8/7/15: ECB QE: Strong Monetary, Weak Real Impacts

My presentation on QE for today's hearing at the Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform, the Houses of the Oireachtas.

8/7/15: Latest Round of Greece Talks: Smoke, Fire, Grexit

Summit / Eurogroup takeaways:

1. No progress of any variety beyond the usual agreement to have more talks
2. Short term deal 'weighing in' for Sunday is rumoured - effectively a bridge loan based on Greek acceptance of pre-referendum proposals. One of proposals involved a 3-4 months long bridge financing deal (Bailout 2.1) followed by 3-4 year deal (Bailout 3.0). This was rejected by Finland.
3. Any 'possible' new deal being discussed is 2-3 years in duration - a can kicking of weak variety, in other words.
4. No haircuts on debt will be allowed.
5. Sunday - full EU heads summit (not euro alone), which indicates something serious brewing - at least in terms of applying pressure on Tsipras. Also, possible Grexit push. Summit can be 'avoided' if Greece presents an acceptable plan on Thursday. Decision to be finalised on Saturday.
6. Overall, Bailout 3.0 package of measures is now being pushed out to tougher conditionality for Greece than in previous talks.
7. Juncker stated that the EU Commission has prepared a detailed Grexit plan, inclusive of humanitarian aid. Juncker plan also includes balance of payments support scheme for non-euro states with big exposures to Greek banks: Bulgaria, Romania. Big questions are also about Macedonia and Serbia.
8. At least in theory (detailed theory per Juncker) we have the end of 'irreversibility' of the euro (for now - at single state level).
9. IMF is back in the Troika 'Institutions' pairing.
10. No parallel currency discussions - left to Finance Ministers discussions.

My take: Overall, Greek position is now nearly toast. Contrary to many expectations, a No vote did not produce a stronger playing hand for Greece. Possibly because Tsipras failed to deliver any new proposals. Sunday EU Council would be required for a treaty change. This implies two possibilities: haircuts (ruled out) or Grexit. We are leaning toward Grexit, heavily.

The acceleration in Eurogroup and council demands on Greece suggests that prior to the Referendum there was already a strong consensus that Grexit is the preferred direction for further talks.


Serious sidelines:

Italy position is optimistic on the deal, but no debt relief in sight. Still remains hard-line on Greece.

Merkel takes harder stance than anyone else: strikes down bridge agreement: "Bridge financing didn't play any role in our talks tonight." Stance on conditions: "The proposals we are expecting now encompass what we put forward for second programme plus more for third programme." Haircuts: "A haircut is not up for debate. That is a bailout under the treaties and that will not happen." Merkel isn't even keen on discussing ESM programme resumption. Tougher thing still: "The situation has become much worse. I have to take 3rd programme proposals to Bundestag - hence need detail." Which means serious hurdles to cover here.

France is the lead in Greek side support and Hollande is not impressed: "It is true that if there were no agreement, the situation would be serious. Other options would have to be sought."

Spain's Rajoy "New Greek programme will have conditions attached. Will have to be approved by institutions, then Eurogroup, then leaders". Meaningless, surprisingly.

Donald Tusk: "Our inability to find an agreement may lead to the insolvency of Greece and the bankruptcy of its banking system". Says the Greek government is to present its proposals by Thursday, July 9. Juncker put deadline at 8:30 am Friday, July 10. So lots of confusion.

Finland: ruled out Bailout 3.0 for Greece on any terms.

Belgium: Finance Minister Van Overtveldt: "very disappointed" by today's Eurogroup meeting. New Greek Finance Minister made "very good explanation" of situation, but "had no new proposals to show us". "I had the strong impression that everybody really feels the sense of urgency, except the Greek government." His boss: Belgian PM Michel: has “more and more difficulty to understand the logic of Tsipras. On the one hand he says 'we want to stay in the eurozone'. On the other hand, he's not taking any initiative, zero, nothing, to stay in the eurozone.”

Lastly - a link worth reading: http://www.capx.co/the-eurocrats-are-punishing-greece-to-scare-other-countries/

7/6/15: Secular Stagnation: A Double-Threat

Recent evidence on long term growth dynamics and drivers decomposition across the advanced economies presents a striking paradox relating to the post-recessionary experience around the world. In a traditional business cycle, recovery period growth exhibits certain historical regularities, that are no longer present in the current cycle. These regularities involve the following stylised facts:

1) Following a recessionary contraction in aggregate output, advanced economies enter a stage of recovery associated with strong growth in investment and domestic demand;

2) Gains in factors' productivity, especially in labour productivity, are amplified in the early stages of post-recessionary recovery compared to their pre-crisis trend levels; and

3) Rates of growth in the recovery cycle are in excess of pre-recessionary growth.

These facts are patently absent from the data for the major advanced economies today, some four to five years into the recovery. This realization has prompted some economic and financial analysts to speculate about the potential structural decline in long term growth rates, the thesis commonly termed "secular stagnation".

Currently, there are two prevailing theses of secular stagnation, linked to two long-term cycles gaining prominence in the global economy: the demand side and the supply side theses.

Investment-Savings Mismatch

The first theory suggests that secular stagnation is linked to a structural decline in aggregate demand, manifesting itself though a decades-long mismatch between aggregate savings and investment and more broadly related to the demographic effects of ageing.

This theory traces back to the 1930s suggestion by Alvin Hansen that the U.S. Great Depression aftermath was coinciding with decreasing birth rates, resulting in oversupply of savings and a fall off in demand for investment. The thesis was salient throughout the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s, but was overrun by the war and subsequently forgotten in the years of the post-WW2 baby boom and investment uplift. Large scale increase in public investment, linked to rebuilding destroyed (in Europe and Japan) or neglected (in the war years in the U.S.) public infrastructure, helped to push Hansen's forecasts of a structural growth slowdown aside.

The thesis of demand-driven secular stagnation made its first return to the forefront of macroeconomic thinking back in the 1990s, in the context of Japan. As in Hansen's 1930s U.S., by the early 1990s, Japan was suffering from a demographics-linked glut of savings, and a structural drop off in investment. Suppressed domestic demand has led to a massive contraction in labour productivity. During the 1980-1989 period, Japan's real GDP per worker averaged 3.2 percent per annum. In the following decade, the rate of growth was just over 0.82 percent and over the period of 2000-2009 it fell below 0.81 percent. Meanwhile, Japan's investment as a percentage of GDP fell from approximately 29-30 percent in the 1980s and the 1990s to under 23 percent in the 2000s and to just over 20 percent in 2010-2015.

Following Japan's experience and the shock of the Great Recession, the theory that the entire developed world is set for a structural growth slowdown has gained traction. Between 1980 and 2014, the gap between savings and investment as percentage of GDP has widened in Canada, Japan, and the Euro area. Controlling for debt accumulation in the real economy, the widening of savings surplus over investment over each decade since the 1980s is now present in all major advanced economies, including the U.S.

In line with this, labour productivity also fell precipitously across all major advanced economies. As shown in the chart below, even a period of unprecedented rise in unemployment in the U.S. and the euro area over the recent Great Recession did not shift the trend for declining labour productivity growth.

CHART: Five-year Cumulated Growth in Real GDP per Employee

Percentage Points

Source: Author own calculations based on data from the IMF

Worse, current zero rates monetary policy environment is reinforcing the savings-investment mismatch, rendering the monetary policy impotent, if not damaging, in stimulating the return to higher long term growth.

Traditionally, low interest rates create incentives for investment and reduced saving by lowering the cost of the former and increasing the opportunity cost of the latter.

However, today's ageing demographics and rising dependency ratios offset these 'normal' effects. This means that for the older generations, retirement pressures work through both insufficient reserves built in pensions portfolios, and also through lower yields on retirement portfolios, incentivising more aggressive savings.

For the working age population, the pressures are more complex. On the one hand, middle age workers today face severe pressures to deleverage their balance sheets, aggressively reducing liabilities accumulated before the crisis. On the other hand, growing proportions of middle-age adults are facing twin financial pressures from the rising demand for support for ageing parents and, simultaneously, for increasing number of satay-at-home younger adults who continue to rely on family networks for financial and housing subsidies. A recent Pew Research study found that 64 percent of Italian middle-aged generations find themselves sandwiched between ageing parents and children. In the U.S. this proportion is 47 percent and in Germany 41 percent. All along, the same households are under pressure to build up their pensions, as retirement security and social provision of pensions are now highly uncertain.

In his speech to the NABE Policy Conference in February 2014, Lawrence H. Summers (http://larrysummers.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/NABEspeech-

Lawrence-H.-Summers1.pdf) outlined six  core sources of this demand side-driven slowdown:

1) Existent legacy of the private debt overhang;

2) Demographics of ageing;

3) Rising income inequality that induces greater financial insecurity today and into the future, thus creating incentives for increased ordinary and precautionary savings;

4) Access to low cost capital;

5) Positive real interest rates that continue to prevail despite historically low policy rates; and

6) Large scale holdings of banks' reserves on central banks balance sheets.

All of these factors are currently at play in the U.S., UK and the euro area, as well as Japan. With a lag of about 3-5 years, they are also starting to manifest themselves in other advanced economies.

Tech Investment: Value-Added  Miss

The supply side of secular stagnation thesis is a relatively new idea coming from the cyclical view of historical development of physical and ICT-linked technologies. First formulated by Robert Gordon some years ago it is summarised in his August 2012 NBER paper, titled "Is the US Economic Growth Over? Faltering Innovation Confronts the Six Headwinds" (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2133145).

Gordon looks at long-term - very long-term - trends in growth from the point of challenging the traditional view of macroeconomists that perpetual economic progress is subject to no time constraints. In Gordon's view, U.S. economy over the period through the 2050s is likely to face an uphill battle. Per Gordon, "The frontier established by the U.S. for output per capita, and the U. K. before it, gradually began to grow more rapidly after 1750, reached its fastest growth rate in the middle of the 20th century, and has slowed down since.  It is in the process of slowing down further."

The reason for this, according to the author, is the exhaustion of economic returns to the most recent technological / industrial 'revolution'.  "A useful organizing principle to understand the pace of growth since 1750 is the sequence of three industrial revolutions. The first with its main inventions between 1750 and 1830 created steam engines, cotton spinning, and railroads. The second was the most important, with its three central inventions of electricity, the internal combustion engine, and running water with indoor plumbing, in the relatively short interval of 1870 to 1900.  Both the first two revolutions required about 100 years for their full effects to percolate through the economy. …After 1970 productivity growth slowed markedly, most plausibly because the main ideas of [the second revolution] had by and large been implemented by then. The computer and Internet revolution began around 1960 and reached its climax in the dot.com era of the late 1990s, but its main impact on productivity has withered away in the past eight years. …Invention since 2000 has centered on entertainment and communication devices that are smaller, smarter, and more capable, but do not fundamentally change labor productivity or the standard of living in the way that electric light, motor cars, or indoor plumbing changed it."

Gordon’s argument is not about the levels of activity generated by the new technologies, but about the rate of growth in value added arising form them. In basic terms, ongoing slowdown in the U.S. (and global) economy is a function of six headwinds, including the end of the baby boom generation-linked demographic dividend; rising income and wealth inequality; factor price equalisation; lower net of cost returns to higher education; the impact of environmental regulations and taxes; and real economic debt overhangs across public and non-financial private sectors.

Gordon estimates that future growth in consumption per capita for the bottom 99 percent of the income distribution is likely to fall below 0.5 percent per annum over the period of some five decades.

The supply-side thesis, implying persistently falling returns to technological innovation and resulting reduced rates of productive investment in technological capital, is supported by some top thinkers in the tech sector, notably the U.S. entrepreneur and investor Peter Thiel (see http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8adeca00-2996-11e2-a5ca-00144feabdc0.html).

A recent study from IBM, titled "Insatiable Innovation: From sporadic to systemic", attempted to debate the thesis, but ended up confirming Gordon’s assertion that incremental and atomistic innovation is the driver for today's technological progress. In other words, the third technological revolution is delivering marginal returns on investment: significant and non-negligible from the point of individual enterprises, but hardly capable of sustaining rapid rates of growth in economic value added over time.

Disruptive Change Required

The problem is that both theses of secular stagnation are finding support not only in the past historical data, but also in the more recent trends. Even the most recent World Economic Outlook update by the IMF (April 2015) shows that the ongoing economic slowdown is structural in nature and traces back to the period prior to the onset of the Great Recession.

As both, the demand and supply side theses of secular stagnation allege, the core drivers identified by the IMF as the force behind this trend are adverse demographics, decline in investment, a pronounced fall off in total factor productivity growth (the tech factor), as well as the associated decline in labour and human capital contributions to productivity. IMF evidence strongly suggests that during the pre-crisis spike in global growth, much of new economic activity was driven not by expansion on intensive margin (technological progress and labour productivity expansion), but by extensive margin (increased supply of physical capital and emergence of asset bubbles).

Like it or not, to deliver the growth momentum necessary for sustaining the quality of life and improvements in social and economic environment expected by the ageing and currently productive generations will require some serious and radical solutions. The thrust of these changes will need to focus on attempting to reverse the decline in returns to human capital investment and on generating radically higher economic value added growth from technological innovation. The former implies dramatic restructuring of modern systems of taxation and public services provision to increase incentives for human capital investments. The latter implies an equally disruptive reform of the traditional institutions of entrepreneurship and enterprise formation and development.

Absent these highly disruptive policy reforms, we will find ourselves at the tail end of technological growth frontier, with low rates of return to technology and innovation and, as the result, permanently lower growth in the advanced economies.

7/6/15: Greece Needs a Structured Euro Exit: Sinn

As the saying goes... can't have a Greece drama without Target 2 drama... Hans Werner Sinn on Greek referendum results:

In simple terms: make Grexit. As this stage int the game, I agree - facilitated (using European financial and investment supports) exit by Greece from the euro area is the optimal resolution path to the crisis.

The arguments about new costs are irrelevant: Greek debts are currently unrepayable and will not be made good by any structural reforms. In fact, the debts are holding back the effectiveness of such reforms and will likely wipe out all and any benefits of devaluation that can be gained from conversion into drachma. Whether Greece remains in the euro area or exits, either path will require a write-down of more than 30% of Greek Government debt (my estimate - at least EUR125 billion, in line with recent IMF estimate, although my estimation is higher, since the IMF assessment was prepared prior to the Greek economy deteriorating further and the country fiscal position weakening beyond April 2015 assessments) and some additional assistance (in form of investment funds from the EU) to the tune of EUR20-30 billion over 3 years.

The write-downs should be carried out via ECB and monetised as a part of the ECB QE (wiping out the losses) so the only new call on EU funds will be investment funding. Drachma return will have to be used to carry out immediate fiscal adjustment (so there will be plenty of pain and reforms on that front).

Chart below (source: Open Europe) shows the breakdown of Greek debt by holding:

Ex-IMF official sector holdings are at 68%. IMF should, by all possible metrics, take a bath too, but it won't, so the 9% of the total liabilities held by the IMF is not at play. Banks can take a haircut, but that will require recaps (Greek banks) and/or is utterly immaterial in quantum of debt held (1% for Foreign Banks). Other bonds above are predominantly short-term stuff that can be haircut. No matter how you spin the numbers - Eurozone holdings will have to be cut by more than a half.

6/7/15: More Nama and IBRC headlines

More interesting 'stuff' is seeping into the public domain from Nama and IBRC:

1. Irish Times on PIMCO reporting to Nama an un-solicited approach http://www.irishnews.com/news/2015/07/04/news/-unsolicited-approach-to-pimco-to-buy-nama-loans-161616/ "...at least one informal meeting took place at Stormont in late 2013 - thought to have involved Ian Coulter, Frank Cushnahan and a senior politician - with a view to Pimco acquiring Nama’s northern portfolio in its entirety". 
2. A report in the Indo on John Flynn's letter concerning IBRC overcharging: http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/banking-inquiry/bank-inquiry-refuses-to-probe-anglo-overcharging-31352266.html

On the first topic above, see the following links: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/07/4715-another-nama-story-that-wont-go.html

On the second story above, see the letter and the links posted here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/06/1762015-mr-john-flynns-letter-to.html and BankCheck report reprinted here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/06/21615-bankcheck-report-into-anglo-ibrc.html

5/7/15: Votes are in... What's next for Greece?

With over 75% of votes counted in the Greek referendum, 61.6% of the votes counted are in favour of 'No'.

So what's next? Or rather, what can [we speculate] the 'next' might be?

Possible outcome: Grexit

• This can take place either as a part of an agreement between Greece and Institutions (unlikely, but structurally less painful, and accompanied by debt writedowns, a default or both), or
• It can take place 'uncooperatively' - with Greece simply monetising itself using new currency (more likely than cooperative Grexit, highly disruptive to all parties involved and accompanied, most likely, by a unilateral/disorderly default on ECB debt, IMF debt, EFSF debt and Samurai debt. Short term default on T-bills also possible).

Either form of Grexit will be painful, disruptive and nasty, with any positive outcome heavily conditional on post-Grexit policies (in other words, major reforms). The latter is highly unlikely with present Government in place and in general, given Greek modern history.

Grexit - especially disorderly - would likely follow a collapse of the early efforts to get the EU and Greece back to the negotiating table. Such a collapse would take place, most likely, under the strain of political pressures on EU players to play intransigence in the wake of what is clearly a very defiant Greek stance toward the EU 'Institutions' of Troika. 

Key to avoiding a disorderly / unilateral Grexit will be the IMF's ability to get European members of the Troika to re-engage. This will be tricky, as IMF very clearly staked its own negotiating corner last week by publicly identifying its red-line position in favour of debt relief and massive loans package restructuring. The EU 'Institutions' are clearly in the different camp here.

EU Institutions will most likely offer the same deal as pre-referendum. Greece will be 'compelled' to accept it by a threat of ELA withdrawal, but, given the size of the Syriza post-referendum mandate, such position will not be acceptable to Greece.  In the short run, ECB can allow ELA lift to facilitate transition to new currency, but such a move would be difficult to structure (ELA mandate is restrictive) and will result in more debt being accumulated by the Greek government that - at the very least - will have to guarantee this increase.

Problem with Grexit, however, is that we have no legal mechanism for this, implying that we might need a host of new measures to be prepared and passed across the EU to effect this.

Which brings us to another scenario: Status Quo

In this scenario - no player moves. We have a temporary stalemate. Greece will be cut off from ELA and within a week will need to monetise itself with new currency. 

Why? Because July 10th there is a T-bill maturing, default on which would trigger a cascade of defaults. Then on July 13th there is another IMF tranche maturing (EUR451 million with interest). Non-payment of either will likely force EFSF to trigger a default clause. Day after, Samurai bonds mature (Yen 20bn) - default here would trigger private sector default. More T-bills come up at July 17th and following that interest on private bonds also comes up on July 19th (EUR225 million). And then we have July 20th - ECB's EUR3.9 billion due, with additional EUR25mln on EIB bonds. Non-payment here will nearly certainly trigger EFSF cross-default.

Most likely scenario here would be parallel currency to cover internal bills due, while using euro reserves and receipts to fund external liabilities. Problem is - as parallel currency enters circulation, receipts in euro will fall off precipitously, leading inevitably to a full Grexit and a massive bail-in of depositors prior to that. Political fallout will be nasty.

Most likely outcome is, therefore, a New Deal

This will suit all parties concerned, but would have been more likely if Greece voted 'Yes' and then crashed the current Government. This is clearly not happening and the mandate for Syriza is now huge. Massive, in fact. 

So there will have to be a climb-down for the EU sides of the Troika. Most likely climb-down will be a short-term bridge loan to Greece (release of IMF tranche is currently impossible) and allowing use of EFSF funds for general debt redemptions purposes. 

The New Deal will also involve climb-down by the Greek government, which will, in my view, be forthcoming shortly after Tuesday, especially if ECB does not loosen ELA noose. 

Bad news is that even if EU side of Troika wants to engage with Greece, such an engagement will probably require approval of German (and others') parliament. Which will require time and can risk breaking up already fragile consensus within the EU. In fact, only consensus building tendency in the wake of today's vote is for a hard stand against Greece. Even in an emergency, EU is very slow to act on developing new 'bailouts' - in Cypriot case it took almost a year to get a deal going. For Portugal - almost 1.5 months. Urgency is on Greek side right now, not EU's, so anyone's guess is as good as mine as to how long it will take for a new deal to emerge.

That said, short-term approach under the status quo scenario above might work, as long as:

1. Greece engages actively, signalling willingness to deal;
2. Greece does not monetise directly via new currency (IOUs will do in the short run); 
3. IMF puts serious pressure on Europe (unlikely); 
4. ECB plays the required tune and keeps ELA going (somewhat likely); and
5. There is no fracturing of the EU consensus (if there is, all bets are off).

In a rather possible scenario, EU does opt for a new deal with Greece, which will likely involve pretty much the same conditions as before, but will rely on removing IMF out of the equation altogether. In this case, EUR28.7 billion odd of Greek debt held by the IMF gets transferred to ESM. The same will apply to ECB's EUR19 billion of Greek debt. The result will be to cut Greek interest costs (carrot), and involve stricter conditionality and cross-default clauses (stick). Euro area 'Institutions' therefore will end up holding ca 73% of all Greek debt in that case. Terms restructuring (maturities extension) can further bring down Greek costs in the short run. 

The negative side of this is that such a restructuring & transfer will be challenged in Germany and Finland, and also possibly in the Netherlands. 

It is. perhaps, feasible, that a new deal can involve conversion of some liabilities held by the euro area institutions into growth-linked bonds (I am surprised this was refused to start with) and/or a direct conditional commitment (written into a new deal) to future writedowns of debt subject to targets on fiscal performance and reforms being met (again, same surprise here). Still, both measures will be opposed by Germany and other 'core' economies. 

Either way, two things are certain: One: there will be pain for Greece and Europe; and Two: there will be lots of uncertainty in coming weeks.

As a reminder of where that pain will fall (outside Greece):
Source: @Schuldensuehner 

4/7/15: Russia Services and Manufacturing PMIs: June 2015

Manufacturing: 

• "Operating conditions in Russia’s manufacturing sector continued to deteriorate modestly during June as output, new orders and employment all fell."
• "Price levels continued to rise, albeit at historically muted rates, while shortages of working capital and input inventories meant firms continued to meet their orders directly from stock wherever possible."
• Manufacturing PMI posted 48.7 in June, still in contracting mode, but a slight improvement on 47.6 in May. 
• June marked 7th consecutive month of Manufacturing PMIs below 50.0
• 3mo average through June was 48.4 against 3mo average through March at 48.5 and 3mo average through June 2014 at 48.8. In other words, the rate of contraction remained broadly the same in 3mo through June 2015 as in previous 3mo period.

Services:

• Slight fall in service sector business activity during June as activity declined in spite of ongoing growth in new work
• Extra capacity signalled in service sector as backlogs and employment both continue to fall
• Service providers retain some optimism of pickup in activity in coming year
• "Activity levels in Russia’s service sector were down marginally in June as ongoing growth in new business proved insufficiently strong relative to capacity levels. …Capacity was cut in response through to another marked fall in staffing levels."
• Services PMI fell to 49.5 in June from 52.8 in May, reversing two months of above 50.0 readings in April-May.
• 3mo MA through June 2015 was 51.0 against 3mo average through March 2015 at 43.8 - a marked improvement for the 2Q 2015. 3mo average through June 2014 was 47.6, which means that 2Q 2015 saw, on average, positive, but weak growth against sharp contraction in 1Q 2015 and moderate contraction in 2Q 2014.

Composite:

• Markit Russia Composite PMI Index recorded a level of 49.5 in June, down from 51.6 in May and a three-month low. 
• Composite PMI 3mo average through June 2015 was 50.6, well ahead of 45.7 average through 1Q 1015 and 48.3 average for 2Q 2014. Again, in quarterly terms, 2Q 2015 was stronger, signalling growth, compared to contractionary dynamics in 2Q 2014 and 1Q 2015.

Note: most recent trend (downward shift in overall activity across all two sectors) set in around October 2012 and run through February 2015. Since February 2015, we are seeing some improvements in the series, but no new trend, yet.

4/7/15: Another Nama Story That Won't Go Away...

While everyone is obsessed with Greece, our little island is quietly slipping into yet another Nama-linked scandal. Here we go - some links on that, without a comment by me (for legal reasons, of course):

1. "Nama property sale: Mick Wallace claims Belfast firm had £7m in bank after deal"  http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-33372786
2. "Secret tapes stored on £7m Nama deal"  http://www.irishnews.com/news/2015/07/04/news/secret-tapes-stored-on-7m-nama-deal-162532/
3. "Nama adviser had concerns over property sale 'wall of silence'" http://www.irishnews.com/news/2015/07/04/news/nama-adviser-had-concerns-over-property-sale-wall-of-silence--162165/
4. "Ian Coulter named over disputed fees linked to Nama sale" http://www.irishtimes.com/business/commercial-property/ian-coulter-named-over-disputed-fees-linked-to-nama-sale-1.2273084
5. "Mick Wallace’s claims prompts calls for thorough PSNI inquiry" http://www.irishtimes.com/business/commercial-property/mick-wallace-s-claims-prompts-calls-for-thorough-psni-inquiry-1.2272788
6. "Profile: Who are Nama NI appointees named by Wallace?" http://www.irishtimes.com/business/commercial-property/profile-who-are-nama-ni-appointees-named-by-wallace-1.2272609
7. "Northern venture controversial from the outset: Nama's activity in the North has been plagued by questions" http://www.irishtimes.com/business/commercial-property/northern-venture-controversial-from-the-outset-1.2273900
8. "Cerberus denies improper payments or fees linked to Nama deal: Private equity firm ‘deeply troubled’ over allegations made in Dáil by Mick Wallace" http://www.irishtimes.com/business/commercial-property/cerberus-denies-improper-payments-or-fees-linked-to-nama-deal-1.2273101
9. 2006 report on the Cerberus links to a senior US politician: "The congressman & the hedge fund" http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-01-19-cerberus-cover_x.htm
10. And while some of Irish mainstream media is talking about Mick Wallace facing a 'grilling' in the Northern Ireland (e.g. http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/politics/wallace-to-face-grilling-in-north-over-nama-claim-31351195.html), much of the Northern Irish media is talking about investigating his claims: http://www.belfastlive.co.uk/news/belfast-news/psni-urged-probe-claims-belfast-9578876. Which is sort of a big difference in interpreting what is happening: grilling someone suggests they are the wrong-doer, investigating someone's claims suggests looking into the wrongdoing alleged by someone. Get the 'angle'? Back to no comment promise...

4/7/15: Timeline for Greece and Some Anchoring

Greece timeline for the weekend:

Greece has missed the IMF and ECB payments this week with both non-payments having potential for triggering a mother of all defaults for Greece: the ESM/EFSF loans call-in (EUR145bn worth of debt).

The EFSF/ESM decision so far has been to 'ignore' the arrears, noting that non-payment to IMF qualifies as "an event of default":

"The Board of Directors of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) decided today to opt for a Reservation of Rights on EFSF loans to Greece, after the non-payment of Greece to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Following the IMF Managing Director's notification of the IMF Executive Board, this non-payment results in an Event of Default by Greece, according to EFSF financial agreements with Greece."

Greece owes the EFSF EUR109.1bn in "Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement" loans, plus EUR5.5bn in "Bond Interest Facility Agreement" loans and EUR30bn more in "Private Sector Involvement Facility Agreement" loans.

For now, EFSF decided not to call in loans, preferring to wait for Sunday vote outcome. Per EFSF statement: "In line with a recommendation by the EFSF's CEO Klaus Regling, the EFSF Board of Directors decided not to request immediate repayment of its loans nor to waive its right to action – the other two possible options. By issuing a Reservation of Rights, the EFSF keeps all its options open as a creditor as events in Greece evolve. The situation will be continuously monitored and the EFSF will consider its position regularly."

A 'No' vote in the Sunday referendum can change that overnight.

This adds pressure on Greece to pass a 'Yes' vote - a pressure that is most publicly crystallised in the form of ECB refusal to lift ELA to Greek banks. Athens imposition of capital controls (limiting severely cash withdrawals from the banks) has meant that the current level of ELA (CHART below) is still sufficient to hold the bank run, but the ELA cushion remaining in Greek banks was estimated at EUR500mln at the start of this week. Even with capital controls in place, this would have dwindled to around EUR250-300mln by the week end.

Again, a 'No' vote in the referendum risks crashing Greek banks as ECB will be unlikely to lift ELA any more. In an indirect sign of this, the ECB appears to be setting up swap lines and euro credit lines for EU member states outside the euro area. For example, as reported by Bloomberg, "European Central Bank is set to extend a backstop facility to Bulgaria and is ready to assist other nations in the region to ward off contagion from Greece, according to people familiar with the situation". Such a move is a clear precautionary measure to put into place firewalls around Greek system.

Meanwhile, here is a report suggesting that Greek banks are preparing for an aggressive bail-in of deposits in the case of a 'No' vote (assuming ELA cut off):

The Government denied the reports of preparations of bail-ins, and continues to insist that the banks will reopen on Tuesday, a day after the referendum results are published, but it is hard to imagine how this can be done (unless the banks start trading in drachma) without ECB hiking ELA, and it is even harder to imagine how ECB can hike ELA in current conditions.

Source: TheodoreZ

So far, public opinion polls in Greece show very tight vote for Sunday. The latest GPO poll has the "Yes" vote at 44.1% and "No" at 43.7%. Alco poll puts the “Yes” figure at 41.7% against 41.1% for “No”. All together, four opinion polls published yesterday put the 'Yes' vote marginally ahead, another poll fifth put the 'No' camp 0.5 percent in front. All polls results were well within the margin of error. At the same time, majority of polls also show Greeks favouring remaining in the euro by a roughly 75 percent margin.

REFERENDUM TIMELINE
Sunday 5th July:
Polls open – 0500BST/0000EDT
Polls close – 1700BST/1200EDT

First exit poll – Shortly after 1700BST/1200EDT

~20% of votes counted – 1900BST/1300EDT
~50% of votes counted – 2100BST/1600EDT
~70% of votes counted – 2200BST/1700EDT (markets open)
~90% of votes counted – 0000BST/1900EDT

Timeline source: Trading Signal Labs

The build up of tension ahead of the Sunday poll has been immense. Even international bodies are being convulsed by the potential for a 'No' vote. So much so, that, as reported by a number of media outlets, there was a major cat fight between European members of the IMF and other IMF board members.

As reported by Reuters at Wednesday board meeting of the IMF, European members of the board attempted to block IMF from publishing its analysis of debt sustainability for Greece.

Quoting from the report: ""It wasn't an easy decision," an IMF source involved in the debate over publication said. "We are not living in an ivory tower here. But the EU has to understand that not everything can be decided based on their own imperatives." The board had considered all arguments, including the risk that the document would be politicized, but the prevailing view was that all the evidence and figures should be laid out transparently before the referendum. "Facts are stubborn. You can't hide the facts because they may be exploited," the IMF source said."

If only European members of the IMF Board were as concerned with the reality of the Greek crisis on the ground as they are concerned with the appearances and public disclosures of that reality.

A neat reminder of how bad things are in Greece today, via @RBS_Economics

Source: @RBS_Economics

As numbers tell, Greece has posted one of the worst collapses in economy for any advanced economy since 1870, fourth worst for periods outside WW1 and WW2.


So what to expect?

• In the event of a 'Yes' we are likely to see a significant bounce in the markets from the current levels, with euro strengthening on the news in the short run. But real re-pricing will only take place when there is more clarity on post-referendum bailout agreement. The key risk to that outlook is that a 'Yes' vote can trigger early elections - which will (1) extend the current mess for at least another 1-2 months, and (2) put new sources of uncertainty forward - as outcome of such elections will be highly unpredictable. I do not expect the EU to re-start new deal negotiations until after the elections, which means that there will be mounting, not abating pressures on the Greek voters to vote in 'the right' Government, acceptable to the Troika.
• In the event of a 'No' we are likely to see serious run on the markets in Greece and some 'peripheral' states, especially Italy. Greek capital controls will have to be stepped up significantly. Euro is likely to weaken in the short run, especially if ECB aggressively moves to monetise risks via both accelerated QE purchases and lending to non-euro banks.

Beyond these two possible scenarios, everything else is in the realm of wild speculation.

3/7/15: Add ECB to IMF and Greek arrears can get ugly...

Ah, remember Brodsky's "Urania is old than sister Clio" bit? Well, not in finance. Apparently, or allegedly, as reported in press, Greece is now in arrears (err... default, or not or whatever) not only on IMF, but also on ECB. See this.

Which relates to 1993 loans, last repayment of which was due in June this year and amounted to EUR470mln. And which were not paid.

The gyrations of Greek and Troika positions are out of the league of the ordinary.

We had a threat to take EU to court over threats of forcing Grexit (see here). Which is quite bizarre (on the EU side), given the Institutions have already said that the very subject of the referendum is non-sensical as no deal exists to carry out referendum over (see here), though such statements did not preclude the EU leaders from calling for a 'Yes' vote in the referendum (see here).

And the EU and some internal Greek concerns about constitutionality of the Greek referendum (see here).

In simple terms, we have a mash of contradictions: a referendum that has no grounds in terms of its outcome is nonetheless of questionable constitutionality, though the voters should vote 'yes' regardless, because, presumably, an outcome that is not an outcome is preferred to a different outcome that is not a outcome... [someone should stop spinning the world around us]...

We also have IMF that was forced (by a leak) to release its (preliminary - aka... "we say so, but we don't say so") analysis of Greek debt sustainability (see simplified version here and full version from the source here). Surprise, surprise... those of us not paid lavish salaries by the IMF turned out to be right: Greek debt sustainability thesis is nonsense, a pipe dream made up of flour, feathers and water...

Meanwhile, the ECB - not to be outdone by the fellow jostlers or jousters - is entering a probabilistic game of guessing Greek banks solvency (condition for accessing ELA is solvency of the banks, which, until today was a concept of 0=insolvent, 1=solvent and is now 0.1%=solvent 49.9%='something of sorts' and the rest... err... well, we await holding our breath for a technical paper from the ECB staff on that one) on the basis of referendum outcome (see here).

Next turn will be for the EU or may be ESM/EFSF as ECB (rumoured above) default trigger for EFSF default is "Very Likely" and can only be 'corrected' for via a new deal agreement (see here).

Have fun deciphering the torrent of news, views and leaks that the Greek crisis has unleashed. In the mean time, the only conclusive statement to be made is that we are in a situation where headless chickens are trying to round up legless lambs... all performed in a quicksand pit...

29/6/15: Greek Options & Default Contagion Mapping

Couple of interesting charts on Greece.

First up: what are the options?

Source: @MxSba

Interestingly Greece already has capital controls, but yet to miss (officially) and IMF payment. Now, even if there is a deal, Greece will still have to go into the arrears on IMF, unless they found that proverbial granny's couch from which they can squirrel away few bob (EUR1.6 billion that is). We also have an already scheduled referendum. Which, according to the chart is a dead-end. Which it is, because its outcome is either rejecting a non-valid deal or accepting a non-valid deal. Though, presumably, the non-valid deal can be revalidated by the Troika (Institutions) in a jiffy.

In short, the chart above doesn't help much.

Now, a default trigger table and a map:

Source: both via @jsphctrl

Non-payment to IMF can trigger (though does not have to) default on EFSF and holdout private sector bonds (pre 2004). Default on T-bills (short term bonds) triggers privately held bonds excluding holdouts and new bonds. Everything else is fairly simple. Now, per table above, we are in the 'Publicly Acknowledged' blue-shaded area (any delay on payment will be known at this stage and avoiding a public declaration will be hard, if not impossible, especially given political stalemate).

• Non-payment to IMF triggers default on EFSF, and likely to trigger default on bilateral EU loans.
• Non-payment of EFSF loans triggers nothing with any certainty.
• The worst contagion is from PSI bonds default. 

Special note to CDS triggers: basically, bigger risks are from SMP (ECB) bonds, PSI (private) bonds, and post-PSI (private) bonds. EU loans and holdouts from PSI bonds are dodos. 

Enjoy playing with the above...

29/6/15: Greece & Grexit: In Europe, what the bank does, the kings say

Couple of interesting items on on Greek crisis:

Bloomberg prints an exercise in extrapolating Greek devaluation to Mexico peso crisis. It is an interesting exercise in so far as it does indicate (imperfectly) one side of the 'pain coin' currently spinning in the air. But it does not provide for any realistic comparatives to the other side of the same coin: the side of Greece not opting out of the euro area. Suppose the estimated path in the Bloomberg chart is correct and Greece, exiting the euro does face a devaluation 'bill' of some 300 percent-odd. As Bloomberg article says, there will be pain. Huge pain. Now, suppose Greece does not opt for direct devaluation. Then what? Then - exactly the same adjustment will have to happen via internal devaluation. Absent inflation (of any significance) in the euro area (and even given the ECB target inflation), this means all of this adjustment will be carried by Greek people. Except, with devaluation and exit, Greece will still retain internal markets for adjustment: with reforms (not guaranteed by any means), and with some pain taken on the side of capital / funding, it might ameliorate the period of post-default devaluation (the 'jump' stage in the chart below). Staying in the euro clearly implies zero adjustment on capital side, with all adjustment on households' side (employment, earnings, pensions etc). In addition, staying with euro implies no imports substitution (no price effects), exiting implies devaluation-driven imports substitution. Finally, staying with the euro implies no exports boost from devalued currency.

Source: Bloomberg

So the Bloomberg exercise is fine and interesting, but one-sided ad extremum.

Which rounds us to the latest news from the ECB. With Greeks requesting EUR6 billion increase in ELA and ECB rejecting it, Reuters reports a comment from a source on the situation:

"Commenting on the expected extension of existing emergency funding, one person said: "It doesn't make sense to stop it now. The banks are not able to pay it back anyway. So if you froze it for another two or three days, it wouldn't make any difference."" Except, of course, it does make perfect sense: if the ECB were to extend ELA, there would not have been capital controls (note: I am not suggesting the ECB should have done so - that's a different matter). However, without ECB support for ELA uplift, we have capital controls. Which sends a clear message from Frankfurt to Greek voters: this is what you will have to live with if you go against us. 

And this neatly dovetails with what Jean Claude Juncker said to the Greek voters earlier: "You should say ‘yes’ regardless of what the question is.” 

Because whether Reuters wants it or not, in Europe, what the bank does, the banks' kings say.