15/1/16: Gold Bullion as Risk Diversifier: 2015 Overview

A note of mine covering 2015 Gold market and the continued role of gold bullion & coins as risk diversifiers in current environment is now available on GoldCore page here: http://www.goldcore.com/us/gold-blog/gold-bullion-retains-key-role-of-a-major-diversifier-dr-gurdgiev/.

15/1/16: Russia in a Downshifters Club

A very interesting speech by German Gref (Sberbank) on Russian economic development amidst global economic transition from hydrocarbons-based economy

In the nutshell: Russian economy is in a state of 'downshifting' and is positioned to be a losing economy in the new post-hydrocarbons era.

I am not sure about Gref's timing (he thinks there is at most a decade left before the global economy fully re-orients toward alternative sources of energy), but he is correct on the urgency of institutional reforms.

14/1/16: Push or Pull: Entrepreneurship Among Older Households

Recently, I highlighted some of the potential problems relating to the less stable nature of the Gig Economy employment, including the longer-term pressures on life-cycle savings and pensions, as well as health care provision (you can see my discussion here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/12/71215-cx-future-of-work-summit-dublin.html and my slides here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/11/111115-gig-economy-challenge.html.

Mainstream economics has been lagging behind this trend, with little research on the long-term sustainability of the Gig Economy employment. Thus, it is quite heartening to see some related, albeit tangentially, research coming up.

One example is a very interesting study on entrepreneurship amongst the U.S. older households. Weller, Christian E. and Wenger, Jeffrey B. and Lichtenstein, Benyamin and Arcand, Carolyn, paper titled "Push or Pull: What Explains Growing Entrepreneurship Among Older Households?" (November 30, 2015: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2697091) does what it says: it looks at both push and pull factors for entrepreneurship and self-employment amongst older households.

Per authors (italics are mine): "Older households need to save more money for retirement, possibly by working longer. [Which is a pull factor for self-employment and  entrepreneurship]. But, the same labor market pressures that have made it harder for people to save, such as increasingly unstable labor markets, have also made it more difficult for people to work longer as wage and salary employees. [Which is a push factor toward self-employment and entrepreneurship].

Self-employment hence may have become an increasingly attractive alternative option for older households.

Entrepreneurship among older households has indeed grown faster than wage and salary employment, especially since the late 1990s.

But, this growth, rather than reflecting rising economic pressures, may have been the result of growing financial strengths – fewer financial constraints and more access to income diversification through capital income from rising wealth. Our empirical analysis finds little support for the hypothesis that growing economic pressures have contributed to increasing entrepreneurship. Instead, our results suggest that the growth of older entrepreneurship is coincident with increasing access to income diversification, especially from dividend and interest income. We also find some tentative evidence that access to Social Security and other annuity benefits increasingly correlate with self-employment. Greater access to interest and dividend income follows in part from more wealth and improved access to Social Security may reflect relatively strong labor market experience in the past."

This is an interesting result, because it is based on older households' access to:

1. Income from savings and wealth, including assets wealth; and
2. Income from retirement.

In the Gig Economy, both are likely to be compressed due to higher income volatility (and thus rising precautionary savings), tax incidences that impose liability with a lag (inducing higher income uncertainty), and lower earnings (due to lack of paid vacations, maternity/paternity and sick leave). In some cases, e.g. countries like Ireland, there is also an explicit income tax penalty for the self-employed (via both lower standard deductions and higher tax rates, such as those under the USC). All of which implies reduced access to income from retirement in the future, lower savings and wealth (including through inheritance). 

Subsequently, the current cohort of older entrepreneurs and self-employed may exhibit exactly the opposite drivers for their post-retirement employment choices than today's younger cohorts. And that matters because entrepreneurship and self-employment that start with push factors (e.g. necessity of life and constraints of the labour markets) is less successful than entrepreneurship and self-employment that start with pull factors.

14/1/16: Debt in Sub-Saharan Africa & Country-Specific Risks

The age of QE in the West, as well as the Great Recession and the Global Financial Crisis have both undoubtedly left some serious scars on the Emerging Markets. One example is the rising (once again) debt in the countries that prior to 2007 have benefited from major debt restructuring initiatives. Here is the new World Bank paper assessing the extent of debt accumulation in Sub-Saharan Africa post-2007.

"Sub-Saharan African countries as a group showed a considerable reduction in public and external indebtedness in the early 2000s as a result of debt relief programs, higher economic growth, and improved fiscal management for some countries. More recently, however, vulnerabilities in some countries are on the rise, including a few with very rapid debt accumulation."

Across Sub-Saharan African countries, "borrowing to support fiscal deficits since 2009, including through domestic markets and Eurobond issuance, has driven a net increase in public debt for all countries except oil exporters benefitting from buoyant commodity prices and fragile states receiving post-2008 Highly Indebted Poor Country relief. Current account deficits and foreign direct investment inflows drove the external debt dynamics, with balance of payments problems associated with very rapid external debt accumulation in some cases. Pockets of increasing vulnerabilities of debt financing profiles and sensitivity of debt burden indicators to macro-fiscal shocks require close monitoring."

And looking forward, things are not exactly promising: "Specific risks that policy makers in Sub-Saharan Africa need to pay attention to going forward include the recent fall in commodity prices, especially oil, the slowdown in China and the sluggish recovery in Europe, dependence on non-debt-creating flows, and accounting for contingent liabilities."

Full paper: Battaile, Bill and Hernandez, Fernando Leonardo and Norambuena, Vivian, Debt Sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa: Unraveling Country-Specific Risks (December 21, 2015). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7523 is available via SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2706885

14/1/16: Two Charts to Sum Up Global Growth Environment

SocGen recently produced some interesting charts looking into 2016 trends. Two caught my eye, as both relate to long running themes covered on this blog throughout 2015.

The first one is that of a decline in global trade flows as the driver for growth. Per SocGen: "Global trade growth has been anchored below its historical average since the Great Recession, offering further evidence of tepid world economic recovery. Decreasing global demand, especially due to slowing emerging markets, weighs on the outlook for world trade."

http://uk.businessinsider.com/societe-generales-charts-of-the-global-economy-in-2016-2016-1


Another relates to the second drag on global economic progress - debt overhang. SocGen focuses on Emerging Markets’ debt, saying: "Zero interest policies in the developed world have bolstered debt issuance from EM corporates. Only a fraction of EM countries are immune to the current adverse conditions requiring a cautious approach to these markets."

Both do not offer much optimism when it comes to both cyclical (interest rates forward) and structural (capex and demand capacities) drivers for global growth. And both suggest that 2016 is unlikely to be more robust year for the world’s economy than 2015.

13/1/16: Bail-ins in Europe: Have Some Fun, Legal Eagles…

In a recent article for Forbes, In Europe, 2016 Will Be The Year Of Lawsuits, Frances Coppola neatly summed up the problem of the EU’s attempts to structure a functional bail-in mechanism for failing banks resolution regime.

I covered to topic in a number of previous posts here (the more recent one). But as the first days of the New Year are rolling in, the problem is becoming apparent.

FT covered the problem with Portugal’s Novo Banco bail in here. Summing up the case: “Europe’s new regime for winding up failing banks has made an inauspicious start, as investors lashed out at the European Central Bank for allowing Portugal to impose losses on almost €2bn of senior bondholders in Novo Banco”.

And beyond Portugal, there is the case of Austria’s attempt to reduce burden on taxpayers from bailing out Hypo Alpe Adria via “imposing losses on bondholders through a reversal of guarantees given by the province of Carinthia”. Back in July 2014, the whole house of cards that is Europe’s ‘no-bail-outs’ promise of the new regulatory architecture was taken down by the Austrian court ruling that ex post bail ins of bondholders can’t be done. Which rounds things from the impossibility of ex post bail-ins to the impossibility of ex ante bail-ins.

And then there is the case of the Cypriot banks’ depositors bail-ins of 2012 that is about to start going.  A reminder of the case: “The EU initially agreed to provide bank recapitalisation assistance as it was necessary to safeguard the Eurozone, but in March 2013 the European Commission and the European Central Bank relented and set new conditions for providing financial assistance that involved depriving depositors of Cyprus Popular Bank (Laiki Bank) of all their savings – except the government-guaranteed amount of €100,000 – and in the case of Bank of Cyprus of 47% of uninsured deposits. The EU’S change of mind was unprecedented and unexpected because bank deposits are regarded as sacrosanct. …The EU was not prepared to assist depositors in Cyprus with €7 billion because the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was not satisfied Cyprus could sustain such a debt.”

One must also remember the role of the European ‘regulators’ in all of this mess. Take the Bank of Cyprus. It passed EU banks stress tests just before it crashed and burned in a subsequent bail-out and bail-in to the tune of €23 billion to the taxpayer and a 47.5% haircut on deposits over €100k.

It looks like 2016 is going to be a fun year for European financial sector ‘reforms’ and a stimulus to the legal profession. All paid for by the taxpayers, of course.

12/1/16: That Savage Deleveraging: Global Debt 2000-2015

Here's a neat summary chart based on data from BIS through June 2015, covering total global credit (debt) outstanding (excluding IMF debt), issued in three main currencies:

That savage deleveraging... it has been truly epically... unnoticeable... Oh, and one more thingy: the unsustainable build up of debt prior to the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) was just about the same as the increase in debt during the so-called deleveraging period since the onset of the GFC.

11/1/16: Dealing with Systemic Sovereign Debt Crises: IMF's Animal Farm Model

IMF brainiacs have been struggling over time to develop some sort of a coherent framework for managing the fallouts from systemic sovereign debt crises. So far, the golden rule has ben elusive for them. However, following the Cypriot and Greek experiences with private sector bail-ins and realising the direct connection between these experiences and the cases of other peripheral Euro area states, most notably Ireland and Portugal, the IMF have been coming around to the idea that while all countries are ‘equal’, some are ‘more equal’ than others. In other words, that in the world where might is right, there are two tiers of countries: those that get whacked and those that get properly rescued.

Behold the IMF’s latest thinking on the subject. Sandri, Damiano of IMF’s research department authored a new working paper, titled “Dealing with Systemic Sovereign Debt Crises: Fiscal Consolidation, Bail-Ins or Official Transfers?” (October 2015, IMF Working Paper No. 15/223: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2711133).

It says what it does: “The paper presents a …model to understand how international financial institutions (IFIs) [read IMF and European ESM/EFSM/EFSF and so on] should deal with the sovereign debt crisis of a systemic country, in which case private creditors' bail-ins entail international spillovers.” Notice the emphasis on ‘systemic’ country. In other words, ‘not the ordinary fry’ like smaller ‘peripherals’.

“Besides lending to the country up to its borrowing capacity, IFIs face the difficult issue of how to address the remaining financing needs with a combination of fiscal consolidation, bail-ins and possibly official transfers. To maximize social welfare, IFIs should differentiate the policy mix depending on the strength of spillovers. In particular, stronger spillovers call for smaller bail-ins and greater fiscal consolidation.” Which simply says: more systemic is a country, less risk of bail-ins, so if you are a French or a German depositor or lender, you are lucky. If you are a Belgian or Irish depositor or lender, tough sh*t, mate.

“Furthermore, to avoid requiring excessive fiscal consolidation, IFIs should provide highly systemic countries with official transfers. To limit the moral hazard consequences of transfers, it is important that IFIs operate under a predetermined crisis resolution framework that ensures commitment.” Oh, what this means is that systemic countries get bailed out via official sector (IMF et al) burden sharing. Small countries - get screwed by not having access to such largess.

Here’s more beef from the paper:

“…consider the optimal policy mix to address the financing needs of a non-systemic country, for which bail-ins do not entail international spillovers. In this case, besides lending to the country up to its borrowing capacity, IFIs should use only fiscal consolidation and bail-ins.” In other words: small country gets only funds sufficient to cover its standing allowance under the normal rules and not a penny more. Rest of ‘rescue’ funds should be squeezed out of the country economy. “Official transfers should …be avoided because they do generate severe moral hazard since they are not priced into countries’ ex-ante borrowing rates.” Which simply says: look, bailing out through official burden sharing will not increase fiscal pain for smaller countries as yields on government debt are not going to rise high enough.

So, please, whack these small countries harder, to teach them a lesson and who cares about their economies and people. Lessons matter, you peasants.

Now onto systemic countries case: “Dealing with the sovereign debt crisis of a systemic country, …a first implication is that bail-ins should be used to a lesser extent since they are more socially harmful due to the associated spillovers. If IFIs are prevented from providing transfers, any reduction in bail-ins would need to be offset entirely through an increase in fiscal consolidation. In this case, systemic countries might be required to endure an excessive amount of consolidation to spare the international community from the systemic consequences of bail-ins. When dealing with systemic countries, it may thus become efficient to compensate the reduction in bail-ins not only through greater fiscal consolidation, but also with official transfers.” So in simple terms: if you are a big country, you will be treated entirely differently from a small country. Never mind that moral hazard thingy - systemic countries get official sector burden sharing, lending over allowed capacity and less bail-ins pressure.

Of course, the IMF Working Paper is not reflective of the Fund official position, as disclaimers go. So this paper is nothing more than a ‘discussion’ of what should take place, rather than what will take place. But, of course, we all know one simple fact: in the world of IMF, some countries are ‘more equal’ than others.

10/1/16: My 2004 article on Irish property bubble

Per friend's reminder, here is an article of mine from November-December 2014 Business & Finance magazine, showing the dangerous levels of house prices overvaluation in Ireland relative to underlying fundamentals:

10/1/16: Russian Banks: Licenses Cancellations Galore

Why Russian Central Bank’s chief Elvira Nabiullina deserves title of the best central banker she got in 2015? Why, because she sticks to her stated objectives and goes on even in challenging conditions.

When Nabiullina came to office, Russian banking system was besieged by underperforming and weak banks - mostly at the bottom of banking sector rankings, but with some at the very top too (see ongoing VEB saga here http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2016/01/1116-another-veb-update-things-are.html). And she promised a thorough clean up of the sector. I wrote about that before (see http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/22122014-elvira-nabiullina-roubles-last.html and http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/03/1432013-comment-of-appointment-of-new.html).

But times have been tough for such reforms, amidst credit tightening, rising arrears and economic crisis. Again, majority of the problems are within the lower tier banks, but numbers of loss-making institutions has been climbing over 2015. January-November 2015 data shows that almost 30% of Russian banks are running operating losses and overdue loans have risen by nearly 50% to RUB2.63 trillion. Still, this constitutes less than 7 percent of total credit outstanding. Stressed (but not necessarily overdue) loans rose from 7 percent of total credit in January 2015 to 8 percent at the end of December 2015. Notably, both stressed and overdue loans numbers are surprisingly low. And on another positive side, bank’s own capital to assets ratio averaged 13 percent. The aggregate numbers conceal quite some variation within the banking sector, as noted by Bofit: “At the beginning of November, 129 banks had equity ratios below 12%. Large deficiencies in calculating the capital have come to light in several bank insolvencies.”

Amidst this toughening of trading conditions, CBR continued to push our weaker banks from the market. Over 2015, 93 banks lost their licenses, almost the same number as in 18 months prior with just 740 banks left trading the market as of December 2015. As the result, banking sector concentration rose, with 20 largest banks now holding 75 percent share of the market by assets. In January-October 2015, some 600,000 depositors in Russian banks were moved from banks losing licenses to functioning banks, per report here.

Chart from Bofit illustrates the trends in terms of banking licenses revoked:

Overall, this is good news. Russian banking system evolved - prior to 2009 - into a trilateral system of banks, including strong larger (universal) banks, medium-sized specialist and foreign banks with retail exposures, weak and sizeable fringe of smaller institutions, often linked to industrial holding companies. Aside from VEB - which officially is not a bank - larger banks are operating in tough conditions, but remain relatively robust. Smaller banks, however, having relied in previous years on higher risk consumer credit and holding, often, lower quality capital, have been impacted by the crisis and by the lack of liquidity. Shutting these operations down and consolidating the smaller banks' fringe is something that Russian needs anyway. 

10/1/16: Tsallis Entropy: Do the Market Size and Liquidity Matter?

Updated version of our paper:
Gurdgiev, Constantin and Harte, Gerard, Tsallis Entropy: Do the Market Size and Liquidity Matter? (January 10, 2016), is now available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507977.

Abstract:      
One of the key assumptions in financial markets analysis is that of normally distributed returns and market efficiency. Both of these assumptions have been extensively challenged in the literature. In the present paper, we examine returns for a number of FTSE 100 and AIM stocks and indices based on maximising the Tsallis entropy. This framework allows us to show how the distributions evolve and scale over time. Classical theory dictates that if markets are efficient then the time variant parameter of the Tsallis distribution should scale with a power equal to 1, or normal diffusion. We find that for the majority of securities and indices examined, the Tsallis time variant parameter is scaled with super diffusion of greater than 1. We further evaluated the fractal dimensions and Hurst exponents and found that a fractal relationship exists between main equity indices and their components.

10/1/16: Crisis Contagion from Advanced Economies into BRIC

New paper available: Gurdgiev, Constantin and Trueick, Barry, Crisis Contagion from Advanced Economies into Bric: Not as Simple as in the Old Days (January 10, 2016). 

Forthcoming as Chapter 11 in Lessons from the Great Recession: At the Crossroads of Sustainability and Recovery, edited by Constantin Gurdgiev, Liam Leonard & Alejandra Maria Gonzalez-Perez, Emerald, ASEJ, vol 18; ISBN: 978-1-78560-743-1. Link: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2713335.

Abstract:      

At the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007-2008, majority of the analysts and policymakers have anticipated contagion from the markets volatility in the advanced economies (AEs) to the emerging markets (EMs). This chapter examines the volatility spillovers from the AEs’ equity markets (Japan, the U.S and Europe) to four key EMs, the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China). The period under study, from 2000 through mid-2014, reflects a time of varying regimes in markets volatility, including the periods of dot.com bubble, the Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, the Great Recession and the start of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis. To estimate volatility cross-linkages between the advanced economies and BRIC, we use multivariate GARCH BEKK model across a number of specifications. We find that, the developed economies weighted return volatility did have a significant impact on volatility across all four of the BRIC economies returns. However, contrary to the consensus view, there was no evidence of volatility spillover from the individual AEs onto BRIC economies with the exception of a spillover from Europe to Brazil. The implied forward-looking expectations for markets volatility had a strong and significant spillover effect onto Brazil, Russia and China, and a weaker effect on India. The evidence on volatility spillovers from the advanced economies markets to emerging markets puts into question the traditional view of financial and economic systems sustainability in the presence of higher orders of integration of the global monetary and financial systems. Overall, data suggests that we are witnessing less than perfect integration between BRIC economies and advanced economies markets to-date.