Economics 24/8/10: Anglo Tranche 2 goes 'Boom!'

Two weeks ago in a post on Anglo (here) I provided a quick explanation of my forecasts for why the mid range expected capital hit on the entire Anglo book of ca €72bn worth of loans (original face value) will be in the region of €33bn. This estimate referred to the mid-range assumptions.

In the light of today's speculations/reports (here) that the final Tranche 2 haircut on Anglo loans will be 61.93% I am now more confident in my original lower- and mid-range estimates, though adjusting my upper margin loss estimate down a notch.

To repeat my projections are:

• Worst case scenario for Anglo requires €38.6bn (down from €38.9bn)
  
• The mid-range is €33bn in total hit (same as earlier)
  
• The best case scenario is €30bn (same as earlier)
  

Some details: Tranche 2 of Anglo loans was valued at €6.75bn. Combined total amount of loans transferred to Nama in Tranche 2 is €11.9bn on an average discount of 55.6%. Tranches 1 & 2 combined is €27.2bn of the total €81 bn planned with an average discount of 52.3%. If this discount stands, remaining Tranche 3 transfers of €53.7bn to be completed by February 2011 will incur capital hit of RWA-adjusted €28.1bn - to a combined Nama-induced capital loss to all 6 banks of €42.3bn. Nama expects further €12bn to be transferred by the end of September - a highly unlikely deadline, at least if Anglo-INBS stuff were to be included here. Provisions by the

As telling as the haircuts are the assumed LTEVs - in Tranche 1 the implied LTEV was 11 percent. In Tranche 2 this is down to 9 percent. Since Nama marks to November 2009, this change can be explained either by lower quality of loans being taken on board (bad news for Nama, better news for banks) or by Nama aggressive drive into raising cash flow (good news for Nama, bad news for the banks).

Now, to my valuations. Table below summarizes:
Notice, I allow for interest margins of 1.5% pa in my mid-range assumptions. This is rather unlikely. To end of 2009, interest margin on Anglo loans (performing) was roughly 1% and this did not reflect Nama costs. In addition, my mid-range scenario assumes Nama recovering 100% of the principal amount of the loans - something that I believe to be equally unlikely. Either way, mid-range estimate implies that Messr Aynsley and Dukes will be coming in with new demands for cash soon - to the tune of €8.5bn more based on my mid-range scenario.

Economics 11/8/10: Anglo saga continues

For about 24 hours I have resisted commenting on the Anglo latest twist in the capital hole - the EU approval yesterday of additional funding for the dead bank. But given the lack of straight forward and insightful analysis in the media, I thought I should throw int couple of direct comments on the affair.

First, consider the EU statement (available here):
"Anglo Irish Bank needs a third emergency recapitalisation to meet its obligations. ...there is no doubt that Anglo Irish Bank has to restructure profoundly in a way that effectively tackles the weaknesses of the past business model and ensures a sustainable future without continued State support."

Sadly, no Irish commentator noticed the irony that the EU is calling for a profound restructuring of the Anglo after 3 episodes of approvals of extraordinary funding for the bank by the taxpayers. Surely, if the Commission were to do its job and properly police national decisions relating to financial institutions stability, after the second call for capital from Anglo, Mr Almunia should have said something along the following lines: "Don't come back for any additional funds approval until you first provide a clear map as to how you are planning to shut down this insolvent institution."

Second, consider the timing of the approval. For some days before the approval, Irish 'analysts' and policy officials have been massaging public opinion. Various leaks and speculative statements that the bank will need more cash were floated around. Some of the Irish brokerages suggested that Anglo will need €2-4bn more in funding. Of course, while this circus was ongoing, the Government has been quietly labouring away at the submission to the EU Commission. The approval was issued on Tuesday, suggesting that the request for emergency funding extension was filed at the very latest - on Friday. This request was not subject to any parliamentary debate or other procedures that should have been deployed to ensure democratic participation in disbursing of the public money was adhered to.

Third consider Irish media and 'analysts' response to the Anglo call for cash. Of all stockbrokers, only NCB managed to comment on the Anglo call, despite the fact that Anglo's capital demands are indicative of the sector-wide problems. NCB guys actually did a good job in their morning note, saying that:

• "We had added €23bn to our General Government Debt to GDP ratio as a result of Anglo to leave it at 98.1% at year end 2011. This additional €1.4bn now needs to be added and will add approximately 0.7% to our debt to GDP figure at year end 2011." Yeps, with Anglo latest request for funding, Ireland Inc sovereign debt is set to be 99% by the end of 2011.
  
• The NCB guys are also aware, unlike, it appears Davy and Goodies, that Anglo can end up costing us (taxpayers) of sovereign bonds side as well: "The NTMA announced that its next auction on Tuesday August 17th it will tap the 4.0% 15 January 2014 bond and the 5.0% 18 October 2020 bond. The NTMA will be hoping that the Anglo issue is cleared up sooner rather than later and that clarity is given on the final requirement by the State. The uncertainty surrounding the exact amount of the transfer into Anglo is weighing on the Irish sovereign. The Irish 10 year is currently at 5.16% which is 274bps over the equivalent German bond and wider than the benchmark Portuguese 10 year which is yielding 5.079%."

Of course, most of the media have missed the two points of Anglo contagion to the broader markets:

1. Sovereign risk rising due to Anglo uncertainty, and
2. Corporate risk is also rising due to spillover from sovereign uncertainty to corporate assets valuations.

Finally, the whole circus around Anglo's 'news' missed the core point - Anglo started into the present mess with €71bn of 'assets' (aka loans). The total amount earmarked to date for the bank amounts to €24.354bn.

If Nama were to be believed in its LTEV estimates, Anglo's book is roughly 55% under water. This means that its post-Nama book is somewhere closer to being:

• 1/7 of the total book (€10bn) under water to Nama or better than Nama levels - say impairment of 30% due;
• 35% (or €25bn destined for the 'Bad' bank) is under water more than Nama haircuts - say 60-70% impairment due.

Translated to the full pre-crisis book, this implies the average recovery rate on Anglo loans of ca 43-47% across the whole book.

Let me explain the above numbers: €10bn recoverable at 70% and 25bn recoverable at 30-40% implies 14.5bn recovery on 35bn of assets left post-Nama, adding to it Nama haircuts implies recovery rate of 43-47%, ex-costs). This, in turn, implies across the book impairments of €37.6-40.5bn. Take the lower number - total through restructuring cost of Anglo can be expected to reach ca €37bn in the end or higher. Take 10% off for risk-weighting and restructurings of funding etc to boost regulatory capital.

End of the Anglo affair cost comes to roughly speaking €33bn. That's the amount we can expect to pay in the end. The latest €24.4bn count is, therefore, only less than 3/4 of the saga. So here's my forecast - by end 2011 Anglo will ask for ca €10bn more in our cash and by the end of 2012 - for up to €13bn more than the amounts already advanced. The only way these figures can be made smaller is if Nama grossly overpays Anglo for Tranche 2 and 3 loans.

Anyone noticed that? Not really. Just as no one noticed that Anglo is going to, in the end, cost every working person in this country something of the order of €19,600 - a hefty bill for rescuing Anglo's bondholders for every household of two trying to pay a (negative equity) mortgage and get kids through school.

Instead, our media keeps on asking Minister Lenihan rhetorical questions along the lines 'How much more?' and lamenting 'unexpected Anglo demands for more cash'. Per all publicly available information on this site, Peter Mathews' site and Irish Economy site, all I can say: "Expect more of the 'unexpected', folks".

Economics 6/8/10: Anglo's plans & systemic risks

Updated

Here are some interesting questions (note - just questions for now, on the foot of comments made by Prof Brian Lucey earlier today) regarding the 'Good' v 'Bad' Anglo plans.

Take it from the top: we started with a bank with €71bn on the books valued at valuations of the peak markets. This is now allegedly going to:

• €25bn of the face value of loans pre-writedowns - to the 'Bad' bank, implying that these loans are so poor in quality, even Nama, with an average 50%+ (LTEV-inclusive) haircut is not touching it. This implies that even in the long run, these loans are not going to generate more than, say, 30% recovery rate (a generous 30% that is, but let's take it as such. Note: that is across the entire loan book of the 'Bad' bank);
• €10bn of the face value of loans pre-writedowns - to the 'Good' bank, implying that these loans are better than Nama average, so the LTEV on these loans is above 50%. Assume that the LTEV on them is 60% (which makes them better than Ulster Bank's Irish book, per today's results for Ulster - again a generous allowance, but let's entertain it);
• the remainder is going to Nama.

Now, another little factoid: Central Bank of Ireland has lent Anglo €11.5bn under a MLRA repo agreement secured against the non-Nama loans.

Per Anglo last published results: "Sale and repurchase agreements with central banks include €12.2bn (30 September 2008: €7.6bn) borrowed under open market operations from central banks and €11.5bn (30 September 2008: €nil) borrowed under a Master Loan Repurchase Agreement (’MLRA’) with the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland."

Let's do some simple math.

Value (recall - I am factoring referencing to Long Term Economic Value, not the current mark-to-market value, which is even lower):

• €10bn in 'Good' Anglo can be (optimistically) expected to yield €6bn valuation using LTEV;
• €25bn in 'Bad' Anglo can be (again, optimistically) expected to yield €7.5bn valuation using LTEV.
• Allow for 1.5% margin of costs on both sides, to €525mln pa, or over 5 years - i.e. much shorter than Nama horizon - €2.6bn (note: current bank cost structure, which one can expect to be preserved as both banks go about conducting impaired assets recovery - a higher cost activity)
  
• Total non-Nama book value is, inclusive of LTEV net of expected management costs, therefore could be already around €10.9bn.

Against this value of €10.9-13.5bn, CB of Ireland holds €11.5bn worth of loans to the Anglo.

Now to the question: Does this mean that CB might be facing a potentially significant loss on the repos?

This possibility raises two issues:

1. If the repos are spread across 'Good' and 'Bad' bank, then the 'Good' bank is hardly a feasible undertaking, as repos alone already exceed the value of the 'Good' bank even absent impairment charges, while 'Bad' bank has clearly no ability to repay any fraction of these;
2. If the repos are inherited by the 'Bad' bank, then, either CB has to declare a loss (and I am not sure how it can do this), or the taxpayer is on the hook for the repos by having to pay them down through the 'Bad' Anglo.
   

Now, alternatively, let's ask the following question: to recover CBs repos from non-Nama assets, we need to have a combined 'Good' & 'Bad' banks recovery rate of 33% (not covering the costs of operating both banks, funding, bond holders etc). And this, once again, refers to the valuations done on the face value of the loans before any recent impairments - before the bubble burst. To recover all other CBs' funds, plus our own - we need a recovery rate of ca 68% (again ex all costs etc). That's really highly unlikely, folks.


Quite a dilemma, then, especially since ECB (see here) didn't approved the repos in the first place... and since Anglo also owes the other Eurozone Central Banks some €12.2bn more.

What could Mr Trichet say about Anglo's priorities in repaying the loans? Would he be (a) so kind as allow CB of Ireland to recoup its repos, which ECB thought were dodgy enough to refuse to take them itself? or (b) insist that other CBs be repaid first before our own repos are covered? If (a) - I'd say Mrs Merkel would have a few kind words to say to Mr Trichet, given her electorate's feelings about having to bailout Greece. If (b) - the above potential negative valuation of the repos will have to be multiples larger...

Just asking some questions for now... Wonder if there are any answers out there...

Economics 1/6/2010: Numbers game at Anglo

Last night, I sat down to run through possible scenarios for the Anglo's 'The Bad and the Ugly' Banks division. You see, something was telling me right off the start that the idea of a 'Good' Bank just doesn't really square off with our knowledge of the bank's operations to date.

So I posited to myself the following question: given Nama transfers and rumored split off of €12-15bn worth of loans into a 'good' bank, can the resulting entity be viable? Like a scientist in a lab, I donned on a white coat (well, really my favorite UofChicago sweatshirt), pulled out a Petri dish (my Excel) and started observing the split of that outright not-so-beautiful and very toxic (to the taxpayers) bacteria, called Anglo...

Here are the results, first in numbers and then in plain English:

Step 1: recall we have pumped €10.3 billion worth of promisory notes into the bank alone. Relying on my yesterday's analysis (see details here), I reproduced the demand that a 'Good' Anglo will generate for funding these promisory notes. Now, a reminder - these numbers (penultimate column) correspond to interest only charge on Anglo from the promisory notes. They exclude principal repayment and other recapitalization funding already in the bank.
Bah, I said, the thing in the Petri dish of mine looks pretty ugly. Ugly as in unable to cover the taxpayers-due interest on capital it receives at the first glance.

Ok, I said to myself, but may be were the new 'Good' bank to grow over time, it will become relatively viable with time? Suppose the 'Good' bank generates no impairments going forward (unrealistic assumption, but suppose it does), suppose that 'Good' Anglo grows its book at 5% (generating no new impairments). Further suppose that there's some value in the 'Bad' bank - so assume 20% of the loans transferred to it perform in the future (an extremely optimistic assumption, but what the h***ll, not much out of line with the general assumptions the Government has been making all through its management of the crisis).

The question I asked then was: with all these rosy assumptions in place, what amount of interest payments annually can Anglo afford?

To compute this, I took several scenarios:

1. I allowed 'Good' Anglo to take €12 or €15 billion in loans on board;
2. I assumed that it generates 2% of the loan book annually (another optimistic assumption - as it corresponds to an efficiently operating bank in terms of costs, book of business and funding costs - all of which are not exactly characteristic of the Anglo)
3. I then assumed three different potential burden levels on interest (recall, no principal) repayment at 30% of the total annual return by the bank, 25% and 20%. Let me explain here that a 30% number is utterly unrealistic, implying that almost a third of the entire operating revenue of the bank will be used to pay interest on a small share of its capital funding. This will, in effect, leave no surplus to pay bonuses (of any kind) and dividends (of any kind) as well as to finance bank's insurance etc. 25% mark is also unrealistic, while 20% is back-breaking for a bank, but can be probably sustained over a couple of years.

Table below shows the results by stating the amount of interest repayment that the bank can generate across both its 'Good' and 'Bad' divisions. Blue-bold numbers mark the first time that the annual interest funding requirement gets met.
All of this is fine, I said to myself next, but before the interest requirement is first met on the annual basis, there are years of the bank not covering the interest bills. These will cumulate.

My next question, therefore was: How soon can the bank break into the 'black' vis-a-vis interest repayment alone?
Table above shows the cumulated interest arrears from the €10.3 billion in promisory notes. It clearly shows that under all scenarios, save one (the most optimistic scenario) the entire Anglo operation cannot be expected to generate enough cash to cover even the portion of its interest bill. In fact, under the more realistic scenario (last two columns), Anglo - 'Bad' and 'Good' combined - will continue to accumulate interest arrears on the taxpayers funds (ex €4 billion in direct capital it received) through 2020.

There is no principal repayment charge in the above, nor is there a chance of receiving anything close to the interest bill, even assuming that we do not roll up interest on the cash we put in. In simple words - the entire Anglo operation is so fundamentally bust, that the taxpayer is likely to never receive even a few cents on the euro of the money we've put into it.

The only thing that grew in my Petri dish was a voracious bacteria capable of hoovering taxpayers money at a speed unimaginable to any other bank.

One wonders if that is what Mr Alan Dukes and our Government mean when they are saying that proceeding with keeping Anglo on a respirator amounts to minimizing the cost to the taxpayers.

Economics 31/05/2010: Anglo's latest cash call

This just in - the Government has decided to give Anglo, yes, that very Anglo which is Ireland's real zombie bank with no prospect - even theoretical one - a fresh capital injection of €2 billion (here). This brings taxpayers' capital injected into the bank to €14.3 billion to-date.

The official information by DofF claims that because the injection comes in a form of a promisory note, payable over 10-15 years, there will be lesser impact on the taxpayers today. However, although the official announcement does not say so, this term structure of payments means that our future deficits will be front loaded (pre-committed to the amount announced today), implying that for Ireland to reach required 3% deficit/GDP limit by 2015, we will have to face an increased funding requirement for Anglo over time.

This requirement must be provisioned today, since the notes work in the following way:

• At any point in time between today and 10-15 years from now, Anglo can waltz into DofF's offices and ask for any share - between 0.00001% and 100% of the amount issued on the promisory note.
• At that moment, the Government will have to come up with cash pronto, which means - no time to issue separate bonds.
• Which implies that the very second Mr Dukes asks for cash, our deficit goes up by that exact amount.

Now, prudentially, we should have set an escrow account and provided for this funding. In practice, as is clear from the DofF release, no provisions will be made. The entire, and I repeat, the entire risk of the drawdown therefore is leveled on the shoulders of taxpayers. The DofF in effect is praying to the forces of fortune that Anglo won't come in with a request for funds tomorrow, and/or that any request will not be for the entire sum of the promisiory note.

Now, let us revert back to the 'bank' called Anglo. The State has now committed €10.3 billion in promisory notes. These carry interest rate of... well, I am not sure... but suppose it is 5% to cover the cost of borrowing for these funds in the market, once the funds are disbursed. Assume that 10% of that (actually below a normal charge for a letter of credit for an insolvent company) is outstanding annually until a drawdown. Make a further assumption: assume that Anglo will draw the entire amount in equal annual installments over 5 years - an assumption that is also extremely conservative.

At 5% per annum, Anglo's liabilities to the taxpayers are:
Let me quickly and briefly explain the last 2 columns above. The penultimate column shows the sum of interest charges (at 5% on drawn funds), plus underwriting charge (at 0.5% for undrawn promisory note funds remaining) that Anglo should be paying over the next 10 years, assuming draw down is evenly spread over 5 years on both tranches. The last column then states the amount of loans that are performing that Anglo needs to have on its books in each year to cover the loans interest, not the principal, but interest, assuming that Anglo uses 0.5% of the loans to cover its interest rate, which would roughly amount to 25-30% of its entire interest income on the loans (note - that is really a severe case of the credit squeeze on a bank, but hey, suppose they manage without breaking the back).

How do I come up with this 25-30% estimate? In a normal year, one can expect a fully efficient bank to make ca 2% of their loans volume in revenue. If it pays 0.5% of that amount to cover costs of promisory note, it will be swallowing 25% of the revenue base.

Now, Anglo is transferring to Nama some €35 bn worth of loans, leaving it with ca €30 billion in remaining loans on its books. Of these, roughly 60% is expected to go into the 'bad' bank - in other words, roughly €18 billion worth of loans won't b performing. This leaves it with roughly 40% of loans or €12 billion on the side available for revenue generation. It needs ca €28 billion to cover the cost of the prmisory notes alone...

Get the picture? Even if you dispute my assumptions and half all the costs of the promisory note carry, you still can't get Anglo balance sheet to cover the cost (not the principal) of what it is borrowing from the taxpayers. This puts into perspective the DofF claim that: "As the Minister stated last March the overriding objective of the Government is to minimise the cost to the taxpayer of the restructuring of Anglo Irish Bank".

Economics 30/04/2010: Anglo Irish Bank shutdown costs

We are once again swamped with the 'new numbers' from the DofF and Minister Lenihan. This time the latest 'facts' relate to the potential cost of shutting down Anglo. Yesterday, Mary Coughlan stated in the Dail that the cost of an immediate liquidation of the bank had been prohibitive (per Irish times - here). Today, the unquestioning media squad is reporting that the cost of shutting down Anglo will be "more than €100 billion" (The Irish Independent, page 17). This figure has been floated out by the Anglo's paid-public-'experts'-turn-paid-executives, like Mr Dukes, and by the DofF talk-heads.

In reality this number is simply plain wrong, representing, simultaneously, a combination of

• bad arithmetic, and
• poor understanding of finance

Here is why. Take Anglo's balancesheet:

Assets of €72 billion:

• Loans to customers of €65 billion (with €35 billion earmarked for Nama)
• Loans in the interbank markets (loans to other banks) of €7 billion
• Risk-adjusting loans to customers to reflect an impairment charge of 60% implies recoverable loans of €26 billion (without a need to call in Nama at all).

Total recoverable assets of €34 billion.

Liabilities to customers and the ECB of €60 billion

• Customers' deposits of €27 billion
• Banks and ECB deposits of €33 billion

Thus, the real taxpayers' liability is €60bn-€34bn=€26 billion. Not €70 billion, nor €100 billion claimed by the various parties.

You might ask me 2 questions at this junction:

1. "What about bond holders?" Ok, there are €15 billion worth of senior bond holders and €2.3 billion of subordinated bond holders. These bondholders - all institutional - have been begging the State for years to keep banking sector lightly regulated. And I agree with them on this, in principle (omitting details here). As a part of their pleas, we've been repeatedly told that markets are able to price risks better than any regulator can. And I agree with them on this as well. So, as a consequence of their own stated desires and claimed powers, the bond holders should be made to bear the responsibility for their own errors in pricing risks. In other words, the Government should tell them to count their losses. This is what the market is all about and this, not the rescue by taxpayers, is what the real market participants expect from Ireland Inc. Lastly, on this point, there is not a single financial instrument or contract that legally requires the Irish taxpayers to foot the bill for non-sovereign investment undertaking. Full stop. Cut the guarantee on all Anglo bondholders and send them packing. Note: even if we are to cover bondholders in full, Anglo wind down will cost no more than €39 billion. Not €70 billion, nor €100 billion.
   
2. "How can the winding down take place?" Simple - we proceed to gradually, over the next 5 years, to sell assets. Depositors remain guaranteed, so we can rest assured they will not call in their deposits all at the same time. As we realize the value of the assets, we gradually close off the liabilities. To do this, bank staff can be reduced by over 50% and their wages (currently averaging €110,515 per annum per employee) can be cut by the same proportion. This is it, folks - simple.

Now, let me ask you two questions in return:

1. Why are Messrs Dukes, Lenihan etc are claiming that the winding down Anglo will cost €70-100 billion? Is it because (a) they have no idea and are 'inventing' numbers as they go? or (b) they have an ulterior motive to claim improbably high figures to continue dragging out this Anglo saga over 20 years?
2. Why have the Irish taxpayers paid hundreds of thousands of euros to 'consultants' who cannot come up with a simple, straight forward plan for dealing with Anglo to date, despite the fact that people like Peter Mathews (to whom I am obliged for much of the figures quoted above), Brian Lucey, Karl Whelan and myself have provided viable alternatives for dealing with the 'bank' free of charge?

Economics 09/04/2010: Bank of Ireland: strategic insanity

And so, as I predicted in the press some months ago and confirmed (also in the press) following the AIB rate hike and previous BofI hike in the non-mortgage rates, Bank of Ireland had succumbed to the temptation to destroy its own paying clients in order to plaster up the gaping hole in its capital base.

There are, as you have noticed, a number of things going on in the above statement. Let me briefly explain:

• A hike of 50bps on variable rate mortgages announced by BofI is a short-sighted strategy: the bank holds ca 25% of all mortgages in the country (about 190,000) of these, more than 20% are already in negative equity (over 40,000). BofI should be concerned about preserving those mortgages that are currently at risk - in other words, the bank should focus on helping (or at least not hurting) those who are close to the margin of defaulting. Variable rate hike will most severely impact those households with higher LTV ratios, who are younger and thus at higher risk of unemployment. Thus, the interest rate elasticity of the mortgage default rate is the highest exactly for this category of clients. Put in 'can my grandma understand this' terms - BofI move today is equivalent to destroying that parts of its performing loans book which it should be focusing on saving.
• A hike of 50bps on variable rate mortgages will do absolutely nothing to BofI's balancesheet. Bank might be estimating that it can get few million worth of funds from the move. But the wholesome destruction of its own client base and their loans, in my view, will cost it more than it will bring in in the longer-term.
• A hike of 50bps will further amplify the already destructive force of precautionary savings wrecking destruction across the Irish domestic economy. This effect will be driven by two forces. First, any money the banks take in higher mortgage rates will not be recycled into the economy through higher investment or new lending because the banks will force the new cash into capital reserves to pay down defaulting debts. Thus, every penny taken by the banks in will mean a one-for-one contraction in direct consumer spending and household investment, amplified through the usual multiplier effects 3-4 fold in the course of just one year. Second, households will now rationally expect more hikes in mortgage rates, thus increasing further their saving. For every €1 that BofI, AIB, ptsb, and the rest of the gang collect from mortgage holders, consumer spending will therefore decline by at least €4-5.

The BofI move today is, therefore, equivalent to a deranged asylum patient having fallen off the cliff, hanging onto the last available branch of a tree frantically sawing off the said branch with a fervor.

And since we are on the theme of deranged asylum patients, why not mention the latest, and perhaps the most comical idea our state-backed financial engineers can conjure: the Anglo Irish Bank taking over Quinn Insurance. That one is equivalent to AIG being taken over by General Motors. A bank that is as full of bad loans as Hindenberg was full of hydrogen is taking over an insurance company that is so disturbingly short of capital - sparks are flying from underneath its wheels.

What can possibly go wrong here? Oh, just about countless more billions from the taxpayers wasted...

Economics 31/03/2010: An expensive joke called Nama

I must confess, the last thing I expected in yesterday's quadruple whammy of one Ministerial speech, one Nama document release, a Central Bank statement and the Financial Regulator's decision was a joke. But there it was. For all to see, for few to notice.

Armed with a law degree-backed mastery of logic, Minister Lenihan has issued a statement that he will be requiring Irish Bankers Federation to run courses for the benefit of our bankers on how to lend money to projects other than property. That statement, coming from the Minister after he announced that the Anglo will be provided with up to €18.3 billion in taxpayers cash, and the rest of our banks will swallow billions more was worthy of a comedian. In an instant - we had a Minister for Finance throwing money at the banks which, by his own admission, have no idea of how to lend.

Anything else had to take a back seat to this farce. And it almost did. If not for another pearl of bizarre twist in the Nama saga. Recall that this Government has promised the world an arms-length entity to control and legally own Nama - the Special Purpose Vehicle arrangement which, in order to keep Nama debts out of the national debt accounts was supposed to be majority (51%) owned by external investors.

At the time of the original announcement of this arrangement I publicly stated that there was absolutely nothing in the Nama legislation precluding parties with direct interest in Nama from investing in this SPV. And boy, clearly unaware of such pithy things like conflict of interest, Nama announced that its majority owners will be:

• Irish Life Assurance (a part of the IL&P that has been at the centre of the Anglo deposits controversy and one of the most leveraged banks in the nation),
• New Ireland (an insurance branch of BofI), and
• AIB Investment Managers.

In other words, the very institutions that will be benefiting from Nama's taxpayers riches will also own Nama and will comprise SPV board. They couldn't have given a share to Seannie Fitz and Mick Fingleton, could they?

Having a good laugh - even at the cost of tens of billions to us, the ordinary folks - is a great end for a day in the Namacrats land. So much for responsible and vigilant policies of the Government.


Now to the beef: Nama release figures.

In its note on the first tranche of loans transferred, Nama provides a handy (although predictably vague) description of the loans the taxpayers are buying as of March 30, 2010. Table below summarizes what information we do have:

Let us take a further look at the data provided in the official release and the accompanying slide deck.
Applying more realistic valuations on the loans transferred against the average Nama discount, while allowing for 11% assumed LTEV uplift (Nama own figure), net of 2% risk margin - the last column in the above table shows the amounts that should have been paid for these assets were their valuations carried out on the base of March 30, 2010 instead of November 30, 2009 and were the discounts applied reflective of realistic current markets conditions.

Thus, in the entire first tranche of loans, Nama has managed to overpay (or shall we say squander away) between €1.2 and €3.1 billion - a range of overpayment consistent with 14-37% loss under the plausibly optimistic assumptions. Returning this loss across the entire Nama book of business and adding associated expected costs of the undertaking implies a taxpayer loss of €9.6-25.3 billion from Nama operations.


In Nama statement, Brendan McDonagh, Chief Executive of NAMA said: “Our sole focus at NAMA is to bring proper and disciplined management to these loans and borrowers with the aim of achieving the best possible return and to protect the interests of the taxpayer. ...NAMA is willing to engage with an open mind to our acquired clients ...”

Pretty amazing, folks - Nama CEO clearly sees the borrowers as his 'clients', while claiming that his organization objective is to benefit the taxpayers. Would Mr McDonagh be so kind as to explain the difference? Is Nama going to serve the 'clients' or is it going to protect the taxpayers? The two objectives can easily find themselves at odds - the fact Mr McDonagh is seemingly unaware of.

Economics 12/03/2010: Anglo's latest fun in the sun

In latest development: as Mr Alan Dukes – retired politician extraordinaire – takes over as the Chairman and Executive Chairman of the Anglo. Presumably he will no longer be acting in the interest of the taxpayers – which would, of course, be a conflict of interest for a Chairman and Executive Chairman.

There was a nice question put Mr Dukes on Newstalk – about the extraordinary €10 billion worth of ‘Master Loan Repurchase Agreements’ carried on the banks books (per Anglo’s latest annual report). Mr Dukes didn’t answer that question. But here is what we know:

MLRepos are in effect Central Bank of Ireland repurchase agreements that are so toxic, the ECB refuses to accept them as a collateral for its own discounted lending. So our Central Banks stepped in to hover these off the Anglo’s balance sheet.

Which begs several questions – and I do hope Mr Dukes actually answers these:

1. What exactly are these MLRepos and why are they held by the CB and not ECB?
2. Does Anglo continues to engage in such derivative operations vis-à-vis Irish CB?
3. Is this equivalent to the CB ripping out the decks to keep Anglo afloat – after all, in all banking finance theory, special purpose Repos held by the lowest rank lender of last resort can only be viewed as the last chance corral for a financial lender?

In a Newstalk interview, Mr Dukes did not deny the existence of the MLRepos, but said that these were not a part of the normal funding for the bank. I guess we knew this much already. Anglo, you see, is hoping to move away from this sort of shenanigans in some time in the future, when the normal property markets return, so the bank can too start lending in normal ways.

Really? How many tens of billions of taxpayers funds later would that be, Mr Dukes?

I wish Mr Dukes well in his role. And I am sad to see Donal O'Connor leaving the post - he has great experience and did his best to keep the sinking Titanic afloat.

Economics 24/02/2010: What's heading for Nama land

On a serious note - good post by Gerard O'Neill here.

On a lighter note: wanna see one Nama-bound investment courtesy of Anglo Irish Loose Loan Giveaways?

Check it out here - replete with grammatical errors and misspellings in the text. 'Autentik' stuff...

Since Anglo holds the loan and we (taxpayers) hold Anglo, I wonder if being an Irish taxpayer qualifies one for a free drink in this place.

Economics 22/02/2010: Leading indicators of an Irish recovery

For those of you who missed my Sunday Times article yesterday, here is the unedited version (note: this is the last article of mine in the Sunday Times for the time being as Damien Kiberd will be back with his usual excellent column from next week on):


The latest Exchequer results alongside the Live Register figures clearly point to the fact that despite all the recent talk about Ireland turning the corner, the recession continues to ravage our economy. And despite all the recent gains in consumer confidence retail spending posted yet another lackluster month in December 2009. Predictably, credit demand remains extremely weak, with the IBF/PwC Mortgage Market Profile released earlier this week showing that the volume of new mortgages issued in Ireland has fallen 18% in Q4 2009.

Even industrial production and manufacturing, having shown tentative improvement in Q3 2009 have trended down in the last quarter.

As disappointing as these results are, they were ultimately predictable. Economic turnarounds do not happen because Government ‘experts’ decide to cheer up consumers.

Instead, there is an ironclad timing to various indicators that time the recessions and recoveries: some lead the cycle, others are contemporaneous to it, or even lag changes in economy.

In a research paper published in 2007, UCLA’s Edward E. Leamer shows that in ten recessions experienced in the US since the end of World War II, eight were precluded by housing markets declines (first in terms of volumes of sales and later price changes). The two exceptions were the Dot Com bust of 2001 and the end of the massive military spending due to the Korean Armistice of 1953. Residential investment also led the recovery cycle.

Despite being exports-dependent, Irish economy shares one important trait with the US. Housing investments constitute a major proportion of our households’ investment. In fact, the weight of housing in our investment portfolios is around 65-70%. It is around 50% in the US. As such, house markets determine our wealth and savings, and have a pronounced effect on our decisions as consumers.

Consider the timing of events. Going into the crisis, Irish house sales volumes turned downward in the first half of 2007. House prices declines followed by Q1 2008, alongside changes in manufacturing and services sectors PMI. A quarter later, the whole economy was in a recession.

House price declines for January 2010 indicate that roughly €200 billion worth of wealth was wiped out from the Irish households’ balancesheets since the end of 2007. With this safety net gone, the first reaction is to cut borrowing and ramp up savings, to the detriment of immediate consumption and new investment.

So, if housing markets are the lead indicator of future economic activity, just where exactly (relative to the proverbial corner) are we on the road to recovery? Not in a good place, I am afraid.

Per latest data from the Central Bank, private sector credit continues to contract in Ireland, with December 2009 recording a drop of 6% on December 2008. Residential mortgage lending has also fallen from €114.3 billion in December 2008 to €109.9 billion a year later. This suggests that at least some households are deleveraging out of debt – a good sign. Of course, the decline is also driven by the mortgages writedowns due to insolvencies.

Worse, as Central Bank data shows, the process of retail interest rates increases is already underway. In November 2009 retail interest rates for mortgages have increased for all loans maturities and types. Irish banks, spurred on by the prospect of massive losses due to Nama, are hiking up the rates they charge on existent and new borrowers.

And more is to come. Based on the current dynamic of the interest rates and existent lending margins for largest Irish banks compared to euro area aggregates, I would estimate that average interest rates charged on mortgages will rise from 2.67% recorded back at the end of November 2009 to around 3.3-3.5 % by the end of this year, before the ECB increases its base rate. This would imply that those on adjustable mortgages could see their cost of house financing rise by around 125 basis points, while new mortgage applicants will be facing rates hike of well over 150-160 basis points.

On the house prices front, absent any real-time data, all that we do know is that residential rents remain subdued. Removing seasonality out of Daft.ie most recent data, released this week, shows that downward trend in rents is likely to continue. Commercial rents are also sliding and overall occupancy rates are rising, with some premium retail locations, such as CHQ building in IFSC, are reporting over 50% vacancy rates.

Does anyone still think we have turned a corner?

The problem, of course, is that the structure of the Irish economy prevents an orderly and speedy restart to residential investment.

First, there are simply too many properties either for sale or held back from the market by the owners who know they have no chance of shifting these any time soon. We have zoned so much land – most of it in locations where few would ever want to live – that we can met our expected demand 70 years into the future. We also have 350-400,000 vacant finished and unfinished homes, majority of which will never be sold at any price proximate to the cost of their completion. To address these problems, the Government can use Nama to demolish surplus properties and de-zone unsuitable land. But that would be excruciatingly costly, unless we fully nationalize the banks first. And it would cut against Nama’s mandate to deliver long-term economic value.

Second, there is a problem of price discovery. Before the crisis we had ESRI/ptsb sample of selling prices. Based on ptsb own mortgages, it was a poor measure. But now, with ptsb having pushed its loans to deposits ratio to 300%, matching Northern Rock’s achievement, there is not a snowball’s chance in hell it will remain a dominant player in mortgages in Ireland. Thus, we no longer have any indication as to the actual levels of property prices, and absent these, no rational investor will brave the market. The Government can rectify the problem by requiring sellers to publish exact data on prices and property characteristics.

Third, the Government can aid the process of households deleveraging from the debts accumulated during the Celtic Tiger era. In particular, to help struggling mortgage payers, the Government can extend 100% interest relief for a fixed period of time, say 5 years, to all households. On the one hand such relief will provide a positive cushion against rising interest rates. On the other hand, it will allow older households with less substantial mortgage outlays to begin the process of rebuilding their retirement savings devastated by the twin collapse in property and equity markets. Instead of doing this, the Government is desperately searching for new and more punitive ways to tax savings. Finance Bill 2010 with its tax on unit-linked single premium insurance products is the case in point.

Fourth, the Government can get serious about reducing the burden of our grotesquely overweight public sector. To do so, the Exchequer should commit to no increases in income tax in the next 5 years. All deficit adjustments from here on will have to take a form of expenditure cuts. Nama must be altered into a leaner undertaking responsible for repairing banks balancesheets, not for providing them with soft taxpayers’ cash in exchange for junk assets.

Until all four reforms take place, there is little hope of us getting close to the proverbial corner for residential investment, and with it, for economy at large.


Box-out:

Back in January 2009, unnoticed by many observers, a small change took place in the Central Bank reporting of the credit flows in the retail lending in Ireland. Per Central Bank note, from that month on, credit unions authorized in Ireland were classified as credit institutions and their deposits and loans were included in other monetary financial institutions. This minute change implies that since January 2009, Irish deposits and loans volumes have been inflated by the deposits and loans from the credit unions. Thus, a search through the Central Bank archive shows that between November 2008 and February 2009, the total deposits base relating to resident credit institutions and other MFIs rose from €166 billion to €183 billion, despite the fact that the country banking system was in the grip of a severe crisis. Adjusting for seasonal effects normally present in the data, it appears that some €14-15 billion worth of ‘new’ deposits were delivered to the Irish economy though this new accounting procedure. Of course, deposits on the banks liability side are exactly offset by their assets side, which means that over the same period of time more than €16 billion of ‘new’ credit was registering on the Central Bank radar. Now, this figure is also collaborated by the credit unions annual reports which show roughly €14 billion worth of loans issued by the end of 2007 – the latest for which data is available. This suggests that the credit contraction in the Irish economy during 2009 is understated by the official figures to the tune of €14-15 billion. Not a chop change.

Economics 04/02/2010: Nama - riskier than Anglo?

I just came across a very interesting paper, written back in November 2007 and published by the Bank for International Settlements as a Working Paper No 238.

As a proposition: I will use the study results to argue that Nama is a more risky undertaking than the Anglo Irish Bank.

Authored by Ryan Stever and titled “Bank size, credit and the sources of bank market risk” the paper “…examines bank risk by investigating the equity and loan portfolio characteristics of publicly-traded bank holding companies.” The study is based on the US banks, with sample being a panel of ‘at least 339 publicly trades BHCs at each point in time” for the period of 1986-2003. “These range in size from American Bancorporation at $31 million in book assets (200 employees) to Citigroup at $1.26 trillion (over 280,000 employees).”

“Unlike the pattern for non-financial firms, equity betas of large banks are two to five times greater than those of small banks. In explaining this, we note that regulation imposes an effective cap on banks’ equity volatility. Because the portfolios of small banks are less diversified, this cap has a greater effect on small banks than large banks.”

In other words, there is plenty of evidence that even when effective, regulators can induce some unintended consequences onto the banking system and that these consequences, if unaddressed can lead to systemic failures. Here is how it works:

• Regulators (and/or shareholders through exercise of their voting rights) place a limit on the total volatility of each bank’s assets regardless of size, which tends to minimize bank risk; however
• Small banks have more idiosyncratic risk inherent in their loan portfolio “because they cannot diversify away idiosyncratic volatility as well as large bank” (practically – smaller banks are more specialized, making their loans books more exposed to idiosyncratic strategy risk).
• Smaller banks inability to diversify comes about in “a number of different ways – for example; less total loans held, less diversity in borrower type (they do not have access to large borrowers) and geographic restrictions (small banks tend to be more localized);
• Because their total equity volatility is limited by regulation smaller banks must then find a way to eliminate their idiosyncratic volatility that is in excess of larger banks’ idiosyncratic volatility.

To do this, small banks do not necessarily pursue higher levels of equity capitalization or lending to different sectors in the economy – in other words, they do not strive to become like larger banks, but instead they either

• make loans with less credit risk than large banks (Swiss private banks, for example). This has the effect of reducing idiosyncratic volatility (as desired) and also reducing the beta of each loan (and thus the equity beta of small banks); or
• demand more collateral (e.g. Irish banks).

Of course, the problem with selecting the latter path way (collateral beefing up) as opposed to the penultimate pathway (more conservative, risk-sensitive lending) – as Irish banks should have learned from the current crisis – leads to additional problem, not highlighted in the study. This problem is manifested in the selection bias induced onto collateral – smaller banks opting for higher collateral requirements will take on less diversified collateral that is more likely to be positively correlated with their own (risk-skewed) loans books.

Thus collateral risk becomes positively correlated with loans risk.

Just think of what type of collateral Liam Carroll was supplying for his property development loans? You’ve guessed it – property-based collateral.

In fact, the study does find that small banks did not lower their equity volatility through lower leverage. Instead, “the reduced ability of small banks to diversify forces them to either pick borrowers whose assets have relatively low credit risk or make loans that are backed by relatively more collateral.”


What are the lessons for Nama from all of this? I am afraid not very positive ones. Nama is setting out to purchase loans on the basis of their collateral. Loans that are in distressed with collateral that has breached covenants due to precipitously declining valuations. Guess what – collateral risk is positively correlated with loans risk here from the start. Can this correlation be diversified? Yes, but not within Nama setting.

Remember, Nama promised to take good and bad loans together and mix them to derive cash flow. But these loans are all written against the same types of collateral as in:

• Same instruments;
• Same geography;
• Same vintages;
• Same currencies and so on.

In language of diversification – which loans returns are orthogonal to each other? Answer: none. Hence, no diversification is possible.

Take this back to the study findings and treat Nama as a sort-of-a-bank undertaking (with no deposits, but plenty of loans, although of course it does not matter, because Nama is not facing market funding constraints, courtesy of the state that is willing to give it your and my money with nothing definitive being asked in return).

Recall the last quote: “the reduced ability of small banks to diversify forces them to either pick borrowers whose assets have relatively low credit risk or make loans that are backed by relatively more collateral.” But in Nama’s case – what borrowers with “lower credit risk” can they select? None.

This leaves only option for Nama – to raise the underlying quantity and quality of collateral. Again – can this be done?

Sure, if Nama can either increase seniority of its claims on the collateral, or if it can swap assets for higher quality assets somehow. Alas, this works in theory, but in practice, Nama is saddled with seniority and quality of assets that banks have. It cannot go out to the market and demand that senior debt holders out there step aside and let residual quality claims that Nama might hold to step forward. Nor can it go to the developers and demand that better or more collateral be pledged for the loans. It is neither legally possible, nor feasible, given the dire state of developers’ finances.

Now, step aside and think of the Anglo. Anglo is a bank that is saddled with exactly the same dilemma – poor loans risk diversification. Can it escape this conundrum, assuming it can get funding (remember – Nama has no funding constraint). Of course it can. It can diversify client base and start attracting clients with lower risk profile by offering cheap loans to selected clients. And of course, Anglo has done so in the past – perhaps not enough, but it did. It can go out and lend outside Ireland, to diversify via change of geographies (it has done so in the past as well). And it can load up on collateral – which, once again, Anglo did. And yet, despite doing all these things, Anglo collapsed.

Anyone still thinks Nama – with much more limited ability to diversify key risks – can succeed?

So here you have it – Nama is the ultimately non-diversifiable risk undertaking that is actually worse off in terms of risk profile than the Anglo Irish Bank…


One would hope their board and risk committee understand this. Not really - the board contains such experienced finance and risk people as town managers, and the risk committee - well, that one will be staffed by who knows who, for it will have no one from outside Nama on it.

And this, of course, is where Nama is so nicely reflective of the Anglo...

Economics 19/01/2010: Nama - adverse selection is happening

Newspapers today are reporting that banks may be pressuring Irish developers to sell their UK assets to write down the loans that are bound for NAMA. This is an interesting development. As UK market has shown some signs of revival (although these signs are tenuous at best), prime properties with less recent vintage can be sold off to generate cash to pay down some loans. Now, the problem for Nama is that of selection bias.

On one side of this equation, developers willing to do this will be disposing of the more liquid and better properties, depleting their own risk-weighted assets base.

They will be using cash to pay down the loans that are marginally at the boundary of being transferred to Nama. Why? Elementary, Watson!

Suppose Nama imposes a discount of 30% on your loans. You have two loans. One is recoverable at 80%, another at 0%. You have a choice – pay down one loan and let the other go Nama. If you take loan A with 80% recovery, you get 70cents on the euro from Nama. If you hold it to maturity you get 80 cents. If you take loan B with 0% recovery, you get 70 cents on the loan from Nama and zilch from the market. Guess which loan will be repaid and which will be heading for Nama?

In the mean time, naïve and inexperienced in collection and recovery business Nama is still sticking to 30% average discount claims, thus further incentivising this adverse selection process against itself. NAMA chief executive Brendan McDonagh few days ago repeated this much.

So the end game here is that, if the banks are successful, even poorer quality loans will be transferred to Nama, while Nama’s CEO is running around town committing himself to valuations before any valuations are even done.

Lovely.

Economics 02/01/2010: Comparing banking systems

Based on the latest available data from ECB (through 2008, unfortunately), the following three tables provide relative performance analysis of Irish banking system against its main peers.

In all three sets of comparisons I have:

• included only countries with some proximity (trade / investment / market structure) to Ireland;
• computed some additional (combined) variables using ECB data (group averages and categories totals etc);
• ranked all countries on subsets of criteria shown in each table, so that increasing scores in each case reflect worsening of the rank position; and
• identified in shaded cells the instances where other countries (and/or group average) show poorer performance than Ireland in specific category.

The first table above shows indicators for profitability & efficiency. Here performance rank is computed by assigning the best performing country the score of 1 and the worst performing one the score of 10. There 11 scoring categories in line with the main parameters.

Irish banking system overall comes out as the fourth worst performing in the sample of countries, with significant gap to the group average in terms of sources of income (less stable in the case of Ireland) and total income as a share of assets. Note a very poor performance in net interest income and net fees / commissions - both of these indicators of income will have to be increased in the near future, leading to higher interest charges and fees for retail and corporate clients.

On expenditure side, Irish banks performed above the average, clearly showing that even in the end of 2008 there was virtually no room for improving the margins through further spending cuts. (One caveat - the expenditure side is measured relative to the assets base, so further writedowns on assets in 2009 would have pushed the expenditure performance metric deeper into negative territory). Apart from some layoffs and wages cuts, the sector in Ireland has no choice but to go after income side of the profit margin equation in order to rebuild margins.

On profitability side, provisions & impairments figure is below the average reflecting a clear lack of realism on behalf of the banks. This, in turn, translated into artificially inflated profits, that fell insignificantly short of the group average. However, the relative underperformance of the Irish banking sector was clearly visible in the distribution of returns on equity with most of our banks performing in the lower tier of the group.

The next table shows balancesheets comparatives:Using the same approach as before, I computed rank scores for the countries (note, I omitted countries with no data observations from the sample). Once again, Irish banks come out as below average performers in the group, ranked fourth from the bottom.

Other interesting features of the data:

• On liabilities side - deposits from CBs - or can we call it dependency on CBs liquidity to prop up deposit base is hefty?
  
• Total equity as share of asset base is low.
• Issued capital was low, while reserves are seemingly ok. Issued capital and reserves combined are below average. Ditto for tangible equity.
• On liquidity side, low dependency on interbank market in 2008 really shows the extent to which Irish banks were not being able to access private liquidity pools. So funding base stability was weak.
  

Last table deals with capital adequacy. Once again, Irish banking sector posted a lackluster performance.

Mid-range solvency ratio and Tier 1 ratio in the environment of artificially depressed / unrealistic writedowns and over-inflated assets base is worrisome as are total own funds. Securitization weighted heavily under standardized approach, but this was not captured under the internal approach. Average risk-weight for credit risk were high and total capital requirements for operational risks were the lowest in the group.

Little insight can be gained from operational exposures, as these are obscured by the non-Irish IFSC operations, but corporate exposure and retail exposures combined to a hefty 105% for risk-weighted assets, compared to 91% for the group average. The last two lines - overall solvency ratios are telling. Group average is 12.36%. For Ireland: 91% of all assets were held by the institutions with less than 12% in terms of solvency ratio.

The main conclusions from the tables are:

• Irish banks were too slow to recognise impairments;
• Irish banks profitability is below par, while efficiency is relative robust (with the risk to the downside due to inflated value of assets);
  
• Risk reserves and equity are poor in comparison to other countries, although this does not appear to be a function of regulatory-set reserves; and
• Margins rebuilding on the banks side will have to take place at the expense of retail and corporate clients.
  

Given the lags in the data and in our banks' willingness to face reality of the risks carried on their books, it will probably take well into 2010 (waiting for Nama to become fully operational) for the banks to start in earnest rebuilding their capital and margins positions. Which means that we will not know the true state of our banking sector fundamentals until mid 2011, when the data will be available to cover 2010.

The risk, of course, is that before then, the banks will squeeze all domestic liquidity out of the Irish economy, while the ECB begins to restrict inflow of external liquidity to the system. If that happens, Nama losses and budget deficits will take the second seat to the wave of insolvencies that will hit our country.

Of course, as usual, we have no road map for addressing such risks. Remember - even despite all banking heads insisting publicly that post-Nama there will be no increase in credit flows to SMEs / corporates / households, our Government continues to claim that Nama will be a 'liquidity event' restoring flow of credit to economy.


I will leave you with the following quote:

"Most of this lending is policy-directed with an implicit government guarantee. Despite ...closed factories in *** resulting from the global financial crisis, and hundreds of empty office buildings, retail centres and hotels that are not meeting their debt service payments, banks are still not foreclosing on these properties nor calling the loans due.

The banks prefer to rollover or extend the loans to avoid having to report an increase in non-performing loans. It is not uncommon for *** banks to extend a loan for as much as one year without interest payments if the lender “believes” the ultimate recovery value of the assets will be greater than the outstanding principal and interest. However, it is nearly impossible for a bank to value an empty office building, in a market with a reported vacancy rate nearing 40 per cent ...and declining rents."

The article goes on to argue that for *** this scenario of banks unwilling to recognize losses is risking a derailment of the country progression to the top of the world economic order. The *** is, of course, China. And the article was published here.

But it might have been written about Ireland, where the banks' belief in the ultimate recovery value is nothing more than a punt on selling the distressed rubbish assets to Nama for the price that even at a 30% haircut will reflect an overpayment on their true value of up to 30-40%.

What will Nama do to these assets and how willing it might be to shut down insolvent operations? More willing than the completely reluctant Irish banks? I doubt it.

So where does this leave us at in the beginning of 2010? A Japanese-styled zombie economy scenario for 2010-2025? I hope I am wrong!

Economics 30/11/2009: Nama estimates confirmed

Scroll for a couple of interesting topics (other than Nama) below...

Per Bloxham’s note today (emphasis is mine):

“Bank of Ireland this morning officially announced its intention to participate in the National Asset Management Agency ... The bank sees the first assets as moving from January 20th 2010, and on a phased basis from there on until mid 2010. The group does not know the discount to be applied to the assets on transfer to NAMA. However, the bank expects to receive €11.2 billion for the assets currently shown with a worth of €16 billion in the balance sheet, based on the 30% discount guided by NAMA. Total provisions set aside on the assets to move to NAMA are €1.4 billion resulting in a €3.4 billion loss. The Risk Weighted Assets will be adjusted down by €15.2 billion as a results of the transfer. The bank shows a loan book of €116.7 billion (down from €131.3 billion pre NAMA) after the movement in assets, while Risk Weighed Assets fall from €100.7 billion to €85.5 billion. Core Equity will fall to €3.5 billion from €6.6 billion. Therefore, the reduction in Core Equity Tier 1 would be from 6.65% in September 30th to 4.2% as a result of the transfer to NAMA, and subsequent write down.”

So to restore the bank balancesheet to internationally acceptable risk-core equity balance of over 6% will require some €2.55bn in capital injection post-Nama, not accounting for any additional deterioration in the remaining book. In a note published exactly a month ago (here) I predicted that BofI will need €2.0-2.6bn in fresh capital – bang on with today’s statement.

This is the second estimate fully confirmed by the Nama-participating banks that is in line with my projections of October 30, with earlier this month media reports putting Anglo’s demand for fresh post-Nama capital at €5.7bn.

Further per Bloxham:

“Loss on disposal of assets will be tax deductible as we understood previously. Bank of Ireland also highlights that after 10 years, in the event NAMA discloses a loss the Minister of Finance may bring forward legislation to impose a special tax on participating institutions. The bank goes on to confirm that the interest rate Bank of Ireland will receive from the bonds which replace the transferred assets, is still not know. Therefore the impact on income is still not known.”

Oh and per Davy's morning note: using average 30% haircut implies a loss of €3.4bn on top of the €1.4bn impairment already estimated at September 30, 2009. This implies - per Davy's model - €960mln pre-tax hit which, "combined with some other adjustments to RWAs and sub-debt... would increase the capital required to keep core equity at the trough of 5% from €1.3bn to €2.3bn."

Now, Davy's model, therefore suggests demand for €2.8bn in capital to 6% ratio. Both Davy estimates are therefore comfortably within my range of expected capital demand by BofI. And good luck to those who have a hope that BofI can raise new funding with 5% core equity ratio at anything close to reasonable costs.

Anyone who at this stage in the game still holds illusions that Nama will allow for a restart of lending in this economy has to be simply bonkers.

Oh, and on a funny side of things: today's CSO data release is for:

"Census of Industrial Production 2008 - Early estimates". One question begs asking: When will the later estimates arive? December 20, 2011?

Oh, and do see this on Ireland v Dubai - here. The worrying thing is that it is talking about partial default scenario for Ireland and the ECB rescue ahead of Greece! which, of course, goes nicely with my article in The Sunday Times yesterday - which I will post later tonight.

Economics 21/11/2009: State Directors Fees

Per RTE report (here), Anglo's 'Public Interest' directors are being paid handsomely for their gargantuan efforts to... do exactly what? Steer the bank out of trouble? Not really, Anglo is not any better today than a year ago. Carry out its ordinary business? Not really, Anglo is not doing any new business at all and is in effect sitting pretty until Nama cleans up the mess. Safeguard public 'investment'? Not really, for no one sane really expects any return from this 'investment'. So what exactly do these 'Public Interest' director do? No one dares to ask. 

In the mean time, Alan Dukes and Frank Daly - two, in my view fine individuals - collect public retirement pay and are receiving €99,360 each in fees from a publicly-owned Anglo. A figure more than six times the compensation for directors of other State bodies.

But things are not much better in BofI (where Tom Considine and Joe Walsh received total fees to €102,375 and Joe Walsh's to €78,750). AIB in contrast paid Dick Spring and Declan Collier €27,375 and also topped these with €3,000 for each committee meeting attended. IL&P's public guardians, Ray MacSharry (fees of €56,250) and Margaret Hayes (€63,500) were handsomely well off as well. At EBS, Tony Spollen and Ann Riordan both receive a basic fee of €29,000 each. State appointed noble folks of Nationwide, Rory O'Ferrall and Adrian Kearns, in line with a long-running tradition at the building society to behave like a secretive private bank, simply didn't disclose their earnings to the public.

Further irony: fully state-owned Anglo pays second highest rate to its non-execs, while the Irish Government is flustered with privately held banks (AIB & BofI and the rest of privately held 5) executives' remuneration. It looks like someone (Minister Lenihan?) can't control his own organization (Anglo), while trying to play tough with organizations he has little stake in. Oh, incidentally, the fees for Dukes & co were set on the 'recommendation' by the State own 'commission' - another state body that Minister Lenihan apparently cannot reign in.

Expected annual cost (inclusive of expected, but not disclosed fees) €760,000 plus.

After having a quick chat with few friends in academia, here is a bold proposal for the Minister for Finance - you can find at least 12 senior and experienced academics and industry practitioners, including my self, who would do these jobs for €10,000 per annum plus expenses. As a real exercise in our patriotic (Minister Lenihan's words from last Budget) duty.

How about it, Minister? You promise left right and center that you will save taxpayers money. Here is a chance to do so. Some €640,000 of taxpayers money!

Oh and while we are on the topic of silly/dodgy political news - there is a recent report in the US (here) that argues that President Obama evokes Jesus and God more frequently than his predecessor. Not that I have a problem with this myself, but I wonder what all the European 'Liberals' would make of this...

Economics 30/10/2009: Reliance or dependency

Quick points on post-Nama recapitalisation, credit flows from ECB to Ireland and Frank Fahey encounter with an egg...

I have done some sums on demand for equity capital by Irish banks post-Nama. Assuming underlying conditions for loans purchases as outlined in Nama business plan, using 6% core equity ratio as a target (remember, this is a lower target by international standards) and assuming no further deterioration in the loans books quality post-Nama:

• AIB will require €3.2-3.5bn in equity capital post-Nama;
• BofI will need €2.0-2.6bn;
• Anglo will need €4.5-5.7bn;
• INBS/EBS & IL&P will require total of €1.1-1.2bn.
• Total system demand for equity will be in the range of €9.7-12.4bn.

Approaching the same issue from the angle of Risk-Weighted Assets, system-wide demand for equity will be around €10.8bn post-Nama. This will extend Nama-associated rescue costs to:

• €54bn in direct purchases;
• €5bn in completion 'investments' with estimated further €3-5bn in future completion additional funds;
• €1bn in legal, advisory and management costs;
• €9.7-12.4bn in equity injections;
• Past measures €11bn.

Net of interest costs and losses, total price tag looks now like €84-88.5bn. This, for a system that can be fully repaired through a direct equity-based recapitalisation at a cost of roughly €32bn.


Our agriculture is the heaviest subsidised in the EU (and indeed in the world). This fact has never troubled our policymakers, as if subsidies are a sign of industry viability and strength, as long as they are being paid by other countries taxpayers (as in the case of CAP).

Now, we have become the biggest ECB liquidity junkie by far. Table below from RBS research note shows the dramatic level of financial life support our economy requires.
Note that the above list of countries includes heavily crisis-impacted Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, APIIGS (less Ireland), aggregated in the 'Other' grouping. And yet... they all have larger economies than Ireland and smaller demand for liquidity injections.

Does anyone still believe that Nama can add liquidity to our economy? Or that such an addition can improve lending conditions? Apparently, ECB-own lending operations were not able to do so to date...


And on related note, there is an interesting quote from Dr Alan Ahearne in a recent article in the Southern Star newspaper (here):

"As one economist warned last year, ‘buying the assets at inflated prices would amount to a back-door recapitalisation of the banks’. Best practice ‘is for the banks to recognise the losses on these loans up front and sell the assets at fair market value’. Whose words? Dr. Alan Ahearne – now economic advisor to Brian Lenihan and one of the chief advocates for NAMA. Go figure."

Well, not much to figure, really - call this miraculous conversion a '€100K effect' triggered by new employment...

Oh, and while we are on Nama, here is an excellent 'Public Anger at Nama' account of the latest Leviathan encounter by Peter Mathews. I wonder if Senator Boyle and Frank Fahey get the point - people are angry at the way the country is mismanaged, but they are even angrier at being pushed into Nama.