30/11/2012: 'Other' European SOE is back in growth

While the euro area zombie economy continues to contract (more on this later tonight) that shrunk 0.6% y/y in Q3, Swiss economy is expanding, after posting a contraction in Q2 2012. That's right - that 'other Europe' SOE is expanding despite the fact CHF is tied to the sick euro. Swiss economy grew 0.6% q/q in Q3 2012 at annualized rate of 2.3%, beating consensus expectations (+0.2% q/q). In Q2 2012 Swiss economy contracted 0.5% annualized.

Today’s GDP data were encouraging but other indicators including the manufacturing PMI (see chart below) have remained weaker recently. Overall, our forecasts for Swiss GDP growth remain unchanged: 1.0% for the full year 2012 and 1.5% for 2013. Y/y growth was +0.3% in Q2 2012 (a downward revision from +0.5% estimate) and +1.4% in Q3 2012.

Swiss growth was driven by exports which rose 1.2% y/y in Q3 2012 and domestic consumption which was up 2.5% y/y. However, fixed investment fell on quarterly basis, although remaining up 1.4% on y/y basis.

Switzerland recorded an increase of 2.8% in foreign resident population (inward migration) between 2010 and 2011 - a trend that is most likely remained in 2012. In Q3 2012 employment grew at 1.9% y/y and is now 1.9% above the pre-crisis peak levels. Meanwhile, euro area employment is 2.6% below the pre-crisis peak levels, while in the US employment is still 3.1% down on pre-crisis levels.

27/11/2012: Neural Data and Investor Behavior

Fascinating stuff... really: a new study, titled "Testing Theories of Investor Behavior Using Neural Data" by Cary Frydman, Nicholas Barberis, Colin Camerer, Peter Bossaerts and Antonio Rangel (link) finds that "...measures of neural activity provided by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) can be used to test between theories of investor behavior that are difficult to distinguish using behavioral data alone."

How so? "Subjects traded stocks in an experimental market while we measured their brain activity. Behaviorally, we find that, our average subject exhibits a strong disposition effect [the robust empirical fact that individual investors have a greater propensity to sell stocks trading at a gain relative to purchase price, rather than stocks trading at a loss] in his trading, even though it is suboptimal."

More so: "We then use the neural data to test a specific theory of the disposition effect, the “realization utility” hypothesis, which argues that the effect arises because people derive utility directly from the act of realizing gains and losses. [Note to my Investment Theory (TCD) and Financial & Business Environments (UCD) students - we talked about direct utility derived from actual transactions, plus indirect utility effects of learning from same... remember?..] Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that

• activity in an area of the brain known to encode the value of decisions correlates with the capital gains of potential trades, 
• that the size of these neural signals correlates across subjects with the strength of the behavioral disposition effects, and that 
• activity in an area of the brain known to encode experienced utility exhibits a sharp upward spike in activity at precisely the moment at which a subject issues a command to sell a stock at a gain."

Awesome! We might not be wired for living in the world of uncertainty, but we might be somewhat wired for deriving utility out of uncertain gambles?

Now, that's what I call taking investment to MRI and getting results... well, might be not investable results, but...

25/11/2012: Irish Current Account and Government Debt

In the previous post I highlighted the problem presented by the EU Budget changes in the near future to the sustainability of Irish debt dynamics. I referenced expert opinions on the role of current account surpluses in determining these dynamics. here is an example from early 2011 (emphasis is mine):

"... this dependency [2010 bailout] of Ireland on foreign support is difficult to understand given that the country has not lived continuously above its means in the past.  Ireland has run a current account deficit (which means the country uses more resources than it produces) only for a few years; and if one totals the current account balances over the last 25 years, one arrives at a foreign debt of about €30 billion.  This should not be too difficult to finance given that it represents only about 20% of the country’s GDP of €150 billion. Moreover, Ireland is on track to run a current surplus this year and should thus not have any need for additional foreign funds."

Here's a problem - the above, as I noted in the previous post is based on some rather unpleasantly non-sustainable assumptions. Here's the arithmetic, based on IMF WEO data.

As chart above shows, Irish cumulated current account balances for the period 1980-2009 totalled -€39 billion, that's where the 'about €30 billion' miracle figure coming from. Alas, over the same period of time, Ireland received €39.4 billion worth of net transfers from the EU, which counted as a positive addition to the current account. Netting these out, Irish real 'external balance' cumulative for 1980-2009 was -€78.4 billion. Worse than that, net of EU subsidies, Ireland have run external deficits in every decade from 1980 through 2009. In other words, using the expert turn of phrase, Ireland used more resources than it produced in every decade through 2009. 

Now, was it true that Ireland 'has run a current account deficit only for a few years'? Why, here's a chart plotting Ireland's current account balances:

Gross of EU transfers, Ireland run current account deficits in 1980-1986, 1989-1990, and 2000-2009, which means that it run deficits over 19 out of 30 years between 1980 and 2009, which is more than 63% of the time. Ireland run current account deficits almost 58% of the time in the period of 1980-2012. Hardly 'a few years'. More importantly, removing EU net subsidies, Ireland has managed to run current account deficits every year between 1980 and 2012 except in 1996 and 2010-2012. That means that Ireland was using more resources than it produced in 29 out of 33 years since 1980, or 88% of the time.

For the last bit, let us recall that back in the 1990s (the period of Ireland's rapid recovery from debt overhang of the 1980s) Irish current account surpluses relative to General Government Debt stood at 26.8% (using 1999 level of General Government Debt and the cumulated current account surpluses, inclusive of EU transfers throughout the decade of 1990-1999). For the period of 2010-2017, the IMF projections imply the same ratio of less than 17.5%. 

Let's take a closer look at these comparatives. Irish debt peaked (for 1980-1999 period) in 1987 at 109.24% of GDP and was deflated on foot of a current account surpluses cumulated at 26.8% ratio to 1999 debt trough. For the period of 2000-2017, the debt will peak at 119.31% of GDP in 2013 and is expected to deflate at a maximum surplus rate of 17.5% (all based on IMF projections) before we allow for EU budgetary reductions for 2014-2022 period (which can bring this number closer to 14%). 

Again, one has to wonder if the argument that current account surpluses can really be viewed as a serious enough potential source for wrestling Ireland out of the debt trap. And that is before we start worrying about the potential drivers for these surpluses, such as:

• The 1990s exports boom driven by a combination of very robust US and UK growth expansions during the 1990s;
• The 1990s convergence race for Ireland to catch up with the EU capital and income levels - something that is now firmly exhausted as the potential for growth; and
• Significant net transfers from the EU during the 1987-1999 period that totalled some €12.6 billion which in 2014-2022 are likely to turn into net contributions to the EU from Ireland.

24/11/2012: EU Transfers to Ireland - boom or bust?

There's been some debate recently as to the size and importance of EU subsidies to Ireland and the EU budgetary allocation in the context of Irish economic growth. Here are the facts.

First up, the summary of EU subsidies, contributions and net subsidies:

Next, using the IMF WEO database, the netting of the EU Net Receipts out of of our GDP and GDP per capita:

Factoring in the net receipts into growth equation:

The above clearly shows that lower volatility in receipts has contributed to smoothing of the GDP growth rates in most periods, but exacerbated 1991 and 2001-2002 slowdowns. EU net receipts also helped fuel (not significantly, though) 2004-2006 bubble and failed to provide any support for the economy in 2008-2010 collapse.

The reason for small effect of supports in recent years is very clear from the charts below:

However, the most dramatic effect the subsidies had was registered on the side of our external balance. Recall that international 'experts' love the idea of Irish Current Account surpluses as the driver for sustainability of our debt. Herein, however, rests the problem:

The logic of 'experts' arguments is that Ireland can sustain current levels of Government debt because we have potential to generate current account surpluses vis-a-vis the rest of the world. And their evidence of that rests on their reading of past (1991-1999) current account positions. Alas, once we net out net transfers from EU from these... the picture changes. In the entire pre-2010 history, Ireland generated current account surplus (net of EU subsidies) in only one year, namely 1996. When one realises that debt sustainability for Ireland requires current account surpluses to be in excess of 3% on average over the next 10-15 years, one has to be slightly concerned by the prospect (as 2014-on suggests under the current EU Budget proposals) that Ireland will no longer be a net recipient of EU subsidies. Here's what happens were Ireland to become net contributor to the EU budget in 2014-on at a rate of 1/2 of 2009-2011 annual subsidy received. Our average annual CA surplus (per IMF projections for 2013-2017) should run at 3.585% of GDP, but factoring in EU potential budgetary changes it is likely to run at 2.825% of GDP. And since the path of the CA surpluses is expected to decline (as IMF projects) in 2016-2017, then it is unlikely that the CA surpluses will be in excess of 3% over the period through 2022. So what about that 'sustainability' of Irish debt levels, then?

23/11/2012: France's fall from economic Olympus

 Charting France's descent into the newsflow hell:

So the current state of economic affairs is now:

1. Structural downturn (see grey-shaded turning point indicator in the first chart above) 
2. Worse than current crisis period average (from January 2008 through today)
3. Comparable to Q1 2010 reading at levels and to Q4 2008 reading levels
4. Worse than the lowest reading for 2002-2003 downturn period
5. Worse than the average for the early 1990s recession
6. Almost as bad as the lower points of the 1980s recession

23/11/2012: Global & Irish Outlook: few slides

My slides from today's presentation on the longer-range outlook for the Irish economy (and global) - you can click on each slide to open a larger image:

22/11/2012: Net cash - EU27

Via zerohedge.

In case you wonder who funds who in EU in 2012:

Do note that all peripheral economies of the EA are net recipients of EU funds and that is on top of the lending of funds by various European mechanisms. 

21/11/2012: Brave Face of the Eurogroup is not enough

Headlines from yesterday's eurogroup summit hitting this morning wires are far from encouraging:


Dutch finance minister Dijsselbloem says Greece may cost extra money
Says: Not in a hurry on Greece.
20 Nov 2012 - Economic commentary -
09:12 EU's Van Rompuy is to present a new EU budget proposal at start of summit
09:03 Greece PM Samaras and EU's Juncker are to meet in Brussels tomorrow
09:00 German Chancellor Merkel tells lawmakers Greece's financing hole through 2016 can be filled with combination of lower rates and increased EFSF according to a source
08:42 According to Schäuble, eurogroup finance ministers and the IMF could not agree how to fill the €14bn shortfall in Athens' finances over the next two years. There was also disagreement on whether Greece had to achieve debt sustainability by 2020 or 2022.
08:26 German finance minister tells lawmakers ECB believes Greece can raise EUR 9bln through T-bill issues according to a source
08:19 German finance minister tells lawmakers it is still open question whether 2020 or 2022 is benchmark for Greek debt sustainability according to a source
... and so on.

It means that the EU is once again finding itself lacking any real means for dealing with the Greek crisis. Here's the summary of what solutions have been floated and why none of them are dealing with the problem at hand:

- Greek haircuts/writedowns (see my note on these here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2012/11/15112012-impossibility-of-greek-2020.html) are for now off the table. This is the major problem with the summit. As I explained in my earlier note, Greek crisis cannot be resolved without a major writedown of the Greek debt held by the EFSF and the ECB. 'Major' here references 25% writedown on EFSF and 75% writedown on ECB. Even these levels of writedowns will not bring Greece to 120% debt/GDP limit in 2020.

- The Fin Mins more open to extending Greek debt maturity structure, including doubling these from 15 to 30 years. Assuming this action was interest rate neutral, the resulting reduction in debt financing burden will be minor, and will be offset by the two factors: (1) extending maturity will not make debt levels any lower at any point in time to 2020-2022, so it is hard to see how this measure can have anything but a marginal improvement effect on debt target sustainability for Greece; and (2) extending maturity will make debt profile flatter in period post-2020 or post-2022 depending on which target date you take. In other words, saving a little today will mean longer debt overhang and higher debt levels in the future. Lastly, extending maturity profile will only increase probability of Greek Governments in the future reneging on their budgetary commitments - the longer the enforcement period, the more likely the enforcement will come against future recessionary pressures (we are not abolishing business cycles to 2040 are we?) and/or changes in political outlook.

- The Fin Mins are luke warm to the idea of interest rate reductions on Greek debt held by the EFSF. Currently, Greece is charged ca 3.5% on the EFSF funds it borrows. Cutting these by a half can yield savings of around 3-3.2% of GDP at the peak point for debt. Given current projections, by 2020 these savings can be running at an annual rate of 2.4% of GDP. These are significant - enough to fund current paydowns on the debt that would be consistent with the status quo scenario of dropping Greek debt from  ca 180% of GDP to 144% of GDP by 2022. But these will not be enough to cover debt reductions repayments required to drive it down to 120% of GDP.

So here we are: the euro zone's Greek 'can' is now a full oil drum filled with cement and the road is sloping uphill. Good luck kicking…

Now, go back to the drawing board: In the Greek case, OSI is not only unavoidable, it actually might not be enough, if carried via ECB-held debt alone. Which has some seriously grave implications for EFSF and thus to the ESM.

These implications are:

1) Greek restructuring of EFSF-held debts and/or alteration to maturity duration of Greek borrowings from EFSF will mean changes in the ESM profile as well or changes in the ESM position as the ultimate crisis resolution mechanism. For example, if EFSF funds carry maturity of 30 years, ESM either becomes secondary (non-structural) vehicle with lower maturities or it alters its funding maturity to match EFSF. Furthermore, any Greek deal will have to be open to Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus, and potentially to Spain and even Italy.

Now, let me remind you that EFSF/ESM set up is structural to the entire EU response to the crisis (not only Greek case). That's a hefty hurdle to jump: rescue Greece and risk weakening ESM?

2) Lowering interest rates charged on greek debt by official holders - although in itself still a form of restructuring - presents some added risks not mentioned above. Suppose we half Greek current costs of funding to 1.8% or so. Currently, EFSF can borrow at around 1%. But that borrowing rate is not guaranteed. To fund longer maturity for Greece, EFSF/ESM will either have to borrow longer (in which case cost of funding rises) or will have to carry maturity mismatch risk (in which case expected future cost of funding rises). Add to that the fact that current low interest rate environment is most likely abnormal. With these considerations, expected future cost of funding 1.8% loans to Greece might run into negative margin scenario, where ESM funding costs will exceed Greek interest rates.

Worse, one can easily make an argument that ESM funding costs are endogenous to Greek funding costs and to absence of OSI risk. Hence, if Greek situation (and 'no OSI' conditions) deteriorates, ESM cost of funding can rise too.

So far, after yet another eurogroup meeting, we are still where we were - on the road to a spectacular Greek risks unraveling...

20/11/2012: CEPR Recession Dating puts EZ on downturn from Q3 2011

With some delay, it is worth taking a look at the official economic dating of euro area recessions via CEPR (full release here):


"Euro area GDP peaked in the third quarter of 2011 and, except for a minor rebound in the first quarter of 2012, it has declined since then according to currently available data. Although some other indicators of economic activity, most notably employment, had peaked earlier (see below), the Committee has determined that, in this episode, the peak of economic activity coincides with that of GDP. In other words, the euro area has been in recession since 2011Q3." [ emphasis mine]

Two charts:

And a chart with most current leading economic indicator and actual Q3 preliminary data on GDP growth:

19/11/2012: Two points on Irish Corporate Tax

Two thoughts, related (on foot of the current discussions of the Irish Corporate Tax Haven in the EU, US and in Ireland):

1) US/EU/Ireland strategy dilemma: 

(X) : US is unhappy about MNCs underpaying tax in the US via international tax arbitrage

(Y) : US' strategic ally - the EU - is unhappy about US MNCs underpaying tax in the EU via international tax arbitrage

(Z) : Ireland is a trading & investment ally with the US and a member of the EU

(W): Ireland is a major center for tax arbitrage by the MNCs

So now: Z  =  X  +  Y  -  W  +  V(?)

Where V(?) is the unknown 'good will' that US and EU must feel toward Ireland to sustain the above equation.

2) And the above implies this: In the current environment: 

-- incentives for the US to increase (X) are higher than normal (driven by the fiscal cliff and the need to onshore jobs); 

-- while incentives for the EU are to increase (Y) are also much higher than normal (driven by EU own fiscal deleveraging and aggravated by the fact that EU member states are funding 'bailout' for Ireland), 

-- yet at the same time, incentives for Ireland to keep increasing (W) are also extremely heightened (due to the Irish crisis 'solution' model of 'exporting out of the recession and fiscal deleveraging'). 

All of which means that V(?) is rapidly diminishing, squeezed by contradicting (X)+(Y) and (W) rapidly pulling the national interests further and further apart.

I'd say (as an old boxer) - we are heading for the corner... Good luck to anyone thinking we can sustain current corporate tax regime in this world...

19/11/2012: Links on Irish Corporate Tax Haven

Due to page loading restriction on post links, I am moving this list to a new location.

Here is the original page with a number of links on the topic of Ireland as a Corporate Tax Haven. And here's a link to the Irish Government 'defense' of the same.

Updated 19/11/2012: And a new article on US Multinationals facing tax demands / pressures in Europe with explicit referencing of Ireland: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/technology/19iht-tax19.html

Updated 20/11/2012: No country named, but you know who they are talking about here: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/798f30d2-3242-11e2-916a-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2CaviTlTt

Updated 9/12/2012: And more on Google using Ireland as a conduit for tax minimization: http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/google-pays-just-014-tax-in-seven-years-3319796.html
The core problem highlighted here is not the headline 0.14% tax rate, but €47 billion worth of revenues booked via Ireland - an exemplification of Ireland's beggar-thy-neighbor economic policies.

Updated 20/12/2012: Here's The Economist article on Starbucks UK case, mentioning Google use of Irish tax system: http://www.economist.com/news/business/21568432-starbuckss-tax-troubles-are-sign-things-come-multinationals-wake-up-and-smell?fsrc=scn/tw/te/tr/wakeupandsmellthecoffee

18/11/2012: Housing equity and retirement dis-savings

A new paper "Home Equity in Retirement" by Makoto Nakajima and Irina A. Telyukova (September 20, 2012) looks at the effects of homeownership on savings/dissaving by retirees, using the US data for 1996-2006.

Using an estimated structural model of saving and housing decisions, the study finds that "homeowners dissave slowly because they prefer to stay in their house as long as possible, but cannot easily borrow against it. Second, the 1996-2006 housing boom significantly increased homeowners' assets. These channels are quantitatively significant; without considering homeownership, retirees' savings are 24-43% lower."

Some more details:

Figure 1 shows over the period 1996-2006, median net wealth remains high very late into the life cycle. The observation that many people die with significant savings, which is puzzling in the context of a simple life-cycle model, has been termed the \retirement saving puzzle. However, the picture changes dramatically if we consider the saving behavior of retirees who

own homes, compared to those who do not. Consider figure 2, which documents the cohort profiles of median net worth over the same period, normalized by the first observation, for homeowners versus renters.

The difference is stark. Homeowners have flat or increasing profiles of net wealth over this period, while renters display a far faster rate of asset decumulation. This suggests that housing may play a major role in determining how retirees save or dissave."

Overall, the paper finds that:

• "…high homeownership rate late into the life-cycle that we observe in the data is crucial to consider for understanding retiree saving behavior."
• "Housing-related channels are significant contributors to the retirement saving puzzle. Retirees stay homeowners late in life, but become increasingly locked into their home equity as they age; 
• "...we find that borrowing constraints on retirees tighten considerably. This means, on the one hand, that those who remain homeowners do not decumulate their home equity, thus creating the kind of flat housing profile that we see in the data, while those who face a large expense may come up against their borrowing constraint and be forced to sell the house. 
• "We also use the model to understand why people retirees choose to remain homeowners late in life. We find that the leading motivators are utility benefits of owning a house (which capture also financial benefits, such as tax advantages) and bequest motives. 
• "In contrast, precautionary motives in the face of medical expense risk do not a effect homeownership significantly, but play a role in the puzzle through financial asset accumulation, although overall this role is quantitatively modest and affects younger retirees more than older ones. 
• "Quantitatively, we find that the housing channels {utility benefits of ownership, collateral constraints, and the housing boom} jointly account for between 24 and 43% of the median net worth profile, depending on age.
• "The bequest motive accounts for up to 31% of the median net worth profile, and its importance increases with age. 
• "Medical expense risk accounts for maximum 8% of median net worth, and its importance generally falls with age, due to interaction with Medicaid.
• "..we conduct an experiment where we allow households to make a decision on whether or not to maintain their home. We want to evaluate this as an additional, possibly hidden, channel of asset decumulation, consistent with data evidence that homes of elderly owners depreciate more quickly than those of younger owners. We treat this as a hidden channel because we assume that self-reported housing values of owners who remain in their houses do not take into account the depreciation rate unless they have the house appraised for sale, for example. We find this to be a significant channel of asset decumulation. 30% of our model homeowners choose not to maintain their homes in the 75-85 year old cohort; for the younger cohort, that proportion is over 50%, while it is lower for the oldest cohort. We show that this channel affects median housing asset profiles as well."

All of this has huge implications for countries like Spain and Ireland that have undergone a massive property prices bust. Declines in property prices have wealth effects, negative equity has wealth effects. Both, however, have also direct behavioural effects that are also adverse, as outlined above. In my view, we have not even started to count the real costs of the property busts in our fiscal and economic forecasts.