Saturday, October 3, 2009

Economics 03/10/2009: Exchequer receipts - bad news redux

Another month, another set of Exchequer returns and another prediction of mine confirmed: Exchequer revenue is not stabilizing. A second wave of downgrades for Income Tax and VAT, as well as the adverse timing effects on Corpo Tax are now appearing.

This time around, the prediction was not only made on this blog (here), but was also elaborated in my Business & Finance magazine column. A combination of poor forecasting (overestimating the extent of seasonality on tax revenue in August, while underestimating the impact of seasonality on other months revenue) and of a naïve belief that things can’t get much worse from April 2009 Supplementary Budget position are now at play.

In other words, it now appears that summer months’ targets were seasonally adjusted in a simplistic linear fashion. August out-performance by actual returns looks like a DofF failure to see that in a recession more people will be taking forced ‘time-off’ in summer months and that this can boost, temporarily, spending. The DofF also dramatically underestimated the extent of forward payment of corporate taxes, which automatically means that they overestimated corporate revenue expected in the future months.

During the boom, underestimated revenue projections by DofF were routine. Nay, they were annual regularity, so much so that the Government came to depend on these ‘windfall revenues’ as a sweetener to various Social Partnership deals – a little annual bonus for cronies. This time, looking to September, the DofF folks grossly underestimated the extent of the recession impact on income and thus the direction of the income tax. Having stabilized and even improved (very slightly) through July on the back of new levies, Income Tax has since taken a dive again. The implicit assumption that ‘things always improve in September might hold at the times of a boom, when July and August mark mass exodus of consumers from Ireland, while September marks return of the school year and back-to-work spending rises. But it will not hold in a recession, where economic activity remains slow in September or even falls (due to falling tourism and recreational spending).
For some inexplicable reasons, DofF set targets for income tax to rise through September at a constant rate of roughly €1bn per month from May on. Given timing of self-employed filings and seasonalities in their incomes (with many taking unpaid ‘holidays’ during the summer), plus given the fact that the numbers of self-employed are rising due to redundancies and high unemployment, such an assumption of relatively static growth in Income Tax revenues is a bit amateurish.

The same factors have a knock on effect on VAT revenues. As income falls, consumption drops. As people get more leisure time, they tend to shop for cheaper goods and might take two trips up North instead of one. All point to the significant possibility that VAT receipts will be losing ground in summer months. Furthermore, the DofF forecasters also missed the effect of unemployment and falling incomes on parent’s willingness to spend vast fortunes of kids ‘back-to-school’ shopping. More importantly, what DofF clearly had no idea about is the psychology of ‘bundled shoppers’ – parents going to buy kids school-related items. If in Celtic Tiger days such a shopping outing was bound to end in a department store where parents can indulge in some compulsive shopping of their own, this year back-to-school shopping took them more likely to Aldi and Lidl, with only compulsive co-purchases taking place relating to the luxury items of, say, a box of chocolate biscuits. Not exactly an item where 21.5% tax rip off means much.
To be fair to DofF folks, they don’t really have much data to go to get an accurate model working. But to assume that July-September 2009 tax receipts will be directly proportionate (at a virtually constant rate) to those in 2008 is, at very best, naïve. Yet, per chart below, this was simply 'assumed'…
Now, September numbers confirmed more than just a shoddy quality of forecasting by the DofF (with an accumulated error for just 5 months-ahead forecast now standing at 3.91% we really do have a shoddy quality forecast here). Instead they show that all tax heads (apart from artificially inflated by timing changes) tax heads are tanking through 2009 relative to the already crisis-ridden 2008. Chart below and table illustrate:
As far as state solvency goes, there is surprising one off change in our borrowings, which have apparently fallen back by some €5.2bn in September. I have no explanation for this, other than potential maturity of some earlier issued bonds or an error in reporting of the figures. Meanwhile the deficit trend continues to diverge from last years in the direction of further widening in fiscal deficit this year. Chart below illustrates.
Income and expenditure gap is also still widening as the chart above shows. But there is something else that can be glimpsed from the data. Remember that in May 2009 this Government started a campaign to assure the markets and domestic taxpayers that their policies are working, that the worst is almost over and that the economy is in the state of having ‘bottomed out’. Chart below shows that even in the Government’s own back yard such statements were completely unjustified. Suppose that May did mark a month of arrested downward slide in this economy. One would expect at the very least that Government finances will not continue deteriorating at a greater rate than before April Budget. The path of fiscal deficit that is traced out by the black arrows in the chart below corresponds to exactly such an assumption.
It is clear that we are not, currently, anywhere near the state of ‘improvement’ in the economy (as far as the Exchequer figures are concerned), or even the ‘bottoming out’ stage. We are still in a relative free-fall stage.

And this clarity is magnified by the expenditure side of the Exchequer balance sheet. Per Ulster Bank research note, the chart below shows the break down of the excessive spending by two main categories:Minister Lenihan is more than willing to cut into Government's only official stimulus to the economy - capital spending. This is a right way forward as much of our capital 'investment' was, in reality, simply masked-up wasteful current expenditure on soft targets like 'training & education', 'social cohesion' etc. But the chart above shows that current spending cuts to date have been extremely shallow. This is not a policy consistent with the claims of rigorous addressing of the deficit - cyclical or structural.
Table above clearly indicates the following facts about our Exchequer's spending side:
  1. Capital spending is down significantly, at -13.1% yoy, but not really enough still - cutting capital spending back by 50% would do a better job;
  2. Current spending is still rising +0.7% yoy in September (and no, increased social welfare and unemployment payments are not the only story here);
  3. Waste on current spending side is still abundant - table shows those articles of reductions where cuts in spending for each department are the deepest. Predominantly, these cuts are on the capital side and not on the current expenditure side;
  4. Increased spending on social welfare is now clearly indicating that early job cuts in 2007 are now translating into people signing off unemployment benefits and onto the dole - a move that is likely to lead to a very long-term dependency on social welfare.
The verdict from all of this is a simple one - this Government is not doing enough to correct for structural and cyclical fall off in revenue. Tax increases and levies passed in October 2008 and April 2009 are not working. While cuts promised since July 2008 are not forthcoming. We are still on a path to state insolvency.

Friday, October 2, 2009

Economics 02/10/2009: IMF World Economic Outlook

IMF released its World Economic Outlook for H2 2009 last night. Here are some highlights, more to come later tonight.

Summaries of IMF latest forecasts:

Next, I created an index of overall economic activity that is GDP-weighted. This index is geared in favor of Ireland and other smaller exporting economies by magnifying the effects of GDP growth (as opposed to GNP) and the effects of the current account (reflective of higher share of trade and FDI in Irish economy) and downplaying both price inflation (with larger share of domestic inflation in Ireland imported from abroad) and unemployment (with traditionally smaller both unemployment and labour force participation in Ireland).

Rankings based on the index: Based on the above index of economic activity, ranking countries in order of declining quality of economic environment, shows the extent of our performance deterioration: if in 2007 Ireland ranked 18th from the top in the developed world, by 2010 we are expected to rank 29th or fourth from the bottom.
Peer economies comparatives:
Based on the above table, we can compute a relative impact of the crisis 2008-2010 on our competitor economies. Chart below illustrates this, showing that when compared to other economies, only Iceland is expected to show more severe contraction in economic activity than Ireland. More importantly, the gap between Irish performance during the crisis and that of an average economy in our competitor group is 1.5 Standard Deviations away from the mean.
Property markets crisis estimates: based on IMF model of duration and amplitude of property busts, table below reports the relative impacts of the global property slump in the case of Ireland, comparative to the rest of the OECD:
Stay tuned for more...

Wednesday, September 30, 2009

Economics 01/10/2009: External Debt - still a problem

As of 30 June 2009, per CSO’s today release, “the gross external debt of all resident sectors (i.e. general government, the monetary authority, financial and non-financial corporations and households) amounted to almost €1,689bn. This represents a drop of €7bn or 0.4% …compared to the level shown (€1,696bn) at the end of March 2009.”

“…the bulk of Ireland’s external debt arises from the liabilities of IFSC financial enterprises and also that most of its overall foreign financial liabilities are offset by Irish residents’ (including IFSC) holdings of foreign financial assets.” Hmmm… again this over-emphasis of IFSC. One note of caution - we do not actually know if these 'assets' are valued at fair rates (we do not know what percentage of these assets is valued at mark-to-market, and what percentage is valued at hold-to-maturity bases), so some questions to the quality of the assets can be raised.

“Liabilities of monetary financial institutions (credit institutions and money market funds) consisting mostly of loans and debt securities were almost €691bn, a drop of almost €27bn on the 31stMarch 2009 stock level and down €117bn on the June 2008 level.” In other words, our banks are de-leveraging… as in charts below… but at whose expense?

The reduced liabilities of MFIs “are broadly reflected in the significantly increased Monetary Authority liabilities of €103bn, up by over €98bn since June 2008. These obligations are to the European System of Central Banks (ESCB)...” Aha, de-leveraging by loading up on those ECB loans, then?

But wait, there is more: “The liabilities of other sectors including those of insurance companies and pension funds, treasury companies and other relevant financial enterprises, as well as non-financial enterprises were €624bn, remaining relatively flat compared to end-March 2009. However, compared to end-June 2008, these liabilities had increased by €28bn.” Yeeeeks – banks de-leveraging is pushing ‘other sectors’ – aka the real economy – deeper into debt.

But wait, there is more: “The level of general government foreign borrowing increased by €10bn to €72bn between March and June this year and was €29bn up on the June 2008 level.” Ooops, banks are costing us here too (as do our social welfare rates and public sector wages bills).
Pull one end of the cart up, the other end sinks?

Some details on top of CSO’s release:
Table above shows percentage increases in debt levels across sectors and maturities. Pretty self-explanatory. The Exchequer is borrowing short and increasingly so. But the Exchequer is borrowing long as well, and rather aggressively as well. Monetary Authority is truly remarkable. Incidentally, MA borrowings are mostly short-term (higher than 3:1 ratio to long-term).

Banks (oh, sorry, MFIs) are cutting back debt more aggressively this year than in 2008. And, strangely enough, they are cutting more long-term debts than short-term debts (in proportional terms). Of course, this in part reflects bad loans provisions and pay downs of Irish subsidiaries debt by foreign parents.

Other sectors are rolling up accumulated interest and amassing new loans. Short-term liabilities net of trade credits are up over two years, trade credits flat over last year. What does it tell you about importing activities?
Shares of MFIs in total debt thus are falling across the years, as are FDI shares, but everything else is rising.

Looking at short vs longer term debt issuance by sector:
Monetary Authority is now almost all short-term, Government is increasingly short-termist as well. Maturity mismatch risk is rising as is, but with Nama (a rolling 6-months re-priced bond against 10-20 years work out window on loans) maturity mismatch risk on Government balance sheet will go through the roof.
MFIs short term debt is now also declining, while long term debt has been declining for some time. It would be interesting to have this broken down by foreign vs domestic lenders, but there is no such detail in CSO figures, despite CSO's constant repeating that the figures include IFSC. If IFSC is so important to this analysis - why not report it separately?

Other sectors are relatively flat, which is bad news. Trade credits flat as well.

Overall, lack of significant de-leveraging and in some cases, continued accumulation of liabilities, in the real economy.

Economics 30/09/2009: Unemployment crisis continues

Per CSO release today: “The seasonally adjusted Live Register total increased from 428,800 in August to 429,400 in September, an increase of 600. In the year to September 2009, there was an unadjusted increase of 183,422 (+76.4%). This compares with an unadjusted increase of 192,672 (+77.9%) in the year to August 2009.”

Are things improving? Declines in LR appear to point to two major factors at play here:
  • Main sources of layoffs are flattening out, including construction and retail services. This is a sign of stabilization, but it is not a sign of impending improvement, as likelihood of these sectors aggressively rehiring staff is slim in the foreseeable future;
  • Large movements from the LR are also a function of more people dropping out of the labour force and signing up for welfare benefits, while ceasing job searches.
“The average net weekly increase in the seasonally adjusted series in September was 150, which compares with a figure of 1,350 in the previous month. The standardised unemployment rate in September was 12.6%” - flat on August.

“In the month, the estimated number of casual and part-time workers on the LR was 38,268 males and 32,590 females.” In August, the same figures were 37,749 males and 32,354 females. And so on: table illustrates
How do you explain this? A friend of mine used to be a broker, now drives a taxi. Per official stats, he is doing fine. Per his own state of mind, he is doing the necessary thing to survive. This is the difference between voluntary under-employment and self-employment and its forced version. CSO’s latest figures show the latter.

So per some commentators out there, “the unemployment rate, which didn’t rise this month – the first time that has happened since December ‘07” and this is an improvement. For me, this is like telling someone who’s house just burnt down that all’s fine – there won’t be another fire for a while.

I am still sticking with 14-15% forecast for 2009 peak unemployment, though it might be looking like a bit downside from 14% is possible. Who know – Christmas season (aka desperation levels in retail sector) will tell.

Now, to that other pesky issue – labour force participation. One issue of growing importance is youth unemployment. This is contracting per LR figures. But this contraction is likely masking two factors at play:
  1. there is significant seasonality - much of youth employment is part time and linked to higher activities in summer months (hotels, recreational etc sectors), plus
  2. there is a number of those who are simply dropping out of the labour force (either those who would have joined, but are not joining now that the jobs evaporated, or those who have been out of work for over a year and stopped searching, or those who have gone back to school or who continued in school transitioning to a new programme).
Per QNHS released earlier this month: "Almost all of the decline in the size of the labour market is attributable to a decline in participation of almost 36,000.” Now, remember, that was for Q2 2009 – pre summer months. “This is shown by a fall in the participation rate from 63.7% in Q2 2008 to 62.5% in Q2 2009.” To me, this indirectly confirms that drop-outs from the labour force are most likely to be our younger workers. In QNHS see Table 9: labour force participation rates have fallen by age group as follows for April-June 2007 to April-June 2009:
  • 15-19 age group from 29.1% to 22.1% (7 percentage points down)
  • 20-24 age group from 77.0% to 73.6% (3.4 percentage points down – less than half of decline in younger category)
  • 25-34 age group from 85.5% to 84.7% (0.8 percentage points down)
  • Economy-wide from 64.0 to 62.5% (1.5% percentage down)
So youths are dropping out of labour force at a rate nearly 5 times those of the average decline.

Hmm… things are improving, rapidly. Dom Perignon 1988 uncorking time, yet?

Economics 30/09/2009: Global Financial Stability Report

Update: There is an interesting note in one of today's stockbrokers' reports: "AIB is to review its selection process for a successor to Eugene Sheehy, according to reports this morning. The Government will not endorse an internal candidate based on renewed signals according to the article. Separately, Minister Brian Lenihan said it was "inevitable" that further public capital will be required by the country's banks after the NAMA transfers."

Two points:
  1. If Government is so aggressive in staking its control over AIB's selection of a CEO, why can't the same Government commit to firing the entire boards upon initiation of Nama? Governments change overnight, so why banks' boards are so different?
  2. I must confess, I like Minister Lenihan's belated (this blog and other analysts have said months ago that there will be second round demand for funding post-Nama due to RWA changes triggered by Nama, and then due to second wave of defaults within mortgage and corporate loans portfolia) recognition of a simple financial / accounting reality. Strangely enough, the brokers themselves never factored this eventuality in their projections of Nama effect on banks balance sheets.
Oh, another little point: Minister Lenihan was last night explaining on RTE that BofI and IAB both raised circa Euro1bn bonds each with the issues oversubscribed by a healthy margin and that these were 3-3.5 year bonds. we should be impressed, then? Au contraire: those foreign investors (in the case of BofI 92% of the bond issue gone to foreign institutionals and banks) are making a rational bet that Ireland will continue to guarantee depositors through 2014 if not even longer, and that the Exchequer will rather destroy the households than see banks go under. In other words, the markets priced Irish banks now as being effectively fully guaranteed by the state - bondholders, shareholders, unsecured debt holders, furniture and office suppliers, staff - you name a counterparty working with Irish banking sector... they are all now implicitly guaranteed by you, me, ordinary taxpayers in Tallaght and elsewhere across the nation. Some success, then.

News: IMF's Global Financial Stability Report Chapter 1 is out today. This is the main section of the report and it focuses on two themes:
  1. Continuation of the crisis in financial markets - the next wave of (shallower, but nonetheless present) risks to credit supply in globally over-stretched lending institutions; and
  2. Future exist strategies from the virtually self-sustaining cycle of new debt issuance by the sovereigns that goes on to mop up scarce liquidity in the private sector, thus triggering a new round of debt issuance by the sovereigns (irony has it, I wrote about the threat of this merry-go-round link between public finances and private credit supply back in my days at NCB - in August 2008).
The report is a good read, even though it is a voluminous exercise - check it out on IMF's main website (at this hour I am still working with press access copy).

Ireland-specific stuff:
Nice chart above - Ireland was pretty heavy into ECB cash window back in 2007, but by 2009 we became number one junkies of cheap funding. Like an addict hanging about the corner shop in hope of a fix, our banks are now borrowing a whooping 7% of their total loans volumes through ECB. This is a sign of balance sheet weakness, but it is also a sign that the banks are doing virtually nothing to aggressively repair their balance sheets themselves. Why? Because Nama looms as a large rescue exercise on the horizon.
But, denial of a problem is not a new trait. Per chart above, through 2006, Irish banks were third from the bottom in providing for bad loans despite a massive rate of expansion in lending and concentration of this lending in few high risk areas (buy-to-rent UK markets, speculative land markets in Ireland, UK and US and so on). Now, taking the path the Eurozone average has taken since then, adjusting for the decline in underlying property markets in Ireland relative to the Eurozone, and for the shortfall on provisions prior to 2007, just to match current risk-pricing in the Eurozone banks, Irish banks would have to hike their bad loans provisions to 3-3.75%. And this is before we factor in the extremely high degree of loans concentrations in property markets in Ireland. Again, why are we not seeing such dramatic increases? One word: Nama.
Lastly, table above shows the spreads on bonds in the US and Eurozone. Two note worthy features here:
  1. The rates of decline in all grades of bonds and across sovereign and corporate bonds shows that they are comparable to those experienced by Ireland. This debunks the myth that Irish bonds pricing improved on the back of something that Irish Government has done ('correcting' deficit or 'setting a right policy' for our economy). Instead, Irish bond prices moved in-line with global trends, being driven by improved appetite for risk in financial markets and not by our leaders' policies;
  2. Current spreads on Irish bonds over German bunds suggest market pricing of Irish sovereign bonds that is comparable to US and European corporates. In effect, Ireland Inc is not being afforded by the markets the same level of credibility as our major European counterparts. One wonders why...

Tuesday, September 29, 2009