Wednesday, March 12, 2014

12/3/2014: (If You Missed Them) Here're Mortgages Approvals Numbers


Since we are due data on these soon-ish, only a quick update on IBF data for mortgages approvals and drawdowns. Mostly charts with quick comments.

Here are monthly results through January 2014 for approvals:


We are solidly on-trend on average mortgage approved, below trend on number of new accounts approved. Year on year, however, things are better: 3mo through January 2014 are up on same period in 2013 by some 11.36% for house purchases, 3.47% for re-mortgages and top-ups and up 10.77% for all mortgages (by number of accounts). Average mortgages (on 3mo y/y basis as above) are up 4.72% for house purchases, down 1.3% for re-mortgages and top-ups and up 5.09% for all mortgages.

Overall volume of mortgages approvals by total value are trending also nicely, though the latest numbers came in below trend and are testing some resistance levels:


Drawdowns data is only reported on a quarterly basis, so here is the latest (through Q4 2013):


The above shows us just how abysmal the metric performance has been over the last 3 years. Basically no life in the series to speak of.

Monday, March 10, 2014

10/3/2014: One Day There Will Be Real Growth... Until Then...


There is no growth... like credit-growth-fuelled growth...

Via Pictet, two charts plotting US economy:



Note: credit impulse is, loosely, growth in credit supply.

So one day, some day, things will turn out to be anchored in real growth - productivity, new tech, shift to higher quality, new demand, new demographics... until then, there is always a credit boom-and-bust. Don't believe me? Last chart shows that underlying growth drivers are currently close to those in 2004-2008. 

10/3/2014: Industrial Production & Turnover: Q4 2013 & January 2014


CSO released Industrial Production & Turnover figures for January 2014 back last week, and here is an update.

Obviously, we all are familiar with the fact that Manufacturing is booming once again, thanks for PMI signals, but... table above is not exactly cheerful, is it? On an annual production volumes data, activity is down 1.4% and turnover is up only 0.2%. On 3mo basis, production volumes are up just 0.2% and turnover is down massive 5.0%. Ugly...

Let's take the following experiment. Irish industrial production data (monthly series) is pretty volatile. So instead, let's take a look at quarterly data and augment this with the latest available data for running quarter (so for Q1 2014, let's take the only data currently at hand, that covering January 2014). Furthermore, let's look at seasonally-adjusted series to strip out even more volatility. Here are some charts with quick commentary.

Traditional Sectors:


Trend down, but January 2014 is above trend.  Beyond that:

  • Current running quarter is 3.44% up on Q4 2013 and Q4 2013 was up 0.35% on Q3 2013 on volume basis. Current year on year is +6.12% on volume basis. So things might be improving.

Manufacturing:

No above luck with Manufacturing: trend down and we are below trend. Beyond that:

  • By turnover, current Q1 2014 is down 1.37% on Q4 2013 and Q4 2013 was down 3.47% on Q3 2013. Year on year, current is down 2.40%, while Q4 2013 was down 1.76% y/y.
  • By volume, current Q1 2014 is up 0.1% on Q4 2013 and Q4 2013 was down 1.68% on Q3 2013. Year on year, current is down 1.22%, while Q4 2013 was down 0.66% y/y.
Do tell me where those PMIs are now?

Worse, you can't really blame Pharma and Chemicals for this alone. Trend in this sector is down, and we are below trend, but Q1 2014 so far showing a slight uptick"



  • By turnover, current Q1 2014 is down 4.36% on Q4 2013 and Q4 2013 was down 10.19% on Q3 2013. Year on year, current is down 10.60%, while Q4 2013 was down 3.54% y/y.
  • By volume, current Q1 2014 is up 1.39% on Q4 2013 but Q4 2013 was down 5.98% on Q3 2013. Year on year, current is down 2.05%, while Q4 2013 was down 1.58% y/y.
Things are ugly in Pharma, true. But this is not the sole driver of manufacturing.

Modern Sectors aka MNCs that are, allegedly, supposed to benefit from the global upturn:


Trend down, series below trend, shrinking still:
  • By volume, current Q1 2014 is down 0.35% on Q4 2013 but Q4 2013 was down 4.78% on Q3 2013. Year on year, current is down 3.52%, while Q4 2013 was down 1.62% y/y.
Unpleasant. 

10/3/2014: NYSE Margin Accounts Busting Record Levels...


Two quick twitter posts on leverage accumulation in the markets.

First one via Holger Zschaepitz @Schuldensuehner:


Shows NYSE members debit balances in margin accounts - at historic highs (since 1960).

Second, via Ioan Smith @moved_average:


Shows the above as % of nominal GDP as third highest in history. As noted by @moved_average, currently margin accounts balances are at ca 26% of all commercial and household loans outstanding in the US banking system.

This is just NYSE... Do we need to add timing lines for QEs here?.. (Hint: see peaks...)

Monthly data on the above: http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?mode=tables&key=50&category=8

Here's a good post on monthly series analysis: http://www.advisorperspectives.com/dshort/updates/NYSE-Margin-Debt-and-the-SPX.php

And a telling chart from the above on growth rates in margin accounts:


Oh, and a comment from above post: margins accounts are at historic highs in real (inflation-adjusted) terms too...

Don't get too worked up if things get jittery next... cause this time (unlike in Q2 2000 and Q3 2007) things are going to be different...

Update:  via John Tracey @traceyjc84 the above expressed relative to Dow Industrials:


10/3/2014: Crimean Crisis: NewstalkFM podcast


There was a very robust and interesting discussion of the Ukrainian crisis (including Crimea) last night on NewstalkFM Marc Coleman's show. Podcast http://russianireland.com/index.php/home/news-mainmenu/politics/7791-2014-03-10-08-52-48

Very good panel (excluding my small contribution). 

Sunday, March 9, 2014

9/3/2014: Financial Repression, Debt Crises & Debt Restructuring: R&R Strike Again


According to Reinhart and Rogoff recent (December 2013) paper "Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises: Some Lessons Learned and Those Forgotten" (by Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, IMF Working Paper WP/13/266, December 2013 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13266.pdf) many economies in the advanced world will require defaults, as well as drastic measures of Financial Repression, including savings taxes and higher inflation as debt levels reach a 200-year high.

You can read the entire paper, so I am just going to summarise some core points, albeit at length.


R&R open up with a statement that is more of a warning against our complacency than a claim of our arrogance: "Even after one of the most severe crises on record (in its fifth year as of 2012) in the advanced world, the received wisdom in policy circles clings to the notion that advanced, wealthy economies are completely different animals from their emerging market counterparts. Until 2007–08, the presumption was that they were not nearly as vulnerable to financial crises. When events disabused the world of that notion, the idea still persisted that if a financial crisis does occur, advanced countries are much better at managing the aftermath..."

This worldview is also not holding, according to R&R: "Even as the recovery consistently proved to be far weaker than most forecasters were expecting, policymakers continued to underestimate the depth and duration of the downturn."

The focal point of this delusional thinking is Europe, "…where the financial crisis transformed into sovereign debt crises in several countries, the current phase of the denial cycle is marked by an official policy approach predicated on the assumption that normal growth can be restored through a mix of austerity, forbearance, and growth."

The point is that European (and other advanced economies' policymakers are deceiving the public (and themselves), believing that they "…do not need to apply the standard toolkit used by emerging markets, including debt restructurings, higher inflation, capital controls, and significant financial repression. Advanced countries do not resort to such gimmicks, policymakers say. To do so would be to give up hard-earned credibility, thereby destabilizing expectations and throwing the economy into a vicious circle."

Note: per R&R "“Financial repression” includes directed lending to government by captive domestic audiences (such as pension funds), explicit or implicit caps on interest rates, regulation of cross-border capital movements, and generally a tighter connection between government and banks. It often masks a subtle type of debt restructuring."

The warning that stems from the above is that "It is certainly true that policymakers need to manage public expectations. However, by consistently choosing instruments and calibrating responses based on overly optimistic medium-term scenarios, they risk ultimately losing credibility and destabilizing expectations rather than the reverse."

It is worth noting as a separate point in addition to the above issues that:

  1. Financial repression in its traditional means (forcing public debt into investment portfolio of captive funds, such as pension funds, reducing real returns on savings, tax on savings, bail-ins of private investors etc) in the case of the advanced economies are running against demographic changes, such as ageing of these societies. Just as the economies reliance on savings and pensions rises, financial repression is cutting into the economies savings and pensions.
  2. Higher inflation is associated with higher interest rates in the longer term, which can have a devastating impact on debt-burdened households. Hence, deleveraging of the sovereigns cuts against the objective of deleveraging the real economy (households and companies). This is most pronounced in the case of countries like Ireland.
  3. Strong point from R&R on austerity. In many cases, advanced economies debate about austerity is 0:1 - either 'do austerity' or 'do expansionary fiscal policy'. This is superficial. Per R&R: "Although austerity in varying degrees is necessary, in many cases it is not sufficient to cope with the sheer magnitude of public and private debt overhangs."


So the key lessons from the past are as follows.

Lesson 1: "On prevention versus crisis management. We have done better at the latter than the former. It is doubtful that this will change as memories of the crisis fade and financial market participants and their regulators become complacent."

Figure 1. Varieties of Crises: World Aggregate, 1900–2010
A composite index of banking, currency, sovereign default, and inflation crises (BCDI), and stock market crashes (BCDI+stock) (weighted by their share of world income)


Lesson 2: "On diagnosing and understanding the scope and depth of the risks and magnitudes of the debt. What is public and what is private? Domestic and external debt are not created equal. And debt is usually MUCH bigger than what meets the eye."

R&R are not shying away from the bold statements (in my view - completely warranted): "The magnitude of the overall debt problem facing advanced economies today is difficult to overstate. The mix of an aging society, an expanding social welfare state, and stagnant population growth would be difficult in the best of circumstances. This burden has been significantly compounded by huge increases in government debt in the wake of the crisis, illustrated in Figure 2. …As the figure illustrates, the emerging markets actually deleveraged in the decade before the financial crisis, whereas advanced economies hit a peak not seen since the end of World War II. In fact, going back to 1800, the current level of central government debt in advanced economies is approaching a two-century high-water mark."

Figure 2. Gross Central Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP: Advanced and Emerging Market Economies, 1900–2011 (unweighted average)

Things are even worse when it comes to external debt, as Figure 3 illustrates.

Figure 3. Gross Total (Public plus Private) External Debt as a Percentage of GDP: 22 advanced and 25 Emerging Market Economies, 1970–2011

Note the 'exponential' trend on the chart above since the 1990s...

This is non-trivial (as per Figure 2 conclusions). "The distinction between external debt and domestic debt can be quite important. Domestic debt issued in domestic currency typically offers a far wider range of partial default options than does foreign currency–denominated external debt. Financial repression has already been mentioned; governments can stuff debt into local pension funds and insurance companies, forcing them through regulation to accept far lower rates of return than they might otherwise demand. But domestic debt can also be reduced through inflation."

And, as Figure 4 illustrates, public and external debts overhang are just the beginning of the troubles: "the explosion of private sector debt before the financial crisis. Unlike central government debt, for which the series are remarkably stationary over a two-century period, private sector debt shows a marked upward trend due to financial innovation and globalization, punctuated by volatility caused by periods of financial repression and financial liberalization."

Figure 4. Private Domestic Credit as a Percentage of GDP, 1950–2011 (22 Advanced and 28 Emerging Market Economies)


Lesson 3: "Crisis resolution. How different are advanced economies and emerging markets? Not as different as is widely believed."

R&R (2013) show "five ways to reduce large debt-to-GDP ratios (Box1). Most historical episodes have involved some combination of these."



As R&R note, "the first on the list is relatively rare and the rest are difficult and unpopular." But more ominously, "recent policy discussion has tended to forget options (3) and (5), arguing that advanced countries do not behave that way. In fact, option (5) was used extensively by advanced countries to deal with post–World War II debt (Reinhart and Sbrancia, 2011) and option (3) was common enough before World War II."

Beyond the fact that the two measures have precedent in modern history of the advanced economies, there is also the issue of the current crisis being of greater magnitude than previous ones.

"Given the magnitude of today’s debt and the likelihood of a sustained period of sub-par average growth, it is doubtful that fiscal austerity will be sufficient, even combined with financial repression. Rather, the size of the problem suggests that restructurings will be needed, particularly, for example, in the periphery of Europe, far beyond anything discussed in public to this point. Of course, mutualization of euro country debt effectively uses northern country taxpayer resources to bail out the periphery and reduces the need for restructuring. But the size of the overall problem is such that mutualization could potentially result in continuing slow growth or even recession in the core countries, magnifying their own already challenging sustainability problems for debt and old age benefit programs."


The authors conclude that "…if policymakers are fortunate, economic growth will provide a soft exit, reducing or eliminating the need for painful restructuring, repression, or inflation. But the evidence on debt overhangs is not heartening. Looking just at the public debt overhang, and not
taking into account old-age support programs, the picture is not encouraging. Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2012) consider 26 episodes in which advanced country debt exceeded 90 percent of GDP, encompassing most or all of the episodes since World War II. (They tabulate the small number of cases in which the debt overhang lasted less than five years, but do not include these in their overhang calculations.) They find that debt overhang episodes averaged 1.2 percent lower growth than individual country averages for non-overhang periods. Moreover, the average duration of the overhang episodes is 23 years. Of course, there are many other factors that determine longer-term GDP growth, including especially the rate of productivity growth. But given that official public debt is only one piece of the larger debt overhang issue, it is clear that governments should be careful in their assumption that growth alone will be able to end the crisis. Instead, today’s advanced country governments may have to look increasingly to the approaches that have long been associated with emerging markets, and that advanced countries themselves once practiced not so long ago."


What R&R are showing in their paper is that Financial Repression already underway is hardly inconsistent with the potential for further restructuring and repression. They also show that the current crisis is still unresolved and ongoing and that the current de-acceleration in crisis dynamics is not necessarily a sign of sustained recovery: things are much longer term than 1-2 years of growth can correct for. In the mean time, as we know, the EU continues on the path of shifting more and more future crisis liabilities onto the shoulders of savers and investors, while offloading more and more public debt overhang costs onto the shoulders of taxpayers. All along, the media and our politicians keep talking down the risks of future bailouts, bail-ins and structural pain (lower growth rates, higher interest rates, higher rates of private insolvencies).


Note: You can read more on the rather lively debate about the effects of debt on growth by searching this blog for "Reinhart & Rogoff" Some of the links are here:


Saturday, March 8, 2014

8/3/2014: Morgan Kelly on the Next Incoming Train...


Superb as he always is, Professor Morgan Kelly gives a public lecture on the state of Irish economy (poor), the evolution of the crisis (currently at a temporary stabilisation), recovery (superficial) and what is coming up (ugly)... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8LCofepdUzE&feature=youtube_gdata_player

Morgan delivers in his usual - engaging - manner.

I must say that I do not necessarily agree with all of this, but that is not the point for this post...

8/3/2014: FTT - More Benign Estimates of Impact?


In recent years, I have written extensively about the problems relating to the introduction of a Tobin-styled FTT, including as proposed by the european authorities.

Last year, I cooperated with an academic survey of the extent literature on FTT across various asset markets and instruments. Using meta analysis that study concluded that on the net, FTT will likely result in:
1) revenues well below those expected by the policymakers, and
2) significant reduction in markets efficiency and price discovery, including potential for adverse changes in liquidity risk environment in the markets for major financial instruments.

This February, a new working paper, titled "A General Financial Transactions Tax: Motives, Effects and Implementation According to the Proposal of the European Commission" by Stephan Schulmeister (WP: 461/2014 Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, February 2014 Source: http://www.wifo.ac.at/wwa/pubid/47125) summed up "the main arguments in favour and against a FTT" and provided "empirical evidence about the movements of the most important asset prices."

The author shows that "long swings [in the asset prices] result from the accumulation of extremely short-term price runs over time. Therefore a (very) small FTT – between 0.1 and 0.01 percent – would mitigate price volatility not only over the short run but also over the long run."

In this, the paper conclusions are not novel.

It is generally accepted that efficiency-enhancing FTT will require extremely low rate of taxation in order to 'separate' HFT activities from long-only investment activities. The premise for this is well established in the literature: it is believed that higher order volatility in the markets is induced by HFTs and not by long-only or covered shorts positions.

Alas, I am not entirely convinced that we should be concerned with higher order volatility. Short-lived multiple-sigma events - capturing imagination of the media and the public - are not as disruptive as structural crises. And we all know that structural crises have nothing to do with either naked shorting, leveraged shorting or HFTs. These crises are not caused by the active trading. They are caused by active and sustained fraud or passive and sustained failure to enforce existent regulations, or both. On behavioural side, they are also caused by the 'exuberant expectations' - a situation where individuals mis-price directional risks. None of these causes is subject to FTT constraints if the tax is set at the levels where it is not impeding lucidity and price discovery.

So from the very top, the rationale presented in the paper to support FTT introduction (high frequency volatility) is distinct from the rationale presented by the EU leaders for introducing FTT (structural crises).

It is worth noting that Schulmeister puts heavy emphasis in the causality argument on the feed through from HFT to algos, relying on short shocks propagation mechanism via algos-induced changes in the trend.

The problem with this argument is that

  1. It ignores the existence of arbitrage opportunities (lack of contrarian algos is hardly consistent with Schulmeister's worldview)
  2. It also fails to account for reversion to the mean property of algos.


The paper "discusses the most important implementation issues if only a group of 11 EU member countries introduces this tax (without the UK). If London subsidiaries of banks established in one of the FTT countries are treated as part of their parent company, overall FTT revenues of the 11 FTT countries are estimated at € 65.8 billion, if London subsidiaries are treated as British financial institutions, tax revenues would amount to only € 28.3 billion."

The problem with the above that while the amounts are small, potential disruptions to the markets generated by, say, a 10bps tax can be significant. Take equities portfolio, returning 5% pa gross FTT will reduce the base by 0.1% or 0.2% on trade covered by a derivative contract. Thus, for full execute of a simple long-only strategy, involving simple one-direction hedge, the total tax exposure under the 0.1% FTT is 30 bps. Which is consistent with a 6 percent drop on gross return.

Thus, even if FTT were to deliver reduced short-term volatility, since long-only holders face a new tax, equivalent to roughly 1/5th of the CGT (if CGT is set at 30%). This is hardly immaterial.

Another issue arises in the context of the numerical estimates presented in the paper. The upper envelope estimate of EUR65.8 billion is based on the assumption of zero migration by institutions. EUR28.3 billion lower envelope estimate is based on the assumption that some migration is possible to the UK, with such migration triggering FTT application only to one side of trade (the side domiciled in FTT-imposing country). Alas, obviously, the exercise fully ignores the possibility to both sides of the trade migrating to non-FTT jurisdiction.

8/3/2014: Democracy and Inequality: A Link of Surprising Direction?


Everything written or co-authored by Daron Acemoglu is worth reading. Everything. And here is an example why. The man does not shy away from big questions in life.

"DEMOCRACY, REDISTRIBUTION AND INEQUALITY" by Daron Acemoglu, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo and James A. Robinson (Working Paper 13-24, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, October 30, 2013: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2367088) looks into the relationship between democracy, redistribution and inequality.

"We first explain the theoretical reasons why democracy is expected to increase redistribution and reduce inequality, and why this expectation may fail to be realized when democracy

  • is captured by the richer segments of the population; when it caters to the preferences of the middle class; or 
  • it opens up disequalizing opportunities to segments of the population previously excluded from such activities, thus exacerbating inequality among a large part of the population."

From theoretical reasons for differences in inequality and redistribution, the paper moves to empirical. The authors "survey the existing empirical literature, which is both voluminous and full of contradictory results. We provide new and systematic reduced-form evidence on the dynamic impact of democracy on various outcomes."

Core empirical findings are:

  1. "…there is a significant and robust effect of democracy on tax revenues as a fraction of GDP, but no robust impact on inequality." So while democracy increases taxes, it does not reduce inequality. why? Because "policy outcomes and inequality depend not just on the de jure but also the de facto distribution of power", so "those who see their de jure power eroded by democratization may sufficiently increase their investments in de facto power (e.g., via control of local law enforcement, mobilization of non-state armed actors, lobbying, and other means of capturing the party system) in order to continue to control the political process". Furthermore, "democratization can result in “Inequality-Increasing Market Opportunities”. Nondemocracy may exclude a large fraction of the population from productive occupations (e.g., skilled occupations) and entrepreneurship (including lucrative contracts) as in Apartheid South Africa or the former Soviet block countries. To the extent that there is significant heterogeneity within this population, the freedom to take part in economic activities on a more level playing field with the previous elite may actually increase inequality within the excluded or repressed group and consequently the entire society".
  2. "…we find a positive effect of democracy on secondary school enrollment and the extent of structural transformation (e.g., an impact on the nonagricultural share of employment and the nonagricultural share of output)".
  3. Very interestingly, "The evidence …points to an inequality-increasing impact of democracy in societies with a high degree of land inequality, which we interpret as evidence of (partial) capture of democratic decision making by landed elites."
  4. "We also find that inequality increases following a democratization in relatively nonagricultural societies, and also when the extent of disequalizing economic activities is greater in the global economy as measured by U.S. top income shares (though this effect is less robust)."
  5. "We also find that democracy tends to increase inequality and taxation when the middle class are relatively richer compared to the rich and poor. These correlations are consistent with Director’s Law, which suggests that democracy allows the middle class to redistribute from both the rich and the poor to itself."

"All of these are broadly consistent with a view that is different from the traditional median voter model of democratic redistribution: democracy does not lead to a uniform decline in post-tax inequality, but can result in changes in fiscal redistribution and economic structure that have ambiguous effects on inequality."




Friday, March 7, 2014

7/3/2014: How are cohorts of immigrants changing?.. 2002-2012 data


This week, CSO published 2012 data on PPSN numbers and employment status of immigrants. The data is telling, makes for uncomfortable reading, and you can explore all the details here: http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/fnaes/foreignnationalsppsnallocationsemploymentandsocialwelfareactivity2012/#.UxhZ6PTV9bs

Not to run repeats of the CSO own analysis (which is excellent), here are couple of my own insights:

Chart below shows all foreign individuals age 15+ that are either in employment or in social welfare activity, irrespective of their entry year. To strip out any possible y/y volatility, I took averages roughly corresponding to the following periods:
1) Period prior to EU Accession of EU15-25 states (2002-2004)
2) Period of the pre-crisis bubble following Accession (2005-2008) and
3) Period since the onset of the crisis (2009-2012).

I then computed share of each 'nationality' in activity as percent of the total number of nationals of this group in the country at the time.

To control for effects of the overall employment trends, I then took difference for each nationality percentage in activity to the total foreign population percentage in activity.

The result is plotted in the chart.



Arrows in the chart above show overall changes in relative activity in each group/'nationality' over the three periods, relative to overall foreign population activity rates.

For example, EU15 ex Irish and UK nationals group data shows that in 2002-2004, this group was 19.1 percentage points less likely to have been employed or have social welfare activity compared to the all foreign nationals. By 2005-2008 period this number fell to 2.7 percentage points. Over 2009-2012 this group was 8.2 percentage points more likely to have registered employment or social welfare activity than the overall foreign nationals population.

What does this show?

- Across all cohorts (by date of entry), most active engagement in 2002-2012 has been associated with the nationals of EU15-EU25 states.
- Between 2002 and 2012, the largest increase in engagement took place amongst the EU-15 ex-Irish and UK nationals
- Non-2004 Accession EU states (EU25-EU27) had a massive deterioration in activity between 2002 and 2012.
- There was also deterioration in activity for 'Other', although 2009-2012 average is -1.2, which is not far away from the average.
- Americans consistently ranked the worst in terms of overall low activity in all periods.

For a second exercise, I took same year as entry performance for each entry cohort and then once again took difference to the total. Chart below shows the results.



As measured by activity rates, only one cohort showed significant improvement over time: EU15 ex-Irish and UK nationals. Marked deterioration in quality of cohorts (by year of entry) over time is recorded for EU25-EU27 group, UK and 'Other'.

There are many caveats to interpreting the data, so the above should not be deemed reflective of some real values and qualities. When I say 'quality' in the context of data, I simply reference the extent of engagement. Not actual quality of human capital or work performance etc.

My concern, however, is that we are seeing rather predictable, steady deterioration in activity rates for all groups of foreigners, excluding EU15 ex-Irish and UK nationals.

Chart below summarises.




07/03/2014: To sterilise or not to sterilise... ECBs (possible) next dilemma


Yesterday, I was asked by a journalist a question about the possible effects of ECB non-sterilising SMP operations. 

The question was in relation to the measure that has been rumoured as being a part of the ECB’s toolkit under consideration for adoption and it is bound to come up in the next meeting of the GC.

The answer is that we do not know.

Currently, ECB is sterilising around EUR175 billion via weekly operations. Absent such sterilisations, the money will remain within the euro system banks. This is as far as we know. Beyond this point, we can only speculate as to what will happen. 

In normal monetary and balancesheet conditions, banks will lend this money out into the interbank markets, leading to reduced Eonia and, downstream also Euribor, rates. This, in turn, will increase banks willingness to lend to the real economy - businesses and households, but also to purchase government debt. Traditionally, non-sterilised market interventions are seen as an effective tool for increasing money supply in the environment of zero-bound interest rates. And there are good reasons to believe that such a measure would be more effective in raising supply of credit in the euro system than a 25bps cut in the policy rate, as it will likely have a more dramatic effect on Eonia rate and simultaneously flatten the money market curve. Additional benefit of such a measure will be the signal it will send to the markets. Removing requirement to sterilise its SMP, ECB will be signalling that it is open to the traditional QE measures - extending 'whatever it takes' argument from sovereign risk markets (OMT) to the real economy (deflation risks). This too is likely to add liquidity available in the euro system.

However, we are not in a 'normal' monetary and balancesheet environment. Increasing supply of liquidity via non-sterilising SMP can lead to banks substituting away from their normal ECB funding, and as the result, net liquidity supply may not rise by as much as the reduction in sterilisations. 

Two other, longer-term, effects of non-sterilising SMP are: potential loss of credibility and threat to OMT.

By not sterilising SMP, the ECB will signal a major departure from its past commitments, which does not help market confidence in its other commitments, namely the commitment to hold interest rates low over long term horizon. This is a relatively weak argument against non-sterilising of SMP, as all long term monetary policy commitments are only credible as long as underlying fundamentals warrant them. The second point is more salient. ECB committed itself to sterilising not only SMP but also OMT purchases. So far, ECB did not make any OMT purchases, but it already faces stern opposition to OMT from Germany. If ECB signals willingness to break its commitments to sterilisation under SMP, it can send a wrong signal on its commitments to the same under OMT, further putting pressure on ECB to scrap OMT.

Overall, materially, removing requirement to sterilise SMP will, in my view, result in a moderate drop in Eonia and will provide improved supply of credit to the economies that currently do not witness severe credit constraints, such as Germany, where current credit supply conditions are already the most favourable of any period in recent history.

But I doubt that such a measure will have a material impact on peripheral economies due to the general breakdown in the transmission mechanism within the euro area.

Crucially, if ECB opts for non-sterilisation of SMP over the option of lowering policy rates, such a move will not help existent debtors. As the result, non-sterilisation might help where help is least needed and will do little to provide any support for economies with severe corporate and household debt overhang.

Finally, along the longer range expectations, forward-looking agents will be pricing – in the wake of non-sterilisation now – higher uplift in lending rates when monetary policy returns onto normalisation path. In other words, with non-sterilisation today we can expect higher rates in the future, with sharper rises in the rates to long-term trend levels. This too will hurt current borrowers, as lender will be less likely to pass on margins uplifts they will receive if non-sterilisation does deliver reduction in the interbank lending rates.


Note: my view of the lower/reduced effectiveness of non-sterilised interventions is in line with the view held by many researchers and the ECB that we are operating in the environment with broken transmission mechanism. Application of this argument in the OMT case is exemplified here: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp4628.pdf

Thursday, March 6, 2014

6/3/2014: A New Property Building Boom for Dublin? Not So Fast...


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from March 2, 2014.


Much has been written about the alleged turnaround in the Irish house prices and property markets fortunes. With first-time buyers reportedly priced out of the market by the cash-rich investors, the commentary has been focusing on the need to deliver new supply of properties to the markets. Enter the wave of recent calls on the Government to create incentives to restart a new building boom.

Alas, new construction can do preciously little to alleviate the property markets pressures. Instead of calling for more construction permits, those interested in delivering a sustainable long-term recovery should be focusing on the resale markets. Given the causes of the current under-supply of and uneven distribution of demand for second-hand properties, it is hardly surprising that this requires dealing with the problems of legacy debts and the structure of the Irish mortgages pool.


The latest data published this month shows that the overall levels of new mortgages issued to the first-time and mover purchasers in 2013 came in at a disappointingly low level of EUR2.3 billion – the second lowest since the records began in 2005. This is almost nine times lower than at the pre-crisis peak, and around half the average levels of lending recorded in 2008-2012.

Yet, by all accounts, there is a build up of demand for properties within the first-time buyer segment of our population. This assertion is supported by empirical evidence.

In 2005-2008 average number of first-time buyer mortgages issued in Ireland stood at 7,062 per annum. In 2011-2013 the number was 1,202.  Even if we accept that half of the pre-crisis mortgages were issued to households with unsuitable risk and financial profiles, since the onset of the crisis, penned up demand for FTB mortgages has cumulated to some 9,342 or EUR 1.65 billion.

As the result of the penned up demand, rents are up, especially in Dublin and major urban areas, where jobs are now being created and where jobs destruction during the crisis peak was less pronounced. The most recent Daft.ie data showed that Dublin rents were rising at 11% a year at the end of 2013, the fastest rate of inflation since mid-2007. This implies that Dublin rents are now almost 18% above the crisis period trough. Meanwhile, outside the urban areas, jobs remain scarce and long-term unemployment is running at higher levels. Thus, excluding Dublin, rents are either stagnant or growing at significantly slower rates.

Property prices are also confirming the ongoing bifurcation in the markets between Dublin and the rest of the country. Dublin residential property prices are now 18 percent higher than at the crisis period trough. Excluding Dublin, property prices are up just 2.6 percent compared to crisis period low.

However, looking at the peak-to-present changes, residential property prices in Dublin are 49.2 percent below their peak. Excluding Dublin, the figure is 46.8 percent.



Thus, data on rents, property prices and volumes of transactions, suggest that to-date, Dublin property market has been driven by the delayed convergence to national trends. Beyond the on-going catching up, however, the property market in Ireland will remain dysfunctional.

This mis-match between demand and supply drivers will likely push the property prices even higher in Dublin over the next 24-36 months. However, absent any significant improvement in the underlying household finances, this price inflation will start flattening out in years ahead.

The reason for this conclusion is the presence of two concurrent drivers of the market.

Firstly, Dublin's demographic and economic fundamentals suggests that equilibrium prices should be somewhere around 30 percent below their pre-crisis peak. This would require prices for Dublin houses to rise by roughly a third on their current averages. Apartments prices should gain some 25 percent over the next 2-3 years to deliver equilibrium level pricing at around 45 percent below the pre-crisis peak.

Secondly, we are also witnessing separation of prices from underlying household incomes and credit supply. Ongoing long-term changes in employment and earnings push purchasing power toward urban centres and are turning rural communities into focal points of emigration for younger and more skilled workers. At the same time, the financial position of established and middle-age Irish households remains severely constrained. The overhang of legacy mortgages debts, lower after-tax earnings and continued jobs insecurity are all weighing on the credit supply, depressing the funding available for house purchases.

Parallel to these trends, we are witnessing gradual increases in the cost of funding mortgages. Based on the data from the Central Bank, retail rates on loans for house purchases over 1 year fixation in Q4 2013 averaged 4.5 percent, or almost 1 percentage point above their Q4 2009 levels. Were the ECB return its policy rates to their historical averages, current lending margins would require new mortgages interest costs in 6.5-7 percent range

Mean-reversion in the interest rates will mean that the majority of the first-time buyers in the market will not be able to secure a mortgage sufficient to cover house purchases without relying on large (ca 30 percent of the property value) down payments. Another problem is that with the cost of funding rising disproportionately for adjustable rate mortgages, keeping legacy tracker mortgages becomes more attractive to current homeowners. This, in turn, implies reduced willingness to trade up or down, depressing supply of existent properties to the market.

Supply of properties in the market is further adversely impacted by the nature of banks' solutions to the arrears crisis. Irish banks 'permanent' restructurings of arrears predominantly involve increasing the levels of debt carried by the households.

The cost of suppressing foreclosures and debt write-downs in the existent mortgages pool is the severely constrained ability of households to trade in the property markets. On the demand side, the knock-on effect is that younger households cannot rely on their parents to fund their down payments for FTB purchases.


The above problems also contribute to tighter supply of new homes to the market, especially in Dublin.

In 2013, new dwellings completions and commencements were running below those recorded in 2011-2012, based on data through Q3 2013. The overall weakness in the residential construction activity is confirmed by the CSO-reported indices. With data covering the period through Q3 2013, both value and volume of residential buildings construction and the number of planning permissions granted in Ireland are down year on year.  Estimates suggest that since the onset of the crisis penned up demand for first-time and mover purchasers has totaled around 25,000-32,000 dwellings. At current rate of new buildings completion, this is equivalent to up to 15 years of new construction supply.

Lack of funding from the zombified banks means that developers and builders cannot launch new projects. In addition, uncertainty about the future tax status of vacant sites and completed properties, as well as the dominant position of Nama in controlling access to land and development finance, are weighing heavily on potential new supply.

But beyond these supply constraints lies an even bigger problem: we simply cannot expect to build any meaningful quantity of new family homes in the areas where we need them.

In Dublin, new construction implies either building apartments blocks or redeveloping existent neighborhoods to increase density. Apartments are hardly in demand by the growing families beyond serving as a first step on the property ladder. In other words, no matter how much our planners dream about building a mini-Manhattan on the Liffey, Dublin property buyers still want individual homes with own gardens. Just as they did so at the times when property prices were double their current levels.

Demographics also stack up against us in the hope of significantly expanding apartments ownership. After 6 years of depressed volume of transactions, the new generation of First-Time Buyers is older and has larger families than their predecessors in the early 2000s. The one- and two-bedroom apartments developments that we used to produce in the past are no longer suitable for them. Furthermore, the city infrastructure – schools, crèches, shopping and family amenities – that accompanies these developments is not fit for purpose in Dublin City.

On the other hand, redevelopment of existent tracks of housing is a costly proposition that requires rapid inflation in selling prices for new homes. Crucially, it demands high turnover in the market to secure suitable redevelopment sites – something that we are unlikely to witness anytime soon. The very same constraints that hold back supply of second hand homes to the market are also holding hostage large-scale redevelopment projects.


This means that for Ireland to generate significant enough uplift in buildings supply we need to incentivise developers to build suitable apartments and for buyers to opt for these apartments. Even assuming we are successful, the resulting uplift in supply will be unlikely to enough downward pressure on property prices inflation in Dublin. In contrast, to support non-speculative demand and to free the supply of properties, we need to restructure our pool of mortgages away from tracker loans, reduce overall debt levels for current borrowers and improve after-tax incomes across the workforce. Until we do, the polarization of Irish property markets between Dublin and the rest of the country will continue.

Calling for more new construction is a naïve exercise in seeking a quick panacea to a very complex and dynamic malaise permeating every corner of our property markets.





BOX-OUT

In recent written answers to questions by Michael McGrath, TD, Minister for Finance, Michael Noonan, TD stated that the Irish State has received €10.24 billion in various proceeds from the banks since 2008. At the same time, the State shares in AIB, Bank of Ireland and Permanent TSB are currently valued at €13.35 billion. These numbers prompted some commentators to suggest that the net cost to the State of rescuing banks currently stands at EUR40.5 billion down from the originally paid-in EUR64.1 billion. Alas, this accounting misses some major points. Firstly, there is cost of funding. Based on current interest rates, the total costs of funds made available for banks recapitalisations is some EUR1.5 billion annually, with full expenditure at the peak of the capital injections running at more than double that. Tallying up these costs cuts the gross receipts by around EUR7.2 billion. Secondly, the EUR13.35 billion estimated value of the banks shares held by the Exchequer is nothing more than an estimate. Selling AIB and Ptsb shares will be an uphill battle. Even realising the value of the Bank of Ireland equity without destroying the bank's balance sheet is a hard task. Adding insult to the injury, the 'repayments' by banks claimed by Minister Noonan came at the expense of the economy at large. Instead of writing down unsustainable mortgages, restricting viable businesses' loans and supplying credit to the economy, the banks were tasked by the State to sell non-core assets to pay down state funds. Any wonder why the credit keeps shrinking, while Minister Noonan keeps talking about the need for banks to support the economy?