1/1/2012: Groundhog Year 2012 - part 2

And on with another summary of 2011. One side of the euro area economy had a boom year in 2011, unlike the rest of us. The boom, of course, was of a very dubious nature, but it is set to continue through 2012. That side was the ECB balance sheet.

Check out the following charts to spot the 'up year' for ECB's 'assets':

But what about ECB's capacity to carry these? Well, of course, ECB doesn't really function like a regular bank, but were it, with capital and reserves finishing 2012 at €81.481bn against total assets of €2,733.2 billion, ECB's leverage currently stands at 3,354%, which is well above 2000-2004 average of 1,372% and 2005-2008 average of 2,180% and 2009 level of 2,609% and 2010 level of leverage of 2,565%.

And, of course, more financial wizardry to come in 2012, folks. So brace yourselves for another 'up-and-up they go' year at ECB.

1/1/2012: Groundhog Year 2012 - part 1

In the tradition of looking back at the year passed, let's take a quick view of one of my favorite indicators for risk assets fundamentals: the VIX index.

CBOE Volatility Index finished the year well off the inter-year highs, but nonetheless in an unpleasant territory. VIX closed December 2011 at an elevated 23.40, ahead of December 2010 close of 17.75, 2009 close of 21.68 and only behind the December 2008 levels of 40.00. December 2007 close was 22.50 and December 2006 was 11.56.

More unpleasant arithmetic emerges when we consider inter-annual performance. Historical maximum for daily close (from January 1990 through present) is 80.86, while maximum for 2010-present was 48.00 set on August 8, 2011.

The historical average for VIX is 20.57, while the average for January 2008-present is 27.74, for January 2010-present is 23.38 and for 2011 as a whole - 24.20, implying that wile 2011 was not the worst performing year on the record, it was certainly worse than 2010. Table below summarizes annual data comparatives.

Average intra-day volatility actually marks 2011 as the worst year on record. Average intra-day spread for VIX stands at 9.28 in 2011 against 8.97 in 2010-present and 9.08 in 2008-present. And both 3mo and 1mo dynamic standard deviations posted poor performance for VIX in 2011, making it the worst year on the record other than 2009. VIX dynamic 1mo semi-variance closed the year on 7.80 and annual average of 4.26 against 2010 average of 3.96 and 2009 average of 5.78.

Charts below highlight the fact that 2011 was a poor year for fundamentals-based analytics:

All above suggest that volatility is the starting point for 2012. Welcome back to the New 'Groundhog Day' Year.

30/12/2011: Eurocoin December 2011: recession + inflation

Eurocoin - euro area's leading indicator of growth environment - posted another disappointing month in December. December reading came in at -0.20, same as November with 'stabilization' accounted for by improvement in surveys-based indicators for industrial and services firms, offset by material deterioration in actual demand indicators. Core Q4 2011 forecast for euro area growth now moved to -0.2, dangerously close to establishing a full-blown statistical contraction in the economy. More significantly, current growth and inflation conditions pairing pushed ECB policymaking into a proverbial straight jacket corner: rates consistent with inflation remain in the region of 3-times higher than current rate, while rates consistent with growth conditions are about right for the current 1.0% rate.

Charts below illustrate.

3mo MA for Eurocoin is now at -0.18, against 6mo MA of +0.03. YOY Eurocoin is down 141% and the indicator remains at the lowest level since August 2009. Annualized growth rate is forecast is running at -0.798% and 6mo MA annualized growth rate is running at +0.117% (also the worst performance since August 2009).

30/12/2011: Taleb's quote

AN excellent quote from Nassim Taleb via @econbrothers :

"If we attempt to systematically extinguish all forest fires, we will eventually experience a big one".

Which, of course, goes to describe concisely and precisely the fallacy of rescuing all banks that Europe has pursued as a principled policy. The old Schumpeterian creative destruction is a required condition for functioning of the private economy, with the latter being the required condition for functioning of the public economy as well. Bankruptcy - as a tool for clearing the hazardously dead forest of private enterprises - must apply to the banks too.

By underwriting the entire private banking system, the EU has created the Mother of All Hazards - a dry forest with numerous pockets of quasi-extinguished fires burning. Now, all we need is wind...

28/12/2011: ECB: New evidence on public-private pay gap: part 2

As an addendum to the previous post on public-private pay gap study, here are the core results for differences in the pay gap based on various income percentiles:

In the table above, levels of income are referenced to percentiles, so wage differentials are estimated for public-private sector gap per each income percentile. In general, for most countries other than Spain, Ireland and Portugal, "the public sector gap is higher at the lower quantiles and declines along the wage distribution. This is further evidence that the dispersion of the wages in the public sector is much smaller than in the private sector. In this context, public sector employees with low wages earn a higher wage premium relative to higher income employees [again, ex- Spain, Ireland and Portugal]."

In the case of Ireland, the premium lowest for top-earners, second lowest for bottom-earners. The premium rises slightly for 25th percentile and 75th percentile and peaks at 50th percentile. So Irish public sector premium is highest for mid-range earners, lowest for top-range earners, and second lowest for low earners.

28/12/2011: Brain-drain & IRL's knowledge economy

When Government policy-supported brain-drain is compounded by heavily subsidised 3rd level education system, Ireland risks turning into a third world-styled resources supplier to our more dynamic trading partners:

http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2011/1228/1224309553505.html

HT to @dalkeyhead

That's the 'Knowledge Economy' in the absence of real jobs creation: taxpayers pay for knowledge, private holders of knowledge emigrate to earn private returns, taxpayers pay for more 'Knowledge Economy' boffins and pamphlets... but do not worry - 20 years from now, the IDA will have plenty of new ex-Irish execs in UK, US, Australia, Canada, etc to beg for FDI.

28/12/2011: ECB: New evidence on public-private pay gap: part 1

ECB Working Paper 1406 (December 2011) titled "The Public Sector Pay Gap in a Selection of Euro Area Countries" looks at the relationship between public and private sector wages over recent decades in the light of "the increase in public sector employment in many countries, with relevant implications for the overall macroeconomic performance and for public finances". The study considered ten euro area countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain.

Per authors: "According to national account aggregate data, the wage earned by a representative public sector employee is higher than the one earned by a representative private sector employee in all the countries of this study, except Belgium, France and Germany. In particular, in the period 1995-2009 the ratio of public to private compensation per employee is found to be consistently below one in the case of France, slightly below one in the cases of Germany and Belgium, around 1.1 for Austria, around 1.2-1.3 for Italy, Spain, Greece, Ireland and Slovenia, and above 1.5 for Portugal."

"Available data on union membership – referring to the period 1997-2009 depending on the country - show that union density (measured by the ratio between reported membership and employed dependent labour force) is typically much higher in the public than in the private sector (in the European countries approximately twice as much). Among the countries included in this study, union density rates are relatively high in Belgium (around 50%), followed by Austria, Ireland, Italy and Portugal (in the 30- 40% range) and Germany (27%); it is relatively low in France (about 8%) and Spain (16%)."

The summary of the premium evolution is provided here:

In the chart above, Ireland has the second highest gap after Portugal.

The paper provides a reminder of a number of studies that have examined the public-private sector wage gap in Ireland:

• Boyle at. al. (2004) report wage premia for public sector workers, greater for low-paid workers and smaller for public sector workers at the top of the earnings distribution using microdata from the European Community Household Panel Survey. 
• Foley and O’Callaghan (2009), using micro data from the 2007 National Employment Survey, also find a sizable public sector wage premium, highest at the lower ends of the earnings distribution. The authors use a variety of estimation techniques and control for work place and employee characteristics such as age, education, gender, occupation, etc. However, the authors urge caution in reaching a definitive conclusions on the average public sector premium. 
• Kelly et. al. (2009), using data from the 2003 and 2006 National Employment Surveys, analise the public- private sector wage gap in Ireland. Their results indicate that the public sector pay premium increased considerably from 14 to 26 per cent between 2003 and 2006. Moreover, they also reported that there was significant variation across public service sub-sectors.

The ECB research provides controls for a number of variables that can theoretically explain diferences in pay between public and private sector, such as education as skills proxy and gender,  earnings groupings by percentiles,  and firm size. All are found to retain statistically signifcant public sector earnings premium in the case of Ireland. 

The study also looks at one specific category - Education. "On average workers in “Education” earn much higher wages with respect to workers with similar characteristics in the private sector relative to workers in the other sub-sectors, while workers in the “Health” sector are less at advantage, and as in the case of Germany even at disadvantage with respect to their private sector counterparts. This finding is confirmed on the basis of a formal statistical test..."

And the premium holds when controlling for workers' own education:

So overall, the study finds that: "A large body of literature has analysed the issue using micro-data on single countries. Most of these studies find a differential in favour of public sector workers, even after taking into account some observable individual characteristics. As in the previous studies, our results, referring to the period 2004-2007, point to a conditional pay differential in favour of the public sector that is generally higher for women, for workers at the bottom of the wage distribution, in the Education and the Public administration sectors rather than in the Health sector. We also find notable differences across countries, with Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain exhibiting higher public sector premia than other countries. The differential generally decreases when considering monthly wages as opposed to hourly wages and if we restrict our comparison to large private firms."

There goes one of those "We are not Greece" comparatives that the Irish Government is so keen on. When it comes to pay premium in the public sector, we are in the Club Med (PIIGS) group after all.

26/12/2011: LTRO will not solve Euro banks' problem

As the annus horribilis concludes for the terminally ill, but refused (by the ECB & EU & the respective Governments) death, Euro area banks, the key note of that Mahlerian (the 5^th symphony-styled) Trauermarsch is the LTRO allocation of cheap 3 year €489 billion worth of ECB credit (at 1%) to the European banks. And, thus, the theme for 2012, the second movement in the opus magnum of the Euro destruction, is the looming recapitalization deadline for the said zombies – the end of June.

Alas, the hope that seems to sweep the markets to boost, albeit moderately, Euro area banks valuations – the hope that having the mother of all carry trades can help these banks recover their margins just in time to use ‘organic’ recapitalization path through mid 2012 – is seemingly out of reach.

Firstly, I put ‘organic’ in the inverted commas, since the margins rebuilding on the back of ECB-created artificial liquidity boost is about as organic as performing a puppet show with a corpse is ‘live-like’.

Secondly, the carry trade I am talking about - for those readers of this blog who are unfamiliar with finance – is the artificial exercise of taking cheap loans in one country/currency and carrying funds into purchase of assets in another country/currency. Of course, with nothing but loss making (or near-loss making) assets in the markets of the Euro zone, any banks who borrowed funds in the LTRO will be either buying Government paper (yielding on average, say, 3.0 percent margin on borrowings gives Euro area banks pre-tax uplift of just €7.3 billion in 6 months time (and no, there are no capital gains realizable, since buying today and selling into mid-2012 will leave this paper, at best, capital gains neutral). Thus, to make even a dent in the capital demand, the banks will be needing assets yielding more than double the junkier Euro area sovereign yields, which means carry trade, and all associated currency and asset risks.

Of course, Euro area banks can try to magnify their returns via ECB-offered leveraged carry trades. But unless ECB offers more LTRO-styled longer term operations, doing so at 3mo or even 11mo liquidity supply windows would be simply mad. 

So, having borrowed through LTRO, Euro area banks will purchase Government bonds which then can be used as a collateral for further ECB borrowing. So let us assume that the banks will be buying liquid debt, e.g. Spanish or Italian. The margin earned by banks is ca 2.6-3.5% per annum after they cover the cost of LTRO borrowing. Note, this carry trade will turn loss-making for the bank if the sovereign bonds yields fall below 1% cost of ECB LTRO funds. In my view, this is highly unlikely.

So the whole operation can provide some €14.6 billion annually to the banks in terms of profits earned. And this is pretty much the unleveraged maximum. Nice one, but through June 2012 hardly enough to support banks recaps. Even if EBA deadline is shifted to December 2012, profits from LTRO are nowhere near the required funds to cover recapitalizations. Recall that under 9% Core Tier 1 scenario, euro area banks require something to the tune of €119 billion in fresh capital.

The downside from this conclusion is that the Euro area banks will require, post LTRO either a warrant to die (the preferred option, assuming the death warrant involves orderly shutdown of the insolvent banks) or a public bailout of immense proportion. Given the EU hit some serious trouble coming up with €200 billion for loans to IMF, good luck with that latter option.

23/12/2011: EU - 2013 = Year of Citizens, Rest of Time = Years of Brussels?

So 2013 theme for EU is "The European Year of Citizens". I know, it was proposed some months ago, but...

The challenges for the "Year of Citizens" will be to:

• Raise citizens' awareness of their right to reside freely within the European Union and of how they can benefit from EU rights and policies [Though, of course, if they happen to be Russian-speaking near-majority in some Baltic States, they are not quite 'citizens' and if they happen to be from certain EEC member states, they can reside, but have no right to work in other member states, plus if they live in Ireland, they have a duty to repay banks bondholders in other member states, and if they live in Greece, they have no right to have a referendum on their own economic policies, and... oh, well... the list goes on];
• Stimulate citizens' active participation in EU policy-making [because, as we know it, European 'citizens' are starting to get tired of the farcical nature of governance in the EU, especially when it comes to that pesky democratic deficit (chart below is from Spiegel Online):

• Build debate about the impact and potential of the right to free movement, especially on strengthening cohesion and people's mutual understanding of one another [no comment here, since we are currently living through the period when many member states are starting to put in place measures to reduce that 'free movement']

But overall, did anyone ask the EU Commission and the European Parliament the following question: If 2013 is the year of European citizens, then, pardon me for using foreign turn of phrase here, what the hell were all the previous and will the subsequent years be about? Years of Brussels? 

23/12/2011: Composition of Irish exports to Russia

For those of you who asked: composition of Ireland's exports to Russia, data through August 2011:

This shows pretty decent diversification and the stronger role for indigenous enterprises, especially in Agrifood sector (26.2%, plus some segment of Other category).

22/12/2011: Irish Foreign Assets and Liabilities: Q3 2011

Some interesting data courtesy of CSO's Quarterly International Investment Position and External Debt for Q3 2011.

The summary:

Yep, pretty dramatic. The above is in billions of euros. Let's look at the historical series and decomposition by IFSC and non-IFSC:

• Overall Total Foreign Assets in the country amounted to €2,587,566 million (€2.59 trillion) in Q3 2011, which is up on €2,544,483mln in Q2 2011. Total Foreign Assets are up 1.69% qoq and down 1.51% yoy.
• Of the above, €2,093,152mln accrues to IFSC or 80.89% of all our Foreign Assets. This is up from €2,039,307mln in Q2 2011. IFSC assets are up 2.64% qoq and 1.35% yoy.
• Non-IFSC Foreign Assets amounted to €494,404mln or 19.11% of our total Foreign Assets. These assets are down 2.13% qoq and 11.99% yoy.
• Overall, Total Foreign Liabilities (Debt) are up from €2,678,809mln (€2.68 trillion) in Q2 2011 to €2,735,556mln (€2.74 trillion) in Q3 2011. Total Foreign Liabilities are now 2.12% qoq but down 1.50% yoy.
• Of the above, €2,072,484mln accrues to IFSC or 75.76% of all our Foreign Liabilities. This is up from €2,007,592mln in Q2 2011. IFSC liabilities are up 3.23% qoq but down 0.2% yoy.
• Non-IFSC Foreign Liabilities amounted to €663,072mln or 24.24% of our total Foreign Liabilities. These debts are down 1.21% qoq and down 5.34% yoy.

Charts illustrate:

The above figures are massive, but the balance of them is shocking:

• In Q3 2011, Net External Liabilities position (Net IIP) was €148,000mln up 10.18% qoq but down 1.37% yoy
• The above accounted for the surplus of €20,668mln in IFSC - down 34.83% qoq but up 282% yoy
• Which means that non-IFSC net debt was €168,668mln - more than our entire GDP - which is up 1.58% qoq and 21.6% yoy.

Yes, that's right - the 'bad' IFSC had a positive impact on our net External Liabilities position in Q3 2011, while the 'good' Ireland Inc had a massive shortfall of more than 100% of its GDP.

So now, let's think in relative terms - relative to our GDP:

• In Q3 2011 our Total Gross External Liabilities stood at a massive 1,738.9% of our GDP
• Of the above, 1,317.4% of our GDP was accounted for IFSC, and
• 421.5% of our GDP was captured by non-IFSC.

Now, that's pretty impressive... 17.4 times the GDP! And even at 4.2 times the GDP for non-IFSC foreign liabilities (keep in mind, these are just foreign liabilities, not capturing internal debts and other internal liabilities) we are pretty heavily under water.

22/12/2011: Retail Sector Activity Index: November 2011

I covered detailed retail sales for November data in the previous post (link here). Now is the time to update the Retail Sector Activity Index.


It is worth noting that my Retail Sector Activity Index for October has predicted November moderate uplift in sales - a nice surprise for the index just created:
"A large jump in consumer confidence in October (to 63.7 from September reading of 53.3) is the core driver of improvement in the overall Index od Retail Sector Activity, which now stands at 102.2 - above the expansion level of 100. This means that we can expect a small uplift in retail sector activity in months ahead, but this uplift can manifest itself through improved volumes of sales (value static, so margins declining) or improved value of sales (inflation) or both (more demand-driven uplift)."


As shown in my detailed analysis (linked above), the retail sales did indeed improve in November, and the improvement took place across all three possible drivers (depending on specific areas of sales):
" Only notable increases yoy are in Non-specialized stores ex-Department Stores (where inflationary pressures drove value up 1.4% while volume was up only 0.5%), Fuel (where inflation was so rampant that value of sales rose 10.3% while volume of sales fell 3.7%) and Electrical goods (where season sales started early and cuts were running deep with value +0.5% and volume up 7.5% yoy). Everything else was either down or flat."

So now to that data update:

• Retail sales (core) volume index rose to 100.6 in November from 98.8 in October. 
• Retail sales (core) value index rose from 94.6 in October to 95.6 in November
• Consumer confidence, however, declined from 63.7 in October to 60.1 in November.

The above implies that RSAI have dropped slightly from 108.64 in October to 107.96 in November. Dynamics however remain encouraging for continued firming up of sales:

• RSAI November reading is 3% ahead of 3mo ago, and 5.33% above the reading a year ago.
• 6mo MA now stands at 105.94, ahead of previous 6mo MA of 104.91, signaling what can be a moderate uplift.
• For comparison, 2006-2007 average is 125.41.

Charts to illustrate:

Medium-term, however, the indices remain below historical trends, with more firm confidence still failing to drive up retail volumes and values:

In other words, structural weakness in the sector remains unchanged. It will take couple of months of solid gains in retail sales (annual gains of 1.5-2% minimum per month) to deliver signs of real structural improvement.