7/2/20: Mapping Real Economic Debt 2019

A neat summary map of the real economic debt as a share of the national economies, via IIF, with my addition of Ireland's benchmark relative to its more accurate measure of the national income than GDP:

Yep, it is unflattering... albeit imperfect (there is some over-estimate here on the corporate debt side).

3/2/2020: Demographics and Support for the EU: Populism Base

Rising populism in politics, demographics and the financial crisis aftershocks are linked. Intuitively and empirically. And thus says a new study, published in the Journal of European Public Policy. The study by Fabian Lauterbach and Catherine e. De Vries, titled "Europe belongs to the young? Generational differences in public opinion towards the European Union during the Eurozone crisis" tackles the "...notion that younger people hold more favourable attitudes towards the European Union (EU) is prevalent in both academic and popular discourse." The authors shows that "Younger cohorts in debtor countries have become significantly more sceptical of the EU than their peers in creditor states" after the crisis. At the same time, "Older generations are more supportive of the EU in debtor countries compared to creditor states."

Marginal means by cohort, Euro-debtor, Euro-creditor and other EU member states

Full paper: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13501763.2019.1701533. 

28/1/20: The Precariat of America's Workampers

Precariat is defined as "a social class formed by people suffering from precarity, which is a condition of existence without predictability or security, affecting material or psychological welfare. The term is a portmanteau obtained by merging precarious with proletariat." [Source]

Here is a very interesting article chronicling journalist's experience with the "Workampers", or a large number of Americans living in the world of campers, RVs and seasonal jobs: https://www.marketwatch.com/story/many-older-americans-are-living-a-desperate-nomadic-life-2017-11-06. Many are undoubtedly victims to the age discrimination that adversely impacts Americans after the age of 50, despite the pro forma legal bans against discrimination on the grounds of age.

28/1/2020: Federal Tax Revenues Over Time

Via the @SoberLook, WSJ's data / charts newsletter, a neat summary of changes in the U.S. federal taxation base over the years:

What does it tell us? In the 1940s-1960s, the share of excise, inheritance and other taxes, plus the share of corporation taxes in total federal tax revenues ranged above 30 percent, declining from around 45 percent in the 1940s to roughly 35-36 percent in the 1960s. Over the last decade, that share was around 14-15 percent. The burden of taxation, instead, has dramatically shifted onto labor income and personal income. This trend is forecast to worsen over the 2020s decade, with non-income taxes expecting to decline in their importance to around 12-13 percent of the total tax revenues.

It is worth noting that the benefits distribution has been also trending against current income earners, with a rising share of Government spending accruing to old-age support programs, social security payments and, of course, as usual - Pentagon.

Given these trends, it is hard to see how the politics of the younger electorate (growing role of the Millennials, GenXers and GenZers in voting) is going to be compatible with this situation. Likewise, given the likelihood for future shift in electoral politics against low corporation tax revenues share in total tax take in the U.S., it is hard to see how continued prosperity of the well-known corporate tax havens, including Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands et al, can be sustained either.

28/1/20: What Doesn't Work in NYC Probably Won't Work in Dublin

As Irish politicians talk rent controls, here is some interesting evidence from NYC's recently passed rent control rules (since June 2019): https://reason.com/2020/01/27/totally-predictable-consequences-of-new-yorks-rent-regulations/.

Summary:

• Sales of apartment buildings in NYC fell by 36 percent in 2019, and that the total spend on purchases fell by 40 percent. Not all of this is down to rent controls changes - NYC is grossly over-supplied in the premium segment of the market and traditionally large-ticket buyers are staying out of the market (Russian and Middle Eastern money) or selling (Russian and Chinese) due to geopolitical and legal ownership threats.
• "The prices investors were paying for rent-stabilized units—where allowable rent increases are set by the government and usually capped at around 1 or 2 percent per year—fell by 7 percent." More direct evidence for less than 6 months of new rules being in force.
• "... landlords are reportedly cutting back on the money that they're putting into the buildings that they do own... [as] 69 percent of building owners have cut their spending on apartment upgrades by more than 75 percent since the passage of the state's rent regulations. Another 11 percent of the landlords in the survey decreased investments in their properties by more than 50 percent." More direct evidence things are not going in the desired direction.
• "The new law's limits on recouping the costs of renovating apartments mean it is often more  financially feasible to leave old apartments vacant."
• The lower end of the market is probably most hit: "The Commercial Observer reports that the new rent laws are encouraging small- and mid-sized landlords to exit the market entirely, writing that "many property owners have woken up to a world where their buildings are worth 30 to 50 percent less than they were a year ago."" 
• And another quote: "Middle-class and working-class neighborhoods, ... would be at particular risk."

Thoughts on why this should work any differently for Ireland are welcomed in the Irish mainstream-populist media.

27/1/20: The Value of History and the Shifting Winds of Public Policy

My latest contribution to the Manning Financial for January 2020 is out: https://issuu.com/publicationire/docs/mf_january_2020?fr=sZTk2MDI2MTg4NA.

21/1/20: Inflation and Growth: BRIC 2020

Via Danske Bank Research, an interesting chart showing 6-12 months forward expectations for inflation (CPI) and economic growth (GDP) for a number of countries, most notably, the BRIC economies:

Clearly suggests continued growth suppression in Russia and, at last, moderating inflationary pressures, returning the economy back toward a longer-term trend of ~2% growth and sub-3% inflation. Also shows continued problems is Brazil persisting into 2020 and only a moderate uptick in economic activity in India, where Modi 'reforms' have been largely washed out into slower growth over the recent quarters.

21/1/20: US Deficits, Growth and Money Markets Woes

My article for The Currency on the effects of the U.S. fiscal profligacy on global debt and money markets is out: https://www.thecurrency.news/articles/7371/the-us-deficit-has-topped-1-trillion-and-investors-should-be-worried.

Key takeaways:

"As the Trump administration continues along the path of deficits-financed economic expansion, the question that investors must start asking is at what point will debt supply start exceeding debt demand, even with the Fed continuing to throw more cash on the fiscal policies bonfire?"

"In the seven years prior to the crisis of 2008-2012, US economic growth outpaced US budget deficits by a cumulative of $1.56 trillion. This period of time covers two major wars and associated war time spending increases, as well as the beginnings of the property markets and banking crises in 2007.

"Over the last seven years since the end of the crisis, US economic growth lagged, on a cumulated basis, fiscal deficits by $928 billion, despite much smaller overseas military commitments and a substantially improved employment outlook.

"These comparatives are even more stark if we are to look at the last three years of the Obama Administration set against the first three years of the Trump Presidency. During the 2014-2016 period, under President Barack Obama, US deficits exceeded increases in the country’s GDP by a cumulative amount of $226 billion. Over the 2017-2019 period, under  Trump’s tenure in the White House, the same gap more than doubled to $525 billion.

"No matter how one spins the numbers, two things are now painfully clear for investors. One: irrespective of the stock market valuations metrics one chooses to consider, the most recent bull cycle in US equities has nothing to do with the US corporate sector being the main engine of the economic growth. Two: the official economic figures mask a dramatic shift in the US economy’s reliance on public sector deficits since the end of the crisis, and the corresponding decline in the importance of the private sector activity."

21/1/20: Investor Fear and Uncertainty in Cryptocurrencies

Our paper on behavioral biases in cryptocurrencies trading is now published by the Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance volume 25, 2020:

We cover investor sentiment effects on pricing processes of 10 largest (by market capitalization) crypto-currencies, showing direct but non-linear impact of herding and anchoring biases in investor behavior. We also show that these biases are themselves anchored to the specific trends/direction of price movements. Our results provide direct links between investors' sentiment toward:

1. Overall risky assets investment markets,
2. Cryptocurrencies investment markets, and
3. Macroeconomic conditions,

and market price dynamics for crypto-assets. We also show direct evidence that both markets uncertainty and investor fear sentiment drive price processes for crypto-assets.

16/1/20: Irish GE2020: Kommersant

My musings on the Irish election 2020 via Russia's Kommersant.ru: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4220157.

15/1/20: Putin's Latest Call Option Buy

"Poekhali!" sad Vlad, refraining Yuri Gagarin's famous phrase. And just like, with a sweep of his hand, Mr. Putin has

1. Removed the entire Russian Cabinet, including his long-serving pal, now ex-Prime Minister Medvedev;
2. Outlined a hefty set of forward-promised reforms; and
3. Added billions of dollars to the Global GDP by creating a tsunami of Russia-related analysis, opinion pieces, reports and updates in the vast Kremlinology Sector bridging journalism, opinnionism, and think-tankerism.

WTF happened in Moscow today?

Putin has been under some sustained pressure in the last couple of years on the domestic economy front. Russian economic growth has been anaemic, to put it mildly. Let's take a brief walk through some headline figures (to-date):

• Despite the 'recovery' from 2015 recession (GDP down 2.3%) and 2016 stagnation (GDP up 0.3%), Russian economic growth peaked at 2.3% in 2018 and slumped to 1.1% in 2019 (based on January-September stats).
• Industrial production is up 2.4% y/y in 2019 (latest data is for January-November) which is worse than 2.9% in 2018, but still miraculous, given the state of Russian Manufacturing PMIs (see: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2020/01/5120-bric-manufacturing-pmis-4q-2019.html).
• Fixed capital investment is in a dire state: in Q1-Q3 2019, investment is up only 0.7%, down from the rate of growth of 4.6% in 2017 and 4.3% in 2018. 
• Retail sales are up 1.6% in 2019 (January-November data), but behind 2.8% growth in 2018. Retail sales rose 1.3% in 2017. None of this enough to recover the sector from a wave of massive contractions in 2015-2016, when retail sales fell 10% and 4.8%, respectively.
• Exports have recovered, but are still running below 2011-2014 period averages.
• Current account surplus is still positive, but way lower than in 2018. 
• Unemployment is a bright side, at 4.6% in H1 2019, down from 4.8% in 2018, currently - the lowest on record.
• After years of growth, population is set to slightly contract in 2019 compared to the post-Soviet peak of 2018. The change is estimated and is not statistically significant, but it indicates one breakaway from the prior trend: inward migration into Russia has slowed down substantially in 2018-2019, in part due to anaemic economy.
• Fiscally, Russia is doing brutally well, however. Government surplus of 2018 - at 2.6% of GDP is likely to be exceeded in 2019: January-November data puts surplus at 3.1% of GDP.
• Central Government Debt is at 13.7% of GDP as of October 2019, a slight uptick on 11.5% in 2018 and hitting the highest level since 2005, but more than benign, given it is entirely offset by the sovereign wealth funds and is being effectively shifted out of foreign currencies and into Rubles. As a reminder, in his first year in the Presidential office, Putin faced Government Debt of 79% of GDP, with External Debt being 67% of GDP. In 2019, external debt is at around 3.9% of GDP.
• Oil reserve funds are up massively in 2019. In 2018, the funds amounted to USD 58.1 billion. At the end of September 2019, this stood at USD 124 billion. Including FOREX and Gold reserves, and other sovereign wealth funds, Russian Government had USD 530.9 billion worth of reserves as of September 2019, almost back to the peak of USD537 billion in 2012.
• Inflation has ticked up in 2019. inflation hit an all time low of 2.9% in 2018 and over January-November 2019 this rose to 4.6%. Inflation has been a major historical point of pain in Russia, so return to above 3% price increases environment is a troubling matter, especially as the economy is barely ticking up any growth.
• Average monthly wages in rubles are growing: up from RB 43,431.3 in 2018 to RB 46,549.0 in 2019 (October data). And wages are up in Euro terms (from EUR587.1 in 2018 to EUR654.1 in 2019). Average wages are also rising in USDollar terms. Which is a point of improvement for the Russians.

All of which brings us back to where Mr. Putin was standing at the end of 2019: he was presiding over an anaemic economy with some marginal signs of improvement and a growing dissatisfaction amongst his electorate with the Government management of the socio-economic conditions. Here is a snapshot of Vladimir Putin's and Dmitry Medvedev's approval ratings as collected by the independent Levada Center: http://www.levada.ru/en/

Notice much? Yep. Traditionally, Russian voters have placed increasing blame for deteriorating socio-economic conditions on the Government, as opposed to the President. Recent years are no exception. The last points on these charts is November-December 2019. Putin's approval ratings have basically stagnated from 3Q 2018 on, while Mr. Medvedev's ratings continued to slip.

Here is a nice kicker: majority of Russians are increasingly not seeing an alignment between their interests and the objectives of the Government. Again via Levada:

"Probably not" and "Definitely not": 2007 = 62%, 2009 = 65%, 2011 = 68%, 2013 = 67% and ... 2019 = 72%. Other signs of pressure? Position: "The government lives off the people and isn’t concerned about how normal people live" - support = 53% in October 2019 poll.

So Putin has been facing some major dilemmas in recent months. Chief ones are:

1. How to shift economy toward a faster growth path?
2. How to resolve the 2024 exit strategy without triggering an internal 'civil servants war' in the corridors of power? and
3. How to secure an upside to his legacy (remember, recency bias means that people remember more recent actions / legacies of their leaders, as opposed to the more distant ones)?

Step one in dealing with the three dilemmas is: replace the unpopular Cabinet. Step 2 is: announce new reforms that - by historical experience - must include things that haven't failed before (e.g. focus on longer term political reforms as opposed to the shorter term market reforms). Step 3 is: quietly unleash a host of economic development policy changes (these are not reforms per se, but a rather policy tools that cannot be deployed by the current, status quo-anchored, Cabinet).

Unless you are a tin-hat-wearing member of the Putin World-Domination Conspiracy club, so far - rational, right? 

So Putin announced that he will 

• gradually (a good thing, given weak institutional capital in Russia) 
• rebalance the executive power away from the Presidential status quo 
• toward a more co-shared power arrangement with the Duma (Russian Lower House of the Parliament). 
• The only three details Putin mentioned today on the subject are: 

1. Letting Duma elect the Prime Minister; 
2. Giving Duma the power of appointing the entire Cabinet of Ministers and all Deputy Prime Ministers; and
3. The President will have no veto power over the Duma on these appointments.

The whole idea is not new. 

Yeltsin dramatically reduced Parliamentary powers after the 1993 'Constitutional Crisis' - an event that saw the West applauding him for bombing the Parliament. Putin subsequently tightened the Presidential grip on power, motivated, at least at first, by the reality of the post-Yeltsin Russia spiralling into a series of smaller secessionist civil wars. Yeltsin made a deal with the devil in his last election: in exchange for the regions support for his hugely unpopular Presidency run, he gave regions more autonomy. On his timescale, Russian Federation would have been a wedge of Swiss cheese, riddled with newly independent ethnic and religious enclaves, by the mid-2000s. Under Putin, Moscow had consolidated its power, suppressing ethnic strife and nationalist extremism. By 2009, then-President Dmitry Medvedev started talking about the need for development of a functional opposition to the Kremlin-backing party, the United Russia. Chats about devolution of power back to the Parliament were mooted. In the end, Medvedev's reforms program included none of the political reforms to challenge the Kremlin. Worse, Medvedev's Police reform of 2011 was an exercise in federalization of the police force, effectively removing much of the local control over the cops. That said, the same reform significantly curtailed the imbalance between the rights and the duties of the police, giving more rights to the citizens.

Now, the idea of devolution of power is back. Why? Because today's Russia faces three important realities:

1. Reality of a stagnant economy - traceable back to 2011 and post-2014 collapse of oil prices. This stagnation outlived the economic promises of the Medvedev's reforms and the endless statements from Putin about the need for diversification of the Russian economy;
2. Reality of shifting voter preferences away from supporting geopolitical re-entry of Russia into the exclusive club of countries that 'matter' toward domestic agenda; and
3. Reality of the Putin presidency facing the end game of transition of power - something that virtually never has been achieved in the past without a major mess.

One way or the other, the idea of giving Duma a meaningful say in the formation of the Government is a good idea for Russia. And one way or the other, it will provide new incentives for a gradual (over the longer period of time) evolution of the Russian body of politics away from the rubber-stamping 'opposition' to the ruling United Russia (the status quo) and toward genuine competition in policies and ideas. This, too, is a good thing for Russia. In fact, I can't really find anything bad in the Putin's latest idea, without forcing myself to think in conspiracy theory terms.

Therefore, to me, the main question that everyone should be asking is not whether or not Putin is proposing these reforms in order to remain in power post-2024, but whether such reforms are feasible today. My gut feeling is that they might be. If the Duma is given real powers, starting with the powers of selecting the Government Cabinet, skin-in-the-game incentives for political parties participation in legislative process beyond today's political posturing will rise. This can, over time, lead to the emergence of a genuine and more effective opposition - the one, driven by policy debates and competing world views. Will it happen? I don't know. Does Putin know? I doubt. 

Frighteningly, not a single journalist I've read on the topic today asked these questions of feasibility of the reforms. Instead, all focused on scaremongering their readers into believing that the announcement is yet another dastardly Putinesque plot to [insert the humanity destroying disaster of your choice here].

CNN produced this utter garbage for analysis:

The CNBC folks decided piped in with this one" 

Neither august outfit of 'world class journalism' has managed to notice the fallacy of their 'damned if he does anything, and damned if he does nothing at all' logic. But enough morons. The real test of Putin's 'reforms' will come post 2024. Until then, watch the proposals for the referendum take shape.

PS: Will we miss Medvedev? Well, he sure beats the tax collector who will replace him. At least in charisma, diplomacy and economic thinking. But not in accountancy. 

15/1/20: What Trade Deal Phase 1/N Says About the Four Horsemen of Apocalypse

Phase 1 of N of the "Greatest Trade Deal" that is "easiest to achieve' by the 'stablest Genius' is hitting the newsflows today. Which brings us to two posts worth reading on the subject:

Post 1 via Global Macro Monitor: https://global-macro-monitor.com/2020/01/15/phase-1-of-potemkin-trade-deal-signed-sealed-and-yet-to-deliver/ is as always (from that source) excellent. Key takeaways are:

• "We never believed for one moment that China would cave on any of the big issues, such as restructuring its economy and any deal would be just some token political salad dressing for the 2020 election."
• "Moreover, much of the deal depends on whether the Chinese will abide by Soviet-style import quotas," or in more common parlance: limits on imports of goods into the country, which is is 'command and control' economics of central planning.
• "We are thankful, however,  the economic hostilities have momentarily ratcheted down but the game is hardly over," with tariffs and trade restrictions/suppression being the "new paranormal".
• "Seriously, after more than two years of negotiations, they couldn’t even agree on dog and cat food imports?"

Post 2 via Market Watch: https://www.marketwatch.com/story/phase-one-trade-deal-wont-end-the-uncertainty-in-markets-hsbc-strategist-says-2020-01-15. Key takeaways:

• "The [trade] environment remains very much in flux and a source of concern and challenge for investors".

My takeaways from Phase 1/N thingy: we are in a VUCA world. The current U.S. Presidential Administration is an automated plant for production of uncertainty and ambiguity, while the world economy is mired in unresolvable (see WTO's Appellate Body trials & tribulations) complexity. Beyond the White House, political cycle in the U.S. is driving even more uncertainty and more ambiguity into the system. The Four Horse(wo)men of the Apocalypse in charge today are, in order of their power to shift the geopolitical and macroeconomic risk balance, Xi, DNC leadership, Putin and Trump. None of them are, by definition, benign. 

The trade deal so far shows that Xi holds momentum over Trump. Putin's shake up of the Russian Cabinet today shows that he is positioning for some change in internal power balances into 2020, and this is likely to have some serious (unknown to-date) implications geopolitically. Putin's meeting with Angela Merkel earlier this week is a harbinger of a policy pivot to come for the EU and Russia and Lavrov's yesterday's statement about weaponization of the U.S. dollar and the need for de-dollarization of the global economy seems to be in line with the Russo-German New Alignment (both countries are interested in shifting more and more trade and investment outside the net of the U.S. sanctions raised against a number of countries, including Iran and Russia).

DNC leadership will hold the cards to 2020 Presidential Election in the U.S. My belief is that it currently has a 75:25 split on Biden vs Warren, with selection of the former yielding a 50:50 chance of a Trump 2.0 Administration, and selection of the latter yielding a 35:65 chance in favour of Warren. The electoral campaigning climate is so toxic right now, we have this take on the latest Presidential debate: https://twitter.com/TheDailyShow/status/1217431488439967744?s=20. Meanwhile, debate is being stifled already by the security agencies 'warnings' about Russian 'interference' via critical analysis of the candidates.

Mr. Trump has his Twitter Machine to rely upon in wrecking havoc, that, plus the pliant Pentagon Hawks, always ready to bomb something anywhere around the world. While that power is awesome in its destructiveness vis-a-vis smaller nations, it is tertiary to the political, geopolitical and economic powers of the other three Horse(wo)men, unless Mr. Trump gets VUCAed into a new war.

BoJo's UK as well as Japan, Canada, Australia et al, can just sit back and watch how the world will roll with the Four punchers. The only player that has a chance to dance closely with at least some of the geopolitical VUCA leaders is the EU (read: France and Germany, really).