11/9/2012: Inherent limit to artificial intelligence?

In a rather common departure from economics (as defined by rational expectations subset of the discipline) on this blog - here's a fascinating thinking about the artificial intelligence and the bounds of model-induced systems.

Especially close to me, as it explores that which I thought about back in 2003-2004 when I wrote an essay on the role of leaps of faith (irrational and discontinuous jumps in human creativity and thinking) as the foundation for humanity and, thus, a foundation for recognition of the property rights over uncertainty.

10/9/2012: Ireland's flop in securing European Science Funding

Departing from the IMF, European Research Council has released the list of 2012 winning projects that obtained financial support from the Council under the ERC Starting Grant results, totaling €800 million. The link to the list is here.

Now, a quick run through the headline results:

• Ireland scored 4 projects (2 each for TCD and UCD)
• Portugal (not a country we in Ireland usually associate with being the Land of Scholars) scored same as Ireland
• Israel scored 24 projects
• Austria 9 projects
• Belgium 19 projects
• Switzerland 33 projects
• Netherlands scored 51 project
• Finland 8 projects
• Denmark 13 projects
• Sweden 22 projects
• And to add insult to our injury: University of Bristol (UK) and University of Edinburgh scored 5 projects each (more than the entire country of Ireland), while University of Warwick 4 projects (same as Ireland as a whole)
• University College London scored 16 projects
• In some consolation, powerhouse of knowledge, Northern Ireland, scored none

Here's a handy chart from ERC:

But wait, it gets worse. When broken down by nationality of grantees, Ireland has 7 Irish nationals granted research proposals:

Which includes more Irish national academics working ABROAD than in Ireland:

And, among the researchers who got grants in Ireland, there are a number of non-nationals:

You can check the above in here.

So that strategy on funding and managing research in Ireland - it is clearly working marvels... oh, and do you now think Irish Universities poor rankings have nothing to do with real world outcomes?..

10/9/2012: Corporate debt iceberg

Another topic, much ignored by the Irish media and the Government and covered by the IMF in today's releases is the corporate debt.

The chart below shows the extent of debt overhang in Ireland:

Here's what IMF has to say on that (emphasis mine):
"Despite an overall decline in corporate debt, an increasing number of firms are facing difficulties covering interest payments on debt. Interest coverage ratios [ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to interest expenses] have declined, with the interest coverage for the median firm having decreased from 6.9 in 2002 to 0.8 in 2009, and with an increasing number of firms not generating sufficient income to cover interest payments on outstanding debt. ... Moreover, the interest coverage is markedly lower for SMEs, with a median of 0.8 compared to 1.9 for large firms. The decline in firm profitability associated with depressed demand is playing an important role in the reduction in interest coverage ratio. This suggests that financing constraints are particularly important among SMEs and in property-related sectors."

In other words, whatever supply of credit is doing, demand for credit is severely constrained by deterioration in firms' financial sustainability.

Although "Leverage for the median firm (which is a small firm) has fallen to 46 percent of equity, with the usage of bank debt showing a similar decline. The data also indicate that trade credit and other non-debt liabilities play an important role in the financing of SMEs, together with internal financing from retained earnings." Although leverage overall has dropped, debt affordability has fallen off the cliff:

Why? "The decline in firm profitability associated with depressed demand is playing an important role in the reduction in interest coverage ratio. This suggests that financing constraints are particularly important among SMEs and in property-related sectors."


So what can be done? Here's the list of IMF outlined options:


"Credit guarantees or subsidies on SME loans can in principle stimulate SME financing. ... Until recently, Ireland was one of the few OECD countries without some form of loan guarantee scheme. ...However, the international experience with SME lending schemes is mixed. ...Moreover, the historical experience shows that credit guarantee schemes can only be effective when there are competent, financially sound banks, with adequate staff to effectively screen and monitor SME loans. ...

Government support for SMEs will need to be complemented with progress in improving the operational capacity of banks to work out loans. The restructuring of SMEs on a case-by-case basis is resource intensive yet important to ensure that where a viable core business exists, that it has the possibility to invest and grow, and contribute to broader economic recovery.

Considering the number of SMEs, it would not be appropriate to rely principally on court-based bankruptcy procedures. Rather, banks will need to build their capacity to design and implement work outs though out-of-court workout processes. Drawing on international expertise may well be needed to help major banks build capacity in this area.

The government could also explore ways to facilitate the securitization of SME loans. However, liquidity premia currently demanded by market participants even on senior
tranches, plus the inability of the Irish government to offer substantial credit enhancements
on such securitizations given the low sovereign credit rating, imply that, at least for the
moment, the market for securitization of SME loans is limited."

So, in other words: NOTHING can be done on the scale required. We are boxed into the corner with SMEs debt overhang too. All state resources and economy's resources wasted on rescuing the banks bondholdres, folks. No powder left for the rest of the economy. Sit tight and pray for a miracle.



Aside: An interesting observation via the IMF concerning the links between the negative equity and property values and firms formation: "With depressed home prices it has become more difficult to finance a new firm using home equity, which has hampered job creation."

10/9/2012: Insane path of Irish 'wealth'

Another interesting chart from the IMF reports today:

Now, look at the red line - Net Wealth in Ireland, which has dropped to levels below those in Q1 2002, while housheolds' total taxes (VAT and Income taxes combined, excluding other) has ballooned from €17.96bn in 2002 to €23.54bn in 2011. So let's do a simple mental exercise: net wealth is down ca 30%, household taxes are up ca 31%... and we are supposed to:

• Deleverage our own debt
• Deleverage the banks-related debts of the Exchequer

What a better illustration of madness can one find? Oh, wait, I know - the Armchair Socialists' one: "Ireland is a very wealthy country and we must tax wealth to extract funds for the Government". Alas, we are rich... rich as we were more than 10 years ago. Since 2002, folks, it's not the wealth of ours that grew, but the appetite of the State for our wealth.

10/9/2012: Irish Households Debt Overhang: IMF note

IMF published today three papers relating to Ireland's economy. Each of interest on its own merit and I intend to blog about them.

However, here's a chart that actually summarizes pretty well both the extent of the Irish crisis and the sorry state of affairs expected as we exit it:

Here's IMF's explanation for the household deleveraging process out of what is - by the standards of the chart above - a historically unprecedented debt overhang.


"Under the current forecast, households would reduce debt gradually from about  210 percent of disposable income to 185 percent by 2017. Building on the forecast of the
savings rate, the debt path is calculated based on the IMF desk forecast for a muted recovery
of disposable incomes at below GDP growth. Further, the debt path assumes that households use about half of their savings to retire debt, and new lending growth remains moderate, increasing from 1.6  percent of GDP in 2012 to 5.3 percent by 2017."

Now, give it a thought, folks.

1. Irish crisis in mortgages is well in excess of anything represented in the above chart;
2. Irish deleveraging over 9 years (2009-2017) will yield mortgages debt reduction of just 25 percentage points even if we use half of our entire savings to pay down the debts;
3. This painful deleveraging will still Ireland's mortgages markets in wore shape in 2017 than the second worst peak  of the crisis (the UK) back in 2007.

And here's the chart showing that all the debt paydown to-date has had zero effect on arresting the degree of Irish households leveraging (debt/asset value ratio) as underlying asset values of Irish properties continue to fall:

It is clear from the above that the Irish Government is out to lunch when it comes to dealing with the most pressing crisis we face - the crisis of severe debt overhang on households' balancesheets.

9/9/2012: Ireland's stellar exports performance?

Three charts that put to the test one of our greatest claims to fame - the claim that Ireland is one of the world leaders in exports performance.

Charts above clearly show that Ireland's performance in exports growth was rather spectacular in the 1990s, strong in 2000-2004 period and below average in 2005-2009 period. However, in 2010-2012 period - the very period when, according to our Government we are experiencing dramatic growth in exports - Ireland's exports performance is, in fact, well below the average for our peers.

As the result of this, despite an absolutely massive collapse in imports, Irish current account performance (external balance that is supposedly - per Government and official analysts, and the likes of Brugel think-tank heads - going to rescue us from the massive debt overhang we have) is underwhelming:

9/9/2012: September Euro area bonds supply

September 2012 bonds supply and auctions for euro area countries (via Morgan Stanley):

9/9/2012: Some pretty big moves in CDS markets

Here are the moves in sovereign CDS since April 1, 2012 through last week.

7/9/2012: Theobroma cacao is not a placebo to cognitive ability

One of really cool studies that really shows economics is much more than dismal science:

The paper by Savastano, titled "The Impact of Soft Traits and Cognitive Abilities on Life Outcomes" (link here) "combines neuroscience, psychology, and behavioral economics to empirically analyze the extent to which academic achievement, the relative weight of rationality vs. fairness in decision-making, and life satisfaction are affected by cognitive ability, persistent personality traits, and short-term stimuli based on psychological priming techniques."

The paper sets an experiment: "Prior to undertaking a course exam and playing the role of the respondent in an ultimatum game, a group of Masters and PhD students were stimulated either emotionally (via chocolate tasting) or rationally (via mathematical problem solving)."

The experiment involved "a chocolate tasting ...on a sample of 83 graduate students who were asked to play the role of the respondent in a one-shot ultimatum game against a computer. A sub-sample of 50 students also undertook one of their exams of their M.Sc or first year of the PhD program in Economics right after receiving the treatment. Students were also asked to complete a standard Big Five Test which was complemented by an Emotion Regulation (ER) Tests to allow disentangling broader aspects of their personality." Other controls were implemented as well.

The core questions were:

1. "how personality traits (Big Five and ER scores) and cognitive abilities (proxied by past school performance) affect educational outcomes, namely the exam score for the two subsamples of students who, respectively, had chocolate or were rationally stimulated prior to undertaking this stressful activity;
2.  the nexus between short-term and long-term determinants of life satisfaction, as well as the extent to which personality traits can help to explain subjective assessment of well-being; and
3. the relationship between personality traits and cognitive abilities on the threshold value of acceptance of the ultimatum game, therefore on rational choices.

Core results are:

1. "This analysis brings good news for “chocolate and its derivatives” lovers. Theobroma cacao is not a placebo; it is statistically confirmed that the brown nectar provides individuals with a shot of positive energy that helps them feel happier. 
2. "If a piece of chocolate is also associated with “positive” soft personality traits, one can also experience some form of persistence in life satisfaction, or other life outcome. 
3. "Like any other external and exogenous shocks, the long-term effects are the sum of different factors, and the relative weight associated to it. There can be a positive relationship between a positive (negative) shock and its short-term impact. 
4. "However cognitive abilities, enduring positive personal traits and rationality help to mitigate the effects in the long-run, when individuals use reappraisal and revise their initial expectations, which together lead to more rational choices. 
5. "It appears that the homo economicus hypothesis is justified in the long term, but subject to the weight of emotionality in the short- run.

If you might think this is all just esoteric academism, don't. The author provides an example of where this knowledge can be applied to specific industry outcomes analysis, e.g. farming.

7/9/2012: Psychological effects of debt

For our brilliant minds in politics and their 'intelectual' parrots who constantly remind us (albeit with, thankfully, decreasing frequency) that negative equity only matters when people need to move, here's one piece of latest research on links between debt (unsustainable) and mental health.

Link.

So, nothing to worry, then. The results are:

• "...Results provide strong evidence  that respondents’ reactions to problem debt have a non-negligible social dimension in which the prevailing local level of indebtedness impacts on individual psychological stress." In other words, other's debt is not just their own problem.
• In a multivariate model "individuals who report they face ‘difficulty’ meeting their housing payments (mortgage or rent) are at least two months late on their housing payments, or who report that meeting their consumer credit repayments presents a ‘heavy burden’ to their household, exhibit worse General Health Questionare scores and greater propensity to suffer from depression". now, note - this is not just about those who are defaulting, but also those who are facing difficulty meeting their repayments.
• Secondly, "...selection into problem debt on the basis of poor psychological health accounts for much of  the observed cross-sectional variation in psychological health between those with and without problem debts. ...individuals who are observed to move into arrears on their housing payments or into reporting a heavy burden of debts between two waves of data exhibited, on average, worse psychological health than those not moving into debt problems in the first wave of data." In my opinion, this is likely the effect of buildup of stress prior to arrears actually arising formally and as households work through their savings, cuts to their budgets and borrowings from relatives on their way into arrears. If so, the longer the delay in dealing with problem debts (and in Ireland it is now counted in years, not months), the worse the psychological outcomes.
• Per negative equity: "...it is shown that mortgage holders who enter into arrears on their mortgage debts in localities where house prices are growing (and so their home equity ‘buffer’ is increasing) suffer less deterioration in psychological health compared to individuals who enter into arrears in localities where house prices are falling (and so their home equity ‘buffer’ is decreasing). Home equity buffers have been shown to be important forms of consumption insurance for households facing adverse income shocks (Hurst et al. 2005; Benito, 2009)." Need I say more.
• "Individuals who exhibit the onset of  problems repaying their unsecured debts in localities with a higher bankruptcy rate ...experience less deterioration in psychological health compared to individuals exhibiting the onset of problem repaying their unsecured debts in localities with lower bankruptcy rates." This is most likely accounted for by much faster and more lenient personal insolvency resolution regime in the UK in general, leaving lower stigma on those defaulting on unsecured debt.
• "By contrast, individuals who exhibit the onset of problems repaying their secured debts in localities with higher mortgage repossession rates are shown to experience more deterioration in  psychological health compared to individuals ...in localities with lower mortgage repossession rates." Again, the UK more developed and more lenient regime for resolving secured debts insolvencies is also at play here, in my view, as repossessions are signals of the deepest form of insolvency, and non-repossession solutions are well advanced. This implies that localities with higher rates of repossessions are more likely to have experienced much greater declines in income, rises in unemployment and/or prices declines in the property markets.

All in, I read the above evidence as the urgent signal that Ireland needs:

1. Immediate reform of its bankruptcy laws to facilitate speedier resolution of debt problems;
2. The reform should focus on pre-bankruptcy resolution mechanisms (as the current Government proposal does suggest) but these mechanisms must be robust and not left to the disproportionate capture by the lenders (as the current Irish Government proposed legislation does).
3. The reform must carry emergency measures to deal with the unprecedented crisis we are facing today - in other words, the reform should not attempt to set a singular new regime for the perpetuity, but have two different regimes - Firstly: a reform to address the emergency situation with much more lenient bankruptcy arrangements for those who have acquired the unsustainable debts in the period 2002-2008, Secondly : a reform to address the future bankruptcy regime, post-emergency. The current legislation is better served for the second purpose, but it does not meet the requirements of the first objective.

7/9/2012: Ireland is not exactly shining in Global Competitiveness terms

Spot that Highly Competitive economy called Ireland?

Yep, that's right:

• Ireland ranks 27th in the Global Competitiveness Index 2012-2013 a great improvement in rankings from 29th place in 2011-2012 won by the massive internal devaluation on the sacrificial fields of defending the overvalued euro.
• Ireland rnaked 35th in Basic Requirements sub-index, 25th in Efficiency Enhancers sub-index and 20th in Innovation and Sophistication Factors sub-index
• Ireland ranks 131st in the world in Macroeconomic Environment,
• 108th in the world in Financial Markets Development,
• 20th in the world in quality of higher education and training,
• 18th in the world in business sophistication, and
• 21st in business innovation.

All results are, of course, skewed positively by the MNCs operating here. 

6/9/2012: ECB's OMT: Negatives slightly outweigh Positives

Here's the distilled version of what ECB did and did not do today. A usual caveat applies - the markets can agree or disagree with this economist's view and other economists will  disagree with this economist's view.



ECB President Mario Draghi attempted to do the tight rope walking and keep markets guessing as to what ECB will do in the end in sovereign debt markets while not deflating the expectations bubble he created with his earlier pronouncements.  That he seemingly delivered on. The core potentialities of his announcements (I stress - potentialities, as in none of these are set in stone and all are subject to huge set of uncertainties) were outlined by me here. These remain functional.

In terms of today's announcement, the overall sentiment is that of a small net negative, driven by the three major negatives: conditionality (linked to the OMT), the three remaining uncertainties (design, deployment and delivery - to be explained below), and sterilization; only partially off-set by positives: unlimited programme (in theory), pari passu purchasing (risk-sharing), maturity focus and collateral easing.

Now on to details:

Positives from the OMT announcement:

• Lack of pre-set limits on bonds purchases is a positive, although, of course, there is always a physical limit and there is also an economic bound to be imposed implicitly by sterilization operations (remember, under sterilization, in effect the ECB will be pumping liquidity into sovereign markets, while pumping same liquidity out of the already distressed private markets). The 'unlimited' purchasing will be severely tested by Italy and Spain (when/if these countries swallow the conditionality costs and join the programme, as Spanish and Italian bonds redemptions for suited horizon (2013-2015) will be in the region of €530 billion or more than 1/2 of the LTROs 1 & 2 combined.
• ECB accepted the premise of official lender participation in future restructurings, by committing to pari passu treatment of its OMT purchases. Sadly for Greece, this comes too late to save some €100 billion or so that could have been restructured under the SMP in the beginning of this year, but is now off-limits. In fact the SMP purchases remain senior. It is unclear if the ECB will mop up SMP holdings into OMT or how these will be unwound. If they are to be held to maturity, they will remain a risk drag for private holders and we have a two-tiered seniority market on our hands.
• Maturity focus remains on 1-3 year horizon, which comfortably works with the economic logic I outlined in the note linked above. However, one issue is that the ECB will hold OMT purchases to maturity, implying a potential redemption cliff for the sovereigns engaged in OMT that can be exacerbated, from the ECB point of view by coincident maturity of the LTROs. 
• Easing of the collateral, and in particular allowance for FX-denominated collateral is similar to what ECB undertook in 2008-2010 period transactions and should provide a wider range support.

Negatives from the OMT announcement:

• Very strong conditionality rhetoric from the ECB, with access to the OMT only via EFSF/ESM and with full macroeconomic conditionality in the form of compliance with the Enhanced Conditions Credit Line (ECCL). IMF oversight involvement is sought, making the OMT a sort of Troika-junior engagement for any country involved. This dramatically reduces the likelihood of any country going into OMT and in particular is a net negative for the countries that might benefit from the OMT when in the process of exiting the current Troika arrangements, such as Ireland and Portugal. In fact, the two countries can only qualify for OMT as they exit Troika deal and this will de facto mean that exiting the Troika deal will re-enter them into another Troika-light deal with OMT - a political no-go territory. It is also a major barrier for Spain and Italy.
• The OMT is a time-buying exercise, in so far as it can only allow the Governments some time (1-2 years) to put in place structural reforms. It does not resolve the crisis itself. The problem is that the Government now have to 
• design the right set of reforms (which is not as straight forward as one can imagine - of the 3 current Troika-programme run countries, only Ireland and Portugal have so far managed to design some sustainable reforms and not all so far, after a number of years of attempting such designs pre-Troika and during the Troika reign);
• deploy the designed reforms (which is a tough process that has to be sustained over time and across political elections. In the sub set of three states currently in Troika programmes, again, only two have managed to partially achieve this, and again, with varying degree of success); and
• the deployed reforms must deliver desired outcomes (subject to heavy set of risks and uncertainties: of the three participant states, none have so far managed to deliver desired outcomes on reforms packages, especially when it comes to achieving economic recovery).
• The OMT will rely on sterilization of monetary supply flows into sovereign bond markets, which means that in order to buy government bonds, the ECB will have to somehow remove liquidity out of the euro system. This can only be achieved by reducing liquidity supply to the real economy and/or financial sector. This, in turn, makes OMT hardly accommodative of private sector growth and can derail the 'delivery' bit in the OMT's DDD challenge outlined above.
• Other negatives worth keeping in mind are: 
• No numerical targets for yields and no way of assessing these ex ante as bonds purchases will be disclosed only on a weekly basis
• No change to collateral eligibility for non-government bonds (other than for government-guaranteed bonds), meaning OMT will have no easing effect on liquidity supply in financial sector.
• Excessive optimism on ECB behalf, with Draghi announcing that the OMT will be a "fully effective backstop that [will] remove tailrisks from the euro area". As I noted earlier, the biggest 'Black Swans' arise when policymakers start believing in non-existence of 'Black Swans'

Update: And here's a map of Draghi's comments on OMT announcement (via Prof Brian M Lucey):

Lets take a note: word 'growth; is the most prominent operative term used and yet, nothing within OMT is about growth. In fact, the policy rate remains unchanged, hence no pro-growth move in policy dimension. The logic of growth-OMT link is a tenuous one at best, and contradictory to the OMT operational objectives. Here's why. OMT - if successful - is supposed to ease the cost of Government's transition to fiscal austerity. It is to be sterilized. Hence, OMT is neither a fiscal nor a monetary tool for sustaining or generating any growth. Other key words to note relate to 'financial' and 'risks' - I commented above on the perverse effect on financial system the OMT is likely have. I have also commented above on the bizarre discounting of risks remaining within the system once OMT is up and running.

Note: I will be working on this post throughout the evening, so stay tuned for additional comments