Sunday, January 11, 2015

11/1/2015: ECB's Favourite Inflation Expectations Indicator is Smokin...


And here's a nice reminder courtesy of @SoberLook.com of the markets' view of 5-year-to-10-year forward inflation expectations for the euro area:


Note: 5y/5y inflation swap basically measures expected inflation for the period of between 5 years from now and 10 years from now (5 years over 5 years from now). Here is a note on its importance to ECB policy http://www.itcmarkets.com/news-press/itc-egbs-questions-regarding-draghis-reference-to-5y5y-forward-rate-and-inflation.

Needless to say, at ECB inflation target of 2% over the next 1-2 years, we should be expecting 5y/5y to be above 2% mark, not below it. And if previous (2004-2007 period) should be our guide for growth, we should be looking at 5y/5y swap rate at around 2.4%.

Which means the 'flashing red' indicator for ECB is now smoking.

11/1/2015: Ending 2014 with a Bang: Russian Inflation & Ruble Crisis


Couple footnotes to 2014, covering Russian economic situation. Much is already known, but worth repeating and tallying up for the full year stats.

Ruble crisis with its most recent up and down swings took its toll on both currency valuations and inflation. Over 2014, based on the rate tracked by the Central Bank of Russia, the ruble was down 34% against the euro and 42% against the USD. The gap reflects depreciation of the euro against the USD.

Virtually all of this relates to one core driver: oil prices. In 2014, Brent prices lost 48% of their values and Urals grade lost 52% of its value. Urals is generally slightly cheaper than Brent, but current gap suggest relatively oversold Urals. It is a bit of a 'miracle' of sorts that Ruble failed to completely trace Urals down, but overall, you can see the effect oil price has - overriding all other considerations, including capital flight and sanctions.

Ruble valuations took their toll on Moscow Stock Exchange - RTS index, expressed in USD, lost 43% of its value, reaching levels comparable to Q1 2009 (791 at the end of 2014, from 1,388 at the start of January 2014).

And ruble crisis pushed inflation well ahead of 5% short term target from CBR set for 2014. Preliminary estimates for December put inflation at 11.4%, with food inflation at 15% (7.3% in 2013), goods (ex-food) at 8% (4.5% in 2013) and services at 10% (8% in 2013). M/m inflation hit 2.6% in December 2014 - the highest since January 2005). Overall inflation was 6.5% in 2013, 6.6% in 2012, 6.1% in 2011 and 2010 and 8.8% in 2009. Last time Russian inflation hit double digit figures was in 2008 - at 13.3%.

Comment via BOFIT: "The pick-up in inflation at the end of the year reflected the ruble’s sharp depreciation and the ensuing frenzy of household spending. Following the ban on certain categories of food imports last autumn, food prices have risen even if no food shortage has actually emerged." Most of this is pretty much as reported. One point worth highlighting - lack of shortages, which is contrary to some of the hype paraded in the media about Russians suffering greatly from diminished supplies and stores running out of goods.

Again per BOFIT: "Representatives of food producers and retail chains committed in September to a government initiative that their members would not raise prices without good reason or create artificial shortages in the market. There has been no move by the government as yet to impose price controls as in 2010. The agreement could have limited price increases somewhat."

And a chart from the same source illustrating pick up in inflation:

Update: Some more numbers on inflation: Meat prices were up 20.1% in 2014, having posted deflation of 3% in 2013; fish prices were up 19.1% in 2014, a big jump on 7.6% inflation in 2013. Cereals are up 34.6% against 3.2% in 2013.


Saturday, January 10, 2015

10/1/2015: Where did Europe's EUR3 trillion worth of debt go?


You know the Krugmanite meme… Euro area is doing everything wrong by not running larger deficits. But here is an uncomfortable reality: since 2007, Euro area countries have managed to increase their debt in excess of 60% of GDP by a staggering EUR3 trillion.



So here's the crux of the problem: where did all this money go?

We know in terms of geographic distribution:


EUR1.6 trillion of this debt increase went to the 'peripheral' countries, and EUR39.2 billion went to the Easter European members of the Euro area. EUR517 billion went to the 'core' economies. And a whooping EUR759.9 billion to France. Now, across the 'periphery' some 20-25% of the debt increase is attributable to the banks measures directly, but the rest is a mix of automatic stabilisers (e.g. increases in unemployment benefits due to higher unemployment) and old-fashioned Keynesian policies.

It might be that Euro area is not spending enough in the right areas of fiscal policy. But to make an argument that it is not spending enough across the board is bonkers. We have allocated some EUR3 trillion in borrowed spending and we will continue to run the debt up in 2015. And still there is no sign of growth on the horizon.

So, again, where is all this money going?

Friday, January 9, 2015

10/1/2015: Irish Retail Sales: November


Irish retail sales figures for November, published by the CSO earlier this week came in at the weaker end of the trend. Here is detailed analysis.

On seasonally-adjusted basis:

  • Value of retail sales ex-motors fell 0.31% m/m in November having posted a 1.04% gain in October. 3mo MA through November was down 0.11% on 3mo MA through October, which itself was down 0.07% on 3mo MA through September.
  • Volume of retail sales ex-motors was up 0.19% m/m in November, having posted a rise of 0.96% in October. 3mo MA through November was up 0.26% m/m  for the 3 months through November compared to 3mo MA through October, having previous posted identical increase in October, compared to 3mo MA through September.
  • Meanwhile, Consumer Confidence was, for a change, more closely aligned with value of sales indicator. Consumer Confidence indicator was down0.23% m/m in November, having posted 0.68% decline in October.

Two charts to illustrate:




The first chart above plots longer-range series, showing two main insights:

  1. Consumer confidence continues to vastly outpace actual retail sales performance in terms of both value and volume of sales, although we are starting to see de-acceleration in consumer confidence growth in terms of trend. Nonetheless, consumer confidence bottomed-out around July 2008. Actual retail sales did not bottom out until June 2012 (in Volume and Value of sales terms).
  2. Since bottoming out, retail sales have been performing with virtually divergent dynamics. Trend in Volume of sales is relatively strong, upward. Meanwhile, trend in Value of sales is relatively flat, upward. In more recent months, this divergence is increasing once again.

The above is again confirmed in November data and in year-on-year comparatives too, as shown in the next chart.


Year on year (based on seasonally unadjusted data):

  • Value of retail sales ex-motors rose 1.33% y/y in November having posted a 1.91% gain y/y in October. 3mo MA through November 2014 was up only 1.4% on 3mo MA through November 2013.
  • Volume of retail sales ex-motors was up robust 3.92% y/y in November, having posted a rise of 4.40% in October. 3mo MA through November was up 3.7% y/y.

The above data clearly supports trends identified in previous months: Irish consumers are not striking, nor are they holding back consumption. Instead, they are willing to buy when they see value. Unfortunately for our retailers, that means more sales with lower profit margins. As the chart below shows, we now have 13 consecutive months of growth in volume of sales outstripping value of sales and out of the last 21 months, only one posted growth rate in value of sales in excess of volume of sales.


Using my Retail Sector Activity Index to plot underlying activity across the sector (note: the RSAI has much higher correlations with both indices of retail sales than consumer confidence), chart below shows that in 2014, growth rate in overall sector activity slowed down significantly compared to 2013.


The above, of course, is rather natural for the recovery that first produces a faster bounce up and then settles into more 'sustainable' over time rate of growth. The problem, however, is that current activity by value of retail sales is still 39.1% below the pre-crisis peak levels and for volume of sales it is 34% below peak. Even compared to the pre-crisis average (2005-2007), activity is down 11.2% in value terms and 3.2% lower in volume terms.

9/1/2015: Advisor-Driven Investment Management: Partial, Biased and Risky?


My post for Learn Signal blog on the issue of sell-side advice and inherent conflicts of interest and biases that are material to advice-driven investments: http://blog.learnsignal.com/?p=142

Wednesday, January 7, 2015

7/1/2015: China Threat: Europe's Exports Under Pressure


Recently, Irish Times run an article about threats and challenges to Irish economic model (whatever it might be - I have no idea), concluding that all is down to 'political leadership' (whatever that might be is also something I can't comprehend). But in reality, a key threat to Irish economy is the threat of changing nature of global production and demand patterns, related to

  • Challenges from China and other emerging economies (which increasingly produce goods and services for global consumption that rival in quality European goods and services);
  • Challenges from growing regionalisation of trade (with producers, including the MNCs, moving closer to the demand growth centres - which are nowhere near Europe); and
  • Challenges from growing regionalisation of investment and capital flows, including financial and human capital (which puts pressure on our funding models for enterprise formation and growth).


There is little in the above that is subject to our policymakers' 'leadership' and much in the above that is subject to our internal market competitiveness.

But, setting aside the above considerations, what is the evidence of the growing threat from the emerging markets economies? Take a look at a recent paper by Benkovskis, Konstantins and Silgoner, Maria Antoinette and Steiner, Katharina and Wörz, Julia, titled "Crowding-Out or Co-Existence? The Competitive Position of EU Members and China in Global Merchandise Trade" (ECB Working Paper No. 1617: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2354238).

Keep in mind - this is ECB, so all conclusions might have been relatively placated or moderated to suit the prevalent narrative that things are going fine for Europe.

In their paper, the authors "analyse export competition between individual EU Member States and China in third-country goods markets."

Top of the line finding is that "competitive pressure from China is strongest for small and peripheral EU members, especially for the Southern periphery, Ireland and Central, Eastern and South-eastern European EU members. While we find no hard evidence for "cut-throat" competition between China and EU countries, we see an increasing tendency of smaller EU exporters leaving markets that are increasingly served by China." And another note of caution: data only goes to 2011, which means that whatever intensification in competition that might have happened in 2012-2014 - the years when European producers saw increased incentives to export due to sluggish growth in Europe, while Chinese exporters faced similar incentives to export due to decline in domestic returns on capital, and changing nature of domestic investment markets.

So some details.

Authors note that "the extent of existent competition between individual EU members and China (observed at the margin of the markets served by EU members) is fairly homogeneous across all EU countries." Figure 1 below (labeled Figure 7 in the paper) "shows that the fraction of trade links where both China and the given EU member are active in two consecutive periods amounts to roughly 62% in 2009, up from 49% in 2001. Thus, mutual competition increased for all EU members."


More per Chart above: "With an overlap of 65% and beyond in 2009, countries like Portugal, Sweden, Ireland, Denmark and the Czech Republic face the strongest existent competitive pressure from China in terms of the fraction of markets where they are directly exposed to China. The group of large exporters shows an overlap of existent markets between 60% and 64%, while many small Eastern European countries and Greece only serve between 56% and 59% of their export markets jointly with China."

Out of all EU countries, therefore, Ireland is 4th most-exposed to competition from China. Good luck devising a 'policy leadership' for that.


What about the markets where China is not operating, yet? Authors have the following to say on this: "the fraction of “newly conquered markets”, i.e. newly established trade links by either an EU member or China where the other exporter did not already operate (figure 8 below), declined from 5.6% in 2001 to 2.4% by 2009 on average across all EU members. Thus, with heightened existent competition, the number of new market conquests where China was not active decreased in all countries over time. The decline was particularly pronounced for large exporter such as Italy, Spain, Germany and Finland. But a number of CESEE-10 countries likewise shows a relatively strong decline, such as Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia."


Ireland faired a little better in terms of "new market entry" for China risks, but that is because we already face much more direct pressure from China's competition.


Next up, the potential for Chinese exporters crowding out Irish (and other European) exporters.

Per study: "the most interesting type of competitive pressure is depicted in figure 10. The four combinations which are summarized here all represent different forms of potential crowding-out of one exporter by its competitor. …As a first interesting observation, even taken together, these cases are less important than the creation of new competition. However, we observe an increasing trend over time. Furthermore, with 10% or more of all cases, in particular CESEE-10 countries and the small peripheral EU members are especially affected by this type of competition."


And, by the above chart, Ireland is under some serious pressure here too.

The authors disaggregate the bars in the above figure in order to "extract information on the crowding-out of EU countries by China."

"Figure 11 [below] shows the share of crowding-out cases in which an EU country exits a market which China has just entered or continues to operate. …[in] Germany [case] crowding-out is observed for only 4.8% of all trade links in 2009 [see chart above] and Germany crowds out China in half of these cases (Figure 11 below). In contrast, evidence for the CESEE-10 is mainly characterized by China crowding out the CESEE-10 countries (Figure 11), and, furthermore, the incidence of crowding-out increased markedly over time (Figure 10 above). The same holds true for the EU’s small peripheral countries Ireland, Portugal and Greece. In all three countries, 90% of all crowding-out cases refer to their exit from a market where China enters or is active (Figure 11 below). Compared with 2001, crowding-out by China has generally gained importance over crowding-out of China, particularly for the core EU members."


Again, Ireland is under huge pressure here from China.

Overall, the paper conclusions are uncomfortable.

"In general, we find that export growth is mainly driven by the intensification of existing trade relationships rather than by the formation of new trade links (extensive margin)." Here's a problem: Irish policy has been about opening new markets (jumping head-to-head into competition with China and other exporters), instead of maximising presence in the already serviced markets (holding onto and expanding exports presence in already profitable markets). And that is despite the fact that "…the extensive margin turns out to be more important for the CESEE-10 than for the EU periphery, the core EU countries or even China."

"Small and peripheral countries are more exposed to competition from China than the large EU export nations." And Ireland is even more exposed here, since we rely almost exclusively on exports as the driver for growth.

"…the crowding-out potential is considerably higher for the CESEE-10 and the small peripheral EU countries than for larger EU members…" As commented earlier, this is about the need to pursue more intensification of our exports, rather than constantly attempting to chase 'new markets' as the core exports growth strategy.


Finally, for illustration purposes, chart below maps the composition of European exports by category of goods.


7/1/2015: Another One for European Century


A chart via @Schuldensuehner this one pointing at another myth of the European Century blowing up: the myth of Euro becoming the global reserve currency.


That's right, Official Reserves held by the Central Banks in euros are down 8.1% in Q3 2014.

This, as Bloomberg notes, is a much faster rate of decline in reserves than during 2010-2011 crisis. "In the third quarter of 2011, the common currency slid 7.7 percent, while its reserves fell 2.8 percent. A deeper plunge of 9.4 percent in the euro in the second quarter of 2010 only prompted a 1.3 percent loss in holdings, the IMF data showed."

Remember, this was supposed to be a European Century (http://www.dw.de/barroso-europe-is-a-success-of-globalization/a-2414542 and http://arc.eppgroup.eu/Activities/docs/berlin_declaration/en.pdf).

Tuesday, January 6, 2015

6/1/2015: BRIC PMIs: Weaker Outrun in December


Markit released PMIs for all BRIC countries for both Services and Manufacturing covering December 2014. Here are the main results.

Starting with manufacturing:

  • Brazil Manufacturing PMI posted its first 50+ reading after 3 months of consecutive sub-50 readings. December PMI came in at 50.2, which is basically signalling no statistically significant growth. On a quarterly basis, Q4 2014 average came in at 49.3 - a contraction, against 49.3 (yep, same) for Q3 2014 and 50.1 (almost no growth) in Q4 2013.
  • Russian Manufacturing PMI for December came at disappointing 48.9, marking the first month of sub-50 readings since June 2014. Q4 2014 average is at 50.3 (basically near-zero growth) against Q3 2014 reading of 50.4 (very weak growth) and Q4 2013 reading of 50.0 (stagnation).
  • China Manufacturing PMI came in at 49.6, the first monthly contraction that follows six consecutive months of at or above 50 readings. Q4 2014 average was 50.0 - meaning Chinese manufacturing posted flat growth across the quarter. Q3 2014 average was 50.7, same as Q4 2013. Overall, there are some very serious weaknesses in Chinese manufacturing sectors.
  •  India Manufacturing PMI jumped from 53.3 in November to 54.5 in December, signalling acceleration in activity in the sector. Q4 2014 average is at 53.1 - up on 52.0 average for Q3 2014 and on 50.5 average for Q4 2013.


Now, Services:

  • Brazil's Services PMI was even worse, set at 49.1 in December (a shallow contraction), continuing with sub-50 readings for the third month in a row. Q4 2014 average is at 48.6 (outright contraction), against Q3 2014 average of 50.5 (weak expansion) and 52.1 (stronger expansion) in Q4 2013.
  • Russian Services PMI stood at 45.8 - sharp contraction - in December 2014, marking third consecutive month of sub-50 readings. The index averaged less than impressive 45.9 in Q4 2014, showing severe strains from collapse in domestic services, such as financial services. The index averaged 50.1 in Q3 2014 and 53.0 in Q4 2013.
  • China Services PMI surprised to the upside, posting 53.4 reading in December, up on 53.0 in November. Q4 2014 average is at 53.1 - faster growth signal compared to Q3 2014 reading of 52.7 and Q4 2013 reading of 52.0.
  • India Services PMI, lastly, posted a slight de-acceleration in growth, slipping from 52.6 in November to 51.1 in December. Q4 2014 reading is now at 51.2, which marks a slowdown in growth from 52.2 index reading in Q3 2014 and47.0 reading in Q4 2013.


And a table and a chart summarising changes in both sets of PMIs




Note the increase in weaker growth signals in December data compared to previous month, driven by poorer PMIs in Manufacturing and by unchanged performance outlook in Services. Also note, per chart above, Russia not only acts as a main downward driver for the BRIC overall PMI-related performance, but it shows strong decoupling in the direction of trend from January-March 2014 on, with the divergence now accelerating over the last three months.

6/1/2015: The Darker Side of Sell-Side Research?


My blog post for @LearnSignal blog on the topic of conflict of interest problem with sell-side markets research: http://blog.learnsignal.com/?p=138.

6/1/2015: Irish PMIs December 2014: Strong End to 2014 Activity

Markit-Investec Irish PMIs releases were finalised today with Services data made public few minutes ago. Here is my quick analysis:

  • December 2014 Manufacturing PMI reading stood at 56.9, signaling a strong expansion. The index was at a 4-months high. 3mo average (Q4 average) stood at 56.7, which represents a rise on Q3 2014 average of 56.1. Q4 2014 marked the highest quarter in terms of Manufacturing PMI average. The series are now 4.5 points ahead of post-crisis average.
  • December 2014 Services PMI reading stood at 62.6, which, as Markit commentary says is a tie with June 2014 reading for the highest mark since February 2007. It is worth noting that September 2014 reading of 62.5 was, of course, statistically indistinguishable from December and June readings. 3mo average through December (Q4 average) is at 61.9, which is only marginally below Q3 and Q2 averages of 62.1. Relative to longer-period average, December reading is 7.1 points ahead of post-crisis average for the series.
Chart to illustrate:

Predictably, given the levels of both indices, there is some moderation in the growth rate of the index (second derivative, effectively):


Which is not a discouraging sign, as historically, the indices do signal strong growth in both sectors:

And as the chart above shows, uplift in Manufacturing is very strong, relative to historical trends. All good signals so far, but do stay tuned for some longer-range analysis later.


Note: as usual, I do not cover composition of the indices, as Investec refuses to supply actual data on indices components.  Should you want to consult their sell-side analysis, feel free to do so at http://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Page.mvc/PressReleases

6/1/2015: Glance Back: Grey and Black Swans of 2014


Portuguese blog by Jorge Nascimento Rodrigues quoting my comments on the topic of black swan and grey swan events of 2014: http://janelanaweb.com/novidades/2014-em-revista-cisnes-negros-cinzentos-6-surpresas/

My comment in English in full:

Black swan events are defined not only by their unpredictability ex ante the shock and the magnitude of the shock-related losses, but also by the fact that the rationale for their occurrence becomes fully explainable ex ante the event. In this sense, looking back at 2014, one can only imperfectly interpret key events as either black or grey swans.

One of the major black swan events of 2014 was the flaring up of a major geopolitical crisis involving Russia and the West. This pre-conditions for the emergence of this crisis were present throughout the late 2000s - early 2010s, but its rapid escalation from to the state of a proxy war fought by the two players over the Ukraine was not something we could have foreseen at the end of 2013.

On economic front, the decoupling of the US economy from global economic outlook and acceleration in the US growth was accurately reflected in a number of major forecasts published in the second half of 2013. As was the associated continued downtrend in growth in the euro area. But the simultaneous crisis across the major emerging economies, including Brazil and South Africa, as well as the onset of the outright recession in Russia and the Russian Ruble crisis of Q4 2014 were black swan events.

A good example of the grey swan event - an event with some predictability ex ante, but with unpredictable timing, was a massive decline in global oil prices. The decline was forecastable in 2013, given the rate of growth in potential supply from the non-OPEC countries, primarily Canada and the US. The rates of new wells drilling and the levels of average output and output dynamics from the existent wells should have told us well in advance that the decline in oil prices was coming. Ditto for the signals coming from the natural gas price divergence in North America against Europe and Asia Pacific. But the exact timing of this decline in oil prices was not easily predictable. In the end, the drop in oil prices in 2014 was driven by a combination of two forces. The supply dynamics - largely predictable, and the contraction in demand driven by the black swan shock to global (and in particular emerging markets) growth.

Two major themes that dominated the financial markets in 2014 - continued decline in sovereign debt yields and simultaneous divergence in prices between the US and European equity markets - was hardly a black swan, given the differences in monetary policies between ECB and the Fed. Nonetheless, to some extent both themes were shaped also by the global growth divergence, and as such, both constitute a sort of a grey swan event.

Last, but not least, the flaring up of the euro area peripheral crisis, starting with Q4 2014 political risk flaring up in Greece, was neither a black swan nor a grey swan, and instead constitutes an empirical regularity of long term instability in the euro area periphery. This instability (both political and economic) is driven by the legacy of the debt crisis and the fallout from the policies used to address it. Nothing, absolutely nothing, has been resolved within the euro area when it comes to addressing debt overhangs present in a number of economies. Nothing has been done to address the endemic lack of structural growth drivers in the majority of the peripheral economies. If anything, the structural growth crisis contagion has now firmly spread to the core economies, such as France and Finland, and is impacting even Germany. Despite lots of sabre-rattling, the ECB remains in a passive policy mode, with the central bank balancesheet stubbornly stuck in the post-crisis lows and liquidity fully captured within a fragmented banking sector.