28/6/2013: Underlying dynamics in Irish GDP & GNP: Q1 2013

Q1 2013 National Accounts do not make for a pleasant reading. The implications from the business cycle perspective are pretty clear - we are in a continued (3rd quarter in a row) recession, which constitutes the fourth 'dip' since the onset of the Great Recession. The post summarising that evidence is linked here.

In this post, let's take a look at the GDP and GNP in constant prices.

On seasonally-adjusted basis (removing seasonal volatility),

• GDP at constant factor cost (national output ex-taxes and subsidies) fell 0.65% q/q in Q1 2013, having contracted 0.12% q/q in previous quarter. On an annual basis, the GDP at factor cost declined 1.32% in Q1 2013, accelerating annual rate of decline relative to Q4 2012 when it fell 1.04%.
• Compared to Q1 2011, when the current Government came to power, GDP at factor cost was 0.72% higher in Q1 2013.
• Taxes rose 1.04% q/q in Q1 2013, after having posted a decline of 0.64% in Q4 2012. On an annual basis, taxes were down 0.79% in Q4 2012, but they rose 2.32% in Q1 2013.
• Compared to Q1 2011, taxes were up 1.16% in Q1 2013.
• To summarise the above, austerity is clearly biting. Taxes are rising at a 60% faster rate than economic activity.
• Subsidies remained relatively constant in Q1 2013 on an annual basis, implying that net taxes rose strongly.
• GDP at constant prices (accounting for taxes net of subsidies - the headline metric usually referenced as GDP) fell 0.58% q/q in Q1 2013, which follows a shallower contraction of 0.18% recorded in Q4 2012. On an annual basis, GDP contracted by 1.03% in Q1 2013, following a 1.02% contraction in Q4 2012.
• Net factor income for the Rest of World (outflows to the rest of the world from factor payments, net of inflows of Irish incomes earned abroad) fell dramatically in Q1 2013, down 16.96% q/q, following a 3.22% decline q/q in Q4 2012. In year-on-year terms, net outflows fell 16.55% in Q4 2012 and by 27.58% in Q1 2013. 
• It is impossible to tell from QNA the core drivers of the net outflows, however, from the balance of payments data we have reinvested earnings in Q1 2013 by the foreign companies in Ireland at EUR4,753 million, up on EUR4,010 million in Q4 2012 and down on EUR6,768 million in Q1 2012. The gap of Repatriations of earnings from Ireland are not provided for Q1 2013.
• On foot of significantly reduced outflow of funds abroad, GNP at constant market prices rose in Q1 2013 rose 2.85% q/q and 5.46% y/y, beating growth of 0.51% q/q and 3.01% y/y recorded in Q4 2012. 
• However, as analysis in the subsequent posts will show, this growth is entirely dependent on reduced outflows of funds abroad. Q/q, net expatriation of funds slowed down by EUR1,204 million, while earnings outflows abroad shrunk by EUR2,015 million.
• Taking the average net factor payments abroad for Q1 2010-2012 in place of Q1 2013 figure, GNP growth controlling for net factor payments changes would have been around -0.01% y/y and -2.48% q/q.

Charts below summarise seasonally unadjusted series:

The chart below clearly shows that even in y/y terms, we are now in a solid, three-quarters long (so far_ recession.

The GDP/GNP gap has, predictably - given the shrinking of net factor payments abroad - declined from 25-26 percent (seasonally-adjusted and unadjusted) in Q1 2012 to 17.3-17.5 percent in Q1 2013:

It is worth noting in the chart above a significant increase in volatility in the gap, which is reflective of the greater volatility in Ireland's GDP and GNP series as well as destabilisation in growth correlation between GDP and GNP. This new pattern is most pronounced starting with Q1 2008 and is associated with both - the crisis and the underlying re-distribution of growth drivers away from the domestic economy to services exports, especially during the 2010-2011 'recovery'.

27/6/2013: Quadru-Sextu-ple-dip Recession in Ireland: Q1 2013

All you need to know about today's QNA data release (though it won't deter me from more detailed analysis later) is:

• Ireland is in a quadruple-dip recession (chart below)
• You and I are in a sextuple-dip recession (second chart below)

Incidentally, just in case you felt like previous 'expansion' (officially from Q1 2010 through Q2 2012) was not much of an expansion at all, then you live in the world we inhabit, closely related to the Gross Domestic Demand. If you felt things were just fine then, you might live in Australia, or read too much of the Department of Finance presentations on their web site, or... I have no idea...

As I commented on earlier post by Brian Lucey: That light at the end of the tunnel did turn out to be an incoming train...

Update: Meanwhile, Minister Noonan thinks that the above (3 consecutive quarters of contraction in the economy, official fourth dip in the Great Recession and 6th dip in Total Domestic Demand) is "certainly disappointing but it's one set of statistics" (link). How long till Enda pops up to greet us with Dude's famous return: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QsogswrH6ck

25/6/2013: ECR Latest scores

Euromoney Country Risk scores, latest changes (higher score implies lower risk):


UP:
Luxembourg score 87.21 up by (+0.22)
Canada score 82.47 up by (+0.12)
US score 75.53 up by (+0.10)
Chile score 75.18 up by (+0.06)
Belgium score 71.69 up by (+0.03)


DOWN:
Greece score 34.08 down by (-0.01)
Spain score 53.60 down by (-0.01)
Finland score 84.39 down by (-0.03)
Italy score 55.26 down by (-0.03)
Portugal score 50.81 down by (-0.03)
UK score 72.53 down by (-0.03)

Australia score 81.53 down by (-0.04)
Japan score 68.02 down by (-0.04)
India score 52.47 down by (-0.05)
Austria score 79.77 down by (-0.06)
Netherlands score 81.51 down by (-0.06)
Sweden score 86.55 down by (-0.07)

China score 59.49 down by (-0.10)
France score 71.93 down by (-0.10)
Malta score 66.30 down by (-0.21)
Brazil score 59.81 down by (-0.27)

26/6/2013: SVT was the only form of property tax promised to the Troika

The previous Government of the FF/GP did not shower itself in a glory of competence. However, someone recently sent me a document from the Department of Finance which clearly shows that when it came to structuring the tax changes under the Troika programme, the FF/GP Government did understand the arguments in favour of the Site Value Tax (as opposed to the Property Tax) that were presented to them by, among others, myself.

http://www.finance.gov.ie/documents/publications/other/2012/eulettertrichet.pdf page 2 contains a reference solely to the Site Value Tax and no reference to the property tax.

This implies that the Troika had no objection to the SVT being the only tax on real estate in Ireland, and that the currently instituted system of property taxation (that exempts large land ownership from tax and induces a system of charges wholly unrelated to economic, environmental and social costs of property) was installed based on the current Government decision absent any pressure or compulsion from the Troika.

You can read on the benefits of SVT over the traditional property tax here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2029515

25/6/2013: IMHO Open Letter to Minister Noonan

Irish Mortgage Holders Organisation have published an open letter delivered to Minister for Finance, Michael Noonan, TD concerning the revised Code of Conduct. Here is the link to the letter:
https://www.mortgageholders.ie/media/130624-letter-to-minister-noonan.pdf

This comes on foot of our earlier submission to the consultative process on the same, available here:
https://www.mortgageholders.ie/media/130409-IMHO-submission-letter.pdf



Disclosure: I am a director and one of five founders of the organisation.

25/6/2013: Planning Permissions in Ireland: Q1 2013

The latest data on Planning Permissions was released by the CSO under a rather cheerful headline: "Dwelling units approved up 24.7% in Q1 2013" which prompted me to start writing a positive note. However, having updated the database, I could not believe my eyes. Not until the third bullet point in the release do you get the sense as to what is really going on in the sector - the fact confirmed by looking at CSO data, rather than reading the CSO release which focuses the top points of analysis on positive side of select sub-components of the overall sector performance. So here are the facts, as conveyed to us by the data itself.

In Q1 2013, total number of planning permissions granted in Ireland for all types of construction stood at 3,275, which is 1.35% down on Q4 2012. This marks de-acceleration of seasonally-driven 17.96% q/q decline recorded in Q4 2012. However, on an annual basis, allowing for some seasonality controls, overall number of planning permissions granted in Q1 2013 was down 2.76%, which contrasts against an annual increase recorded in Q4 2012 of 1.13%.

In summary, things are not going well at all. Q1 2013 marks an absolute historic low for any quarter since Q1 1975! That's right: we hit an absolute historic low in 37 years and CSO release says things are 'up' by focusing on sub-series before it reports in the text the actual aggregates.

In charts below, I marked current sub-period (since Q1 2010) low against historic low before the current crisis. Take a look.

Note: in Q1 2013,

• Total number of planning permissions hit a historic low (as mentioned above)
• Total number of permissions for dwellings stood at 862, the second lowest after the historic low of 832 hit in Q4 2012.
• Total number of permissions for 'other new construction ex-dwellings' stood at 785, which is above the historic low of 636, but still marks a decline q/q.
• Number of permissions for extensions hit a historic low.
• Number of Alterations, conversions, renovations etc hit a historic low. 

Again, I find little to cheer in the above...

25/6/2013: What the hell is going on in the markets?

Two charts from Pictet neatly illustrate the ongoing bonds markets correction:

My two cents on what's going on in the markets today:


Wednesday opening last week at the cusp of FOMC statements, US 10 years were  yielding ca 2.15%. and 4 trading days later, these were at 2.61% or 41 bps up. 30 years are up from the nadir of 2.83% on may 2 to 3.56% currently.

And what about the other QE-infused or enthused market? In just over 3 weeks, FTSE 100 is down 846 points, from 6,875 on 22 May.

Equities and bonds are moving same way? Why?

Because of three factors:
1) When bonds go down, with them goes down capital. Mandated investment vehicles and banks take a bit of a shower.
2) When US or other advanced economies bonds take a shower, Emerging Markets take a bath because of liquidity pull out to cover leveraged losses elsewhere.
3) When EMs and bonds tank, capital-backed leverage falls, so liquidity falls in the advanced markets too, dragging down all risk assets.

These are the tripartite consequences of a liquidity trap, whereby intermediated short-term funding underpins investment activities. Put differently, when humans have less cash (real economy slow recovery, coupled with tax and financial repression), while banks and other institutions have more cash (including, for the latter, via access to banks leverage against Central Banks funding), markets become correlated, even where hedges existed before, correlations turn positive. Where there is contrasting access to the same asset via both financial paper and physical or real assets (e.g. gold vs gold coins), the two diverge, with financialised asset moving in synch with other financial assets, while real/physical asset moving in the opposite direction.

Thus, Brazil's 30-year bonds (dollar-denominated) are down now more than 25% in recent weeks, and instead of flowing into safe havens or rather 'safer hells', the cash is being tucked away into reduced leverage, leading to the US bonds compression down and UK gilts erasing all gains made since October 2011 (when QE2 kicked in).

The only thing that behaves predictably so far is VIX, which has gone from low-flat around 13.6-14.0 between March 24th and May 24th to over 20 average since June 20th through today. Short term VXX index is up from 18.03 on May 17th to 22.81 today.

Not quite panic, but pressure… and pressure is a trigger. And FOMC, and the rest of the Impossible Monetary Dilemma, are triggers too. The point is, given the recent drama in bond markets and equities and EMs, triggers are dangerous in trigger-happy times. When you have lots of capital tied up in 'safe assets' and lots of leverage tied up on top of that capital, pulling the rug from underneath capital quality leads to accelerating cascades across the board.

This is bad news for strategies over the short-term, as traditional allocations based on previously stable relations between asset classes are broken down. Gold co-moves with equities and bonds and currencies. The good news: once financialisation of the long positions is unwound, leverage is reduced and repricing of 'bubble'-like assets (aka financialised assets as opposed to real assets) is finished, the stable relations will return. In the long run, we all are… well, in the long run.

24/6/2013: The Great (Credit) Wall of China

China is now in the anteroom of the 'This Time is Different' sauna... hot seat awaiting:
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/21/say_hello_to_chinas_brewing_financial_crisis

Keep in mind, in China total credit increased from USD9 trillion in 2008 to USD23 trillion now. Credit to GDP ratio went up ca 95% and now stands at 221% of GDP. In the US, in 2002-2007 period, credit/GDP ratio grew by 40 percentage points. And we have no real idea just how deep the real rabbit hole goes: http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21578668-growth-wealth-management-products-reflects-deeper-financial-distortions

Here's the contagion trigger: once China gets seated on the hot bench in the TTisD sauna, Chinese purchases of US and euro area bonds will evaporate. With this, yields will be going up even if current QE is retained by the Fed. And what the cost? BIS estimated last 1 trillion. And with yields rising across the board, 15-35 percent of GDP can go up in smoke in France, Italy, the UK and Japan.

Meanwhile, the euro area banks are sitting on a massive pile of dodgy assets (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/06/1862013-size-of-eurotanics-bad-assets.html) backed by funding secured against... right... the aforementioned government bonds.

In this blog parlance, the Impossible Monetary Dilemma will then hit the Great Wall of China. And there are no airbags...

24/6/2013: Anglo 2008 Annual Report is out. Call your broker, presto!

All going swimmingly... nothing to look at here... move on folks...

http://www.ibrc.ie/About_us/Financial_information/Archived_reports/Annual_Report_2008.pdf
H/T to @KarlWhelan

Oh, yes, do fill your boots with them shares...

A pearl:
"Following the introduction of the Government guarantee on 30 September 2008 the Bank experienced growth in retail deposits and access to other funding markets gradually improved. However, the reputational damage to the Bank resulting from a number of recent disclosures together with  adverse ratings actions have significantly weakened the Bank’s competitive funding position at a time when global markets continue to deteriorate and overall sentiment is negative."

Thus, clearly, barring some bad publicity and bad-bad-bad-n-worse Ratings Agencies intransigence, the bank would have been just fine, thank you...

And as per future, a gem:
"We are determined as part of our long term strategy to rebuild trust and confidence. A key priority of the new Board is to ensure we regain our position in the corporate, wholesale and debt capital markets and over time enhance the quality of funding, building on our diversified international platforms. ...The Bank’s ambition is to expand its retail franchise by targeting new and existing markets with competitively priced transparent products."

The Happy Times, they are coming back...

Obviously, there is no one to blame, but bad PR and bad-bad-bad-n-worse Ratings Agencies:
"I continue to be impressed by the tremendously loyal and professional staff in all areas of the Bank who deserve great credit for their dedication and commitment. Like all stakeholders, staff members across the Group have been deeply impacted and disappointed by recent events. They share the Board’s determination to restore confidence and trust in the Bank. The Board has great faith in the ability and strength of our people and they will play a critical role in ensuring the future viability of the Bank."

In other words, neither the staff, nor the Board had any idea of these bad things that have happened... it is, therefore, 'carry on across all decks' moment... But just in case you don't get this tingling sensation of excitement for the future from above, here it is in full glory:
"...a comprehensive business plan is being developed which will ensure the Bank’s long term viability.

...We will look at evolving from our existing structure to a broader more diversified business bank. The Bank’s customer service ethos and ability to provide effective and efficient service will help us meet the needs of sole traders, SMEs and larger businesses.

The Board is resolute in its determination to ensure that the Bank emerges from its current situation as a strong and viable institution and one that stakeholders feel proud of."

QED.

NB: Judging by objectives set out above, the Board and the senior management of the bank have by now failed in achieving the goals set out by themselves for themselves back in 2008-2009. Anyone to be held responsible?.. other than bad PR and bad-bad-bad-n-worse Ratings Agencies?..

NB2: Karl's reaction - and I am in agreement with him on it:

24/6/2013: Ifo Business Climate Survey for Germany: June 2013

German economy continues to grow, per latest Ifo Business Climate Survey for June 2013:

Basically, all three core indicators are above the water (>100), with

• Business Climate reading at 105.9, up on 105.7 in May and 105.1 in June 2012. 
• Business Situation reading slipped slightly to 109.4 in June from 110.0 in May and is down on 113.8 recorded in June 2012.
• Business Expectations forward are actually relatively soft at 102.5 in June, up on sluggish 101.6 a month ago and up on contractionary 97.1 in June 2012.
• Dynamics wise, Climate and Expectations readings in June were ahead of their 12mo average through May 2013, but Situation reading is basically flat. On 6mo average through May comparative, all indices are ahead of the average in June, save Climate which is flat.

Of four core subsectors, however, only Manufacturing is above water on expectations side. 

Net: strong performance, given prevailing conditions in the global and euro area economies, but no massive fireworks.

23/6/2013: Sindo & Indo: "'Bondholders are f***ing us up the arse' – Anglo"

With slow drip of a freshly leaking faucet, we are getting more and more granularity on the events surrounding Anglo collapse and the events leading up to the Guarantee. Here's the latest instalment:
http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/bondholders-are-fing-us-up-the-arse-anglo-29365626.html

It is impossible to assume that this information, in pretty much the same words, was not conveyed to the Taoiseach and the Minister for Finance before the issuance of the Guarantee. Which, of confirmed, would imply wilful act on their behalf in securing the payouts to the bondholders against all information available.

It is also virtually impossible to imagine, given this information, that the IL&P did not know well in advance of the fated 'deposits'-'loans' swap of late September 2008 that its funding arrangements with Anglo were high risk and not exactly kosher. Which implies that the Irish Fin Reg also knew the same. If the Fin Reg did not know this, its lack of awareness would signify an absolute level of incompetence that would be staggering even by the pretty high bars for incompetence set during Bertie Era.

In short, the two material bits in the article linked above are... well... staggering in their importance.

Updated: more on the same from 
http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/inside-anglo-the-secret-recordings-29366837.html 
now down on tapes and making the case for accusing Anglo senior staff of knowingly manipulating the bank relationship with the CBofI/FinReg!


So while Bondholders were 'f***ing up Anglo', Anglo was f***ing up the entire financial system of Ireland with Ireland's financial system cheerful approval. The only ones who got f***ed up in the end were... Irish taxpayers. Happy times!


Updated: ZeroHedge on the same: http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-06-24/anglo-irish-picked-bailout-number-out-my-arse-force-shared-taxpayer-sacrifice

And Anglo 2008 accounts have been released: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/06/2462013-anglo-2008-annual-report-is-out.html

23/6/2013: On Dealing with Mortgages Arrears: Adverts v Process

A reply to @cbolgerr regarding the issue of contacting your bank when experiencing financial pressure in relation to mortgages:

In simple term (omitting some considerations), prior to the crisis people were mis-sold mortgages by the banks. Many mortgages were mis-sold on the basis of poor risk pricing by the banks - the job that the banks are paid to do. There was so much mis-selling that the problem of unsustainable mortgages is now structural.

People who mis-sold them these mortgages are still in the banks and are now the same people working on 'resolving' the problems. There were no involuntary layoffs of banking staff and there was no clearing of the banks lending officers or risk management staff on a systemic basis to match the problems in the lending markets. Hence, these staff members are still there. And accepting that they have no new lending to do, these are now the staff working on resolving the mortgages problems. As such, they have neither ability, nor credibility, nor incentives, nor compassion to do anything to repair the damage they have done.

In this environment, and provided the information and power asymmetries awarded to the banks by the Government & Regulator at the expense of mortgagees, the only thing that mortgagees should do is, simultaneously:
1) continue contributing to servicing their mortgages to the extent feasible,
2) prepare as much relevant financial information as possible in order to be able to file FSS,
3) identify an independent, properly regulated and knowledgeable/experienced representation for their case,
4) treat any engagement with the bank as potentially hostile and detrimental to them.

Their first step should be to seek independent advice and representation in the process. Unfortunately, the PIP system put forward by the state is itself at risk of being biased in favour of the banks. Still, it is better than following through on the banks advertising and contacting them before securing independent representation.

There are very few practitioners who have any relevant experience in dealing with the banks. And fewer still willing to help with advice before securing large payments from the homeowners. Care must be given to how the banks and the PIP system are approached.

Key issue, however, is that any mortgage holder under stress should continue engaging with servicing the loan to establish 'good will'. The banks are not required to establish any 'good will' toward borrowers, so the system in inherently unfair and asymmetric, but that is the reality of the fundamentally unjust legal framework established by the government and, for now - until challenged and changed - it has to be obeyed.