity growth has collapsed. Entrepreneurship is weak. Employment is sluggish and of deteriorating quality. That’s supply side.
2. Demand side is improving due to a short term boost from the post-Great Recession cyclical recovery. But, legacy issues of debt across corporate and household sectors and public finances are still present.
3. On financial side: banks-intermediated funding model for capex is a drag on growth and there is zero momentum on equity and direct debt issuance sides. Even with ECB going into another round of TLTROs, issuance of new bonds has spiked primarily because of larger corporates issuance, not because of market deepening.
4. On policies front, there is total and comprehensive paralysis. EU is malfunctioning, torn apart by crises of European making. National governments have lost capacity to legislate because of delegation of so much decision making to Brussels in the past. Political discontent is rising everywhere. We now have growing proportions of core European countries’ populations - the Big 4s - wanting to reexamine the entire EU.

Europe has been Japanified. And there is little that it can do to avoid this stagnation trap. There is no hope that  fiscal policy can do what monetary policy has failed to deliver - the great hope of Keynesianistas. And with that, both the monetary and the fiscal sides of European growth equation are out. What's left? Endless low interest rates (with a risk of policy error, should Germans rebel against Draghi's uncountable puts) and endless painful quasi-deflating (through low demand) of debt. Aka, pain.

15/4/16: Slovakia v France: Risk Divergence

I love it when the good guys lead: "Slovakia leaps ahead of France, reveals country risk survey

Full article available here: http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3545875/Slovakia-leaps-ahead-of-France-reveals-country-risk-survey.html?copyrightInfo=true

My full comment on the matter:

"From macroeconomic perspective the two economies appear to be heading in the opposite direction.

While France is experiencing weakening growth momentum with forecast real GDP growth rates for 2016-2017 at around 1.55 percent on average and declining (1H 2015 compared to current, a forecast swing of around 0.05 percentage points), Slovakian economy is gaining speed, with current forecast growth rate at around 3.57 percent for 2016-2017, representing an upgrade of around 0.3 percentage points.

Much of this is accounted for by differences in investment (rising in Slovakia, as a share of GDP, while relatively stagnant in France), as well as growth in exports of goods and services (with Slovakia expected to outperform France in terms of growth in exports in both 2016 and 2017 - a reversal on 2015 outrun).

In fiscal policy terms, both countries are expected to post modest reduction in total burden of Government in the economy, reflected in the declining ratio of Government revenues to GDP over 2016-2017. However, in France, this forecast is less certain due to political cycle and ongoing lack of progress on both structural reforms and fiscal targets. In contrast, Slovakia already runs relatively lean, strongly value-for-money focused public spending policies. As the result, even under relatively rosy projections, France will continue to post greater Government deficits than Slovakia through 2017. Crucially, even with negative Government yields on French debt, France is currently running deeper primary deficits than Slovakia, which suggests that the French fiscal space is much thinner than headline difference between the two countries suggest.

The above dynamics also point to continued divergence between the two countries' paths in terms of external balances. Slovakia's current account surplus in 2016-2017 is likely to average at around 0.15 percent of GDP. In contrast, France's current account deficit is expected to be around 0.37 percent of GDP.

In simple terms, diverging macroeconomic and political risks paths do warrant risk repricing in the case of both Slovakia (to the downside of risks) and France (to the upside in terms of risks assessment) into 2016, and possibly into 2017."

The risk trends are indeed showing counter-movement:

14/3/2016: Foreign Investors, Sovereign Risks & Regulatory Clowns

Over 2012-2013, sovereign and corporate bonds markets started showing sigs of QE-related fatigue within the system, most commonly associated with periodically volatile trading spreads, term premia and risk spreads. In 2013, following the onset of the Fed-related “taper tantrum” many emerging markets spreads on their sovereign bonds widen dramatically, especially in response to rapid devaluations of their domestic currencies.

“This prompted market analysts to identify five of the worst hit economies as the “fragile five,” attributing their vulnerability to economic fundamentals, particularly to current account deficits.” Which is fine - current account is a reasonably important signal of the overall external balance in the economy, but… the but bit is that current account alone means little. Take for example Russia: back in 2013, the economy enjoyed record current account surpluses - so was a picture of rude health by the analysts criteria. Yet, within the economy there was already an apparent and fully recognised on-going structural slowdown.

Bickering over indicators validity aside, however, it would be nice to know which indicators and which risk models do investors flow when they decide to buy or sell emerging market bonds?

Traditionally, we think about two types of factors: “push” and “pull” factors, determining whether the emerging economy experiences capital inflows or outflows.

- “The push factors often relate to economic or financial developments in the global economy as a whole or in the advanced economies, notably the United States.”
- “The pull factors often relate to country-specific economic fundamentals in emerging markets”

Both push and pull factors seem to be important.

In analyzing returns on sovereign CDS contracts, the BIS paper looks at CDS returns “for 18 emerging markets and 10 advanced countries over 11 years of monthly data from January 2004 to December 2014.”

Findings in a nutshell:

• “Statistical tests for breaks in the movements of CDS returns suggest a break at the time of the eruption of the global subprime crisis in October 2008. This leads us to consider two subperiods separately, an “old normal” before the outbreak of the crisis and a “new normal” afterwards.”
• “In both the old normal and new normal, we seek to explain the variation of these [principal factors] loadings [onto risk premia] in terms of such fundamentals as debt-to-GDP ratios, fiscal balances, current account balances, sovereign credit ratings, trade openness, GDP growth and depth of the domestic bond market.”
• “In the old normal, the first risk factor alone explains about half of the variation in CDS returns…” 
• “This factor becomes more dominant in the new normal, in which it explains over three-fifths of the variation in returns.”
• “When it comes to how the different countries load on this factor, we find that that the commonly cited economic fundamentals have little influence on the country-specific loadings on the factor. Instead the single most important explanatory variable for the differences in loadings is a dummy variable that identifies whether or not a country is an emerging market.”

To summarise the BIS findings: “In the end, we find that CDS returns in the new normal move over time largely to reflect the movements of a single global risk factor, with the variation across sovereigns for the most part reflecting the designation of “emerging market”. There seems to be no “fragile five”; there are only emerging markets. While the emerging markets designation may serve to summarize many relevant features of sovereign borrowers, it is a designation that lacks the kind of granularity that we would have expected for a fundamental on which investors’ risk assessments are based. The importance of the emerging markets designation in the new normal suggests that index tracking behaviour by investors has become a powerful force in global bond markets.”

And the cherry on top of the proverbial pie? Why, here it goes: “Haldane (2014) has argued that in the world of international finance, the global subprime crisis and the regulations that followed made asset managers more important than banks. Miyajima and Shim (2014) show that even actively managed emerging market bond funds follow their benchmarks portfolios  quite closely. For the most part, when global investors invest in emerging markets, instead of picking and choosing based on country-specific fundamentals, they appear to simply replicate their benchmark portfolios, the constituents of which hardly change over time.”

Wait, what? All regulators are running around the world chasing the bad bankers (for their pre-2008 shenanigans), all the while the new threat has already migrated to asset management. The regulators and enforcers are busy bee-buzzing around courts and regulatory hearings chasing the elusive ‘signalling value’ of enforcing old rules onto the heads of the bankers. With little real outcome to show, I must add. … But the future culprits are not to be found amongst those who care to watch the fate of bankers unfolding in front of them.

In short, having exposed the farce of bond / CDS markets pricing risks based on a vague and vacuous designation of a country, the BIS paper inadvertently also exposed the massive futility of the financial regulators chasing their own tails trying to get past crises culprits to prevent new crises from happening, even though the future culprits don;t give a toss about the past culprits.

Dogs, tails, everything wagging everyone, and vice versa…


Full paper here: Amstad, Marlene and Remolona, Eli M. and Shek, Jimmy, “How Do Global Investors Differentiate between Sovereign Risks? The New Normal versus the Old” (January 2016). BIS Working Paper No. 541: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2722580

9/2/16: Currency Devaluation and Small Countries: Some Warning Shots for Ireland

In recent years, and especially since the start of the ECB QE programmes, euro depreciation vis-a-vis other key currencies, namely the USD, has been a major boost to Ireland, supporting (allegedly) exports growth and improving valuations of our exports. However, exports-led recovery has been rather problematic from the point of view of what has been happening on the ground, in the real economy. In part, this effect is down to the source of exports growth - the MNCs. But in part, it seems, the effect is also down to the very nature of our economy ex-MNCs.

Recent research from the IMF (see: Acevedo Mejia, Sebastian and Cebotari, Aliona and Greenidge, Kevin and Keim, Geoffrey N., External Devaluations: Are Small States Different? (November 2015). IMF Working Paper No. 15/240: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2727185) investigated “whether the macroeconomic effects of external devaluations have systematically different effects in small states, which are typically more open and less diversified than larger peers.”

Notice that this is about ‘external’ devaluations (via the exchange rate channel) as opposed to ‘internal’ devaluations (via real wages and costs channel). Also note, the data set for the study does not cover euro area or Ireland.

The study found “that the effects of devaluation on growth and external balances are not significantly different between small and large states, with both groups equally likely to experience expansionary [in case of devaluation] or contractionary [in case of appreciation] outcomes.” So far, so good.

But there is a kicker: “However, the transmission channels are different: devaluations in small states are more likely to affect demand through expenditure compression, rather than expenditure-switching channels. In particular, consumption tends to fall more sharply in small states due to adverse income effects, thereby reducing import demand.”

Which, per IMF team means that the governments of small open economies experiencing devaluation of their exchange rate (Ireland today) should do several things to minimise the adverse costs spillover from devaluation to households/consumers. These are:

1. “Tight incomes policies after the devaluation ― such as tight monetary and government wage policies―are crucial for containing inflation and preventing the cost-push inflation from taking hold more permanently. …While tight wage policies are certainly important in the public sector as the largest employer in many small states, economy-wide consensus on the need for wage restraint is also desirable.” Let’s see: tight wages policies, including in public sector. Not in GE16 you won’t! So one responsive policy is out.
2. “To avoid expenditure compression exacerbating poverty in the most vulnerable households, small countries should be particularly alert to these adverse effects and be ready to address them through appropriately targeted and efficient social safety nets.” Which means that you don’t quite slash and burn welfare system in times of devaluations. What’s the call on that for Ireland over the last few years? Not that great, in fairness.
3. “With the pick-up in investment providing the strongest boost to growth in expansionary devaluations, structural reforms to remove bottlenecks and stimulate post-devaluation investment are important.” Investment? Why, sure we’d like to have some, but instead we are having continued boom in assets flipping by vultures and tax-shenanigans by MNCs paraded in our national accounts as ‘investment’. 
4. “A favorable external environment is important in supporting growth following devaluations.” Good news, everyone - we’ve found one (so far) thing that Ireland does enjoy, courtesy of our links to the U.S. economy and courtesy of us having a huge base of MNCs ‘exporting’ to the U.S. and elsewhere around the world. Never mind this is all about tax optimisation. Exports are booming. 
5. “The devaluation and supporting policies should be credible enough to stem market perceptions of any further devaluation or policy adjustments.” Why is it important to create strong market perception that further devaluations won’t take place? Because “…expectations of further devaluations or an increase in the sovereign risk premium would push domestic interest rates higher, imposing large costs in terms of investment, output contraction and financial instability.” Of course, we - as in Ireland - have zero control over both quantum of devaluation and its credibility, because devaluation is being driven by the ECB. But do note that, barring ‘sufficient’ devaluation, there will be costs in the form of higher cost of capital and government and real economic debt.It is worth noting that these costs will be spread not only onto Ireland, but across the entire euro area. Should we get ready for that eventuality? Or should we just continue to ignore the expected path of future interest rates, as we have been doing so far? 

I would ask your friendly GE16 candidates for their thoughts on the above… for the laughs…

4/2/16: Tear Gas v Lagarde’s Tears: Greece

Here’s Greece on pensions reforms:

Source: https://www.rt.com/news/331265-greece-tear-gas-protet/#.VrN56JItCdA.twitter

Here’s IMF on same:

Note: to watch the video comment by Mme Lagarde on Greek situation, please click on this link: http://www.imf.org/external/mmedia/view.aspx?vid=4739363229001 (answer on Greece starts at 22’:22”). Otherwise, here’s official IMF transcript of it:

“I have always said that the Greek program has to walk on two legs: one is significant reforms and one is debt relief. If the pension [system] cannot be as significantly and substantially reformed as needed, we could need more debt relief on the other side. Equally, no [amount of debt relief] will make the pension system sustainable. For the financing of the pension system, the budget has to pay 10 percent of GDP. This is not sustainable. The average in Europe is 2.5 percent. It all needs to add up, but at the same time the pension system needs to be sustainable in the medium and long term. This requires taking short-term measures that will make it sustainable in the long term.

“I really don't like it when we are portrayed as the “draconian, rigorous terrible IMF.” We do not want draconian fiscal measures to apply to Greece, which have already made a lot of sacrifices. We have said that fiscal consolidation should not be excessive, so that the economy could work and eventually expand. But it needs to add up. And the pension system needs to be reformed, the tax collection needs to be improved so that revenue comes in and evasion is stopped. And the debt relief by the other Europeans must accompany that process.  We will be very attentive to  the sustainability of the reforms, to the fact that it needs to add up, and to walk on two legs. That will be our compass for Greece. But we want that country to succeed at the end of the day, but it has to succeed in real life, not on paper.”

Yep. Lots of good words and then there are those ungrateful Greeks who are just refusing to understand:

1. How can Mme Lagarde insist that there’s a second leg (debt relief) where the EU already said, repeatedly, there is none? and
2. How there can be sustainability to the Greek pensions reforms if there are actually people living on them day-to-day who may be unable to take a cut to their pay? Who's going to feed them? Care for them? On what money? Where has IMF published tests of proposed reforms with respect to their impact on pensioners?

Strangely, Mme Lagarde seems to be not that interested in answering either one of these concerns.

27/1/16: Russian Capital Outflows 2015: Abating, but Still High

In two recent posts, I covered Russian External Debt dynamics and drawdowns on Russian Sovereign Wealth Funds. Last, but not least, I am yet to cover capital inflows/outflows for 2015. So, as promised, here is a post covering these.

Based on data that includes preliminary reporting for 4Q 2015, full year 2015 net capital outflows from Russia amounted to USD56.9 billion, composed of USD33.4 billion outflows in the Banking Sector and USD23.5 billion outflows in ‘Other Sectors’. In the banking sector there were simultaneous disposals of some USD28.2 billion of assets and reduction of USD61.6 in liabilities (repayment of maturing debts and deposits).

Thus, 2015 marked the second lowest year in the last 5 in terms of net capital outflows. In comparison, 2014 net capital outflows stood at a whooping USD153 billion and 2013 saw outflows of USD61.6 billion. Net banks’ position improved from outflows of USD86.0 billion in 2014 to outflows of USD33.4 billion in 2015. Other Sectors outflows also improved in 2015. In 2015, this category of outflows amounted to USD23.5 billion, against USD67 billion in 2014. 2015 marked the slowest outflows year in this sector in 8 years.

Chart to illustrate dynamics:

On a quarterly basis, net capital outflows from Russia in 4Q 2015 are estimated at USD9.2 billion, down from USD76.2 billion in 4Q 2014. Capital outflows were lower in every quarter of 2015 compared to corresponding quarter of 2014 and in 3Q 2015 there was a net capital inflow of USD3.4 billion - the first net inflow in any quarter since 2Q 2010.

So on balance, Russian capital outflows remain strong, but are abating rapidly. Most of the outflows is accounted for by the deleveraging of the Banks followed by shallower deleveraging of the ‘Other Sectors’.

26/1/16: Russian External Debt: Deleveraging Goes On

In previous post, I covered the drawdowns on Russian SWFs over 2015. As promised, here is the capital outflows / debt redemptions part of the equation.

The latest data for changes in the composition of External Debt of the Russian Federation that we have dates back to the end of 2Q 2015. We also have projections of maturities of debt forward, allowing us to estimate - based on schedule - debt redemptions through 4Q 2015. Chart below illustrates the trend.

As shown in the chart above, based on estimated schedule of repayments, by the end of 2015, Russia total external debt has declined by some USD177.1 billion or 24 percent. Some of this was converted into equity and domestic debt, and some (3Q-4Q maturities) would have been rolled over. Still, that is a sizeable chunk of external debt gone - a very rapid rate of economy’s deleveraging.

Compositionally, a bulk of this came from the ‘Other Sectors’, but in percentage terms, the largest decline has been in the General Government category, where the decline y/y was 36 percent.

Looking at forward schedule of maturities, the following chart highlights the overall trend decline in debt redemptions coming forward in 2016 and into 2Q 2017.

Again, the largest burden of debt redemptions falls onto ‘Other Sectors’ - excluding Government, Central Bank and Banks.

The total quantum of debt due to mature in 2016 is USD76.58 billion, of which Government debt maturing amounts to just 1.7 billion, banks debts maturing account for USD19.27 billion and the balance is due to mature for ‘Other Sectors’.

These are aggregates, so they include debt owed to parent entities, debt owed to direct investors, debt convertible into equity, debt written by banks affiliated with corporates, etc. In other words, a large chunk of this debt is not really under any pressure of repayment. General estimates put such debt at around 20-25 percent of the total debt due in the Banking and Other sectors. If we take a partial adjustment for this, netting out ‘Other Sectors’ external debt held by Investment enterprises and in form of Trade Credit and Financial Leases, etc, then total debt maturing in 2016 per schedule falls to, roughly, USD 59.5 billion - well shy of the aggregate total officially reported as USD 76.58 billion.


So in a summary: Russian deleveraging continued strongly in 2015 and will be ongoing still in 2016. 2016 levels of debt redemptions across all sectors of the economy are shallower than in 2015. Although this rate of deleveraging does present significant challenges to the economy from the point of view of funds available for investment and to support operations, overall deleveraging process is, in effect, itself an investment into future capacity of companies and banks to raise funding. The main impediment to the re-starting of this process, however, is the geopolitical environment of sanctions against Russian banks that de facto closed access to external funding for the vast majority of sanctioned and non-sanctioned enterprises and banks.


Next, I will be covering Russian capital outflows, so stay tuned of that.

25/1/16: Russian Sovereign Funds: Down, but Not Out, Yet…

In the context of 2016 Budget, Russian sovereign reserves dynamics are clearly an important consideration. For example, in his recent statement, former Russian Finance Minister, Kudrin, has suggested that if Budget deficit reaches above 5% of GDP in 2016, the entire cushion of liquid foreign reserves held by the Government will be exhausted by the end of the year, leaving Russia exposed to big cuts in the budget for 2017. This is similar to the positions of Russia's Economy Minister Alexei Ulyukayev and the current Finance Minister Anton Siluanov.

The expectations are based on three considerations:
1) 2015 dynamics of Russian sovereign wealth funds;
2) Funds outflows expected under the external debt repayment schedules; and
3) A potentially massive call on Russian reserves from the VEB capital requirements.

I covered the last point earlier here. So let’s take a look at the first point.

Russia’s main and more liquid Reserve Fund shrank substantially last year as it carried out its explicit mandate to provide support for fiscal balance. Set up in 2008, the fund holds only liquid foreign assets and 2015 became the first year since the Great Recession and the Global Financial Crisis (2009-2010 in Russia’s case) when it experienced net withdrawals. The value of the fund fell from roughly USD90 billion to ca USD50 billion by the end of December 2015.

However, the key to these holdings is their Ruble equivalent, as Russian budgetary expenditures are in domestic currency. By this metric, the Fund has been doing somewhat better. By end of December 2015, the Reserve Fund held assets valued at RUB3.6 trillion, amounting to almost 5 percent of Russian GDP or roughly 1.7 times Budget 2016 requirement for deficit coverage. Budget 2016 is based on expectation that the Reserve Fund will supply some RUB2.1 trillion to cover the deficit.

The sticking point is that Budget 2016 - in its current reincarnation - is based on oil price of USD50pb. The Ministry of Finance is currently preparing amended Budget based on USD30-35pb price of Brent, but we are yet to see the resulting deficits projections. What we do know is that the Government has requested up to 10 percent cuts across public expenditure for 2016. Absent such cuts, and if oil prices remain around USD30pb mark, the deficit is likely to balloon to the levels where 2016 deficit will end up fully depleting the Reserve Fund.

Added safety cushion, of course, will be provided by devaluation of the Ruble. This worked pretty well in 2015, but the problem going into 2016 is that required further devaluations will likely bring Ruble into USDRUB 90+ range, inducing severe redistribution of losses onto the shoulders of consumers and cutting hard into companies investment in new equipment and technologies.

Bofit provided a handy chart showing the dynamics of Fund resources and a breakdown of these dynamics by key factors

Aside from the Reserve Fund, Russia also has the National Welfare Fund which was set up to underwrite public pensions. The Fund has been used to provide capital and funding to Russian banks shut out of the international borrowing in form of bonds purchases and deposits with the banks, as well as to some Russian companies, in form of debt purchases. These deposits and loans, however, are not liquid and, therefore, not available for fiscal supports. About only hope for some liquidity extraction from these allocations is via Russian corporates using cash flows from exports to repay the Fund - something that is unlikely to create significant buffers for the Budget.

At the end of 2015, the National Welfare Fund held assets valued at USD72 billion, of which USD48 billion (or RUB3.5 trillion) was held in relatively liquid foreign-currency assets and the balance held in assets written against domestic systemically important banks and companies. Even assuming - optimistically - that 10 percent of the residual assets can be cashed in over 2016, the liquidity available from the Fund runs to around USD50 billion.

Thus, total liquidity cushion held by two Russian SWFs currently amounts to USD100 billion without adjusting for liquidity risks and costs, and if we are to take nominal adjustments for these two factors, liquidity cushion probably falls to USD75-80 billion total.

It is worth noting, however, that Russia has other international reserves at its disposal. Per official data, as of the ned of December 2015, total International Reserves stood at USD368.4 billion, down USD17.06 billion on December 2014 and down USD222.17 billion on all time peak. In accessible reserves, Russia has International funds (excluding SDRs and IMF reserves) of USD363.07 billion.

I will be covering funds outflows schedule for 2016 in a separate post, so stay tuned.

14/1/16: Debt in Sub-Saharan Africa & Country-Specific Risks

The age of QE in the West, as well as the Great Recession and the Global Financial Crisis have both undoubtedly left some serious scars on the Emerging Markets. One example is the rising (once again) debt in the countries that prior to 2007 have benefited from major debt restructuring initiatives. Here is the new World Bank paper assessing the extent of debt accumulation in Sub-Saharan Africa post-2007.

"Sub-Saharan African countries as a group showed a considerable reduction in public and external indebtedness in the early 2000s as a result of debt relief programs, higher economic growth, and improved fiscal management for some countries. More recently, however, vulnerabilities in some countries are on the rise, including a few with very rapid debt accumulation."

Across Sub-Saharan African countries, "borrowing to support fiscal deficits since 2009, including through domestic markets and Eurobond issuance, has driven a net increase in public debt for all countries except oil exporters benefitting from buoyant commodity prices and fragile states receiving post-2008 Highly Indebted Poor Country relief. Current account deficits and foreign direct investment inflows drove the external debt dynamics, with balance of payments problems associated with very rapid external debt accumulation in some cases. Pockets of increasing vulnerabilities of debt financing profiles and sensitivity of debt burden indicators to macro-fiscal shocks require close monitoring."

And looking forward, things are not exactly promising: "Specific risks that policy makers in Sub-Saharan Africa need to pay attention to going forward include the recent fall in commodity prices, especially oil, the slowdown in China and the sluggish recovery in Europe, dependence on non-debt-creating flows, and accounting for contingent liabilities."

Full paper: Battaile, Bill and Hernandez, Fernando Leonardo and Norambuena, Vivian, Debt Sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa: Unraveling Country-Specific Risks (December 21, 2015). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7523 is available via SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2706885

23/12/15: Vnesheconombank: where things stay ugly

As reported by BOFIT, Russia’s 4th largest and state-owned Vnesheconombank  (VEB Group which technically is not a bank, but a development bank and an owner of a number of banks, so as such VEB is not subject to CBR supervision) requires estimated funding supports at EUR15–20 billion “to cover at least the next few years”.  Per Bloomberg, VEB has been seeking USD23 billion “to support long-term growth and pay off the upcoming loan” (data as of November 23). VEB total assets in Russia amount to ca EUR45 billion, which, per BOFIT, “would make VEB Russia’s fourth largest bank with holdings that correspond to about 4 % of the banking sector’s total assets”. Overall, VEB holds 2.8 trillion Rubles in loans assets and around 1 trillion Rubles in other assets.

To-date, VEB received EUR8 billion in deposits from the National Welfare Fund and about EUR500 million in other monies (most of which came from the Central Bank’s 2014 profits).

Per both, Bloomberg and BOFIT: VEB has been a major lender behind Sochi Winter Olympics 2014. New lending increased total loans held by the bank by some 25% in Ruble terms in 2013 before doubling loans in 2014. VEB started aggressive loans expansion in 2007 since when its assets base grew almost 10-fold. Over 2015, bank-held loans posted some serious deterioration in quality forcing bank to set aside significant reserves to cover potential losses. Per Reuters report, “S&P estimates some 500 billion roubles of VEB's loans were directed by the government and are therefore regarded as relatively risky. While the huge investments made in Sochi have generated public discussion in Russia, far less attention has been given to no less massive investments VEB made in Ukraine. "That's still on their books and they keep rolling those loans over. Of course it's only a question of time before they accept losses on those assets," said S&P's Vartapetov. In an interview in December 2013, VEB Chairman Vladimir Dmitriev said the bank had via Russian investors ploughed $8 billion into Ukrainian steel plants, mainly in the Donbass region, since ravaged in a separatist conflict. He said the investment had supported 40,000 Ukrainian workers, but did not say how the Russian economy had benefited.” Overall, Russian banks’ continued presence and even growth in Ukraine - while puzzling to some external observers - can be explained by the significant role these banks play in the Ukrainian economy.

In 2014, VEB posted full year loss of USD4.5 billion / RUB250 billion and in 1H 2015 losses totalled USD1.5 billion. VEB’s Ukrainian subsidiary was one of the big drivers for these. Based on the figures, VEB posted the largest loss of any Russian company in 2014.  The top three largest loss making companies in 2014 were: Vnesheconombank, followed by the steelmaking giant Mechel (loss of 167 billion rubles) and the monopoly Russian Railways (losses of 99 billion rubles).

In addition, VEB holds some USD19.3 billion of debt maturing through 2025 (see chart from Bloomberg) with EUR9 billion of this in eurobonds:

VEB is subject to both EU and US sanctions which effectively shut VEB access to funding markets and the bank will require between EUR2.5 and 3 billion for debt servicing in 2016 alone. This week, VEB secured a five-year loan of 10 billion yuan or EUR1.4 billion from China Development Bank.

Recently, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov stated that VEB requires as much as USD20 billion in funding (ca 1.7% of Russian GDP), and that VEB is expected to sell some of its assets to fund part of the gap.


Per Bloomberg, “the finance ministry’s proposals include exchanging the lender’s Eurobonds for Russian government securities, Vedomosti reported Nov. 24. Other options on the table include a local government bond offering for 1.5 trillion rubles to recapitalize the bank, and transferring bad assets from VEB’s balance sheet to the state, according to newspaper Kommersant.”

28/10/15: Russian Economy Update: Consumption and Debt

Updating Russian stats: September consumption and deleveraging: bigger clouds, brighter silver lining. 

In basic terms, as reported by BOFIT, per Rosstat, Russian seasonally-adjusted retail sales (by volume) fell more than 10% y/y in September, with non-food sales driving the figure deeper into the red. On the ‘upside’, services sales to households fell less than overall retail sales. This accelerates the rate of decline in household consumption expenditure - over 1H 2015, expenditure fell just under 9% y/y. Small silver lining to this cloud is that household debt continued to decline as Russian households withdrew from the credit markets and focused on increased savings (most likely precautionary savings).

Russian households are not the only ones that are saving. Overall external debt of the Russian Federation fell, again, in 3Q 2015, with preliminary data from the Central Bank of Russia figures putting total foreign debt at USD522bn as of end-September, down just over USD30bn compared to 2Q 2015. Per official estimates, ca 50 percent of the overall reduction q/q in external debt came from repayment of credit due, while the other 50 percent was down to devaluation of the ruble (ca 20 percent of Russian external debt was issued in Rubles).

Overall, 3Q 2015 saw some USD40 billion of external debt maturing, which means that over 1/4 of that debt was rolled over by the non-bank corporations. Per CBR estimates, ca 40% of the external debt owed by the Russian non-bank corporations relates to intragroup loans - basically debt owed across subsidiaries of the same percent entity. And over recent quarters, this type of debt has been increasing as the proportion of total debt, most likely reflecting two sub-trends:
1) increasing refinancing of inter-group loans using intra-group funds; and
2) increasing conversion of intra-group investments/equity into intragroup debt (and/or some conversion of FDI equity into intra-group debt).

Over the next 12 months (from the start of 4Q 2015), Russian foreign debt maturity profile covers USD87 billion in maturing obligations against country currency reserves of USD370 billion-odd. As noted by BOFIT, “A common rule-of-thumb suggests that a country’s reserves need to be sufficient to cover at least 100% of its short-term foreign debt to avoid liquidity problems.” Russia’s current cover is closer to 430%. And that is absent further ruble devaluations.

A chart via BOFIT:

10/10/15: IMF’s Macro Data and That “Iceland v Ireland” Question, again

Recently, I posted some data from the IMF Fiscal Monitor for October 2015 comparing fiscal performance of Iceland and Ireland and showing the extent tp which Iceland outperforms Ireland in terms of fiscal deficits and Government debt metrics. You can see the full post here.

Now, consider economic performance, especially of interest given recently strong performance by Ireland in terms of GDP, GNP and even Domestic Demand growth rates.

So let’s take a look at IMF's latest economic data and revisit that "Iceland v Ireland" question.

Let;s first take a look at the real GDP per capita, setting peak pre-crisis levels of 2007 (for both countries) as 100 index reading and tracing evolution of the real GDP per capita. Both countries are expected to regain their pre-crisis GDP per capita levels in 2015, with Iceland reaching 0.17% above the pre-crisis peak and Ireland reaching 0.29% above the same measure.

We are not going to dwell on the gargantuan (20%+) GDP/GNP spread or the fact that Irish Domestic Consumption per capita is nowhere near pre-crisis peak (see here). In pure real GDP per capita terms, Iceland is doing as well or as badly as Ireland so far.

The same applies to GDP per capita expressed in current prices and adjusted for differences in exchange rates and price levels (the Purchasing Power Parity adjustment). Iceland is at 112.9 index reading in 2015 forecast, Ireland at 113.1 index reading. For 2016, Iceland is forecast to be around 117.5, Ireland at 117.8. Neck-in-neck.

However, when it comes to the labour market performance, the close proximity between two countries vanishes.

Unemployment rate in Iceland rose from 2.3% in 2007 to a peak of 7.525% in 2010 and is expected to be at 4.3% in 2015, falling to forecast rate of 4.1% by 2016-2017 before rising to 4.4% in 2020. Ireland is faring much worse. Our unemployment rate was double Iceland’s in 2007 - at 4.67% and this peaked in 2012 at 14.67%. Since 2012, the rate fell, with 2015 outlook set at 9.58% - more than double Iceland’s rate, falling gradually to 6.9% in 2020 - more than 50 percent higher than Iceland’s.

Employment rate also tells the story of Iceland’s outperformance. And worse - dynamically, this outperformance is set to continue deteriorating for Ireland. In 2007, Iceland’s total employment ratio to total population was 57.5% against Ireland’s 49% - a gap of 8.5 percentage points. This year, per IMF projections Iceland’s employment ratio will be around 55.8% against Ireland’s 42.2% - a gap of 13.6 percentage points. In 2016 (the furthers forecast by the IMF), Iceland’s employment rate is projected to be 56.5% against Ireland’s 42.7% - a gap of 13.8 percentage points.

Since the beginning of the crisis, Irish policymakers extolled the virtue of our open economy and exports as the drivers for economic recovery. Aptly, we commonly regard ourselves to be a powerhouse of exporting activities. Which means that we should be leading Iceland in terms of our external balances performance. Reality is a bit more mixed. Iceland’s current account deficit stood at a whooping 22.8% of GDP in 2008 on foot of strong ‘imports’ of capital into the banking system. Ireland’s was more benign at 5.73% of GDP. However, since the peak of the crisis, both countries achieved massive improvements in their current account balances, with 2014 ending with Iceland posting a current account surplus of 3.41% of GDP and Ireland posting a current account surplus of 3.62% of GDP. However, in 2015, IMF forecast for current account balance shows Iceland pulling ahead of Ireland, with current account surplus of 4.61% of GDP against Ireland’s 3.2% of GDP. This gap - in favour of Iceland - is expected to persist (per IMF) through 2020.

Table below summarises the sheer magnitude of positive adjustments to pre-crisis and crisis worst points of performance on all metrics above, through 2015 for both countries:

In summary: 

• In absolute terms, both Ireland and Iceland have made big adjustments on low points of performance pre-crisis and at the peak of the crisis through 2015. 
• Iceland clearly outperforms Ireland in labour market terms. 
• Ignoring the caveats on composition of Irish GDP, Ireland and Iceland perform basically in similar terms in terms of economic activity recovery. 
• In terms of external balances, Iceland currently leads Ireland, after having lagged Ireland through 2012. 
• Iceland solidly outperforms Ireland in fiscal metrics of Government debt and deficit dynamics.

The evidence above is sufficient to reject the claims that Ireland outperforms Iceland in recovery.

4/10/15: Wither Capital: Why Euro Area Lacks New Investment Opportunities

Here is an unedited version of my 3Q 2015 contribution to the Manning Financial newsletter covering the topic of  capital investment in the Euro area.

Wither Capital: Why Euro Area Lacks New Investment Opportunities

Despite the positive signs of an improving economy, the euro area is hardly out of the woods, yet, when it comes to the post-crisis adjustments. The key point is that the cure prescribed for the ailing common currency area economies by Dr Mario Draghi might less than effective in curing the disease.

The key risk to the euro area today does not stem from the lack of funding for investment that ECB QE and other unorthodox policies target by attempting to flood the markets with cheap liquidity. Instead, they stem from the lack of sustainable demand for new investment.

Here are three facts.

One: between 1991 and 2001, Euro area member states were moderate net investors, with annual capital spending exceeding savings by 0.6 percent of GDP on average, close to the World average of 0.8 percent of global GDP. This meant that savings generated within the Euro area were finding opportunities for investment at home, and to attract some net investment from the rest of the world.

Two: over the period of 2002-2014,  annual investment in euro area was, on average, lower than savings by some 1 percentage point of GDP. And, based on the IMF forecasts, this gap is expected to increase to 3.5 percent over 2015-2020 horizon, even as economy officially recovers. This implies that the future euro area recovery will be driven not by investment, but by something else. Per IMF forecasts, this new driver for growth will be external demand for goods and services from the euro area, plus a bounce from the abysmal years of the crisis. In other words, new growth will not be anything to brag about at the G7 and G20 meetings.

Three: as investment demand dropped across the euro area since 2002, global savings excess over investment actually rose, rising from a net deficit of 0.8 percent of GDP prior to 2002, to a net surplus of 0.2 percent over 2002-2014 period and to a forecast surplus of 0.3 percent of GDP for 2015-2020 period. This suggests that returns on private investment are likely to stay low, globally, pushing down net inflows of capital into the euro area. Chart 1 below illustrates.

Investment Funding Lacking?

Taken together, the above facts suggest that the euro area does not lack funding for investment, but lacks opportunities for productive capital allocation. Consistent with this, QE-generated funding, is flowing not to higher risk entrepreneurial ventures and capital investment, but into negative returns-generating government bonds. And, in the recent past, liquidity was also rushing into secondary markets for corporate debt, to be used to finance shares buy-backs instead of new technology, R&D or product innovation, or old fashioned building up of productive capital.

As the result we are witnessing a paradoxical situation. Companies’ reported earnings are coming increasingly under scrutiny, with rising investor suspicions that sell-side analysts are employing 'smoke and mirrors' tactics to 'tilt' corporate results to the satisfaction of the boards. Corporate earnings per share metrics are being sustained on an upward trajectory by shares repurchases. All along, bonds markets are running short of liquidity even as ECB is pumping more than EUR60 billion per month into them.

Recent analysis of S&P500 stocks in the U.S. has revealed that the difference between adjusted earnings and unadjusted bottom-line earnings or net income has increased dramatically in recent years. Some 20 percent of all companies surveyed posted adjusted earnings more than 50 percent higher than net income. According to the report complied by the Associated Press and S&P Capital IQ, some companies reporting profit on adjusted earnings basis are actually loss making. European markets data is yet to be analysed, but given the trends, it won't be surprising if euro area leading corporates receive a similar 'tilt'.

Of Debt, Leverage & Loose Monetary Policies

All of this reflects cheap debt and leverage finance available courtesy of central banks activism.

Loose monetary policy, however, can provide only a temporary support to the financial assets. It cannot address the deeply structural failures across the real economies.

The key problem is not the short term malfunctioning of the monetary transmission mechanism between ECB record-low interest rates and real investment, but the exhaustion of the structural drivers for growth. Over the 1990s and early 2000s, European economies accumulated debt liabilities to fund growth in domestic demand (public and private investment and consumption). Now, even at extremely low interest rates, the system no longer is able to sustain continued growth in debt. Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Austria - the net saving economies - are getting grey at an accelerating speed, reducing investors' willingness to allocate their surplus savings to productive, but risky, investments. Their companies, faced with slow growth prospect at home, are investing in new capacity outside the euro area - in Asia Pacific, Central and Eastern Europe, MENA and Africa.

The euro area has been leveraged so much, there is no realistic prospect of demand expansion here over the next decade.

As the result of this, surplus production generated in the saving countries has been flowing out to exports creating a contagion from domestic excess supply to external surpluses on trade accounts. Historically, reinvestment of surpluses converted them into investment abroad. The result was decline in interest rates worldwide. The Global Financial Crisis only partially corrected for this, erasing excess domestic demand and temporarily alleviating asset markets mis-pricing. But it did not correct for debt levels held in the real economy. In fact, current debt levels in the advanced economies are at the levels some 30 percent higher than they were during the pre-crisis period.

Neither did the surplus production and trade imbalances do much for a structural increases in productivity or competitiveness.

Since the start of the crisis, productivity growth declined in the euro area more than in any other developed region or major advanced economy.

At the same time, euro area's favourite metric – the unit labour costs-based index of harmonised competitiveness indicators – on average signaled lower competitiveness during the 2009-2014 period compared to the pre-euro era in eight out of the twelve core euro area states. Another two member states showed statistically zero improvement in competitiveness compared to pre-euro period.

The Key Lessons

The key lesson from the euro area's failed post-crisis adjustment is that debt overhang in the real economy compounds the problem of zero exchange rate flexibility within the common currency area. Flexible exchange rates allow countries to compensate for losses in productivity, competitiveness and for long term external imbalances. Flexible exchange rates also help to deleverage private economies whenever household and corporate debt is issued in domestic currency. In the case of the euro area states, this safety valve is not available.

Creation of the euro has amplified, not reduced, internal imbalances between its member states, while dumping surplus savings into global investment markets and contributing to the declines in the global return to capital and inflating numerous asset bubbles. Surplus supply euro economies, have in effect fuelled housing and financial assets bubbles in the ‘peripheral’ economies of the euro area.

The problem has not gone away since the burst of the bubble. Instead, it has been made bigger by the ECB policies that attempt to address the immediate symptoms of the disease at the expense of dealing with longer term imbalances.

Continuing with the status quo policies for dealing with these imbalances implies sustaining long term internal devaluation of the euro area. Table below shows the gap to 2002-2003 period in terms of overall labour competitiveness currently present in the economies, with negative values showing road yet to be travelled in terms of internal devaluations.

Large scale internal devaluations are still required in all new euro area member states, ex-Cyprus, as well as in Ireland, Italy, Belgium, Finland and Luxembourg. Sizeable devaluations are needed in Austria, France, Netherlands and Slovenia. Of all euro area member states, only Cyprus and Portugal are currently operating at levels of competitiveness relatively compatible with or better than 2002-2003 period average.

The problem with this path is that internal devaluations basically boil down to high unemployment and declines in real wages. In the likes of Ireland, for example, getting us back to 2002-2003 levels of competitiveness would require real wages declining by a further 16.7 percent, while in the case of Greece, maintaining current gains in competitiveness means keeping sky high unemployment unchecked. Political costs of this might be too high for the euro area to stay the course. And ECB policies can’t help much on this front.

An alternative to the status quo of internal devaluations would be equally unpleasant and even less feasible. This would involve perpetual (or at the very least - extremely long term) transfers from Germany, Austria and the Netherlands to the euro area weaker states. It is an unimaginable solution in part because of the scale of such transfers, and in part because the euro area core itself is running out of steam. Germany is now operating in an environment of shrinking labour force and rising army of retirees. The Netherlands and Austria are, potentially, at a risk of rapid growth reversals, as exhibited by Finland that effectively fell into a medium-term stagnation in recent years. Going by the structural indicators, even turning the entire euro area into a bigger version of Germany won’t deliver salvation, as the currency area combines divergent demographics: Berlin’s model of economic development is simply not suitable for countries like Ireland, Spain and France, and unaffordable for Italy.

The third path, open to Europe is to unwind the euro area and switch back to flexible currencies, at least in a number of weaker member states.

Speculations on the future aside, one thing is clear: euro area is not repairing the imbalances that built up over the 1998-2007 period. Even after the economic crisis that resulted in huge dislocations in employment, wages, investment and fiscal adjustments, productivity is not growing and demand is stuck on a flat trajectory.

Support from the ECB via historically unprecedented monetary measures and billions pumped into some economies via supranational lending institutions, such as EFSF, ESM and IMF are not enough to correct for this reality: euro area is new Japan, and as such, it simply lacks real opportunities for a new large scale boom in investment.

15/8/15: Russian External Debt: Big Deleveraging, Smaller Future Pressures

Readers of this blog would have noted that in the past I referenced Russian companies cross-holdings of own debt in adjusting some of the external debt statistics for Russia. As I explained before, large share of the external debt owed by banks and companies is loans and other debt instruments issued by their parents and subsidiaries and direct equity investors - in other words, it is debt that can be easily rolled over or cross-cancelled within the company accounts.

This week, Central Bank of Russia did the same when it produced new estimate for external debt maturing in September-December 2015. The CBR excluded “intra-group operations” and the new estimate is based on past debt-servicing trends and a survey of 30 largest companies.

As the result of revisions, CBR now estimates that external debt coming due for Russian banks and non-financial corporations will be around USD35 billion, down on previously estimated USD61 billion.

CBR also estimated cash and liquid foreign assets holdings of Russian banks and non-bank corporations at USD135 billion on top of USD20 billion current account surplus due (assuming oil at USD40 pb) and USD14 billion of CBR own funds available for forex repo lending.

Here are the most recent charts for Russian external debt maturity, excluding most recent update for corporate and banks debt:

As the above table shows, in 12 months through June 2015, Russian Total External Debt fell 24%, down USD176.6 billion - much of it due to devaluation of the ruble and repayments of maturing debt. Of this, Government debt is down USD22.1 billion or 39% - a huge drop. Banks managed to deleverage out of USD59.9 billion in 12 months through June 2015 (down 29%) and Other Sectors external liabilities were down USD88.8 billion (-20%).

These are absolutely massive figures indicating:
1) One of the underlying causes of the ongoing economic recession (contracting credit supply and debt repayments drag on investment and consumer credit);
2) Strengthening of corporate and banks' balance sheets; and
3) Overall longer term improvement in Russian debt exposures.

6/8/15: IMF Assessment of Russian Banks & Financial Markets

Alongside the Article IV (covered in three posts all linked here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.it/2015/08/3815-imf-on-russian-economy-private.html), the IMF also released a series of technical papers, including one on the state of health of the Russian financial markets.

Top-level conclusion: "using a comprehensive index of financial development, to identify potential bottlenecks", the study "…finds that Russia’s financial markets are relatively deep, accessible and efficient, but that financial institutions, in particular banks, have much to do to improve their efficiency and create further depth. Russia could potentially gain up to 1 percentage point in GDP growth on average over the medium-term from further deepening and efficiency improvements. Policies towards this outcome include reducing banking sector fragmentation through consolidation via increased supervision and tightening capital standards; strengthening the role of credit bureaus and collateral registries to reduce information asymmetries; and removal of interest rate rigidities to foster competition."

Specifically, one key bottleneck is the distribution of sources for finance: "Russian companies rely much less on external financing in general and on bank financing in particular, to finance investment compared to their peers in Eastern Europe and Central Asia or in their upper middle income group. Typically, internal resources, state funds and controlling entities are responsible for financing up to 80 percent of business investment. As a result, banks contribute only 6 percent of funding for business investment, with the bulk of investment financed from retained earnings."

Couple of charts

Now, one can agree with IMF on the need for Russian companies to tap more diversified investment channels, but one has to also observe two key risks inherent in this suggestion:

1. Debt levels overall are low in Russian economy, and much of these are accumulated in controlling entities relations with enterprises - in other words - linked to equity and direct investment. This is good, as this allows enterprises more flexibility and better management opportunities with respect to cash flow and business activity;
2. Low debt levels also allow for absorption of political shocks that we are witness gin today, arising from political shutting down of Russian companies access to Western funding markets. If Russia is to retain meaningful risk buffers, accessing external finance via bond markets and equity markets abroad saddles Russian entities with higher risk of external shocks.

So IMF can propose, but I seriously doubt Russian companies will be rushing to borrow at a breakneck speed any time soon.

IMF uses a relatively new framework for assessment of the financial sector environment, the concept of financial development. "Financial development is defined as a combination of:

• Depth (size and liquidity of markets), 
• Access (ability of individuals to access financial services), and 
• Efficiency (ability of institutions to provide financial services at low cost and with sustainable revenues, and the level of activity of capital markets)."

So IMF main conclusion is quite surprising for those not familiar with Russian markets: "Russia’s financial markets are relatively developed but financial institutions lag behind in terms of efficiency and depth."

"Russia’s FD index (0.58) is higher than the average EM (0.37) and slightly lower than the average BTICS (0.64), a group of countries composed of Brazil, Turkey, India, China, and South Africa. …Russia scores much higher than the comparator groups for FM developments [Financial Markets development] as it features higher degrees of access and efficiency in the operations of its financial markets. Although the depth of financial markets is slightly lower than BTICS countries, it remains much higher than the average EM."

Big bottleneck is in financial depth, where "…financial institutions in Russia are comparatively dominated by the banking system, with fewer to non-existent assets, in percent of GDP, in pension funds, mutual funds and insurance industry. Moreover, the banking system lacks depth with domestic credit at about 50 percent of GDP being the lowest in the BTICS group."

Why? "With some 850 banks operating, the Russian banking system is highly concentrated at the top, and fragmented at the bottom":

• "The top three banks (state-owned) accounted for more than 50 percent of total sector assets at year-end 2014 while the top 20 banks accounted for 75 percent of total sector assets."
• "Lending is highly concentrated among the top 10 bank groups making about 850 banks contribute only 15 percent of total lending."
• "…VTB Group alone with 16 percent share of lending accounts for a similar share as the 830 remaining banks."
• "Most of the banks are small and act as treasury accounts for local firms, operating in particular in mono-cities."

This "…undermines lending to companies and SMEs as their ability to both extend credit and diversify across companies is limited while lending to consumers is usually the dominant form of credit."

What is there to be done to get Russian banking and financial systems up to speed?

IMF benchmarks the potential scope of reforms against the absolute best scenario (not scenario consistent with other comparative economies), which makes things sound quite a bit optimistic, or unrealistic. The menu is predictable and relatively straightforward:

• Cut the number of banks without impacting degree of competition. Which is easy to say, hard to achieve, and at any rate, Russian authorities have been doing as much, albeit slowly, for a good part of almost 2 years now.
• Increase supervisory pressures to remove even more banks out of the active list (again, has been ongoing since 2013).
• Improve quality of collateral registries to lower the cost of collateralisation for SMEs. Which, in part, will also involve improving existent system of credit bureaus.
• Link deposit rates paid by the banks to the banks' deposit insurance cover. In other words, remove Central Bank restriction on deposit rates quoted by the banks, but replace it with a restriction capping ability of highly risky banks to raise uninsured deposits. Which sounds like a good idea, assuming deposit insurance scheme is fully funded and solvent. Which, in turn, assumes no systemic crisis.
• Privatise state banks. Which is strange. IMF also notes that "there is no urgent need in Russia for large scale privatization, especially in light of the fragmentary evidence that public banks in Russia are not less efficient than private ones." And the Fund stresses the importance of economies of scale in delivering improved banking sector efficiencies. Which begs a question: what is to be privatised? Large state-owned banks? If they are privatised with a break up, the system will suffer risks to the efficiency. If they are privatised as they are, the system will receive private dominant players in the market which, arguably, will be no different from the state-owned ones in any meaningful way.

As usual for IMF: neat pics, cool stats, a small pinch of useful proposals and a list of predictable ideas that make sense… only if you do not spot their faulty logic…

3/8/15: IMF on Russian Economy: Private Sector Debt

Continuing with IMF analysis of the Russian economy, recall that
- The first post here covered GDP growth projections (upgraded)
- External Debt and Fiscal positions (a mixed bag with broadly positive supports but weaker longer-term sustainability issues relating to deficits).

This time around, let's take a look at IMF analysis of Private Sector Debt.

As IMF notes, economic crisis is weighing pretty heavily on banks' Non-performing Loans:

In part, the above is down to hefty write downs taken by the banks on Ukrainian assets (Russian banks were some of the largest lenders to Ukraine in the past) both in corporate and household sectors.

However, thanks to deleveraging (primarily in the corporate sector, due to sanctions, and some in household sector, due to economic conditions), Loan to Deposits ratio is on the declining trajectory:

Note: Here is a chart on deleveraging of the corporate sector and for Russian banks:

In line with changes in demand for debt redemptions, FX rates, as well as due to some supports from the Federal Government, banks' exposure to Central Bank funding lines has moderated from the crisis peak, though it remains highly elevated:

Illustrating the severity of sanctions, corporate funding from external lenders and markets has been nil:

And Gross External Debt is falling (deleveraging) on foot of cut-off markets and increased borrowing costs:

So companies are heading into domestic markets to borrow (banks - first chart below, bonds - second chart below):

Net:

1) Corporate external debt is falling:

2) Household debt is already low:

3) But the problem is that deleveraging under sanctions is coinciding with economic contraction (primarily driven by lower oil prices), which means that Government reserve funds (while still sufficient) are not being replenished. IMF correctly sees this as a long term problem:

So top of the line conclusion here is that banking sector remains highly pressured by sanctions and falling profitability, as well as rising NPLs. Credit issuance is supported not by new capital formation (investment) but by corporates switching away from foreign debt toward domestic debt. Deleveraging, while long-term positive, is painful for the economy. While the system buffers remain sufficient for now, long term, Russia will require serious changes to fiscal rules to strengthen its reserves buffers over time.