Showing posts with label real economic debt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label real economic debt. Show all posts

Friday, February 7, 2020

7/2/20: Mapping Real Economic Debt: BRICS


Some great charts on real economic debt, via IIF, with my highlighting of the BRICS economies:

First off, mapping corporate debt and government debt as a share of GDP:


 China is an outlier within the BRICS group when it comes to corporate debt.

 Chart above shows how dramatic has been deleveraging out of FX-denominated debt in Russia over the last decade. Much of this came from the reduction in US Dollar-denominated exposures.


Lastly, the chart above showing changes in the US Dollar-denominated debt quality (by corporate ratings). Again, Russia is a positive stand-alone in this, with more positive outlook than negative outlook corporates - a trend strikingly different from both the Emerging Markets overall, and for other BRIC economies.

7/2/20: Mapping Real Economic Debt 2019


A neat summary map of the real economic debt as a share of the national economies, via IIF, with my addition of Ireland's benchmark relative to its more accurate measure of the national income than GDP:

Yep, it is unflattering... albeit imperfect (there is some over-estimate here on the corporate debt side).

Saturday, December 14, 2019

14/12/19: Governance and Government Debt


What I am reading this week: a new paper via EFMA, titled "Governance and Government Debt" by João Imaginário and Maria João Guedes, available here: https://efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA%20ANNUAL%20MEETINGS/2019-Azores/papers/EFMA2019_0184_fullpaper.pdf.

The paper looks at "the relationship between Worldwide Governance Indicators [a proxy for governance quality] and Government Debt in 164 countries for the period between 2002 and 2015." Using fixed effects (FE) and generalized method of moments (GMM) models the authors show that "governance quality is negatively and statistically related with government debt. For Low Income countries was found evidence that better governance environment is associated with lower public debt levels."

More specifically, "for a set of 164 countries on a period between 2002 and 2015, ... estimation results for FE model suggest that Control of Corruption (CC) and Voice and Accountability (VA) indexes are negative and statistically significant on influencing government debt. In part, this result confirms our Hypothesis 1 that better governance quality is associated with lower levels of public
debt." But the study also shows that these 'global' effects are predominantly driven by the presence of low income countries in the full sample. The authors find that "the link between good governance quality and government debt reduction is more evident for Low Income countries."

As a caveat, the authors do find that overall higher score in the World Governance Indicators Index (as opposed to specific sub scores) has a negative and statistically significant impact on the levels of government debt, so that overall higher measure of governance quality is associated with lower government debt for the High Income economies. The magnitude of this effect was reasonably large, as well.

Wednesday, July 26, 2017

26/7/17: Credit booms, busts and the real costs of debt bubbles


A new BIS Working Paper (No 645) titled “Accounting for debt service: the painful legacy of credit booms” by Mathias Drehmann, Mikael Juselius and Anton Korinek (June 2017 http://www.bis.org/publ/work645.pdf) provides a very detailed analysis of the impact of new borrowing by households on future debt service costs and, via the latter, on the economy at large, including the probability of future debt crises.

According to the top level findings: “When taking on new debt, borrowers increase their spending power in the present but commit to a pre-specified future path of debt service, consisting of interest payments and amortizations. In the presence of long-term debt, keeping track of debt service explains why credit-related expansions are systematically followed by downturns several years later.” In other words, quite naturally, taking on debt today triggers repayments that peak with some time in the future. The growth, peaking and subsequent decline in debt service costs (repayments) triggers a real economic response (reducing future savings, consumption, investment, etc). In other words, with a lag of a few years, current debt take up leads to real economic consequences.

The authors proceed to describe the “lead-lag relationship between new borrowing and debt service” to establish “empirically that it provides a systematic transmission channel whereby credit expansions lead to future output losses and higher probability of financial crisis.”

How bad are the real effects of debt?

From theoretical point of view, “when new borrowing is auto-correlated [or put simply, when today’s new debt uptake is correlated positively with future debt levels] and debt is long term - features that are present in the real world - we demonstrate two systematic lead-lag relationships”:


  • “debt service peaks at a well-specified interval after the peak in new borrowing. The lag increases both in the maturity of debt and the degree of auto-correlation of new borrowing. The reason is that debt service is a function of the stock of debt outstanding, which continues to grow even after the peak in new borrowing.” It is worth noting a well-known fact that in some forms of debt, minimum required repayment levels of debt servicing (contractual provisions in, say, credit cards debt) is associated with automatically increasing debt levels into the future.

  • “net cash flows from lenders to borrowers reach their maximum before the peak in new borrowing and turn negative before the end of the credit boom, since the positive cash flow from new borrowing is increasingly offset by the negative cash flows from rising debt service.”


Using a panel of 17 countries from 1980 to 2015, the paper “empirically confirm the dynamic patterns identified in the accounting framework… We show that new borrowing is strongly auto-correlated over an interval of six years. It is also positively correlated with future debt service over the following ten years. In the data, peaks in debt service occur on average four years after peaks in new borrowing.” In other words, credit booms have negative legacy some 16 years past the peak of new debt uptake, so if we go back to the origins of the Global Financial Crisis, European household debts new uptake peaked at around 2008, while for the U.S. that marker was around 2007. The credit bust, therefore, should run sometime into 2022-2023. In Japan’s case, peak household new debt uptake was back in around 1988-1989, with adverse effects of that credit boom now into their 27 years duration.


When it comes to assessing the implications of credit booms for the real economy, the authors establish three key findings:

1) “…new household borrowing has a clear positive impact, and its counterpart, debt service, a significantly negative impact on output growth, both
of which last for several years. Together with the lead-lag relationship between new borrowing and debt service this implies that credit booms have a significantly positive output effect in the short run, which reverses and turns into a significantly negative output effect in the medium run, at a horizon of five to seven years.”

2) “…we demonstrate that most of the negative medium-run output effects of new borrowing in the data are driven by predictable future debt service effects.” The authors note that these results are in line with well-established literature on negative impact of credit / debt overhangs, including “the negative medium-run effect of new borrowing on growth is documented e.g. by Mian and Sufi (2014), Mian et al. (2013, 2017) and Lombardi et al. (2016). Claessens et al. (2012), Jorda et al. (2013), and Krishnamurthy and Muir (2016) document a link between credit booms and deeper recessions.” In other words, contrary to popular view that ‘debt doesn’t matter’, debt does matter and has severe and long term costs.


3) “…we also show that debt service is the main channel through which new borrowing affects the probability of financial crises. Consistent with a recent literature that has documented that debt growth is an early warning indicator for financial crises, we find that new borrowing increases the likelihood of financial crises in the medium run. Debt service, on the other hand, negatively affects the likelihood of crises in the short turn.”


In fact, increases in probability of the future crisis are “nearly fully” accounted for by “the negative effects of the future debt service generated by an increase in new borrowing”.

The findings are “robust to the inclusion of range of control variables as well as changes in sample and specification. Our baseline regressions control for interest rates and wealth effects. The results do not change when we control for additional macro factors, including credit spreads, productivity, net worth, lending standards, banking sector provisions and GDP forecasts, nor when we consider sub-samples of the data, e.g. a sample leaving out the Great Recession, or allow for time fixed effects. And despite at most 35 years of data, the relationships even hold at the country level.”

So we can cut the usual arguments that “this time” or “in this place” things will be different. Credit booms are costly, painful and long term.

26/7/17: Panic... Not... Yet: U.S. Student Debt is Cancerous


Reuters came up with a series of data visualisations and brief analytics pieces on the issue of student loans in the U.S. These are ‘must read’ materials for anyone concerned with both the issues of debt overhang (impact of real economic debt, defined as household, non-financial corporate and government debts, on economic activity), demographic and socio-political trends (e.g. see my analysis linking - in part - debt overhang to current de-democratization trends in the Western electorates https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2993535), as well as issues of social equity.

The first piece presents a set student loans debt crisis charts and data summaries: http://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/rngs/USA-STUDENTLOANS-MORTGAGES/0100504C09N/index.html. Key takeaway here is that although the size of the student loans debt market is about 1/10th of the pre-GFC mortgages debt overhang, the default rates on student loans are currently well above the GFC peak default rates for mortgages:


The impact - from economic point of view includes decline in home ownership amongst the younger demographic.


But, less noted, the impact of student debt overhang also includes behavioural and longer-term cross-generational implications:

  1. Younger cohorts of workers are saddled with higher starting debt positions that cannot be resolved via insolvency/bankruptcy, which makes student loans more disruptive to the future life cycle incomes, savings and investments of the households;
  2. Behaviourally, early-stage debt overhang is likely to alter substantially life cycle investment and consumption patterns, just as early age unemployment and longer-term unemployment do with future career outcomes and choices;
  3. Generational transmission of wealth is also likely to suffer from the student debt overhang: as older generations trade down in the property markets, the values of their properties are likely to be lower than expected due to younger generation of buyers having lower borrowing and funding capacity to purchase retiring generations' homes;
  4. The direct nature of student loans collections (capture of wages and social security benefits for borrowers and co-signers on the loans) implies unprecedented degree of contagion from debt overhang to household financial positions, with politically and socially unknown impact; and
  5. The nature of interest rate penalties, combined with severe lack of regulation of the market and a direct tie in between Federally-guaranteed student loans and the fiscal authorities implies higher degree of uncertainty about the cost of future debt service for households.


On the two latter matters, another posting by Reuters worth reading: https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-studentloans/.  Student loans debt is now turning the U.S. into an expropriating state, with the Government-sanctioned coercive, and socially and economically disruptive capture of household incomes.

One thing neither article mentions is that student loans are a form of investment - investment in human capital. And as all forms of investment, these loans are set against the expected future returns. These returns, in the case of student loans, are generated by increases in life cycle labor income - wages and other associated forms of income - which is, currently, on a downward trend. In other words, just as cost of student loans rises and uncertainty about the future costs of legacy loans is rising too, returns on student loans are falling, and the coercive power of lenders to claim recovery of the loans is beyond any other form of debt.

We are in a crisis territory, even if from traditional systemic risk metrics point of view, the market for student loans might be smaller.

Thursday, July 20, 2017

20/7/17: Euro Area's Great non-Deleveraging


A neat data summary for the European 'real economic debt' dynamics since 2006:

In the nutshell, the Euro area recovery:

  1. Government debt to GDP ratio is up from the average of 66% in 2006-2007 to 89% in 2016;
  2. Corporate debt to GDP ratio is up from the average of 72% in 2006-2007 to 78% in 2016; and
  3. Household debt to GDP ratio is down (or rather, statistically flat) from the average of 58.5% in 2006-2007 to 58% in 2016.
The Great Austerity did not produce a Great Deleveraging. Even the Great Wave of Bankruptcies that swept across much of the Euro area in 2009-2014 did not produce a Great Deleveraging. The European Banking Union, and the Genuine Monetary Union and the Great QE push by the ECB - all together did not produce a Great Deleveraging. 

Total real economic debt stood at 195%-198% of GDP in 2006-2007 - at the peak of previous asset bubble and economic 'expansion' dynamism, and it stands at 225% of GDP in 2016, after what has been described as 'robust' economic recovery. 

Friday, May 19, 2017

19/5/17: U.S. Household Debt: Things are Much Worse Than Headlines Suggest


Those of you who follow this blog know that I am a severe/extreme contrarian when it comes to median investor perceptions of the severity of leverage risks. That is to say, mildly, that I do not like extremely high levels of debt exposures at the macroeconomic level (aggregate real economic debt, which includes non-financial corporations debt, household debt and government debt), at the financial system levels (banking debt), at the microeconomic (firm) level, and at the level of individual investors own exposure to leverage.

With this in mind, let me bring to you the latest fact about debt, the fact that rings multiple bells for me. According to the data from the U.S. Federal Reserve, household debt in the U.S. has, as of the end of 1Q 2017, exceeded pre-2008 peak levels and hit an all-time high by the end of March.

Let's crunch some numbers.

  • Total Household Debt in the U.S. stood at USD 12.725 trillion at the end of 1Q 2017, up on USD 12.576 trillion in 4Q 2016. Previous record, reached in 3Q 2008 was USD 12.675, while the pre-Global Financial Crisis average was USD 10.112 trillion.
  • During pre-crisis period, Mortgage Debt peaked at USD 9.294 trillion in 3Q 2008. In 1Q 2017 this figure remained below this peak levels at USD 8.627 trillion. As flimsy as house price valuations can be, this means that there is no 'hard' asset underlying the new debt peak. If anything, the new overall household debt mountain is written against something far less tangible than real estate.
  • Student loans are up on previous peak (4Q 2016 at USD 1.310 trillion) at USD 1.344 trillion, as consistent with continued growth in the student loans crisis in the U.S.
Chart below illustrates the trends for total household debt:

Another key trend in household debt relates to debt defaults and risks. Here too 1Q 2017 data is far from encouraging. Pre-Global Financial Crisis average delinquencies (120 days or more overdue loans and Severely Derogatory delinquencies) average 2.07 percent of total debt outstanding. In 1Q 2017, some 29 quarters of deleveraging later, the comparable percentage is 3.0 percent. This is bad. Worse, take together, all household debt that was in delinquency in 1Q 2017 was 4.8 percent, which is still above 4.56 percent average for pre-2008 period. 


While overall delinquencies are not quite at problematic levels, yet, we must keep in mind the underlying conditions in which these delinquencies are taking place. Prior to the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, interest rates environment was much less benign than it is today toward higher levels of debt exposures: debt origination costs (direct cash costs) and debt servicing costs (income charge from debt) were both higher back in the days of the pre-2008 boom. Today, both of these costs are lower. Which should have led to lower delinquencies. The fact that delinquencies still run above pre-2008 levels implies that we are witnessing poorer underlying household fundamentals against which the debt is written.

Sadly, you won;t read this view of the current debt and debt burden issues from the mainstream media and analysts.

Thursday, December 29, 2016

29/12/16: Drowning in Debt


Recently, I posted about the return - with a vengeance - of one of the key drivers of the Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession, the rapid rise of the debt bubble across the global economy. The original post is available here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/12/161216-root-of-2007-2010-crises-is-back.html

There is more evidence of the problem reaching beyond corporate finance side of the markets for debt. In fact, in the U.S. - the economy that led the de-risking and deleveraging efforts during the early stages of the recovery - household debt is now once again reaching danger levels.

Chart 1 below shows that, based on data from NY Federal Reserve through 3Q 2016, full year 2016 average household debt levels are likely to exceed 2005-2007 average by some 3 percent. In 3Q 2016, total average household debt was around USD98,312, a level comparable to USD98,906 in 2006.


And Chart 2 shows that overall, aggregate levels of household debt and per capita levels of household debt both are now in excess of 2005-2007 averages.



Finally, as Chart 3 below indicates, delinquencies rates are also rising, despite historically low interest rates and booming jobs markets. For Student Loans and Car Loans, 3Q 2016 delinquencies rates are 1 percentage points and 3.8 percentage points above the 2005-2007 average delinquency rates. For Mortgages, current delinquency rates are running pretty much at the 2005-2007 average. Only for Credit Cards do delinquency rates at the present trail behind the 2005-2007 average, by some 2 percentage points.

Now, consider the market expectations of 0.75-1 percentage increase in Fed rates in 2017 compared to 3Q 2016 (we are already 0.25 percentage points on the way with the most recent Fed decision). Based on the data from NY Fed, and assuming average 2015-2016 growth rates in credit forward, this will translate into extra household payments on debt servicing of around USD1,085-USD1,465 per annum depending on the passthrough rates from policy rate set by the Fed and the retail rates charged by the banks.

Given the state of the U.S. household finances, this will be some tough burden to shoulder.

So here you have it, folks:
1) Corporate debt bubble is at an all-time high
2) Government debt bubble is at an all-time high
3) Household debt bubble is at an all-time high.
Meanwhile, equity funding is slipping even for the usually credit-shy start ups.

And if you want another illustration, here is total global Government debt, based on IMF data:


We’ve learned no lessons from 2008.


Sources for data:
https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/average-credit-card-debt-household/
https://www.newyorkfed.org/microeconomics/data.html
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/index.aspx

Friday, December 16, 2016

16/12/16: The Root of the 2007-2010 Crises is Back, with a Vengeance


There are several fundamental problem in the global economy, legacies of the past 20 years - from the mid 1990s on - that continue to drive the trend toward secular stagnations (see explainer here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2015/07/7615-secular-stagnation-double-threat.html).

One key structural problem is that of excessive reliance on credit (or debt) to drive growth. We have seen the devastating effects of the rapidly rising unsustainable levels of the real economic debt (debt that combines government obligations, non-financial corporate debt and household debt) in the case of 2008 crises.

And we were supposed to have learned the lesson. Supposed to have, because the entire conversation about structural reforms in banking and capital markets worldwide was framed in the context of deleveraging (reduction of debt levels). This has been the leitmotif of structural policies reforms in Europe, the U.S., in Australia and in China, and elsewhere, including at the level of the EU and the IMF. Supposed to have, because we did not that lesson. Instead of deleveraging, we got re-leveraging of economies - companies, households and governments.

Problem Case Study: U.S. Corporates

Take the U.S. corporate bonds market (that excludes direct loans through private lenders and intermediated loans through banks) - an USD8 trillion-sized elephant. Based on the latest research of the U.S. Treasury Department, non-banking institutions - plain vanilla investment funds, pension funds, mom-and-pop insurance companies, etc are now holding a full 1/4 of U.S. corporates bonds. According to the U.S. Treasury, these expanding holdings of / risk exposures to corporate debt are now "a top threat to stability" of the U.S. financial system. And the warning comes at the time when U.S. corporate debt is at an all-time high as a share of GDP, based on the figures from the Office of Financial Research.

And it gets worse. Since 2007, corporate debt pile in the U.S. rose some 75 percent to USD8.4 trillion, based on data from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association - which is more than USD8 trillion estimated by the Treasury. These are long-term debt instruments. Short term debt obligations - money market instruments - add another USD 2.9 trillion and factoring in the rise of the value of the dollar since the Fed meeting this week, closer to USD3 trillion. So the total U.S. corporate debt pile currently stands at around USD 11.3 trillion to USD 11.4 trillion.

Take two:

  1. Debt, after the epic deleveraging of the 2008 crisis, is now at an all-time high; and
  2. Debt held by systemic retail investment institutions (insurance companies, pensions funds, retail investment funds) is at all time high.

And the risks in this market are rising. Since the election of Donald Trump, global debt markets lost some USD2.3 trillion worth of value. This reaction was driven by the expectation that his economic policies, especially his promise of a large scale infrastructure investment stimulus, will trigger inflationary pressures in the U.S. economy that is already running at full growth capacity (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/12/151216-us-economic-policies-in-era-of.html). Further monetary policy tightening in the U.S. - as signalled by the Fed this week (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/12/151216-long-term-fed-path-may-force-ecb.html) will take these valuations down even further.

Some estimates (see https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-16/republican-tax-reform-seen-shrinking-u-s-corporate-bond-market) suggest that the Republican party corporate tax reforms (that might remove interest rate tax deductibility for companies) can trigger a 30 percent drop in investment grade bonds valuations in the U.S. - bonds amounting to just under USD 4.9 trillion. The impact would be even more pronounced on other bonds values. Even making the estimate less dramatic and expecting a 25 percent drop across the entire debt market would wipe out some USD 2.85 trillion off the balancesheets of the bonds-holding investors.

As yields rise, and bond prices drop, the aforementioned systemic retail investment institutions will be nursing massive losses on their investment books. If the rush to sell their bond holdings, they will crash the entire market, triggering potentially a worse financial meltdown than the one witnessed in 2008. If they sit on their holdings, they will be pressed to raise capital and their redemptions will be stressed. It's either a rock or a hard place.


Problem Extrapolation: the World

The glut of U.S. corporate debt, however, is just the tip of an iceberg.

As noted in this IMF paper, published on December 15th, corporate leverage (debt) has been on a steady march upward in the emerging markets (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16243.pdf).


And in its Fiscal Monitor for October 2016, the Fund notes that "At 225 percent of world GDP, the global debt of the nonfinancial sector—comprising the general government, households, and nonfinancial firms—is currently at an all-time high. Two-thirds, amounting to about $100 trillion, consists of liabilities of the private sector which, as documented in an extensive literature, can carry great risks when they reach excessive levels." (see http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2016/02/pdf/fm1602.pdf)

Yes, global real economic debt now stands at around USD152 trillion or 225 percent of world GDP.

Excluding China and the U.S. global debt levels as percentage of GDP are close to 2009 all time peak. Much of the post-Crisis re-leveraging took place on Government's balancehseets, as illustrated below, but the most ominous side of the debt growth equation is that private sector world-wide did not sustain any deleveraging between 2008 and 2015. In fact, Advanced Economies Government debt take up fully replaced private sector debt growth rates contraction. Worse happened in the Emerging Markets:

So all the fabled deleveraging in the economies in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis has been banks-balancesheets deleveraging - Western banks dumping liabilities to be picked up by someone else (vulture funds, investors, other banks, the aforementioned systemic retail investment institutions, etc).

And as IMF analysis shows, only 12 advanced economies have posted declines in total non-financial private debt (real economic debt) as a share of GDP over 2008-2015 period.  Alas, in the majority of these, gains in private deleveraging have been more than fully offset by deterioration in government debt:

Crucially, especially for those still believing the austerity-by-cuts narrative presented in popular media, fiscal uplift in debt levels in the Advanced Economies did not take place due to banks-rescues alone. Primary fiscal deficits did most of the debt lifting:

In simple terms, across the advanced economies, there was no spending austerity. There was tax austerity. And on the effectiveness of the latter compared to the former you can read this note: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/12/10122016-austerity-three-wrongs-meet.html. Spoiler alert: tax-based austerity is a worse disaster than spending-based austerity.

In summary, thus, years of monetarist activism spurring a massive rise in corporate debt, coupled with the utter inability of the states to cut back on public spending and the depth of the Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession have combined to propel global debt levels past the pre-crisis peak to a new historical high.

The core root of the 2007-2010 crises is back. With a vengeance.

Wednesday, May 11, 2016

11/5/16: U.S. Economy: Three Charts Debt, One Chart Growth


In his recent presentation, aptly titled "The Endgame",  Stan Druckenmiller put some very interesting charts summarising the state of the global economy.

One chart jumps out: the U.S. credit outstanding as % of GDP


In basic terms, U.S. debt deleveraging post-GFC currently puts U.S. economy's leverage ratio to GDP at the levels comparable with 2006-2007. Which simply means there is not a hell of a lot room for growing the debt pile. And, absent credit creation by households and corporates, this means there is not a hell of a lot of room for economic growth, excluding organic (trend) growth.

As Druckernmiller notes in another slide, the leveraging of the U.S. economy is being sustained by monetary policy that created unprecedented in modern history supports for debt:

And as evidence elsewhere suggests, the U.S. credit creation cycle is now running on credit cards:
Source: Bloomberg

And the problem with this is that current growth rates are approximately close to the average rate of the bubble years 1995-2007. Which suggests that in addition to being close to exhaustion, household credit cycle is also less effective in supporting actual growth.

Which is why (despite a cheerful headline given to it by Bloomberg), the next chart actually clearly shows that the U.S. growth momentum is structurally very similar to pre-recession dynamics of the 1990 and 2000:
Source: Bloomberg

Back to Druckenmiller's presentation title... the end game...

Sunday, May 8, 2016

7/5/16: Households Over-Indebtedness in the Euro Area


An interesting assessment of Italian household debt levels in the context of over-indebtedness by D'Alessio, Giovanni and Iezzi, Stefano, (paper “Over-Indebtedness in Italy: How Widespread and Persistent is it?”. March 18, 2016, Bank of Italy Occasional Paper No. 319. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2772485).

Using the Eurosystem’s Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) the authors also compare the over-indebtedness of Italian households with that of other euro-area countries (Ireland, as usual, nowhere to be found, presumably because we don’t have data).

Here is a summary table for euro area households over-indebtedness:


Several things can be highlighted from this table:

  1. There is severe over-indebtedness in Spain (14.1%) and Slovenia (10%); serious over-indebtedness in the Netherlands (8.8%), Luxembourg (8.4%), and Portugal (8.2%)
  2. Demographically, those under 50 are the hardest hit. This would be normal, if the incidence of higher debt amongst younger generations was consistent with demographic profile of the country (younger countries - more over-indebtedness amongst younger generations). This is not the case. 
  3. Overall, worst cross-country over-indebtedness problem occurs in 31-40 age group - the group of the most productive households who should be able to fund their debts from growing incomes.
  4. In 9 out of 13 countries covered, highest or second highest level of over-indebtedness accrues in “University Degree” holding sub-population.
  5. Self-employed are disproportionately hit by over-indebtedness problem compared to those in employment.

In simple terms, the above evidence can be consistent with sustained, decade-long transfers of wealth (via debt channel) from younger and middle-age generation to older generation (>50 years of age). System of taxation that induces higher volatility to incomes of self-employed compared to those in traditional employment might be another contributing factor.

Thursday, April 28, 2016

27/4/16: The Debt Crisis: It Hasn't Gone Away


That thing we had back in 2007-2011? We used to call it a Global Financial Crisis or a Great Recession... but just as with other descriptors favoured by the status quo 'powers to decide' - these two titles were nothing but a way of obscuring the ugly underlying reality of the global economy mired in a debt crisis.

And just as the Great Recession and the Global Financial Crisis have officially receded into the cozy comforters of history, the Debt Crisis kept going on.

Hence, we have arrived:

Source: http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-04-27/debt-growing-faster-cash-flow-most-record

U.S. corporate debt is going up, just as operating cashflows are going down. And so leverage risk - the very same thing that demolished the global markets back in 2007-2008 - is going up because debt is going up faster than equity now:

As ZeroHedge article correctly notes, all we need to bust this bubble is a robust hike in cost of servicing this debt. This may come courtesy of the Central Banks. Or it might come courtesy of the markets (banks & bonds repricing). Or it might come courtesy of both, in which case: the base rate rises, the margin rises and debt servicing costs go up on the double.

Tuesday, April 19, 2016

19/4/16: Leverage and Equity Gaps: Italy v Rest of Europe


Relating to our previous discussions in the MBAG 8679A: Risk & Resilience: Applications in Risk Management class, especially to the issue of leverage, recall the empirical evidence on debt distribution and leverage across the European countries corporate sectors.

Antonio De Socio and Paolo Finaldi Russo recently contributed to the subject in a paper, titled “The Debt of Italian Non-Financial Firms: An International Comparison” (February 25, 2016, Bank of Italy Occasional Paper No. 308: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2759873).

Per authors, “In the run-up to the financial crisis Italian firms significantly increased their debt in absolute terms and in relation to equity and GDP.” This is not new to us, as we have covered this evidence before, but here are two neat summaries of that data:


What is of greater interest is more precise (econometrically) and robust estimate of the gap in leverage between Italian firms and other European corporates. “The positive gap in firms’ leverage between Italy and other euro-area countries has widened in recent years, despite the outstanding debt of Italian firms has decreased since 2011.”

Another interesting insight is the source of this gap. “We find that, controlling for several firm-specific characteristics (i.e. age, profitability, asset tangibility, asset liquidity, turnover growth), the leverage of Italian firms is about 10 percentage points higher than in other euro area countries. Differences are systematically larger among micro and small firms, whereas they are small and weakly significant for firms with assets above 300 million euros.”

But equity gap, defined as “the amount of debt to be transformed into equity type funds in order to fill the leverage gap with other countries”, is not uniform over time.

“…in order to reach the same average level as other euro-area countries, Italian firms should transform about 230 billion euros of financial debt into equity type finance, corresponding to 18 per cent of their outstanding debt. The gap is largest, at around 28 per cent of outstanding debt, for small firms and micro firms with over 1 million euros of assets.”

Authors note one influential outlier in the data: “A large part of the estimated corrections is due to the comparison with French firms, which on average have one of the lowest levels of leverage in Europe. Excluding these companies, the equity gap would drop to 180 billion euros.”


Dynamically, “the results indicate that the gap has widened somewhat since 2009, from about 180 to 230 billion euros”.

Given the EU-wide (largely rhetorical) push for increasing capital structure gearing toward equity, “the Italian Government recently put in place some incentives to encourage recourse to equity financing by reducing the debt tax shield: a cap on the amount of interest expense that could be deducted from taxable income and tax deductions linked to increases in equity (according to the Allowance for Corporate Equity scheme). Similarly, other measures have also been aimed at strengthening the supply of risk capital for Italian firms. The results of our analysis suggest that Italian firms still need this kind of incentives to strengthen their financial structure.”

Monday, April 18, 2016

18/4/16: Leverage Risk, the Burden of Debt & the Real Economy


Risk of leverage has been a cornerstone of our recent lectures concerning the corporate capital structure decisions in the MBAG 8679A: Risk & Resilience:Applications in Risk Management class at MIIS. However, as noted on a number of occasions in both MBAG 8679A and other courses I teach at MIIS, from macroeconomic point of view, corporate leverage risks are just one component of the overall economic leveraging equation. The other three components are: household debt, government debt, and the set of interactions between the burden of all three debt sources and the financial system at large.

An interesting research paper by Mikael Juselius and Mathias Drehmann, titled “Leverage Dynamics and the Burden of Debt” (2016, Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper No. 3/2016: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2759779) looks that both leverage risk arising from the U.S. corporate side and household side.

Per authors, “in addition to leverage, the debt service burden of households and firms is an important link between financial and real developments at the aggregate level. Using US data from 1985 to 2013, we find that the debt service burden has sizeable negative effects on expenditure.” This, in turn, translates into lower economy-wide investment and consumption - two key components of the aggregate demand. Debt “interplay with leverage also explains several data puzzles, such as the lack of above-trend output growth during credit booms and the depth and length of ensuing recessions, without appealing to large shocks or non-linearities. Using data up to 2005, our model predicts paths for credit and expenditure that closely match actual developments before and during the Great Recession.”

With slightly more details: the authors found that “the credit-to-GDP ratio is cointegrated with real asset prices, on the one hand, and with lending rates, on the other. This implies that the trend increase in the credit-to-GDP ratio over the last 30 years can be attributed to falling lending rates and rising real asset prices. The latter two variables are, moreover, inversely related in the long-run.”

In addition and “more importantly, we find that the deviations from the two long-run relationships - the leverage gap and the debt service gap henceforth - have sizeable effects on credit and output. …real credit growth increases when the leverage gap is negative, for instance due to high asset prices. And higher credit growth in turn boosts output growth. Going beyond the existing evidence, we find that the debt service gap plays an additional important role at the aggregate level that has generally been overlooked: it has a strong negative impact on consumption and investment. In addition, it negatively affects credit and real asset price growth.”

The link between leverage gap and debt service gap:



In summary, “The leverage and debt service gaps hold the key for explaining the divergence of credit and output in recent decades. For instance, in the late 1980s and mid 2000s both gaps were negative boosting credit and asset price growth. This had a positive effect on output, but not one-to-one with credit, which caused the credit-to-GDP ratio to rise. This in turn pushed the debt service gap to positive values, at which point it started to offset the output effects from high credit growth so that output growth returned to trend. Yet, as the leverage gap remained negative, credit growth was still high, ie we observed a “growthless” credit boom. This continued to increase the debt-service gap, which had a growing negative effect on asset prices and expenditure, driving the leverage gap into positive territory. And once both gaps became positive they worked in the same direction, generating a sharp decline in output even without additional
large shocks or crises-related non-linearities. The subsequent downturns were deep and protracted, as the per-period reduction in credit had to be faster than the per-period decline in output in order to lower the credit-to-GDP ratio and thereby close the two gaps. This also implied that the recovery was “creditless”.”

Highly intuitive and yet rather novel results linking leverage risk to debt financing costs.

Wednesday, January 6, 2016

6/1/16: Debt Pile: BRICS v BRIS


When it comes to debt pile for the real economic debt (Government, private non-financial corporates and households), China seems to be in the league of its own:




















Per chart above, China’s debt is approaching 250 percent of GDP, with second-worst BRICS performer - Brazil - sitting on a smaller pile of debt closer to 140 percent of GDP. The distance between Brazil and the less indebted economies of South Africa and India is smaller yet - at around 12-14 percentage points. Meanwhile, the least indebted (as of 1Q 2015) BRICS economy - Russia - is nursing a debt pile of just over 90 percent of GDP, and, it is worth mention - the one that is shrinking due to financial markets sanctions.

Tuesday, January 5, 2016

5/1/16: Debt Pile: Advanced Economies Lead


After some 8 years of crisis and post-crisis deleveraging, one would have expected a significant progress to be achieved in terms of reducing the overall debt piles carried by the world’s most indebted economies.

Alas, the case cannot be made for such improvements. Here is a chart based on the latest BIS data (through 1Q 2015) plotting the distribution of total real economic debt (Government, private non-financial corporates and households) across the main economies:




















As the chart above indicates, there are at least 23 economies with debt/GDP ratio in excess of 200 percent, seven economies with debt to GDP ratio close to or above 300 percent and 3 economies with debt to GDP ratio in excess of 300 percent. But the true champs of the debt world are Japan and Ireland, where based on BIS data, debt to GDP ratio is in excess of 375 percent. 

It is worth noting that Germany is the only advanced economy in the chart that has debt/GDP ratio below 200 percent. Of all original Euro area 12 economies, Germany, Austria and Finland are the only three economies with debt/GDP ratio below 250 percent. Six out of top 10 most indebted economies in the chart are Euro area members.


Do note that the above omits local authorities and state bodies debts, so the true extent of debt pile up around the world is significantly larger than that presented in this figure.

Wednesday, December 23, 2015

23/12/15: Corporate Leverage: "I miss you since the place got wrecked"


Remember all the deleveraging the U.S. economy has gone through during the crisis? Why, sure, we've learned a lesson about too much debt, did we not?

Except when you look at the Deutsche Bank data in the following chart:
Source: @SoberLook 

By which the investment grade corporates' net leverage is at all time high 3 quarters running and rising; and gross leverage is at all time high 4 quarters running and rising. Or as Leonard Cohen's lyrics go:
"Ah we're drinking and we're dancing 
and the band is really happening 
and the Johnny Walker wisdom running high..."

Thursday, December 10, 2015

10/12/15: U.S. Corporate Debt: It's Getting Boomier


U.S. Non-financial Corporations debt - the other 'third' of the real economic debt equation - is on the rise, again. Deleveraging is not only over, but has been pushed aside. The new cycle of debt boom is well under way, and with it, the next cycle of a bust is getting closer...



Monday, September 28, 2015

28/9/15: Blow Outs in the Markets: Beware of Debt Financing


 This is an unedited version of my article in the Village Magazine from June 2015.


Three recent events, distinct as they may appear, point to a singular shared risk faced by the Irish economy, a risk that is only being addressed in our policy papers and in the mainstream media.

Firstly, over the course of May, European financial markets have posted surprising rises in Government and corporate bond yields amidst falling liquidity, widening spreads and increased volatility.

Secondly, both the IMF and the Irish Government have recognised a simple fact: once interest rates revert back to their 'normal' path, things will get testing for the Irish economy.

And thirdly, the Irish Government has quietly admitted that the fabled arrears solutions to our household debt crisis are not working.

Deep below the lazy gaze of Irish analysts, these risks are connected to the very same source: the massive debt overhang that sits on the back of our struggling economy.


Stability? Not So Fast.

Take the first set of news. The problem of spiking yields and blowing up trading platforms in the European bond markets was so pronounced in May, that the ECB had to rush in with a bold promise to accelerate its quantitative easing purchases of Government paper to avoid an even bigger squeeze during the summer. All in, between January and the end of May, euro area government bond yields rose by some 6 basis points, cost of non-financial corporate borrowings rose by around 9 basis points, and banks' bond yields were up 1 basis point. All in the environment of declining interbank rates (3-month Euribor is down 10 basis points) and massive buying up of bonds by the ECB.

In one recent survey completed by the Euromoney before May bond markets meltdown almost 9 out of 10 institutional investors expressed deep concerns over evaporating market liquidity (higher costs of trading and longer duration of trades execution) in the sovereign bond markets. In another survey, completed in late 1Q 2015 by Bank of America-Merill Lynch, 61% of large fund managers said that European and U.S. stocks and bonds are currently overvalued - the largest proportion since the survey began back in 2003.

In the U.S., current consensus expectation is for the Federal Reserve to start hiking rates in 3Q 2015. In Europe, the same is expected around Q3 2016. And recently, both estimates have been moving closer and close to today, despite mixed macroeconomic data coming from the economies on the ground. If the process of policy rates normalisation coincides with continued liquidity problems in the bonds markets, we can witness both evaporation of demand for new government debt issues and a simultaneous increase in the cost of funding for banks, companies and the Governments alike.


Cost of Credit

Which brings us to the second point - the role of interest rates in this economy.

In recent Stability Programme Update (SPU) filled with the EU Commission, the Department of Finance provided a handy exercise, estimating the impact of 1% rise in the ECB key rate. The estimates - done by the ESRI - show that in 2017, a rise in ECB rate to 1 percentage point from current 0.05% will likely cost this economy 2.1% of our GDP in 2017, rising to 2.4% in 2018 and 2019. By 2020, the effect can amount to the losses of around 2.5% of GDP.

This increase would bring ECB rates to just over 1/3rd of the historical pre-crisis period average - hardly a major 'normalisation' of the rates. Which means that such a hike will be just a start in a rather protracted road that is likely to see rates rising closer to 3-3.5 percentage points.

But here is a kicker, the ESRI exercise does not account fully for the realities on the ground.

In addition to the ECB rate itself, several other factors matter when we consider the impact of the interest rates normalisation on the real economy. Take for example cost of funds in the interbank markets. Average 12 months Euribor - prime rate at which highest-rated euro area banks borrow from each other - averaged 3.29% for the period of 2003-2007. Today the rate sits at 0.18%. Which means rates normalisation will squeeze banks profits line. If euro area, on average, were to hike their loans in line with ECB increases, while maintaining current 12 months average lending margins, the rate charged on corporate year and over loans in excess of EUR1 million will jump from the current 2.17% to 3.37%.

It turns out that due to our dysfunctional banking system, Irish retail rates carry a heftier premium than the euro area average rates, as illustrated in Chart 1 below. Which, of course, simply amplifies the impact of any change in the ECB base rate on Ireland’s economy.



The reason for this is the pesky issue of Irish banks profitability - a matter that is distinct from the euro area average banking sector performance due to massive non-performing loans burden and legacy of losses carried by our banking institutions. Per latest IMF assessment published in late April, Irish banking system is the second worst performing in the euro area after the Greek when it comes to existent levels of non-performing loans. In today's terms, this means that the average lending margin charged by the banks in excess of ECB policy rate is 3.4% for house purchase loans, 5.63% for loans to Irish companies under EUR1 million with a fix of one year and over, and 4.0% for loans to same companies in excess of EUR1 million. Which means that a hike in the ECB rate to 1% will imply a rise in interest rates charged by the banks ranging from 0.84% for households loans, to 0.92% for smaller corporate loans and to 1.22% for corporate loans in excess of EUR1 million.

Chart 2 below highlights what we can expect in terms of rates movements in response to the ECB hiking its base rate from the current 0.05% to 1%.


No one - not the ESRI, nor the Central Bank, nor any other state body - knows what effect such increases can have on mortgages arrears, but is pretty safe to say that households and companies currently experiencing difficulties repaying their loans will see these problems magnified. Ditto for households and companies that are servicing their debts, but are on the margin of slipping into arrears.

While the ESRI-led analysis does enlighten us about the effects of higher rates on tax revenues and state deficits, it does little in providing any certainty as to what happens with consumer demand (linked to credit), property investment and development (both critically dependent on the cost of funding), as well as the impact of higher rates on enterprise formation and survivorship rates.

In addition, higher rates across the euro area are likely to imply higher value of the euro relative to our major trading partners' currencies. Which is not going to help our exporters. Multinational companies trading through Ireland are relatively immune to this effect, as most of their trade is priced internally and stronger euro can be offset by accounting and other means. But for SMEs exporting overseas, every percentage point increase in the value of the euro spells lower sales and lower profits.


Debt Overhang: It Matters

Across the euro area states, there are multiple pathways through which higher rates can drain growth momentum in the economy.

But in Ireland's case, these pathways are almost all invariably adversely impacted by the debt overhang carried by the households and the corporate sectors. Current total debt, registered in Irish financial institutions as being extended to Irish households and resident enterprises stands at just over EUR263.7 billion. And that is before we take into the account our Government debt, as illustrated in Chart 3.


A 1 percentage point increase in retail rates can see some EUR2.64 billion worth of corporate and household incomes going to finance existent loans - an amount that is well in excess of EUR2.28 billion increase in personal consumption recorded in 2014 compared to 2013, or 24% of the total increase in Ireland's GNP over the same period. Add to that added Government debt costs which will rise, over the years, to some EUR1.5 billion annually.

What is not considered in the analysis is that at the same time, rising cost of credit is likely to depress the value of the household's collateral, as property prices are linked to credit markets conditions. Which means that during the rising interest rates cycle, banks may be facing an added risk of lower recovery from home sales.

The effect of this would be negligible, if things were relatively normal in Irish mortgages markets. But they hardly are.

At the end of Q4 2014, total number of mortgages in arrears stood at 145,949 accounts, amounting to the total debt of EUR29.8 billion or 18% of total lending for house purchases. 94,929 accounts amounting to EUR14.94 billion of additional debt were restructured and are not in arrears. Roughly three quarters of the restructured mortgages involve 'solutions' that are likely resulting in higher debt over the life time of the restructured mortgage than before the restructuring was applied. We cannot tell with any degree of accuracy as to how sensitive these restructured mortgages are to interest rates changes, but arrears cases will be much harder to resolve in the period of rising rates than the cases so far worked out through the system.


When, Not If…

You'd guess that the ESRI and Department of Finance would do some homework on all of the above factors. But you would be wrong. There is no case-specific risks analysis relating to interest rates changes performed. Perhaps one of the reasons why majority of analysts have been dismissing the specific risks of interest rates increases is down to the lack of data and models for such detailed stress-testing.

Another reason is the false sense of security.

Take the U.S. case. The U.S. economy is now in an advanced stages of mature recovery, based on the most recent survey of economic forecasters by the BlackRock Investment Institute. But the underlying weaknesses in growth remain, prompting repeated revisions of analysts' expectations as to the timing of the Federal Reserve rates hikes. Still, the Fed is now clearly signaling upcoming rate hike.

The Fed is pursuing a much broader mandate than the ECB - a mandate that includes the target of full employment. The twin mandate is harder to meet than the ECB's singular objective of inflation targeting.

While the European inflation is low, it is not as low as one imagines. Stripping energy - helped by the low oil prices - inflation in the Euro area was estimated to be at 0.7% in April 2015. Combined, prices of gas, heating oil and fuels for transport shaved 0.66 percentage points off headline inflation figure. Although 0.7% is still a far cry from 'close to but below 2%' target, for every 10% increase in energy prices, HICP metric watched by the ECB will rise approximately 1.06 percentage points. So far, in April 2015, energy prices are down 5.8% y/y - the shallowest rate of decline in 5 months. Month on month prices rose 0.1 percentage points.

Sooner or later, interest rates will have to rise.  In the U.S., explicit Fed policy is that such increases will take place after the real economy recovers sufficiently to withstand such a shock. In the euro area, there is no such policy in place, in the aggregate, across the entire common currency area, and in the case of specific weak economies, such as Ireland, in particular.