Thursday, December 10, 2015

10/12/15: R v G and all the Pikettian Theory Malarky


You know the Pikettian Thesis that if return on capital exceeds in the long run economic growth, then capital income appreciation relative to wages income growth will lead to rising wealth inequality. Except, err...

Source: @MaxCRoser 

Which says, really, that since the start of the 20th century, wages income of the richest 1% became more important in the determination of their full income, whilst entrepreneurial income remained roughly the same, and capital income shrunk. R > G and all that malarky...

Tuesday, December 8, 2015

8/12/15: Irish Rents: A Longer Term View


Much has been written about the plight of renters in Ireland. Much of it is correct - there have been some atrocious rises in rents, primarily private rents, in recent years. Year on year, in the last 3 months (though October 2015), private rents rose 10.35% against local authority rents falling 1.11% and mortgage interest declining 8.88%. A year ago - over 3mo through October 2014, private rents inflation was running at 8.95% against local authorities rents rising 1.06% and mortgage interest falling 10.26%.

Which makes for a depressing reading for the renters. Actual rents paid by tenants were up 8.83% in 3mo period through October 2015 and they rose 7.93% y/y in the 3mo period through October 2014. So inflation rate in rents is going up.

However, rents inflation has to be taken over the longer period of time. And here, things are not as clear cut as in the short run. Comparable CSO data goes only back to January 2003. So we have no reliable benchmark for earlier periods, albeit some bootstrapped comparatives are possible. As the result, let’s consider 1Q 2003 as the starting point for inflation - with a host of caveats attached.

Setting 1Q 2003 average level of price indices at 100, inflation in overall Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels category that includes rents, mortgages and other housing costs stood at 55.94% in October 2015. Actual rentals paid by tenants over the same period of time were up 26.93%. Private rents rose over 1Q 2003 to October 2015 by 18.62% while local authority rents rose 73.36% and mortgages rose 24.33%.

In other words, cumulated inflation since 1Q 2003 was higher in Local authority rents and mortgage interest than in private rents. Chart below illustrates:



Pretty much the same picture emerges if we take the entire 2003 average (not just 1Q 2003) as a benchmark. In fact, compared to 2003 levels, mortgage interest inflation is just above actual rents paid and is still higher than private rents inflation.

Setting levels aside, let’s take a look at inflation rates (y/y changes in indices). Historical average y/y inflation in Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas & Other fuels category is 4.50% against historical mortgages interest costs inflation of 5.29%, historical private rents inflation of 1.56%, historical local authorities rents inflation of 4.56% and historical inflation in actual rentals paid by tenants of 2.00%.


Once again, timing is everything: given low level of transactions in the purchasing markets for property over the current crisis, majority of mortgage payees today have lived through the period of pre-crisis spike in mortgage costs. Their current savings (reduced cost of mortgages interest) are simply lagged off-sets to this high cost reality of the past. On the other hand, renters faced far lower volatility in rents than mortgagees in mortgage interest. Their current pain is a delayed cost uplift on past moderation in inflation.

Which is, of course, not to say there is less pain because of this or that Irish rental markets are somehow functioning well in terms of pricing. Just to point out that timing of comparatives is important and that one should be careful pitching the (real) pain of Irish renters against the allegedly easy-times for other participants in the markets.

8/12/15: Commodities Rot Runs Ahead


Commodities rot continues unabated, as Bloomberg Commodities Index fell to its lowest reading since June 1999:

Source: @Schuldensuehner

Which, of course prompted another repricing of the commodities-linked currencies:

 Source: @Schuldensuehner

As I noted few days ago (post here) for the Russian Ruble, there is some room to the downside from here on.

Here is an interesting discussion of the historical trend/cycles in commodities busts via Carmen Reinhart: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/commodity-price-decline-will-continue-by-carmen-reinhart-2015-11. And long-view chart of same:


Trend-wise, that is 160 years of deflation...

Monday, December 7, 2015

7/12/15: A new study on psychology of crisis response & the role of the media


This is a new study developed by an excellent young Irish psychologist - Seamus Power - at the University of Chicago. 

All Irish people, over the age of 18, are eligible to take part in this survey and all walks of life, ages, demographics etc are really needed. The survey should take under 15 minutes to complete.

Seamus is interested in your responses to a range of questions and your reactions to a randomly assigned media article covering the topics relating to policy responses to the recent crisis.

I can't really stress enough how important this topic is for Ireland and for social sciences, so please, take a few minutes to complete it. We need data-based evidence and Seamus will be sharing his findings with all of us.

Study link here: http://ssd.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bKESEHr6IXjkXGt .

7/12/15: CX Future of Work Summit: Dublin


Another excellent video from the CXC Corporate's "Future of Work" summit on the Gig Economy: https://vimeo.com/148042205.

You can see more on the event, including my slides here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/11/111115-gig-economy-challenge.html



7/12/15: Of Monetary Activism and Growth: CB Balancesheets vs Economies Balancesheets


There is much talk around two matters relating to the monetary policy expectations:

  1. The 'normalisation' course allegedly pursued by the Fed (rates rises); and
  2. The justification for (1) by references to the monetary policy-repaired economy, made wholesome once again thanks to the Central Banks' activism (see recent Janet Yellen speech on the subject here)
Except, of course, the second point is... err... questionable. For all the estimates of percentage points of growth uplifts and unemployment reductions delivered by the Fed-linked economics analysts, there are two simple facts stubbornly persisting out there:

Fact 1: U.S. (and European, and Japanese, and global) growth since the end of the Great Recession has been much slower than historical records for recoveries suggest; and

Fact 2: Fact 1 comes on foot of a historically unprecedented monetary expansions, that are, by far, not over yet.

Here are two charts on the second fact:


Now, observe: as of today, Big 4 CB balancesheets expanded almost 4-fold. By the end of 2017 (per BAML), projected balancesheets are expected to rise even further, by more than 4.5-fold. Both BOJ and ECB will be leading this latter stage of monetary easing - the two economies that are by far fairing the worst throughout the crisis, despite the fact that whilst the ECB adopted a more conservative stand in the earlier stages of the crisis, BOJ raced ahead of everyone else with Abenomics arrival.

In other words, since 2012 through 2015, CB balancesheets grew by more than 50 percent. Meanwhile, what happened to growth rates and growth expectations?


Which, sort of, suggests that all this 'normalisation' of growth under the monetary policies activism is... well... imaginary?..

7/12/15: Another "Nothing to See Here" Chart for M&As


I have written over the recent months about the over-heating present in the global (and especially N. American) M&A markets (see posts here,  here and here) so it is only reasonable from continuity perspective to post some more data on the subject. Here it is :

Source: @Jim_Edwards

Looking at the volumes of M&A deals since around the start of 2Q 2014 through today, one cannot escape a simple conclusion: absent organic growth in revenues, and with shares buy-backs now being discounted in the markets (belatedly awakening to the reality of unsustainable valuations in the equity markets), current levels of M&A (over at least 18-21 months period) are simply, certifiably, clearly bonkers.

Saturday, December 5, 2015

5/12/15: Ruble converging to Urals... at last


After some strengthening in the second half of November, Russian Ruble continues to re-align with oil prices:

With current levels of Urals-Brent spread, Ruble has room to the downside still, at about 2-3 percent, taking it into 69.8-69.9 range. Which means the CBR has some room for raising foreign exchange reserves, but not much room...

Thursday, December 3, 2015

3/12/15: Heard of Number26, yet?..


An interesting 'break-in' into Irish banking market via Number26 which uses:

  • Fintech platform; and
  • German license
to break the Central Bank of Ireland-led freeze on new entrants into the banking market here.

Details are here: http://techcrunch.com/2015/12/02/number26-launches-its-bank-of-the-future-in-6-new-countries/. Surprisingly low margin operation based on fees from transactions, rather than on direct customer charges. Presumably, accounts are insured by German system and are free from the Irish Government indirect tax extraction schemes, such as card duties etc... One, of course, will have to be compliant on Irish DIRT.

Of course, Fintech offers plenty of disruption potential in the sector that is inhabited by technology dinosaurs. Still, for all its promise, Fintech is yet to:
  1. Achieve a significant breakthrough into traditional banking and insurance services (beyond aggregators and price optimising platforms) and
  2. Deliver a viable (financially) margins model.
These two points mean that to achieve scale, Fintech offers today need deep pockets and customer bases of more traditional services providers, as I describe during this discussion: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/10/161015-financegoogle-2015.html.

3/12/15: Of Debt, Central Banks and History Repeats


Couple of facts via Goldman Sachs' recent research note:

  1. Since the start of 2008, U.S. corporate debt has doubled and the interest burden rose 40 percent. Even as a share of EBITDA, debt servicing costs are up 30 percent, so U.S. corporations’ ability to service debt has declined despite the average interest rate paid by the U.S. corporate currently stands at around 4 percent, as opposed to 6 percent in 2008.
  2. Much of this debt mountain has gone not to productive activities, but into shares buybacks and M&As. Per Goldman’s note: “…the changing nature of corporate balance sheets does raise the question, again, about the lack of organic growth and reinvestment post the crisis.”

And the net conclusion? “…the spectre of rising rates, potential global disinflation, declining operating profits and wider credit spreads continues to create near-term consternation for weak balance sheet stocks.”

Source: Business Insider

Oh dear… paging the Fed…


  • Meanwhile, per IMF September 2015 Fiscal Monitor, Emerging Markets’ corporate debt rose from USD4 trillion in 2004 to USD18 trillion in 2014. Much of this debt is directly or indirectly linked to the U.S. dollar and, thus, Fed policy.


Oh dear… paging the Fed again…

And just in case you think these risks don’t matter, a quick reminder of what Jaime Caruana, head of the Bank for International Settlements, said back in July 2014 (emphasis mine):


  • "Markets seem to be considering only a very narrow spectrum of potential outcomes. They have become convinced that monetary conditions will remain easy for a very long time, and may be taking more assurance than central banks wish to give… If we were concerned by excessive leverage in 2007, we cannot be more relaxed today… It may be the case that the debt is better distributed because some highly-indebted countries have deleveraged, like the private sector in the US or Spain, and banks are better capitalized. But there is also now more sensitivity to interest rate movements."

All of which translates, in his own words into

  • "Overall, it is hard to avoid the sense of a puzzling disconnect between the markets’ buoyancy and underlying economic developments globally."

And as per current QE policies?

  • "There is something strange about fighting debt by incentivizing more debt."

Which, of course, is the entire point of all QE and, thus, brings us to yet another ‘paging Fed moment’:

  • "Policy does not lean against the booms but eases aggressively and persistently during busts. This induces a downward bias in interest rates and an upward bias in debt levels, which in turn makes it hard to raise rates without damaging the economy – a debt trap. …Systemic financial crises do not become less frequent or intense, private and public debts continue to grow, the economy fails to climb onto a stronger sustainable path, and monetary and fiscal policies run out of ammunition. Over time, policies lose their effectiveness and may end up fostering the very conditions they seek to prevent."

Now, take a look at the lengths to which ECB has played the Russian roulette with monetary policy so far: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/12/31215-85-v-52-of-duration-of-risk.html

3/12/15: 85 v 52: Of Duration of Risk Mispricing


One of the causes of the most recent crisis in the euro area is frequently linked to the superficially low interest rates set by the ECB during the period of 2002-2006. Taking historical average rates, the actual period of significant interest rates deviation from the ‘normal’ was between 38 and 52 months, depending on how you measure it.

Since then, of course we’ve learned the lessons… so the current period of ECB rates below their pre-crisis historical average (using 1/2 standard deviation around the mean to control for significance) is… err… 85 months and counting. Oh, and by magnitude, the current deviation is much much worse than the one that caused pre-crisis mispricing of financial assets and risks.

Just check the following chart, updated to today’s ECB call…


Eye popping, no?.. say 52 months to blow the bubble up… 85 months to… 

3/12/15: Irish Services & Manufacturing PMIs: November 2015


Markit released Irish PMIs for November. Here are the highlights:

Services Sector PMI for Ireland stood at 63.6 in November - a significant uplift on October 60.1 reading and the highest reading since September 2006. 3mo average through August 2015 stands at 62.9 while 3mo average through November 2015 is at 62.0. Irish Services sector activity has now been running PMIs above 60.0 (signalling an exceptionally high levels of growth) every month since February 2014. Which, basically, makes these numbers either unbelievable or reflective of heavy biases toward MNCs-led activities in the survey. Not that Markit seems to be concerned and certainly not its paying partners in releasing the survey - Investec.

Manufacturing Sector PMI for Ireland moderated marginally to 53.3 in November from 53.6 in October, pushing 3 mo average through November to 53.6 which is somewhat lower than 55.0 recorded over 3 months through August 2015 and 56.2 3mo average through November 2014.

As the chart below shows, Services and Manufacturing PMIs have both continued to signal strong growth in the economy, albeit the trends in two series have now diverged, starting around February 2015 when Manufacturing PMI trend turned toward toward signalling shallower rates of growth, while Services PMI trend turned more volatile and onto a relatively moderate upward path.