11/3/2013: Irish Services Activity: January 2013

In an earlier post I covered annual figures for Services Index for Ireland (link here). Today's release from CSO also provides data for January 2013 (monthly series) and here is the detailed analysis of shorter-term series.

• Wholesale Trade activity index rose in January 10 118.8 from December 2012 level of 115.2 (+3.13% m/m). The index is down 1.49% y/y. 3mo average is at 117.23 up on previous 3mo average of 115.93, but down on 3mo average through January 2012 which stood at 120.47. 6mo average is 116.6 against previous 6mo average of 120.9 and a year ago 6mo average of 119.9. Thus, at 3mo average activity through January 2013 is slower than through January 2012. Ditto for 6mo average.
• Wholesale & Retail Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles activity index increased to 108.9 in January 2013 - up 1.02% m/m, but down 1.27% y/y. 3mo average through January 2013 is static compared to 3mo average through October 2012 and is down on 3mo average through January 2012. 6mo average through January 2013 is down on 6mo average through July 2012 and down on 6mo average through January 2012. Slowdown in the broader category, therefore, is more pronounced and stretched over the last 12 months than in Wholesale Trade alone.
• Transport & Storage services activity index dipped from 112.1 in December 2012 to 111.5 in January 2013, a decline of 0.54% m/m. However, the index is up 10.29% y/y. 3mo average is statistically indifferent in 3mo through January 2013 (111.3), as in 3 mo through October 2012 (111.9), but is significantly ahead of 3mo through January 2012 (101.2). 6mo average through January 2013 (111.62) is ahead of 6mo average through July 2012 and ahead of 6mo average through January 2012.
• Accommodation & Food services index declined in January 2013 to 103.5, down 1.33% m/m and marked second consecutive monthly decline. The index is up 2.38% in y/y terms. 3mo average through January 2013 is at 104.6, which is lower than 3mo average though October 2012 (105.63) but above 3mo average through January 2012 (101.6). On 6mo average basis activity through January 2013 was ahead of activity through July 2012 which itself was ahead of activity in 6 months through January 2012.
• Information & Communication services activity declined in January 2013 from 121.7 in December 2012 to 119.8 (decline of 1.56% m/m) although activity was strongly up (+11.76%) on January 2012. 3mo average through January 2013 was at 118.7, well above 3mo average through October 2012 (112.23) and 3mo average through January 2012 (108.43). Similar increases are traceable to 6mo averages.
• Professional, Scientific & Technical activities index rose to 90.2 in January from 89.4 in December 2012 (+0.89% m/m) although the index is down 1.85% y/y. 3mo average through January 2013 is at 90.53, ahead of 3mo average through October 2012 (87.83), but behind 3mo average through January 2012 (98.13). Similar dynamics can be traced across 6mo averages.
• Administrative & Support services index rose strongly from 100.7 in December 2012 to 104.2 in January 2013 (+3.48% m/m). The index is up incredible 19.63% y/y and I am at a loss as to how this can be explained given the current economic environment and fiscal consolidation. on 6mo average basis index is up from 91.88 average for 6mo through January 2012 to 102.63 average for 6mo through January 2013.

Charts to illustrate:

• Total services activity inched up to 107.9 in January 2013 from 107.7 in December 2012. Year on year, the index clocked a rise of 4.35%. 3mo average through January 2013 was at 107.57 - ahead of 3mo average a year before (105.73).

Despite these above improvements, overall services activity remains below the long-term recovery trend, albeit, owing to the strength of Wholesale Trade and ICT sectors (see the annual data analysis for these) and to the surprise uptick in Admin & Support services, the sector is tracing a shallow U-shaped recovery path so far. From January 2009, it took the index 16 months to hit the bottom, and we are 32 months into the recovery now, with still 1.55% to go (1.86% on 3mo average basis) before regaining January 2009 levels of activity. We will, barring unexpected events, close this gap in the next 2-3 months, but do keep in mind that January 2009 was already 1 year into contracting services activity in the first place.

11/3/2013: Property tax and the markets for property investment

The Irish Government is about to bring in a property tax covering only residential property and excluding land holdings. This is the market for real estate investment that the Government is about to hammer even more:

All permissions for new residential construction are down 87.6% in 2012 (based on estimated full year figure using actual data through Q3 2012) relative to peak. The levels are so low, we are at a historical low now and 2012 was down on 2011. Declines in permissions were recorded every year since 2008. For dwellings - full houses - planning permissions are down whooping 91.8% in 2012 compared to peak attained back in 2005!

Overall planning permissions are down 77.5% on peak. Again, historical series low in 2012 (based on estimate):

This is the same Government that has attempted to 'revive' the property markets via various tax breaks in 2011-2012. Talking about 'policy consistency' then...

11/3/2013: Irish Services Sectors Activity in 2012

Data for 2012 end of the year index of activity in Irish Services sectors is out and before I cover monthly data for January 2013, here are some annual results:

• Wholesale trade services activity expanded 4.03% in 2011-2012, after growing 14.2% in 2010-2011. In 2012 the sub-sector activity was up 31.6% on 2009 and up 18.8 on 2010 making this the fastest growing sub-sector in all Irish services since 2009.
• Wholesale and retail trade, repairs of motor vehicles and motorcycles sub-sector activity grew 2.24% in 2012 compared to 2011 after having expanded 7.2% in 2010-2011. Over 2009-2012 the sub-sector activity grew incredible 14.6% all of which was driven solely by growth in wholesale trade, offset by shrinkages in retail and other sub-sector activities.
• Transportation and storage sub-sector activity expanded 5.39% in 2011-2012 period, having grown at 3.8% in 2010-2011 period. Since 2009 through 2012 sub-sector activity shrunk by 1.88%.
• Accommodation and food services activities expanded at 2.27% in 2011-2012, following growth of 1.4% in 2010-2011 period. Between 2009 and the end of 2012, sub-sector activity was down 6.74%. Accommodation sub-sector alone grew 2.18% in 2011-2012 after posting growth of 5.4% in 2010-2011 and the index is on the aggregate still down 3.67% on 2009. Bizarrely, Food services activities grew since 2009 through 2012 at 1.76%, and this sub-sector posted expansion of 6.80% in 2011-2012 that followed growth of 2.9% in 2010-2011 period.
• Information and Communication sub-sector activity was the star of the show in 2011-2012, rising 8.40% on foot of 3.6% growth in 2010-2011. The sub-sector is now up 20.11% on 2009 making this the second fastest growing sub-sector in Irish services after Wholesale trade.
• Professional, scientific & technical activities sub-sector activity was the worst performing sub-sector in 2011-2012, shrinking 10.39%. This followed growth of 1.1% in 2010-2011. The sub-sector activity is now down 23.80% on 2009 making it overall the worst performing sub-sector, even worse than the Services (68, 92 to 96) sub-sector described below.
• Administrative and support services activity sub-sector clearly doesn't have much in common with the sub-sectors that usually require significant admin & support (e.g. professional, scientific and technical areas of activities) as it posted an robust growth rate of 7.54% in 2011-2012, albeit on foot of strong contraction of 7.2% in 2010-2011 period.The sub-sector activity is cumulatively up 2.67% on 2009. Either Irish exports are becoming more bureaucratised to warrant increases in Admin & supports, or there's some sort of substitution from shrinking public sector employment to temps and outsourced services. Otherwise, why on earth would an economy in a deep slowdown post growth in this category on 2009 figures?
• Services (68, 92 to 96) encompassing Real Estate activities, Gambling and betting activities and Other personal service activities were down 3.48% in 2011-2012, following virtually zero (+0.7%) expansion in 2010-2011. The grouping is down 19.67% on 2009 levels of activity.

Overall, for all services covered in the CSO data, sector growth clocked at 2.52% in 2011-2012 period, down from 3.3% growth in 2010-2011. Not a good sign, but better than posting negative growth, I guess. Compared to 2009, sector activity is up miserly 3.52%. And that is despite increases in R&D spending, massive hikes in availability of state-financed VC and angel investment (via Enterprise Ireland), big-time focus on incentives (including tax incentives) in 'key' sectors etc. Not exactly an achievement to brag about, but, again, could have been worse.

Here's another interesting chart:

As I mentioned above, Professional, scientific & technical activities sub-sector activity was down 23.80% on 2009 making it overall the worst performing sub-sector in all services sectors covered. Which isn't going well with the claims we keep hearing about our 'knowledge economy' and 'smart economy' and the rest of the hoopla surrounding branding like 'Innovation Island'. Looks like stripping ICT, there is not much of 'knowledge'-intensive trading going on out there. And we take out IFSC, the whole landscape of 'knowledge-based economy' might just as well start resembling a veritable desert? Instead, the 'traditional' (aka not 'smart' according to our Government policies priorities) wholesale trade is driving the sector activity, plus the 'smart' ICT sector.

And one last point. Here's the Services PMI data for Ireland for the period covered above in the index (see latest data here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/03/533013-irish-services-pmis-february-2013.html) ...

Strange that a lift-off in PMI from ca 35 average in 2009 to 52 average in 2012 should be translating into only 3.5% increase in actual services activity, no? Sort of suggests something bizarre going on in PMI data, right? Hello, Markit!.. Station Earth paging...

11/3/2013: Food Security & Social Protection

'Gas Flyer of the Week' award this Monday surely goes to the 'never-too-close-to-reality' crowd in the UN:

You see, in the real world, vast subsidies lavished on farming sectors in the advanced economies do two things:

1. Reduce resources available for social protection (and in scarce resources world that UN does not seem to inhabit this implies more severely binding budget constraint effects across the entire economy taxed to support what often amounts to landed gentry and large famers), plus
2. In emerging and middle income economies, subsidies paid out in advanced economies imply reduction in trade flows in agricultural goods from poorer states to richer ones (which in turn reduces economic activity in the former states, increases costs of food in the latter states and reduces resources available for social protection across the board).

So 'food security' hardly has anything positive to do with social inclusion, but a load of negatives...

Go figure, UN thinks differently. Then again, they thought few years back that Iran and Syria were human rights defending nations too...

9/3/2013: Slight improvement in Irish credit risk score

Small and in-line with other countries improvement in Irish Sovereign and Economic risk score from Euromoney Country Risk:

8/3/2013: Why Economists Failed to Predict the Twin Crises?

Wonderfully interesting recent CEPR (DP No. 9269) paper titled THE FAILURE TO PREDICT THE GREAT RECESSION. THE FAILURE OF ACADEMIC ECONOMICS? A VIEW FOCUSING ON THE ROLE OF CREDIT by Maria Dolores Gadea Rivas and Gabriel Perez Quiros (http://www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?dpno=9269.asp) takes up a gargantuan task of trying to answer why (and indeed if) economists failed to predict the latest financial and real economic crises.

In addition, the real economic downturn "has also highlighted the lack of consensus in macroeconomic thinking about how far the financial system influences economic activity."

"Basic economic theory suggests that, in a frictionless world, the shocks originating in credit markets play only a minor role in explaining business cycles. However, the presence of financial imperfections can amplify their effect on the real economy and, thus, disturbances in credit markets can lead to larger cyclical fluctuations in the real economy. These frictions also provide micro-fundamentals for analyzing the channels of transmission." This is known as the financial accelerator mechanism.

However, prior to the crisis, "the most influential dynamic general equilibrium models developed just before the recession by Chistiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouter (2007) do not incorporate any financial accelerator mechanism. The debate at that time was about the effect of frictions, nominal and real, and the role of monetary policy to offset these effects on output and inflation."

Since the onset of the crisis, a new strand of literature has taken prominence in economics, dealing more directly with the links between the economic and credit cycles. This literature is empirical, rather than theoretical in nature and focuses on historical data of financial crises. Much of the literature concludes "that there are strong similarities between recent and past crises and, consequently, the Great Recession is nothing new" and that credit growth acts as a powerful predictor of financial crises, with external imbalances useful ind erecting the turning points. Majority of studies conclude that "credit booms tend to be followed by deeper recessions and sluggish recoveries."

Per authors, "all these papers have much in common, both in the stylized facts derived from them and in their methodological foundations. They provide considerable evidence that financial markets, and credit in particular, play an important role in shaping the economic cycle, in the probability of financial crises, in the intensity of recessions and in the pace of recoveries. The argument is that the strong growth of domestic credit and leverage that fuelled the expansion phase became the trigger for a financial crisis and, therefore, for a recession4. A common finding is that downturns associated with financial crashes are deeper and their recoveries slower."

The clarity and the robustness of the new studies' results begs a question as to why "the financial accelerator mechanism did not appear earlier on the agenda of the theoretical business cycle models"? "It seems that the link between financial and real crises is so obvious that economists should have been blind when looking at data before the crisis to miss such an important feature of the data. Significantly, however, all the papers that find this clear empirical evidence date from after the financial crisis started."

The real question to ask, therefore, is "whether this ex post evidence, could be obtained ex-ante and if it is sufficiently robust to assist with economic policy decisions"?

In other words, ex-post crisis studies do not "take into account the fact that recession dating is uncertain in real time. Furthermore, when the macroeconomic variables have the property of accumulating during the expansions periods, a potential bias may arise because these variables usually present high levels just before the turning points. For example, from this literature, an analyst could extract the lesson. However, during long periods of expansions, credit to GDP growth is high and there is no recession. Also, credit as a proportion of GDP accumulates over time endogenously in different theoretical models, …and, therefore, it is endogenously high when expansions are long. Yet these high levels before turning points do not imply any power of the credit to GDP ratio in predicting the turning points. In medical terminology, the previous literature is more interested in the ”anatomy” of financial
crises, after they have occurred, than in ”clinical medicine”, that is, diagnosis from the symptoms. …For the lessons extracted from the data to be of value to policymakers in their day-to-day policy decisions, we have to understand the dynamics of these financial variables in real time without forgetting the uncertainty about turning points."

This is a brilliantly put introduction to the core thesis of the paper: "to consider the cyclical phases and, especially, recessions in an environment of uncertainty. Policymakers that see credit to GDP growing have to decide when the growth is dangerously high and could generate a turning point. If a long expansion keeps generating a high credit to GDP ratio endogenously, to cut credit dramatically could unnecessarily shorten the period of healthy growth."

Put differently, "the key question for a policymaker is to what extent the level of credit to GDP (or its variation) observed in period ”t” increases or not the probability of being in a recession in ”t +1”, or whether it changes the characteristics of future cyclical phases."

To answer these questions, the authors propose "a novel and robust technique for dating and characterizing business cycles and for analyzing the effect of financial and other types of variables. We combine temporal and spatial data and we show that this approach is legitimate, notably reduces the uncertainty associated with the estimation of recession phases and improves forecasting ability in real time."

The key results can be summarized as follows:
-- "Credit build-up exerts a significant and negative influence on economic growth, both in expansion and recession, increasing the probability of remaining in recession and reducing that of continuing in expansion."
-- "However, these effects, although significant, are almost negligible on the business cycle characteristics.
-- The authors show that "there is no significant gain in forecast performance as a consequence of introducing credit."
-- Thus, "in contrast to the previous literature, our findings indicate that the role of credit in the identification of the economic cycle and its characteristics is very limited."

Per original (and by now secondary) question asked the authors claim that their "results also explain why financial accelerator mechanisms have not played a central role in the models that describe business fluctuations. The financial accelerator was not a key point in explaining business fluctuations simply because, empirically, it did not have such a close relationship to the business cycle, either in a sample (prior to the crisis) or in an out of sample approach, once the uncertainty in dating recession periods is included in the model."

This is a really interesting paper with fundamental implications for macroeconomics and one of the earliest attempts to reconcile empirical predictability and theoretical clarity of core modern theory (namely that of the financial accelerator) relating to the financial crises and the links between the financial and real economic crises.

8/3/2013: The Cyprus' Russian Bail-in Dilemma

With the new Government in place and with more urgency than ever before, Cyprus is heading for the last ditch effort to secure the bailout from the Troika.  However, all indications are there will be no agreement in March, pushing any potential deal closer to the June 3 when EUR1.415 billion of Government bonds come to maturity. The bonds amount to a massive 9.65% of the country GDP and are unlikely to be rolled over unless at a punitive yields.

Cyprus original request for the bailout dates back to June 2011, looking for up to EUR17bn (ca 100% of GDP) and the current foot-dragging from the EU is a clear signal of Frankfurt's and Brussels' conviction that the acute peripheral crisis is now over and there is little risk of contagion from Nicosia. If the full EUR17bn were granted, the bailout would push Cypriot Government debt to ca 145% of GDP, well ahead of the IMF-set sustainability threshold of 120%.

Furthermore, the EU policymakers clearly perceive Cypriot crisis to be distinct from other peripheral states while Cypriot banking system (the cause of the crisis) to be decoupled from the rest of the euro area. The former smacks of the usual euro area denialism, while the latter is probably closer to truth. Nonetheless, someone has to be concerned with sustainability of any debt in excess of 90-100% of GDP in an economy that is about to take a massive hit at the heart of its growth engine: banking and associated exportable services.

Cypriot banks hold assets valued at 8 times the country GDP (roughly EUR 120 billion worth of assets), with deposits of roughly EUR70 billion recorded prior to the recently started 'quiet' bank runs. Within last week alone Cyprus banks lost just over 2% of their deposits. Around 42-43% of these deposits belong to foreign (primarily British and Russian) residents.

The latter are now at the crosshair in the EU vs Cyprus war for bailing-in the depositors in insolvent Cypriot banks.

In 2012, there were some 60,000 Russian expatriates living in Cyprus, a country with the total population back in 2011 at 1.116 million. Russia was the second largest source of tourists inflows into Cyprus in 2011-2012 and Russia received FDI of USD12.3bn via Cyprus (although probably 99%+ of this was recycling of funds that originally left Russia for Cyprus). In 2011 Russia extended a EUR2.5 billion bilateral loan to Nicosia. Despite common theme in the press about Cypriot banking system being used for Russian tax evasion, Russia and Cyprus have signed and ratified the Protocol to the Double Taxation Treaty.

At the end of 2011, many, but not all and not even majority, of the non-Euro deposits in Cypriot banks originated from Russia - amounting to ca EUR18 billion (more than 100% of the Cypriot GDP), but just 20% of the total deposits in the country. Russians are also major holders of equities in BOC and CPB banks. These Russian deposits have declined since then. More ominously, the accounting of these deposits is somewhat dodgy. There are many conflicting figures out there.

Below is the table - courtesy of the Piraeus Bank - detailing the deposits structure in Cypriot banking system through early 2012:

In contrast, Fitch (via International Herald Tribune) reported slightly different figures that are at odds with both above figures and the Min Fin claims (see below):

According to the Min Fin, as of end of 2012, Cyprus banks deposits remain around EUR70 billion and less than EUR30 billion of these are accounted for by foreign depositors, with Russian deposits standing around EUR15 billion. The problem is that all of the above figures include deposits in Cyprus-regulated pure Russian banks, such as division of VTB, for example, which are not going to be covered by the bailout or the haircuts.

A recent estimate by the Euromoney puts non-domiciled Russian deposits in Cyprus closer to 7-10% of total deposits or EUR5-7 billion.


Confusion aside, it is relatively clear that so-called Russian 'oligarchs' funds, while prominent in the overall deposits volumes, are neither the source of the Cypriot problems, nor a source for the sustainable solution to that problem. Even a 50% bail-in of these would not deliver (given the existent EUR100,000 guarantee on deposits, and the fact that large volumes of the Russian money is most likely held in the names of EU-registered entities) Cypriot system to health or even to contribute more than EUR2-2.5 billion to the EUR17-17.5 billion bailout.

Matters are worse, when it comes to bail-in of Russian depositors, when one considers the existent and growing links between the real economies of the two countries. In 2008, Cypriot economy gained EUR1.9 billion (11% of GDP) from tourism trade surplus. Inflows of Russian visitors to the island were up 55% in 2011 in y/y terms and they now represent the second largest source of tourism revenues after the UK (although Russian tourists account for only around 8-10% of all visitors to the island, as opposed to the UK tourists who accounted for closer to 50%). A loss of Russian tourism in the wake of any bail-in would be pretty hard to offset for Cyprus' economy left without the core pillar of International Financial Services. Country income from accounting and legal services amounted to ca EUR700 million or 4.0-4.1% of GDP in 2008, and much of that came from Russian residents, businesses, investors and depositors.

Russian investments in real estate in Cyprus (excluding Russians resident in Cyprus) amounted to ca 7% of total real estate investment back in 2006, a rate that is 1/10th of the UK residents investments there, but nonetheless - significant support for the economy. And this excludes investments by Russian nationals resident in Cyprus.

Overall, prior to the crisis, Russian business and individual activities in Cyprus contributed closer to EUR600-800 million in annual revenues to the economy, excluding taxes and wages. Applying some multipliers to that suggests overall GDP contribution from Russian-linked activities to Cypriot GDP of some EUR2 billion annually or up to 11.7% of the country GDP.

In other words, bail-in of Russian depositors can gain Cyprus some EUR2-3 billion under very adverse conditions imposed on non-resident depositors and cost Cyprus some EUR0.75-1 billion in annual economic losses. How fast does this math start spelling net loss? And how fast does this math start spelling inability to service 120% or so debt/GDP ratio post bail-in?

8/3/2013: Industrial Investment in Ireland 2012

Summary of the capital acquisitions in Irish industry over time:

 and by broad sectors:

Key conclusion: no restart of investment cycle in the Industry in 2012, including the MNCs. Stripping out Pharma sector, net acquisitions of capital in 2012 were at EUR2,516.3mln down from 2011 EUR2547.8mln, and roughly equivalent to the average of 2008-2011 period of EUR2,511.5mln.

Note: all data is based on today's update by the CSO. See http://cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/cai/capitalassetsinindustryquarter42012/#.UToLydFHBF8

8/3/2013: German Lawmaker Challenges Debt Restructuring for Ireland & Portugal

Not exactly good news, and not exactly earth-shattering either, but...
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/07/eurozone-germany-bailouts-idUSL6N0BZI9320130307

The point worth raising is that if Enda & Co do achieve restructuring of our Troika loans, they would de facto deliver a restructuring of Ireland's super-sovereign debt. This raises a number of issues:

1. Why are we seeking restructuring super-senior sovereign debt ahead of seeking to restructure non-sovereign debt, such as, for example banks debts?
2. If restructuring were to materially impact our long-term debt profile by lowering the NPV of our debt, would this not qualify as a 'structured' or 'cooperative' default? I know - the matter here is not material, but rather a label, yet don't we have a Government that staunchly refuses to default on private debts assumed by the State and then goes for a default (or even quasi-default) on super-senior debt?

These questions closely relate to the work I have done over the recent years on Irish Government debt and most directly to my chapter in What if Ireland Defaults? (link the chapter in a working paper format here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1985617)

7/3/2013: Irish Mortgages Arrears Q4 2012

Mortgages arrears data for private residences in Ireland for Q4 2012 was published today by the Central Bank of Ireland. Few surprises.

As expected, arrears rose. Unexpectedly, the rate of increase was much much slower than before in q/q terms and slower in y/y terms. As encouraging as this might sound, there are some points of concern outlined below. Here are some details of data dynamics first:

1. In Q4 2012 there were a total of 792,096 accounts relating to private residential mortgages in Ireland - a massive y/y increase from 765,267 accounts in Q4 2011 due to 'reclassification' of some mortgages accounts.
2. This 'reclassification' made historical comparatives in terms of, say, arrears as % of the total mortgages, utterly useless. This is how Irish official stats go: relabel, re-order, and if it makes things look better by coincidence - spin. 
3. Total number of mortgages in arrears for private residences rose from 141,389 accounts in Q3 2012 to 143,851 accounts in Q4 2012 - an increase q/q of 1.74%, well below any q/q increase since the beginning of the series. Average increase since Q3 2009 when the data started stands at 6.51%.
4. Y/y total number of mortgages in arrears increased 21.43% in Q4 2012, the slowest rate of annual increases since the beginning of the series and below the average of 27.77%.
5. Overall, in Q4 2012, 18.16% of all mortgages still outstanding in the country were in arrears. Adjusting for the CBofI 'reclassification' of mortgages accounts to allow for more direct historical comparative, 18.85% of all mortgages were in arrears. 
6. Number of mortgages at risk or defaulted (defined as mortgages currently in arrears, restructured and not in arrears, plus repossessions) has risen in Q4 2012 to 186,785 (or 24.48% of the total adjusting for 'reclassifications', 23.58% based on official data) from 185,933 in Q3 2012. This implies a rise of 0.46% q/q and 19.61% y/y. Both represent the slowest rates of increase in series (short) history.

Two charts to illustrate:

Good news: the rates of arrears build up have slowed down in Q 2012. 

Bad news, getting worse slower is not the same as getting better. Especially given the deterioration tallied from 2009 through today. 

Worrying side: impacts of property taxes, banks guarantee lift-off, repossessions orders regime change, and personal insolvency 'reforms' are not visible in the current latest data. All represent a threat of accelerating arrears once again. 

Real news: just under 1/4 of Irish private residences-linked mortgages are now at risk of default, in arreas or defaulted and some 650,000-700,000 people are currently impacted by this crisis to the point of being unable to meet the original conditions of their mortgages.

7/3/2013: Are stocks more volatile in the long run?

A recent paper by Lubos Pastor and Robert F. Stambaugh, titled Are Stocks Really Less Volatile in the Long Run? (first published NBER Working Paper Series No. 14757; Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009.) and subsequently in the Journal of Finance (vol 67, number 2, April 2012, pages 431-477) looks at the annualized returns volatility to stocks returns - the central concern for investors and finance practitioners. 

The study uses predictive variance approach to the analysis of volatility and look at what happens to predictive variance as the investment horizon increases. Conditional variance is variance in returns conditioned on the set of information known to investors.The predictive variance is therefore the conditional variance, where conditioning information is taken at the time when investors make their assessment of the risks (volatility) and returns implied by an instrument. 

Now, it is commonly established that stock returns volatility per any given period falls over the longer periods, potentially due to mean reversion, as majority of the studies show or argue. But this only relates to volatility as measured concurrently - in other words unconditionally. Of course, investors face volatility as expected on the basis of conditioning variables, and this predictive variance, it turns out, actually is higher, not lower, over the long periods. The study shows that this reversal of the relationship between investment duration and volatility of returns holds even once we control for mean reversion. In other words, uncertainty about future expected returns is a core driver of higher long-horizon variance in stocks.

7/3/2013: New Vehicles Regs for February 2013

New data on new vehicles licensed in Ireland in February is out and it makes for some depressing reading:

Note the precipitous decline in New Goods Vehicles - down 23% in February and down 21.4% in two months through February. This suggests that even if the "131" license plates are having an adverse effect on purchases, the investment cycle is not turning around still. Good Vehicles are a form of business investment in capital. They are also subject to set depreciation schedules, implying the need for replacement at some relatively stable rate over time. If economy was showing any signs of recovery, retail and wholesale trades, plus other domestic and exports-related activities would have translated in higher rate of capacity utilisation, including for goods vehicles. This, in turn, should translate in higher rates of replacement and new investment. So far - the data shows the opposite.

It is worth noting that the total number of used imported private cars licensed in February was 3,717 against 3,312 a year ago and the number of used goods vehicles rose from 737 in January-February 2012 to 883 in the same period 2013. Still, net effect is that of a more marked decline in goods vehicles than in private cars.

Here's the summary of historical data:

And the summary clearly shows that in terms of All Vehicles, we are now back to the levels of sales consistent with January- February 1994, in terms of New Vehicles sales and in terms of New Private cars sold to the level seen back in the end of 1993. Meanwhile, the State continues to rip off motorists at the ever increasing rate via fuel costs, registrations, VRT, VAT, licenses cost, etc.