13/2/2014: Sticky Wages, Job Effort and Jobless Recoveries

In two posts earlier I discussed some new studies relating to the problem of a jobless recovery (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/02/1222014-jobless-recoveries-post.html) and the ICT-driven displacement of workers (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/02/1222014-ict-productivity-employment-in.html). Here is another recent study dealing with labour markets outcomes in the case of a recessionary shock.

Here is another paper on employment adjustments, this time looking at cyclical shocks and wages rigidity: "HOW STICKY WAGES IN EXISTING JOBS CAN AFFECT HIRING" by Mark Bils, Yongsung Chang, Sun-Bin Kim (NBER Working Paper 19821: http://www.nber.org/papers/w19821, January 2014).

There is much evidence that wages are sticky within employment matches, so that incumbent workers face wages that do not adjust significantly fast downward in the downturns, thus creating a wage mis-match with entry of new workers. "For instance, Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk (2014) estimate a quarterly frequency of nominal wage change, based on the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), of less than 0.2, implying an expected duration for nominal wages greater than a year."

"On the other hand, wages earned by new hires show considerably greater  flexibility. Pissarides (2009) cites eleven studies that distinguish between wage cyclicality for workers in continuing jobs versus those in new matches, seven based on U.S. data and four on European. All these studies find that wages for workers in new matches are more pro-cyclical than for those in continuing jobs."


"Consider a negative shock to aggregate productivity. If existing jobs exhibit sticky wages, then firms will ask more of these workers. In turn this lowers the marginal value of adding labor, lowering the rate of vacancy creation and new hires. Note this impact on hiring does not reflect the price of new hires, but is instead entirely a general equilibrium phenomenon. By moving the economy along a downward sloping aggregate labor demand schedule, the increased effort of current workers reduces the demand for new hires.

The result of this mechanism of adjustment is that "wage stickiness acts to raise productivity in a recession, relative to a flexible or standard sticky wage model. Thus it helps to understand why labor productivity shows so little pro-cyclicality, especially for the past 25 plus years (e.g., Van Zandweghe, 2010)."

The authors set up two versions of the model for such an adjustment.

First model allows firms "to require different effort levels across workers of all vintages… During a recession the efficient contract for new hires dictates low effort at a low wage, while matched workers, whose wages have not adjusted downward, work at an elevated pace."

In the scone variant of the model, authors "impose a technological constraint that workers of differing vintages must operate at a similar pace. For instance, it might not be plausible to have an assembly line that operates at different speeds for new versus older hires."

The study finds that the second model "generates considerable wage inertia and greater employment volatility." In other words, if contracts do not allow firms to impose greater effort requirement on new hires against incumbent workers, there will be more shocks to unemployment and stickier wages for incumbents. Or in other words, there will be a more jobless recovery.

The authors provide an example: "Again consider a negative shock to productivity, where the sticky wage prevents wage declines for past hires. The firm has the ability and incentive to require higher effort from its past hires, in lieu of any decline in their sticky wages. But, if new hires must work at
that same pace, this implies high effort for new hires as well. For reasonable parameter values we find that firms will choose to distort the contract for new hires, rather than give rents (high wages without high effort) to its current workers. This produces a great deal of aggregate wage stickiness. The sticky wage for past hires drives up their effort and thereby the effort of new hires. But, because high effort is required of new hires, their bargained wage, though flexible, will be higher as well. In subsequent periods this dynamic will continue. High effort for new hires drives up their wage, driving up their effort in subsequent periods, driving up effort and wages for the next cohort of new hires, and so forth. By generating (counter)cyclicality in effort, this model can make vacancies and new hires considerably more cyclical." (Or put differently, it creates more unemployment at the shock and retains more unemployment in the adjustment period.

Now onto empirical evidence: "There is only sparse direct evidence on cyclicality of worker effort. Anger (2011) studies paid and unpaid overtime hours in Germany for 1984 to 2004. She finds that unpaid overtime (extra) hours are highly countercyclical. This is in sharp contrast to cyclicality in
paid overtime hours. Quoting the paper: "Unpaid hours show behavior that is exactly the opposite of the movement of paid overtime." Lazear, Shaw, and Stanton (2012) examine data on productivity of individual workers at a large (20,000 workers) service company for the period June 2006 to May 2010, bracketing the Great Recession. At this company a computer keeps track of worker productivity. They find that effort is highly countercyclical, with an increase in the local unemployment rate of 5 percentage points associated with an increase in effort of 3.75%."

The authors use their model to "show that sticky wages for current matches exacerbates cyclicality of hiring when effort responds. In particular, for our benchmark calibration with common effort, the effort response markedly increases the relative cyclical response of unemployment to measured productivity. It does so by increasing the response of unemployment to productivity, but also by making measured productivity less cyclical than the underlying shock."

The authors then look at the data to see if their "model is consistent with wage productivity patterns across industries, especially the cyclical behavior of productivity in industries with more versus less flexible wages. We measure stickiness of wages by industry based on panels of workers from the Survey of Income and Program Participation for 1990 to 2011."

The study finds that 

• "productivity (TFP) is more procyclical in industries with more flexible wages"; and 
• "this impact is much greater for industries where labor is especially important as a factor of production. 
• "However, we do not see that wages are more procyclical for industries with flexible wages, suggesting that frequency of wage change may not capture wage flexibility particularly well."

12/2/2014: The Origins of Stock Market Fluctuations

An exceptionally ambitious paper on drivers of stock markets changes over long time horizon. A must-read for my students in MSc Finance and certainly going on syllabus next year. Big paper, big conclusions.


"The Origins of Stock Market Fluctuations" by Daniel L. Greenwald, Martin Lettau, and Sydney C. Ludvigson (NBER Working Paper No. 19818, January 2014, http://www.nber.org/papers/w19818).

"Three mutually uncorrelated economic shocks that we measure empirically explain 85% of the quarterly variation in real stock market wealth since 1952."

This is an unbelievably strong statement. Traditionally, little attention is given "to understanding the real (adjusted for inflation) level of the stock market, i.e., stock price variation, or the cumulation of returns over many decades. The profession spends a lot of time debating which risk factors drive expected excess returns, but little time investigating why real stock market wealth has evolved to its current level compared to 30 years ago. To understand the latter, it is necessary to probe beyond the role of stationary risk factors and short-run expected returns, to study the primitive economic shocks from which all stock market (and risk factor) fluctuations originate."

"Stock market wealth evolves over time in response to the cumulation of both transitory expected return and permanent cash flow shocks. The crucial unanswered questions are, what are the economic sources of these shocks? And what have been their relative roles in evolution of the stock market over time?"

The authors use "a model to show that they are the observable empirical counterparts to three latent primitive shocks: a total factor productivity shock, a risk aversion shock that is unrelated to aggregate consumption and labor income, and a factors share shock that shifts the rewards of production between workers and shareholders."

And the core conclusions are: "On a quarterly basis, risk aversion shocks explain roughly 75% of variation in the log difference of stock market wealth, but the near-permanent factors share shocks plays an increasingly important role as the time horizon extends. We find that more than 100% of the increase since 1980 in the deterministically detrended log real value of the stock market, or a rise of 65%, is attributable to the cumulative effects of the factors share shock, which persistently redistributed rewards away from workers and toward shareholders over this period."

This is a huge result. "Indeed, without these shocks, today's stock market would be about 10% lower than it was in 1980. By contrast, technological progress that rewards both workers and shareholders plays a smaller role in historical stock market fluctuations at all horizons."

And on the risk aversion shocks? Uncorrelated with consumption or its second moments, these shocks "largely explain the long-horizon predictability of excess stock market returns found in data."

"These findings are hard to reconcile with models in which time-varying risk premia arise from habits or stochastic consumption volatility."

Massively important paper.

12/2/2014: ICT, Productivity & Employment in the US Manufacturing

More recent research, to follow up on previous post (which dealt with jobless recoveries). This time around on the key issue of workers displacement by technology.

"RETURN OF THE SOLOW PARADOX? IT, PRODUCTIVITY, AND EMPLOYMENT IN U.S. MANUFACTURING" by Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon H. Hanson and Brendan Price (NBER Working Paper 19837, http://www.nber.org/papers/w19837 from January 2014) looks into the validity of the 'technological discontinuity' paradigm - the one that "suggests that IT-induced technological changes are rapidly raising productivity while making workers redundant."

Here's the justification of the tested thesis: "An increasingly influential “technological-discontinuity” paradigm suggests that IT-induced technological changes are rapidly raising productivity while making workers redundant. This paper explores the evidence for this view among the IT-using US manufacturing industries."

Basic argument here is that modern workplace is continuing to become more automated, transformed by the ICT capital. Two implications of this are:

"First, all sectors—but particularly IT-intensive sectors—are experiencing major increases in productivity. Thus, Solow’s paradox is long since resolved: computers are now everywhere in our productivity statistics."

"Second, IT-powered machines will increasingly replace workers, ultimately leading to a substantially smaller role for labor in the workplace of the future. Adding urgency to this argument, labor’s share of national income has fallen in numerous developed and developing countries over roughly the last three decades, a phenomenon that Karabarbounis and Neiman (forthcoming) attribute to IT-enabled declines in the relative prices of investment goods. And many scholars have pointed to the seeming “decoupling” between robust U.S. productivity growth and sclerotic or negligible growth rates of median U.S. worker compensation (Fleck, Glaser and Sprague 2011) as evidence that the “race against the machine” has already been run—and that workers have lost."


Top conclusion of the paper: "There is some limited support for more rapid productivity growth in IT-intensive industries depending on the exact measures, though not since the late 1990s."

But there are some serious nuances involved.

"We find, unexpectedly, that earlier “resolutions” of the Solow paradox may have neglected certain paradoxical features of IT-associated productivity increases, at least in U.S. manufacturing." Of these, the paper highlights two:

"First, focusing on IT-using (rather than IT-producing) industries, the evidence for faster productivity growth in more IT-intensive industries is somewhat mixed and depends on the measure of IT intensity used. There is also little evidence of faster productivity growth in IT-intensive industries after the late 1990s.

"Second and more importantly, to the extent that there is more rapid growth of labor productivity (ln(Y=L)) in IT-intensive industries, this is associated with declining output (ln Y ) and even more rapidly declining employment (lnL). If IT is indeed increasing productivity and reducing costs, at the very least it should also increase output in IT-intensive industries. As this does not appear to be the case, the current resolution of the Solow paradox does not appear to be what adherents of the technological-discontinuity view had in mind."

In other words: "Most challenging to this paradigm, and our expectations, is that output contracts in IT-intensive industries relative to the rest of manufacturing. Productivity increases, when detectable, result from the even faster declines in employment."

Goes some miles explaining the declining role of primary labour… 

12/2/2014: Jobless Recoveries post-Financial Crises: Solutions Menu?

Next few posts will be touching on some interesting new research papers in economics and finance… in no particular order. Please note, no endorsement or peer review analysis from me here.

To start with: NBER WP 19683 (http://www.nber.org/papers/w19683) by Calvo, G., Coricelli, F. and Ottonello, P. "JOBLESS RECOVERIES DURING FINANCIAL CRISES: IS INFLATION THE WAY OUT?" from November 2013.

The paper discusses 3  traditional policy tools to mitigate jobless recoveries during financial crises: 

• inflation
• real devaluation of the currency, and  
• credit-recovery policies. 

The nominal exchange rate devaluation tool not being available to the euro area economies independently of the ECB, we have by now heard a lot about inflation (the need for). At the same time, real devaluation tool includes fabled European cost-competitiveness measures. 

Here's the pre-cursor to the paper: "The slow rate of employment growth relative to that of output is a sticking point in the recovery from the financial crisis episode that started in 2008 in the US and Europe (a phenomenon labeled “jobless recovery”). The issue is a particularly burning one in Europe where some observers claim that problem economies (like Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal) would be better off abandoning the euro and gaining competitiveness through steep devaluation. This would be a momentous decision for Europe and the rest of the world because, among other things, it may set off an era of competitive devaluation and tariff war."

Hypotheticals aside, the study starts by "digging more deeply into the relationship between inflation and jobless recovery, also considering the possible role of real currency depreciation and resource reallocation (between tradables and non-tradables)."

As authors note: "This discussion is particularly relevant for countries that, being in the Eurozone, cannot follow a nominal currency depreciation policy to mitigate high unemployment rates 

(e.g. Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal)."

First finding is that there is "some evidence suggesting that large inflationary spikes (not a higher inflation plateau) help employment recovery. Even in high-inflation episodes, inflation typically returns to its pre-crisis levels…" so the effects of the induced inflation wear out quasi-automatically.

Second finding is that "(independent of inflation) financial crises are associated with real currency depreciation (i.e., the rise in the real exchange rate) from output peak to recovery. This shows that the relative price of non-tradables fails to recover along with output even if the real wage does not fall, as is the case in low-inflation financial crisis episodes. This implies that, contrary to widespread views, nominal currency depreciation may eliminate joblessness only if it generates enough inflation to create a contraction in real wages; real currency depreciation or sector reallocation might not be sufficient to avoid jobless recovery if all sectors are subject to binding credit 

constraints that put labor at a disadvantage with respect to capital." In other words, there goes Argentina's fabled hope for recovery via devaluations.

Third finding extends the second one to the case closer to euro area peripherals: "Similarly, for countries with fixed exchange rates, “internal” or fiscal devaluations during financial crises are likely to work more through reductions in labor costs than changes in relative prices and sectoral reallocation obtained through taxes and subsidies affecting differentially tradable and non-tradable sectors." In other words, internal devaluations work, and they work via cost competitiveness gains and exporting sector repricing relative to domestic.

Tricky thing, though: "However, neither nominal nor real wage flexibility can avoid the adverse effects of financial crises on labor markets, as wage flexibility determines the distribution of the burden of the adjustment between employment and real wages, but does not relieve the burden from wage earners." which means that a jobless recovery is more likely under internal devaluation scenario.

Fourth finding: "Our findings highlight the difficulty in simultaneously preventing jobless and wageless recoveries, and suggest that if the goal is to avoid jobless recovery, the first line of action should be an attempt to relax credit constraints." Oops… but credit constraints are not being relaxed in the case of collapsed financial systems and debt overhang-impacted households in the likes of Ireland.

More on this: "Only direct credit policies that tackle the root of the problem seem to be able to help unemployment and wages simultaneously. …common sense suggests the following conjectures. In advanced economies, quantitative easing operations, especially if they involve the purchase of “toxic” assets, can have an effect on increasing firms’ collateral and relaxing credit constraints that affect employment recovery." But, of course, in Ireland these measures failed to trigger such outcomes - Nama has been set up for two years now and credit restart is still missing. May be one might consider the fact that targeting of bad assets purchases is needed? May be buying up wasteful real estate assets was not a good idea and instead we should have pursued purchases and restructuring of mortgages? Sort of what Iceland (partially and with caveats) did?

Overall, tough conclusions all around. 

11/2/2014: Greek Bailout 3.0 or a Fix 1.4: Ifo Assessment

In light of Bloomberg report on new package of supports for Greece being planned (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-05/eu-said-to-weigh-extending-greek-loans-to-50-years.html), German institute Ifo issued a neat summary note.

The core supports being discussed in the EU are: extending term of the loans to 50 years, and lowering the interest cost of loans by 50bps.

Here's a summary via Ifo:

• As of December 2013 "Greece had received 213.4 billion euros from two bailout packages."
• First package was May 2010 Greek Loan Facility (GLF) comprising a loan of ca 73 billion euros, disbursed in December 2011. "Of this sum 52.9 billion euros was loaned in the form of bilateral credit between Greece and the other countries of the Eurozone (excluding Slovakia, Estonia and Latvia), while a further 20.3 billion euros was provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)."
• Second package was extended in February 2012 in the form of credit from the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). "By December 2013 133.6 billion euros of this second package had been paid out. Moreover, the IMF also increased its financial assistance to Greece by 6.6 billion euros during this period."

In addition, Greece already restructured 52.9 billion euro of the GLF. Original loans were issued for 5 years term at an interest rate equivalent to the 3-month Euribor plus an interest rate margin of 3 percentage points for the first three years and 4 percentage points for the remaining years.

• "The term of all loans was subsequently extended to 7.5 years in June 2011 and the interest rate margin was reduced by 1 percentage point." 
• Subsequently, in February 2012 "the term was extended to 15 years and the margin was reduced to 1.5 percentage points for all further interest payments". 
• In November 2012 the GLF lenders "doubled the term of the loans to 30 years and reduced the interest rate margin to 0.5 percentage points. 

So in effect, Greece had: 2 Bailouts and 3 adjustments to-date.

By Ifo estimates, the above revisions reduced real debt under the GLF by 12 billion euros.
"The envisaged further relaxation of credit conditions for the 52.9 billion euros of the Greek Loan Facility - with an extension of the term to 50 years and a reduction of the margin to 0 percentage points would entail further losses of around 9 billion euros for European creditors." 

10/2/2014: Data shows Irish R&D policy is not exactly producing...

Today, Grant Thornton published their review of the Irish R&D Tax Credits policy, available here: http://www.grantthornton.ie/db/Attachments/Review-of-RandD-tax-credit-regime.pdf?utm_content=buffer1e77c&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer

Top level conclusions:

• "60% of the companies that responded to the survey were indigenous Irish companies with 40% multinationals"
• "35% of companies conducting R&D activities engaged in joint research projects with other parties in 2011"
• "with 19.5% being activities with higher education or institutes within Ireland and 8% outside Ireland"
• "70% of claims are by companies with less than 50 employees"
• "large companies with employees of more than 250 employees account for 10% of claims made. However they account for 45% of claims on a monetary basis"

"The credit is a largely positive scheme with real value being added to the economy from it."

My view: too much of subsidy to MNCs, too little evidence the scheme is not being used by SMEs to fund activity that would have been funded anyway and too little evidence the scheme is being used to fund genuine R&D rather than business development.

But aside from this, there is little evidence that funding is yielding any serious uptick in intellectual property generation. Here's the latest data from the NewMorningIP on patents filings in Ireland.

Based on quarterly aggregates, in Q4 2013, total number of Irish academic patents hit the lowest reading of 48 and the goal number of filed patents match this performance at 593. Irish inventions overall sunk to the lowest level of 236 (previous low was 252 for Q3 2012, imputed on incomplete data). Patents applications by non-academic filers stood at 188 - the lowest level in data series.

Overall, in 2013, there were 2561 patents applications, of which Irish total filings amounted to 1072 (41.9%) and of which Irish non-academic patents applications were just 860 (33.6%). This is hardly stellar and cannot be deemed sustainable for the economy that is allegedly based on innovation. It also makes clear that current system of R&D incentives and supports, including tax credit, is not working.

10/2/2014: Six Years to Admit the Obvious? Call in Europe...

There are two things to be said about the latest comments from Euro area's chief banking regulator, Danièle Nouy issued recently (see FT's piece from yesterday: "Let weak banks die, says eurozone super-regulator" for more):

• They are so trivially obvious, that given it took EU 'leaders' 6 years to come up with them, one has to wonder if the EU mandarins have any capacity to supervise banks in the first place, and
• Danièle Nouy deserves praise for speaking to the reality.

Here are the main points of what she said:

1. “One of the biggest lessons of the current crisis is that there is no risk-free asset, so sovereigns are not risk-free assets. That has been demonstrated, so now we have to react.” Correct. But don't expect any change soon. 
2. On the upcoming ECB tests: some banks need to fail for tests to be credible. 
3. “We have to accept that some banks have no future,” she said, parrying speculation that a wave of consolidation could save the currency bloc’s weakest lenders. “We have to let some disappear in an orderly fashion, and not necessarily try to merge them with other institutions.”

You'd think all of the above should be trivial. And you would be right. Which makes the fact that these statements are front-page news in Europe ever so more amazing.

10/2/2014: Irish Services & Manufacturing PMI, January 2014

While on the topic of PMIs (see Construction PMIs update here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/02/1022014-ulster-bank-construction-pmis.html), let's update also Manufacturing and Services PMIs data.

Services:

• January Services PMI index slipped slightly to 61.5 from 61.8 in December 2013. The deterioration was not material from statistical point of view, so the index remains effectively at the high level for the last 12 months.
• 3mo MA through January 2014 was 60.1 - above 56.2 in the same period through January 2013, and ahead of 3mo MA through November 2013. This is good news as it allows for some correction in monthly series volatility.
• The series are above their crisis-period trend and are still trending up.
• The index is now above 50.0 since August 2012 - a solid performance, with the rates of growth being on average above 60.0 since at least July 2013.

Manufacturing: 

• January Manufacturing PMI index also moderated to 52.8 from 53.5 in December 2013, with this moderation being significant, albeit shallow.
• On a 3mo MA average, index is at 52.9, which is ahead of 51.4 in the same period of 2013 and is ahead of the 3mo MA through November 2013.
• The index readings have rested above 50.0 nominally since June 2013, although they are significantly (statistically) above 50.0 for a shorter period of time, from somewhere around September 2013.

Overall, January posted slowdown in both indices growth, and 3mo MA for growth rates in the index is now negative for Manufacturing, and moderately positive for Services.

Longer-range good news is highlighted in the next chart, showing that in January 2014, levels of two PMIs were consistent with expansion across both sectors, contrasting the situation in January 2012 and January 2013.

Top level conclusion: The numbers show a good start to 2014, but Manufacturing remains a weaker point for the economy. Given monthly volatility in the indices, we need to see more data from PMIs to call the 2014 trends


As usual, the caveats apply: I have no data on sub-components of both PMIs - the core information that is no longer being made public by Investec and Markit (the publishers of the two series). Unfortunately, this means I no longer cover the two organisations' analysis of the components as these are unverifiable and statistically no longer testable.

10/2/2014: Ulster Bank Construction PMIs: January 2014

Ulster Bank Construction PMIs are out today with a massive hype over the numbers sweeping official analysts circles. Let's take the numbers in:

• Housing Activity index in January hit 59.8, which is statistically above 50.0 and marks 7th consecutive month of nominal readings above 50.0, although two of these months were not statistically significantly different from 50.0. Nonetheless, good news. 3mo MA through January 2014 is now at 61.1 (very healthy) against previous 3mo MA of 58.3. And 6mo MA is at 59.7 above 43.4 6mo MA through January 2013. Again, good numbers. However, the activity growth rates have slipped m/m, down from 63.2 in December 2013 - a significant fall of 3.4 points. Another key caveat here is that activity is rebounding from extremely low levels, so we can expect a big bounce. The encouraging news is that the bounce is sustained over 7 months and as the first chart below shows - it is robust and well above the upward-sloping long run trend.
• Commercial sector activity is also above 50.0 in January at 59.3. Overall dynamics are very similar to those in the Housing sub-sector. The index is now above 50.0 nominally for 6 consecutive months, with five of these being statistically significantly ahead of 50.0. 3mo MA is 60.5 (high) and compares favourably to 3mo MA through November 2013 which stands at 56.2. But, again, monthly change in the index shows slower growth in January (59.3) than in December 2013 (62.3). And low levels of activity for the starting point are also suggesting this to be a sustained rebound, consistent dynamically with normal recovery. Good news is that the series are still well above the long run upward trend line.

• Civil Engineering sub-index disappointed once again. In January 2014 index fell to 37.3 - the first time we have the reading below 40 since July 2013. This is plain ugly, as the index fell from 43.2 in December. We have not seen any growth in the Civil Engineering sub sector in any month since January 2009. Poor dynamics are confirmed by 3mo MA, 6mo MA and 12 mo MA - in other words, any way you take this data - it is bad.

• Overall construction sector activity index slipped to 56.4 in January 2014 from 58.3 in December 2013. There is much hoopla in official comments about December reading being 'huge', and it was strong, but it was way weaker than the top readings over the last 6 months across all subcomponents (61.7 in Housing activity recorded in October 2013) and it was only the 3rd highest reading for the overall index in the last 6 months. In other words, it was strong, but it was not spectacular. Worse, at 56.4 we are now below 3mo MA and bang on with the 6mo MA. Good news - we are still above the upward-sloping long run trend line. This is the fifth month of readings over 50.0 and all five were statistically significant.

So top of the line summary for indices: we have good readings in overall index and two sub-components, and a very poor reading in one subcomponent. No need for any spin here - net sector activity is positive and it has been sustained over few months now. Let's hope this continues so we can set aside any fears of the latest improvements being a 'dead cat bounce'.

9/2/2014: WLASze: Weekend Links on Arts, Sciences, and zero economics

This is WLASze: Weekend Links on Arts, Sciences, and zero economics. Enjoy!


The new show “Italian Futurism, 1909-1944: Reconstructing the Universe” (http://www.guggenheim.org/new-york/exhibitions/upcoming/italian-futurism-1909-1944-reconstructing-the-universe) is worthy enough of a post of its own, but to make things even more exciting, the Guggenheim has managed a really rare turn. The museum got the first ever loan of five major Futurist murals Palermo, Sicily. The murals never left their home at Palermo's post office in their entire history since they were painted for the office back in 1933-1934.

The murals are of huge importance in the history of futurism. They were pinter by Benedetta Cappa - a brilliant artist in her own right, but also a close companion (and indeed a wife) of Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, the founder the Futurist movement in 1909 and the author of the Futurist Manifesto, published in 1934.

There are days I wish I could get into a car and drive to NYC, like in the old times of my Baltimore years…


I meant for some time to post a link to the best article covering the recent 'controversy' stirred by Dasha Zhukova (Russian contemporary art collector and gallerist). And so here it is:
http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/jonathanjonesblog/2014/jan/21/racist-chair-bjarne-melgaard-dasha-zhukova?CMP=twt_gu

I can't add much to the above. Only that it is one of the examples why The Guardian is in the league of its own when it comes to covering art.

The offending chair and its author:
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/11/arts/design/bjarne-melgaard-ignorant-transparencies.html?_r=1&
http://www.saatchigallery.com/artists/bjarne_melgaard.htm
http://galleristny.com/2013/10/bjarne-melgaard-ignorant-transparencies-at-gavin-browns-enterprise/

And his entry at Lyon Biennale in 2012

I find his work interesting, albeit inconsistent… which is common with 'shock art' in general…

But I also find the PC Brigade censorship-happy means for promoting what often are noble ideas before the PC Brigade gets to them to be damaging to liberty and freedom, including the basic freedom of expression. There is art and then there is politics and ideology - keep the latter two from the former, especially if you want to keep politicians out of your private lives in general. You cannot be a consistent rights advocate and yet deny the rights of artistic expression. Taste, messages etc do not enter into this consideration. So go ahead and have a good debate as to whether Melgaard's work is art or not. Have a hissy fit about whether it is tasteful or not. But don't overreach out into confusing aesthetics with ethics - it is none of your's business. It is artists and her's/his alone.


A very interesting non-technical essay about the work of Jeremy England (MIT, Physics) on the capacity of organic carbon compounds to capture energy more efficiently than inorganic carbon.
https://www.simonsfoundation.org/quanta/20140122-a-new-physics-theory-of-life/

The crux of this is that "“You start with a random clump of atoms, and if you shine light on it for long enough, it should not be so surprising that you get a plant,” England said.

England’s theory is meant to underlie, rather than replace, Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection, which provides a powerful description of life at the level of genes and populations. “I am certainly not saying that Darwinian ideas are wrong,” he explained. “On the contrary, I am just saying that from the perspective of the physics, you might call Darwinian evolution a special case of a more general phenomenon.”"

Here's the actual paper: http://www.englandlab.com/uploads/7/8/0/3/7803054/2013jcpsrep.pdf I confess - I can't make head or tail of it… and here is his talk on the topic: http://www.englandlab.com/uploads/7/8/0/3/7803054/tech2014.pdf

Apparently, according to people much better suited to read through England's physics: "The “big hope” is that he has identified the underlying physical principle driving the origin and evolution of life".



And as if the season of Big Ideas is upon us, Stephen Hawkins is back in the news with another ground-breaking paper… this time around rejecting his own previous work...
http://www.nature.com/news/stephen-hawking-there-are-no-black-holes-1.14583


Event horizons exist in life too. And just as, apparently, in physics of the black holes, they are not all that inescapable... One good example is death. Usually that puts an end to the inflow of work from an artist or a scientist. But occasionally, there is gravity-defying quality to artist's or scientist's thought and work and the event horizon is just not powerful enough…

One near-example is a long-forgotten and rarely published interview with Vladimir Nabokov or rather not an interview, a Q&A:
http://www.brainpickings.org/index.php/2013/01/18/vladimir-nabokov-james-mossman-interview/
Recorded in 1969, published first in 1973 and, as far as I am aware, not published too frequently since… Nabokov, of course, has breached the event horizon very formally not long ago, with publication of The Original of Laura (http://www.amazon.com/Original-Laura-Vladimir-Nabokov/dp/030747285X).

But the latest event horizon breach record obviously goes to J.D. Salinger. The man has reached out of the grave over the last 12 months on a number of occasions. The most recent one is acquisition by the University of Texas of 21 previously unpublished letters by the writer: http://blog.chron.com/bookish/2014/01/ut-acquires-21-previously-unpublished-letters-by-j-d-salinger/ and more here: http://www.torontosun.com/2014/01/18/jd-salinger-laments-famous-status-in-personal-letters

And last year we had a public release of Salinger's will concerning the forthcoming publication of his last five books between 2015 and 2020.


Oh, and speaking of Baltimore, the good old BMA - renovated and reopened - is hosting a small, but very interesting exhibition of 25 works by Morris Louis - the leading figure of New York School-affiliated group of artists, known as  the Washington Color School. Louis, who was born, raised and educated in Baltimore and worked primarily in Washington D.C. is rarely shown outside the individual pieces in major collections or as a part of larger period-linked exhibitions. Yet he is one of the majors in the American art and in the 20th century Art History overall.

On show his less known works, such as (L-R): Untitled 5-76, 1956 and Silver III, 1953

as well as the 'iconic' Dalet Beth 'veil' painting:

Here is his page at the MoMA collection: http://www.moma.org/collection/artist.php?artist_id=3607

9/2/2014: Economics of Olympic Games: Part 4: Income Prices and Corporate Returns

In Part 1 I covered the macroeconomic impact of Olympics (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/02/822014-economics-of-olympic-games-part.html) while Part focused on labour market impact and the effect of the games on the host city (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/02/822014-economics-of-olympic-games-part_8.html). Part 3 covered the cost overruns (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/02/822014-economics-of-olympic-games-part_1467.html).


In this part, summary of some research on the Olympics from the micro-economic perspective of participation determinants and business returns.


So what is the underlying income dynamic linked to participation of athletes in Olympic Games? Johnson, Daniel K. N. and Ali, Ayfer, A Tale of Two Seasons: Participation and Medal Counts at the Summer and Winter Olympic Games (January 2002. Wellesley College Department of Economics Working Paper 2002-02: http://ssrn.com/abstract=297544) "examines the post-War Summer and Winter Olympic Games in order to determine the economic and political determinants of national participation, of female participation in particular, and of success at the Games (i.e., medal counts). Compared to the Summer Games, Winter participation levels are driven more by income and less by population, have less host nation bias and a greater effect of climate."

"Roughly similar factors determine medal count success, although single party and communist regimes win far more medals (and gold medals) in both seasons than can be attributed to other factors."

"We find no large significant differences between types of athletic events (e.g. luge versus nordic skiing). We estimate that major participating nations requires a $260 rise in income per capita to send an extra participant. Similarly the "cost" of an extra medal is $1700 per capita and $4750 per capita for an additional gold medal."

For all these Olympic 'spirits' and 'values', we have an old-fashioned playground for the rich nations when it comes to medals. No, the 'best' don't win, unless they are also backed by the richest...


Of course, the richest require returns on their Olympic investments, if not public, then private, right? So Olympics should be a serious business when it comes to delivering returns on corporate spend. Right?

Frame, W. Scott and Farrell, Kathleen A., The Value of Olympic Sponsorships: Who is Capturing the Gold?. (Journal of Market-Focused Management, Vol. 2, No. 2, November 1997: http://ssrn.com/abstract=282975)

"In recent years, corporate sponsorship has become an increasingly important element of the marketing communications mix. This paper uses data from the 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympic Games to measure the value of Olympic sponsorship."

And they find that: "Using stock return data, …the shareholders of sponsoring firms earn negative average abnormal returns around announcement of Olympic sponsorship agreements. This finding, consistent with an agency cost explanation of corporate investment practices, is robust to variation in a number of firm- and sponsorship-specific variables. In addition, cross-sectional analysis supports the monitoring hypothesis, as significant equity ownership by institutional investors is positively related to abnormal returns around announcement."

All of which means that the study "results suggest that utilizing Olympic sponsorships in the marketing communications mix may not be value-enhancing."


And more on same: Molchanov, Alexander and Stork, Philip A. and Zeng, Victor, The 2008 Beijing Olympic Sponsorships: Value for Money? (October 6, 2010. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1649132)  "use event study methodology to assess the net economic value of 2008 Beijing Olympic Games sponsorships." And with that they found that "investors judge the benefits that accrue to sponsoring companies to be commensurate with the expenses, as evidenced by insignificant announcement date abnormal returns. Furthermore, on the Games opening ceremony date the domestic sponsors’ share prices fall significantly while the international sponsors on average experience positive returns. The domestic firms’ sponsorship decision may have been based on national pride and emotional commitment, rather than on profit maximization."


So Olympics is more about pride than about tangible returns or development or growth or people or host cities or… well, pretty much everything else… And more: Olympic Games are economically inefficient allocations of funds for both public and private sector players involved... Now, there a harmony of sorts...

8/2/2014: Economics of Olympic Games: Part 3: Cost Overruns

In Part 1 I covered the macroeconomic impact of Olympics (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/02/822014-economics-of-olympic-games-part.html) while Part focused on labour market impact and the effect of the games on the host city (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/02/822014-economics-of-olympic-games-part_8.html)

So now, on to business case (cost-benefit and cost) estimates…

Remember all the cost overruns in Sochi? Spectacular, right? Unprecedented, right?

Flyvbjerg, Bent and Stewart, Allison, Olympic Proportions: Cost and Cost Overrun at the Olympics 1960-2012 (June 1, 2012. Saïd Business School Working Papers, Oxford: University of Oxford, 23 pp: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2238053) looked at whether "different types of megaprojects have different cost overruns?

"In this study, we set out to investigate cost overruns in the Olympic Games. To do so, we examined the costs of the Games over half a century, including both summer and winter Olympics. We looked at the evolution of final reported costs and compared these to the costs established in the Games bids, submitted to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) up to seven years before the Games occurred. In so doing we established the largest dataset of its kind, and documented for the first time in a consistent fashion the costs and cost overruns for the Olympic Games, from 1960 to 2012."

So the findings are: "We discovered that the Games stand out in two distinct ways compared to other megaprojects:

1. The Games overrun with 100 per cent consistency. No other type of megaproject is this consistent regarding cost overrun. Other project types are typically on budget from time to time, but not the Olympics. 
2. With an average cost overrun in real terms of 179 per cent – and 324 per cent in nominal terms – overruns in the Games have historically been significantly larger than for other types of megaprojects, including infrastructure, construction, ICT, and dams." 

Or more succinctly: "The data thus show that for a city and nation to decide to host the Olympic Games is to take on one of the most financially risky type of megaproject that exists, something that many cities and nations have learned to their peril."

But, of course, London 2012 Games were different, right, cause that what is being claimed vis-a-vis Sochi 2014 experience… Err… "For the London 2012 Games, we find that:

1. With sports-related real costs currently estimated at USD14.8 billion, London is on track to become the most costly Olympics ever. 
2. With a projected cost overrun of 101 per cent in real terms, overrun for London is below the historical average for the Games, but not significantly so. 
3. The London cost overrun is, however, significantly higher than overruns for recent Games since 1999. London therefore is reversing a positive trend of falling cost overruns for the Games."

Sochi 2014 cost-benefit estimates are actually provided here: Pilipenko, Igor V., The Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics: The Cost-Benefit Analysis and Ways to Improve the Project Efficiency (September 25, 2013. Electronic Publications of Pan-European Institute, 4/2013, (ISSN 1795-5076), 52 p: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2333902)