27/7/15: IMF Euro Area Report: The Darker Skies of Risks

The IMF today released its Article IV assessment of the Euro area, so as usual, I will be blogging on the issues raised in the latest report throughout the day. The first post looked at debt overhang, while the second post presented IMF views and data on the euro area banking sector woes. The third post covered IMF projections for growth.

So let's take a look at the risks to the IMF's 'growth returns to Euro zone' scenario.


Per IMF: "Risks are now more balanced than in recent years when vulnerabilities dominated. On the upside, low oil prices, QE, a weaker euro, and rising confidence could bring larger than anticipated benefits. Downside risks include lingering weakness and low inflation, a potential
slowdown in emerging markets, geopolitical tensions, and financial market volatility, whether due to asymmetric monetary policies or contagion from events in Greece."

Now, let me translate this into human language:

1) Eurozone has no real drivers for current growth uptick (which is weak to begin with). Instead, all it got to brag about are: QE (extraordinary monetary policies); QE-induced weaker euro (beggar thy neighbours trade policies), some rising confidence (hopping mad global asset markets bidding everything up on foot of global QEs - extraordinary policies); and lastly - lower oil prices (that sign of global economy on a downward slide). Congratulations to all - hard work and enterprising are not required for this sort of growth.

2) Eurozone's abysmal growth is at a risk from:

• 'lingering weakness' (aka structural non-reforms that Europe worked so hard to achieve since 2008, we are all in tears… so lots of sweat, not much of gain here) and 
• 'low inflation' (a euphemism for consumers and investors on strike in this promised Land of Plenty); and 
• 'potential slowdown in emerging markets' (that thingy that makes oil cheaper - take you pick, Euro area: get crushed by higher oil prices in presence of EMs growth or get squeezed by lack of EMs growth in presence of low oil prices), 
• 'geopolitical tensions' (aka: Russkies not playing the ball with Good Europeans by refusing to buy their apples), and 
• 'financial market volatility' (wait: what on earth have we been doing since 2007 other than fight the said financial markets volatility? Looks like lots of successes here, if the said volatility is still a risk), 'whether due to asymmetric monetary policies' (in other words, if the Fed hikes rates too early too fast) or 'contagion from events in Greece' (would that be the same Greece that has been ring fenced and repaired? most recently this month?).

You have to wonder: IMF effectively says all risks that were in the euro area in ca 2011 are still in the euro area in ca 2015…

Now, recall that some time ago I said that the next step for Europe will be a fiscal / political union with less democracy for all and more technocracy for the few? (link here). And IMF does not disappoint on this too.

"Beyond the near term, there should be a concerted effort to accelerate steps to strengthen the monetary union and European firewalls. Fully severing bank-sovereign links would require a common deposit insurance scheme with a fiscal backstop, a larger and fully funded Single Resolution Fund, and easier access to direct bank recapitalization from the ESM. The greater risk-sharing implied by these measures should be underpinned by a strengthened fiscal and structural governance framework which could require possible Treaty changes. These reforms are desirable in any case, but accelerated progress could help bolster market confidence in the face of recent events."

What have we learned from the above? Why, of course that the frequent claims by the EU officials that Europe now has fully severed contagion links between banks and taxpayers are… err… a lie. And that common claims by the European officials that we now have a genuine monetary union infrastructure is also a lie. And that to make these two claims not to be a lie we will need something/rather that requires 'possible Treaty changes'… which is of course a political and fiscal union. So kiss that national sovereignty and self-determination bye-bye… assuming you still believe such exist in the Euro Land.

Here is full IMF risks assessment matrix:

Now, do some counting: out of 7 key risks, four have either high probability of occurring or bear high impact if they should occur or both.

Now, all of the above still generates a positive outlook under the IMF forecasts - positive, meaning GDP growth over 1.2-1.4 percent, never mind GDP growth anywhere near that of the U.S.

But then the IMF goes slightly gloomier and paints a "Downside Scenario of Stagnation in the Euro Area". Here we are getting some traction with highly probable reality by the highly diplomatic Fund.

"Subdued medium-term prospects leave the euro area susceptible to negative shocks. A modest shock to confidence—for example, from lower expected future growth, or heightened geopolitical tensions—that lowers private investment could affect households via labor income and wealth. Expectations of lower inflation at the zero lower bound would keep real interest rates high. For countries with high public debt, risk premia could rise, amplifying the shock and raising the risk of a debt-deflation spiral. Policy space would be limited with short-term interest rates at the zero lower bound and public debt high in countries with large output gaps (Bullard, 2013)."

What the above really means is that, given we are already in the environment of zero policy rates and unprecedented money printing by the ECB, any further shocks will have nothing offsetting them on policy side as

• Monetary policy has fired almost all its bullets already, and
• Fiscal policy has no bullets because of already high levels of debt, whilst
• Currency devaluation policy is not an option in the monetary union dominated by Germany.

Welcome to Hope Street where things can only go as smoothly as today, forever.

"An illustrative downside scenario, assuming lower investment for all euro area countries and increased risk premia for high debt countries, suggests that euro area output could be nearly 2 percent lower by 2020." Guess what: 2020 forecast growth is 1.5% (link here) which means that IMF is saying it will be -0.5% aka another recession.

"The main channels would be through higher real interest rates depressing investment and consumption as well as lower inflation and wage growth constraining adjustment within the euro area." Which means IMF is now fully buying into the Secular Stagnation (Demand Side) scenario I wrote about here.

"The impact would vary across countries with real interest rates higher in countries with weaker balance sheets. Fragmentation progress would reverse and public debt would increase more in high debt countries due to lower fiscal balances and nominal output. “Bad” internal rebalancing would follow, as current accounts in high debt countries would rise due to import compression. Lower inflation would worsen external imbalances, by forcing countries with large output gaps and imbalances to adjust through lower prices and employment."

Yeeeks!

So projections:

Double Yeeeeks!

14/1/2015: ECJ Advocate on OMT: We Allow Fudge

Big news today is old news of yesterday:

We can now expect the European Court of Justice to give green light to the ECB's Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program as being 'compatible with EU law'. This is based on the interim ruling made today by the ECJ's Advocate General Pedro Cruz Villalon. In the tradition befitting European institution, Villalon said OMT is legal "in principle" under the EU treaty as long as it meets certain criteria.

The restriction is that the ECB refrains from "direct involvement" in fiscal/government financing (which can be satisfied by ECB buying sovereign debt via secondary markets alone). The problem here is that currently secondary markets are already pricing in huge premium on sovereign bonds, with many (including some 'peripheral' countries') bonds trading at negative rates. So ECB will be de facto buying an overpriced paper. The key question, therefore, is who carries two risks:
1) Market risk relating to market pricing (if bonds prices slip over time); and
2) Default risk relating to sovereign decisions (if bonds carry haircuts in the future).

More on these risks later today.

Key point missed by many commentators is that approving OMT does not equate to approving QE. Another key point is that ECB QE is restricted not only by the objections to any purchases of sovereign bonds, but also by the objections to the potential modalities of purchases, such as total quantum, the distribution of purchases across the member states and the nature of risk sharing. The latter problems were not addressed by the ECJ.

All in, there is little new in the ECJ ruling. ECJ traditionally rubber-stamps EU-centric measures. Hence, given the EU support for QE, the decision is hardly a watershed.


Background to ECJ decision:

The key issue to be decided by the ECJ is whether the ECB has, in principle, a right to purchase sovereign bonds outside the immediate monetary policy considerations (e.g. supply of liquidity to the banking sector).

Back in July 2014, Germany’s Constitutional Court criticised the OMT, saying it probably overstepped the boundaries of monetary policy allowed to ECB. However, the German Constitutional Court ruling effectively gave ECJ full consideration of the OMT legality. OMT traces back to July 2012, when ECB President, Mario Draghi, vowed to do “whatever it takes” within the ECB's mandate to save the euro.

The ECJ heard arguments from both sides of the OMT divide in October 2014.


What to expect next:

Technically, German court can revisit the issue after the ECJ ruling, but most likely, a favourable ruling from the ECJ will allow ECB to push forward with some direct QE measures, such as buying government bonds in the markets. The key question, therefore, is whether the quantity of purchases will be sufficient to stimulate the euro area economy or will it fall short of the required. Rumours have it, the ECB is likely to buy up to EUR500 billion worth of sovereign bonds on top of EUR1 trillion programmes to purchase private assets. One sure bet is that the move will be a huge support scheme for bondholders and banks, who will witness significant appreciation in the value of their bond holdings. ECB purchases will do nothing to ease the burden of already excessive government debt levels. And, depending on modalities, the ECB purchases of bonds can have little impact on aggregate demand in the euro area economy.

We can, nonetheless, expect some sort of a bold QE-related announcement at the next ECB meeting.

Key point is that even if ECJ approves OMT legality, we will need to see the details of the QE programme to make any judgement as to its potential effectiveness. The fudge of ECB policy 'innovations' lives on.

17/9/2014: Letting Go Ireland's Tax Arbitrage Model Will be a Painful Process

OECD has put forward their proposals for new international tax rules that, in theory, could eliminate tax-optimisation structures that have allowed many multinational companies (such as Google, Apple, Pfizer, Amazon, Yahoo and numerous others) to cut billions of dollars off their tax bills. The proposals were prompted by the G20 request issued last year and the measures announced this week have already been agreed with the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs (44 countries).

The proposals form just a part of the overall international tax reforms package called “Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” that will be unveiled in 2015 and is commonly known as BEPS.

There are two pillars in the current announcement.

The first pillar addresses only some of the abuses of dual-taxation treaties that generally aim to prevent double taxation of companies trading across the borders. The OECD is proposing to make amendments to its model treaty package that would prevent cross-border transactions from availing of tax treaty reliefs whenever the principal reason for the transaction is to avoid tax liability. This is a principles-based change, recognising the spirit or the principle of the dual-taxation treaties. De facto, the aim is to prevent the situation where preventing dual taxation leads to the scenario of dual non-taxation.

As with all principles-based reforms, the devil will be in the fine print of the actual regulations and economist's mind is not the best guide for sorting through these. From the top, were the measures to succeed, profits shifting via the likes of Ireland to tax havens will be if not fully stopped, at least significantly impaired. The result will be putting at risk tens of billions of economic activity booked via Ireland. In some cases, practically, this will mean that activity will be re-domiciled to other jurisdictions, where it really does take place. In other, however, it will become subject to tax in the country that stands just ahead of the tax haven in the pecking order of revenues flows. Ireland might actually benefit here, since our tax regime is still more benign than that offered in other countries.

To support the first pillar, however, the OECD also wants to restrict the amount of profits that a company can report in its intra-company accounts when these are based offshore. In effect this will put a cap on how much of their activity companies can attribute to the intra-company transactions or to force companies to redistribute profits generated by intra-company divisions across the entire group.

This is likely to undermine our ability to gain from re-allocation of revenues mentioned above. For example, suppose a company has a division based in Ireland that holds the company IP. The division is highly profitable, despite being very small: revenues it earns from other parts of the company operating around the world are covering the alleged cost of IP. If these profits were capped and/or required to be redistributed around the world to other divisions of the same company, the incentive for the company to retain its IP in tax optimising location, such as Ireland, will be gone no matter what our tax rate is.


The second pillar relates to the rules on tax residency. In particular, the OECD said that the existent rules that allow companies to operate facilities in a country without registering tax residency there should be abolished. The result, if adopted, will be to force companies like Google, Apple and Amazon to pay taxes on activities carried out in larger European states in these states by removing the channel for profit shifting to Ireland and other countries. The OECD is explicit about this by insisting that companies with 'significant digital presence' in the market should be forced to declare tax residence in that country.

Ireland's official response to this threat is that majority of MNCs trading from here do have significant presence here in form of large offices and big employment numbers. This is a weak argument for two reasons. One: Irish operations are relatively small for the majority of MNCs, compared to their global workforce. Two: majority of Irish operations of MNCs are sales, sales-support, marketing and back office. In other words, these support larger markets workforce.


The first pillar of the proposal is likely to impact sectors such as phrama and tech, where significant profits are generated by IP, trademarks and patents and these are often held off-shore in what are de facto shell subsidiaries not registered for tax purposes in the countries where actual activities of the company are based.

The second pillar is even more damaging to smaller open economies such as Ireland, because it mirrors the old EU proposal for CCCTB basis of corporate taxation. This pillar will likely push activities that are registered in countries like Ireland back into the countries where actual transactions take place, favouring larger economies over smaller ones.

For example, take a US company running sales support centre in Ireland servicing Spain. This activity is supplied by Spanish-speaking, largely non-Irish staff that has been imported into Ireland not because they are more productive here or have better human capital or face lower costs of employing, but because their presence in Ireland allows the company to book sales in Spain into Ireland. In fact, absent tax arbitrage, it would probably be cheaper for the company to employ these workers in Spain.

Back in 2013, Reuters reported that 3/4 of the largest US MNCs in tech sector channeled their revenues from sales across the EU into Ireland and Switzerland, avoiding reporting these activities in the countries where actual customers resided.

If OECD proposals are implemented to reflect the spirit of the reforms, the tax arbitrage bit of the abnormal return on locating labour-intensive activities in Ireland will be gone. This, by itself, may or may not be enough to put those jobs on the airplanes back to Spain, Italy, Germany, France and elsewhere. But if other countries start making themselves more competitive in labour costs, tax and regulatory regimes, defending Ireland's competitive proposition will be harder and harder.

This process - of erosion of Irish competitive advantage - will be further accelerated by the OECD proposals on tax data sharing and clearance which envisages massive increase in the data reporting burdens on the multinational companies. The cost of compliance and audits this entails will be large and increasing in complexity of companies' structures, leading to more incentives for them to rationalise and streamline their operations worldwide. A tiny market, like Ireland, much more efficiently serviceable via the larger economy like the UK, is unlikely to win in this race.


OECD proposals can have a pronounced effect on economic growth, employment and financial health of a number of countries, including Ireland, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the Netherlands because the proposals will force MNCs to change their global operations structures and move jobs out of tax optimisation states toward the states where real activity takes place.

From Ireland's point of view, closing off of the loopholes can have a dramatic effect on the ground if it is accompanied by other trends, such as renewed corporate tax rate competition that can challenge our attractive headline rate of 12.5%, erosion of Irish regulatory and supervisory regimes competitiveness, increase in cost inflation and other inefficiencies. Instead of competing on being a tax arbitrage conduit, Ireland will have to start competing on the basis of real economic fundamentals, such as skills, public policy, public goods and services, private markets efficiencies, etc.

Ironically, the threat of the elimination of tax arbitrage opportunities can result in Ireland becoming more competitive and more successful over time, assuming the Governments - current and subsequent - play it smart.

27/10/2013: Financial Repression, Economic Suppression & Budget 2014

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article for October 20, 2013.


With fanfare of media appearances and fireworks of Dail statements, Budget 2014 was pushed off the dry dock and into the turbulent waters of reality. Full of political sparkle on the outside, overloaded with hidden taxes and charges and yet-to-be-fully-detailed painful cuts on the inside, it sailed off into the future. It will take at least 9-12 months from now to see what adjustments will have to be made in 2015 to compensate for the 'savings' on cuts delivered this week. It will take us longer to find out if the Budget 2014 will have a positive or negative effect on our ability to fund our deficits in the markets.

Yet, one thing is beyond the doubt: Budget 2014 was a significant gamble by the Government that could have done better by avoiding taking any gambles at all. Minister Noonan has decided to buy some political capital in the Budget. This capital came in the form of reduced rate of overall budgetary adjustment, compensated for by the hope-based increases in public sector efficiencies, plus some symbolic handouts to middle class families. Majority, such as the free GP visits for children under the age of 5, were poorly targeted and economically inefficient – extending scarce resources not to where they are needed most (such as, for example, long-term care provision or means-tested provision of health services) but to where political expediency leads. Many fail the core Budget objectives of making our fiscal policies more robust to adverse shocks that may occur in the near-term future.

In the end, Budget 2014 delivered virtually no real departures from the past Budgets. Predictably, there were no 'new' taxes. Instead the Budget put forward a list of new 'revenue raising measures'. The State will claw out of the banks EUR150 million in levies. Given that our banking sector is being reduced to a Three Pillars oligopoly, the levies will come straight from charging customers more for the same services. Pensions funds levy - a form of expropriation of private property - is to raise additional EUR135 million. This is a tax on present income, and in the case of pensions funds levy a tax on current wealth, plus a tax on future incomes foregone due to reduced levels of pensions funds. EUR140 million will be pumped out of the banks’ customers by taxing interest on savings. All in – financial sector will take a hit of EUR425 million on a full year basis, reducing its ability to lend, invest in the economy and to deal with mortgages distress. The measures will also weaken the quality of Irish banks' deposits base by reducing incentives to save. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff aptly termed such measures ‘financial repression’. De facto, we are bailing in ordinary banks customers and savers to pay for the past sins of the banks. Cyprus redux, anyone?

Cuts side of the Budget was also predictable. At the aggregate level, departmental expenditure as the share of GDP continues to run above 1990-2007 average. Instead of real cost reductions in Health we got some EUR250-300 million worth of new charges to be levied on services to insurance holders. And reduced insurance deductibility on the revenues side should do even more to reduce insurance coverage in the market. Net effect will most likely be falling transfers from private patients to public services, and higher demand for public health.

From businesses perspective, whatever the State added on one side of the budgetary equation, the state took out on the other. Thus, for all incentives for construction and building trade, overall capital spending by the Government in 2014 is projected to fall by some EUR100 million. As we stand, in 2013, capital spending by the Government barely covers amortization and depreciation of the total stock of public capital. Next year, things are going to get worse.

Much of the business stimulus schemes are geared toward supports for the property markets, including the incentives for foreign investors to put money into Irish REITs. Aside from the property-related measures, other business stimulus polices are either extensions of the already existent ones or more promise of doing something in the future. One example is the issue of Trade Finance supports. We are now five years into talking about the need to help smaller exporters with the cost of and access to trade insurance and credit.  Still, there is no tangible delivery on this.


However, the real question, left unanswered by Budget 2014 is: what's next for Ireland? The Government is rhetorically focused on our 'exit' from the Troika-led funding programme. This objective is a policy epicycle designed to ease public attention off the realities of bad domestic governance during the crisis. Exit from the bailout, financially, fiscally and economically, means a public recognition that Ireland has run out of funds we can borrow from the IMF and the EU. It also puts forward a commitment that, unlike Greece, we will not be asking for another bailout. Being not Greece does not make us Iceland, however, since Iceland repaid its bailout loans. In contrast, we will be carrying our debts to Troika for years to come.

The Government is promising that once we exit the bailout, we will regain our control over fiscal policies. This is a gross over-exaggeration. Having ratified the Fiscal Compact, Ireland is now subjected to heavy EU oversight as long as our fiscal performance falls short of the targets set in the treaty. It will be long time before we meet all of the conditions.

The scrutiny of our targets will increase, while our performance will remain under serious pressures arising from the crisis. Most recent IMF forecasts assume full EUR5.6 billion adjustments taken over 2014-2015 period, and economic growth averaging over 2.1 percent per annum (almost 6 times the average growth in 2012-2013 period). These forecasts imply that in 2014-2015 Ireland will still face the third highest cumulative deficits in the euro area ‘periphery’. And the debt levels of Irish state are set to continue rising. In 2013, the Department of Finance projects the level of Irish Government debt to be at EUR205.9 billion. By 2018 this is projected to rise to EUR211.6 billion.

And here's another kicker. The Fiscal Compact sets the target for long-term structural deficits (in other words deficits that would prevail were the economy running at its long run sustainable growth potential) at 0.5 percent of GDP. IMF projections out through 2018 put Irish structural deficits declining from 5.1 percent of potential GDP in 2013 to 2.0 percent in 2018. In other words, in 2018 Ireland is expected to be the worst performing 'peripheral' state in terms of structural deficits and operate well outside the criteria set in the Fiscal Compact.

Worse, comes December 15, we will lose a strong supporter of our efforts to restructure legacy banking debts and the only member of the Troika that promotes structurally more important economic and markets reforms.

On foot of our weak fiscal position, the politicisation of the Irish economy is already building up, driven primarily by our European partners and – until December 15 – resisted by the IMF.

The pressure is rising on Ireland's corporate taxation regime. The Government admitted as much by promising to close the loophole that allows some MNCs to nearly completely avoid paying Irish corporate taxes.

The pressure is also growing on blocking Ireland’s chances to restructure legacy banks debts. Germany, the ECB and the Eurogroup are angling to block Ireland's potential access to the European funds set up to deal with the future banking crises.

We are going into 2014 self-funding mode with all the costs of the bailout in place, including the Dvoika (Troika less one) oversight and substantial deficit and debt overhangs. It now appears that there will be no credit line to cover any increases in the cost of borrowing that might arise in the future. There will be no precautionary fund to cushion against any risk to market demand for Irish Government bonds. There will be no system in place to deal with any future banking problems or with the legacy debts should such arise. The ECB, the IMF and our forecasters are all warning us that we still face potentially significant downside risks to growth and banks stability. The IMF has been for months raising the issues of the SMEs insolvencies and poor quality of banks capital.

In other words, we are boxing ourselves into a high-risk game with little to show for this in terms of a positive return from our 'exit' from the bailout.

History suggests that prudence, not pride should be our guide. Back in 2010 we pre-borrowed aggressively in the markets prior to the state finances collapsing under the poorly structured banks bailouts. Now, we are gunning for the 'exit' without having secured any support from our 'partners' once again. The hope is that this time it will be different: the markets will lend us at decreasing costs, while growth lifts the entire domestic economy out of stagnation. This might not be an equivalent of playing Russian roulette, but it is certainly a game of chance with high stakes on the losses side and little tabled on the potential winnings side.

Box-out:
The latest OECD research on basic skills across the advanced economies puts to a serious test our claims to having a highly educated workforce. Ireland ranked eighth in terms of the proportion of younger adults with tertiary education. In terms of problem solving proficiency, both our college graduates and adults with only secondary education rank below their respective OECD averages. In problem solving in a technology-rich environment – a proxy for skills related to internationally-traded services, the sole driver of our economy today – Ireland ranks 18th in the OECD. Our younger workers score below their OECD peers in basic literacy and in numeracy. When it comes to introduction of new processes and technologies in the workplace Ireland is ranked between such premier divisions of the global innovation league as Cyprus and Belgium. Given our poor performance in digital economy-specific skills, exposed in October 2012 report by the OECD and covered in these pages before, it is high time for us to get serious about reforming our education and training systems.

28/5/2013: Germany Might Have Caused the Euro Crisis... but...

CNBC today cites a piece of research (http://www.cnbc.com/id/100769233) that argued that "Germany's insistence on keeping wage growth in check has given the country an unfair competitive advantage vis-à-vis its euro zone peers and is preventing troubled countries from returning to growth, a new study argues."

This non-sensical argument cuts across any reasonable understanding of competitive advantage and the role of economic policy in driving this advantage. Germany undertaking structural reforms neither prevented other states from doing the same, nor imposed any costs (or reduced competitiveness) of other states. The authors of the report and the CNBC should go back to Economics 101 to brush up on their understanding of the competitive advantage concept.

In the nutshell, it is not Germany that caused the crisis - based on competitive advantage argument - but the peripheral states' lack of reforms to deliver their own competitiveness improvements.

However, the mere idea that Germany has 'caused' the crisis in the euro area still merits consideration. There are two strands of thought on this that are potentially valid:
1) Germany actively suppressed domestic demand and thus reduced aggregate demand within the euro area: while true to the point that German domestic demand was and remains too weak, this hardly implies any negative slipovers to the peripheral economies of the euro area, unless someone makes a compelling reason as to why German consumers should be buying vastly more Greek feta cheese or olive oil, and paying vastly more for their purchases; and
2) euro area construct itself induced asymmetric development within the common currency area: Germany, as the core driver of euro area creation is, thus, to be blamed for some failures of the construct.

The latter is a preferred explanation in my opinion and there is an interesting paper from the CEPR (published in March 2013: CEPR Discussion Paper No. 9404) titled "Political Credit Cycles: The Case of the Euro Zone" by Jesús Fernández-Villaverde Luis Garicano and Tano Santos that actually confirms my gut instinct.


The authors "study the mechanisms through which the adoption of the Euro delayed, rather than advanced, economic reforms in the Euro zone periphery and led to the deterioration of important institutions in these countries. We show that the abandonment of the reform process and the institutional deterioration, in turn, not only reduced their growth prospects but also fed back into financial conditions, prolonging the credit boom and delaying the response to the bubble when the speculative nature of the cycle was already evident. We analyze empirically the interrelation between the financial boom and the reform process in Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal and, by way of contrast, in Germany, a country that did experience a reform process after the creation of the Euro."


Some more beef from the paper, as CEPR is password protected site:

Per authors, "Before monetary union took place with the fixing of parities on January 1, 1999, the conventional wisdom was that it would cause its least productive members -particularly Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland1- to undertake structural reforms to modernize their economies and improve their institutions. [However], due to the impact of the global financial bubble on the Euro peripheral countries, the result was the opposite: reforms were abandoned and institutions deteriorated. Moreover, …the abandonment of reforms and the institutional deterioration prolonged the credit bubble, delayed the response to the burst, and reduced the growth prospects of these countries."

How so?

"In the past, the peripheral European countries had used devaluations to recover from adverse business cycle shocks, but without correcting the underlying imbalances of their economies. The Euro promised to impose a time-consistent monetary policy and force a sound fiscal policy. It would also induce social agents to change their inflation-prone ways. Finally, … it would trigger a thorough modernization of the economy."

Germany actually is an example of what the euro was supposed to deliver:

"Faced with a limited margin of maneuver allowed by the Maastricht Treaty and with a stagnant economy, Germany chose the path of structural reforms, giving a new lease on life to German exports. But this did not happen in the peripheral countries. Instead, the underlying institutional divergence between them and the core increased. The efforts to reform key institutions that burden long-run growth, such as rigid labor markets, monopolized product markets, failed educational systems, or hugely distortionary tax systems plagued by tax evasion, were abandoned and often reversed. Behind a shining facade laid unreformed economies.

"The common origins of the financial boom are well understood. The elimination of exchange rate risk, an accommodative monetary policy, and the worldwide easing in financial conditions resulted in a large drop in interest rates and a rush of financing into the peripheral countries, which had traditionally been deprived of capital. Furthermore, demographics in Ireland and Spain favored the start of a construction boom with some foundations in real changes in housing demand, the opposite of Germany, where demographics depressed housing demand. … the percentage of the population between 15 and 64 increased dramatically in Ireland and, to a lesser degree, in Spain between the mid 1970s and 2007. In France and Germany, the peak happened about two decades earlier. Since then, both countries have experienced a slow decay in this segment of the population. These demographic trends were accompanied by an increase in the employment to population ratio and, thus, resulted in strong rates of growth even in the absence of productivity gains."

The paper identifies "two channels through which the large inflows of capital into the peripheral economies led to a gradual end to and abandonment of reforms":

1. The first channel "is the relaxation of constraints affecting all agents. It has long been observed in the political economy literature that for growth-enhancing reforms to take place, things must get “sufficiently bad” (see Sachs and Warner, 1995, and Rodrik, 1996). And, as the development literature has emphasized, foreign aid loosens these constraints by allowing those interest groups whose constraints are loosened to oppose reforms for longer. As explained in section 2, Vamvakidis (2007) also finds that this mechanism operates when debt grows, rather than aid."
2. "The second mechanism is more novel. It affects the ability and willingness of principals to extract signals from the realized variables in a bubble, where everything suggests all is well. A sequence of good realizations of observed outcomes leads principals to increase their priors of the agents’ quality. When all banks are delivering great profits, all managers look competent; when all countries are delivering the public goods demanded by voters, all governments look efficient (this mechanism applies both to real estate bubbles, as in Ireland and Spain, and to sovereign debt bubbles, as in Portugal and Greece). This information problem has negative consequences for selection and incentives. Bad agents are not fired: incompetent managers keep their jobs and inefficient governments are reelected. The lack of selection has particularly negative consequences after the crisis hits. Moreover, incentives worsen and agents provide less effort."

Combining the two channels: "Both of these mechanisms, the relaxation of constraints and the signal extraction problem, led to a reversal of reforms and a deterioration in the quality of governance in these countries. Somewhat counterintuitively, this observation implies that being able to finance oneself at low (or negative) real interest rates may have negative long-run consequences for growth."

There is little new here:

• "Other economists have already pointed out that the financial cycle reduces future growth, simply because of the debt overhang (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999)." [Note: the R&R 2010 controversy does little to dispel the core argument of financial cycle transmission of adverse debt effects, as I am arguing in my forthcoming Village magazine column - stay tuned for later link posting on this blog];
• "Also, researchers working on resource booms have suggested mechanisms that delay growth that apply here by analogy (a financial bubble is, in a way, a form of a resource boom). Grand, ill-conceived government programs involve lasting commitments that lead to higher taxes in the long run."
• "Also, the “Dutch disease” suffered most clearly by Ireland and Spain (with land playing the role of a natural resource here) spreads, whereby human and physical capital moves from the export-oriented sector toward real estate and the government sector. But in our view, the reform reversal and institutional deterioration suffered by these countries are likely to have the largest negative consequences for growth."
• The idea also relates to Rajan (2011), "who links the real estate bubble in the U.S. with an attempt by politicians to shore up the fortunes of a dwindling middle class." 

The authors "emphasize, instead, that in Europe the real estate boom interacted with the political-economic coalition that blocked reforms, allowing large policy errors to remain uncorrected and institutions to deteriorate."

Thus, if Germany did 'cause' the crisis in the euro periphery, it is solely by not enforcing the discipline required within a common currency area - too little stick too much carrots from Berlin was the problem, not too little imports of peripheral products into the core.

28/10/2012: ECB and technocratic decay?

Some interesting comments from BNP on ECB and Mr Draghi's tenure to-date. The note is linked here.  But some quotes are enlightening [comments are my onw]:

"While the ECB justifies the OMT as being to improve the functioning of the monetary system, the fact it has done nothing to help the monetary system in Ireland or Portugal suggests the scheme is about fiscal financing." [I fully agree]

"The balance-sheet implications of buying in the secondary market are the same as if bonds had been bought in the primary market. Mr Draghi’s adherence to the spirit of the Treaty is in question. We support his flexibility, however." [In the short run - yes, Draghi's flexibility is a necessary compromise. Alas, in the long run it is of questionable virtue. Hence, as I remarked ages ago, it's not the measures the ECB unrolls in the crisis that worry me, but the impossibility of unwinding them without wrecking havoc on the economy.]

"...Mr Draghi did [cut rates] in November and December [2011], taking rates back to where they started the year before the two misguided mid-2011 hikes. Mr Draghi cut rates again in July 2012, not only taking the refi rate below the 1% barrier (to 75bp), but also cutting the deposit rate to zero, apparently in an attempt to reinvigorate the interbank market (so far, fruitlessly). Mr Draghi should be praised for cutting rates and for overcoming the 1% barrier, in our view." [I agree.]

"However, he seems to be reluctant to take the deposit rate below zero, which looks timid. Moreover, he has failed to stimulate private credit supply. The LTRO has facilitated the expansion of credit to governments, but to some extent, this has crowded out private-sector credit, where growth is now down 0.8% y/y (-0.4% adjusted for sales and securitisation). The line that this is due to weakness in credit demand is a feeble excuse for the ECB failing to do enough to stimulate supply or to circumvent the lack of credit supply, for example, through credit easing. This has been the major failure of Mr Draghi’s tenure." [I am not so sure on BNP rejecting the idea of weak demand. Most likely, both weak supply and demand are reinforcing each other. More on this once we have our paper on SMEs access to credit published in working paper format, so stay tuned].

And the last blast, the potent one: "If central bankers don’t want politicians to mess with central banking, central bankers would be wise not to mess with politics. Mr Draghi was intimately involved in Italian politics and the demise of former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s tenure in the summer of 2011. More recently, his plans for the OMT were reportedly shared with the German chancellor’s office well in advance. The ECB is a very political animal under Mr Draghi. As the only institution with pan-eurozone power, a prominent role for the ECB in crisis resolution and a strong link to politics
may be unavoidable, and even desirable. But ultimately, such links may return to haunt it." [Yep, I agree. Mr Draghi's competence in office comes with a typical European price tag - get a technocrat and surrender checks and balances. This both signifies to the sickness at the heart of Europe (technocracy displacing democracy) and the inability of the 'patient' to develop institutional path for dealing with this sickness (with EZ potentially/arguably facing either a collapse in the hands of democracy or decay in the hands of technocracy).]

7/6/2012: Sunday Times May 13, 2012

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from May 13, 2012.

With Greek and French elections results out last week, the European leadership is rapidly shifting gears into neutral when it comes to austerity. Within two weeks surrounding the French elections, the Commission has issued a set of statements pushing forward its ‘growth budget’, and issued new proposals for enhancing European investment bank.

This, of course, is a classic rhetoric of damage limitation, contrasted by the reality of the currency union that is in the final stage of the crisis contagion. Having spread from economic to financial and subsequently to fiscal domains of the euro area, the cancer of Europe’s debt overhang has now metastasised to its political leadership. And the financial pressures are back on. Since the late March, credit default swaps spreads have widened for all but two core euro area states (excluding Greece), with an average rate of increase of 10.6%, implying that the markets-priced cumulative probability of the euro zone country default within the next 5 years is now, on average, close to 24%.

Next stop is a period of extended navel-gazing, with summits and ministerial dinners, contrasted by the European electorate moving further away from the centre of power gravity.

By autumn we will be either in a selective euro unwinding (Greece exiting) or in a desperate policies u-turn into mutualisation of the national and banking debts, supported by a return to high pre-2011 deficits and an acceleration of the debt spiral.

The former is going to be extremely disruptive in the short run. Portugal will be watching the Greeks closely, while Spain and Italy will be sliding into unrest. If properly managed, Greek and, later Portuguese exits will allow euro area to cut losses. With a stronger ESM balancesheet, euro area will buy more time to deal with the markets panic, but it will still require serious structural adjustments to shore up the failing currency union. Mutualisation of debt will remain inevitable, but deficits run up can be avoided in exchange for slower reduction in deficits.

The latter option of starting with mutualising debt, while allowing for new deficit financing of growth stimuli will be a road to either a collapse of the common currency within a decade or a Japan-style stagnation. The central problem is that the current political dynamics are forcing the euro area onto the path of growth stimulation amidst a severe debt overhang. The lack of real catalysts for economic recovery means that a temporary stimulus will have to be replaced by sustained debt accumulation. In other words, the political cure to the crisis a-la Hollande, not the austerity, will spell the end of the euro zone.

There are two sides to this proposition.

Firstly, the villain of the European austerity is a bogey. In 2011-2012, euro area fiscal deficits will average 3.7% of GDP per annum, identical to those recorded in 2010-2014 and deeper than in any five-year period from 1990 through 2009, including the period covering the recession of the early 1990s. The ‘savage austerity’, as planned, is expected to result in historically high five-year average deficits. At over 3.2% of GDP, 2012 forecast deficit for the common currency zone will be 6^th largest since 1990.

Instead of shrinking, euro area governments over-spending will remain relatively static under the current ‘austerity’ path. Per IMF, general government revenues will account for 45.6% of GDP in 2011-2012, well ahead of all five-year period averages since 1990 except for 1995-1999 when the comparable figure was 46% of GDP. The same comparative dynamics apply to the government expenditure as a share of GDP.

In other words, euro area voters are currently revolting against the austerity that, with exception of Greece and Ireland, is hardly visible anywhere.

Secondly, the talk about Europe’s growth stimulus is nothing more than a return to the policies that have led us into this crisis in the first place. In 1990-1994, euro area public debt to GDP ratio averaged 59%. By 2005-2009, the average has steadily risen to 71%. In 2010-2014, the forecast average will stand at 89%, identical to the ratio in 2011-2012. Euro area is now firmly stuck in the policy corner that required accumulation of debt in order to sustain economic activity. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has produced one growth policy platform after another that relied predominantly on subsidies and public investment.

By the mid-2000s, the EU has exhausted creative powers of conceiving new subsidies, just as the ECB was flooding the banking system with cheap liquidity. At the peak of the subsequent sovereign debt crisis, in March 2010, Brussels came up with Europe 2020 document – yet another ‘sustainable growth’ scheme through featuring more subsidies and public investment.

At the member states’ level, private debt-fuelled construction and banking bubbles were superimposed onto public infrastructure investments schemes and elaborate R&D and smart economy bureaucracies as the core drivers for jobs creation. State spending and re-distribution were the creative force driving economic improvements in a number of countries. Amidst all of this, euro area overall growth remained severely constrained. For the entire period between 1992 and 2007, euro area real economic growth averaged less than 2.1% per annum, while government deficits averaged over 2.5%. The only three years when public deficit financing was not the main driver of growth were the peaks of two bubbles: 2000, and 2006-2007.

In brief, Europe had not had a model for sustainable growth since 1992 and it is not about to discover one in the next few months either.

Which brings us to the core problem facing the European leadership – the problem of debt overhang.

As a research paper by Carmen M. Reinhart, Vincent R. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff published last week clearly shows, “major public debt overhang episodes in the advanced economies since the early 1800s [were] characterized by public debt to GDP levels exceeding 90% for at least five years.” The study found “that public debt overhang episodes are associated with growth over one percent lower than during other periods.” Across all 26 episodes studied, “the average duration …is about 23 years.”

Now, according to the IMF data, the euro area will reach the 90% debt to GDP bound in 2012 and will remain there through 2015. Statistically, the euro area will be running debt levels in excess of 90% through 2017. Between 2010 and 2017, IMF forecasts that seven core euro area states will be facing debt to GDP ratios at or above 90%. Of the four largest euro area economies, Germany is the only one that will remain outside the debt overhang bound. Increasing deficits into such a severe debt scenario would risk extending the crisis.

After two years of half-measures and half-austerity, the euro as a currency system is now less sustainable. The survival of the euro (even after Greek, Portuguese and, possibly other exits) will depend on structural reforms, including change in the ECB mandate, political federalisation and fiscal harmonisation beyond the current Fiscal Compact treaty.

The real problem Europe is facing in the wake of the last week’s elections in Greece and France is that traditional European elites are no longer capable of governing with the tools to which they became accustomed over decades of deficits and debt accumulation, while the European populations are no longer willing to be governed by the detached and conservative elites. Not quite a classical revolutionary situation, yet, but getting dangerously close to one.

CHARTS: 

Box-out:

This was supposed to be a boom year for car sales as the threat of getting an unlucky ‘13’ stuck on your shiny new purchase for some years was supposed to spell a resurgence in motor trade fortunes. Alas, the latest stats from the CSO suggest that this hoped-for prediction is unlikely to materialise. In the first four months of 2012, new registrations of all vehicles have fallen 8.5% year on year and 60% on 2007. New private cars registrations have suffered an even deeper annual fall, down 10.2% year on year although since the peak they are down ‘only’ 56%. The news of the motor trade suffering is hardly surprising. Unemployment stuck above 14%, fear of forthcoming tax increases in the Budget 2013, plus the dawning reality that sooner or later interest rates (and with them mortgages costs) will climb sky-high are among the reasons Irish consumers continue to stay away from purchasing large ticket items. Cyclical consumption considerations are also coming into play. Over the last 4 years, Irish households barely replaced their stocks of white goods. Given the life span of necessary household appliances, the households are likely to prioritize replacing ageing dishwasher or a fridge over buying a new vehicle. Families compression with children returning back to parental homes to live and grandparents taking over expensive crèche duties are also likely to depress demand for cars. Lastly, there is a pesky consideration of the on-going deleveraging. Irish households have paid down some €36 billion worth of personal debts and mortgages in recent years. Still, Irish households remain the second most indebted in the Euro area. New cars registrations fall off in 2012 shows that in the end, sanity prevails over vanity and superstition, at the detriment to the car sales industry. 

29/5/2012: Fiscal Compact - one very interesting view

I rarely post articles by others on this site, usually preferring links, alas the following article is not available on the web. Its full attribution goes to the Irish Daily Mail (Monday 28, 2012 edition) and it is written by one of the best - if not the best - commentators in the paper both sides of the pond - Mary Ellen Synon.

It is a must-read to understand the context of the Referendum, because it places our vote into the broader and more real context than any domestic debate we might have on merits or failings of the Treaty.

Please note, I am not advocating you follow Mary Ellen's conclusion on the vote - as you know, I am not advocating in favour of any direction of the vote. Make your own choice. I am posting this because I think that many risks highlighted in the article are real.

To be fair to the 'Yes' side, if any of you, readers, spot an excellent article on that side of the argument, I will be delighted to post it. So far, I have not come across one, but that might be due to the omission, rather than lack thereof. (see update below)

Thus, judge for yourselves:

Update: I remembered - the best argument for 'Yes' side I ever read is from another economist, one whose opinion I respect and who has provided many clarifications during this debate to my own occasionally erroneous positions - Professor Karl Whelan. Here's the link and here are his full remarks on the Treaty - certainly worth reading.

13/5/2012: Village Magazine May 2012: Fiscal Rules & actual outruns

This is an unedited version of my article for Village magazine, May 2012.

However one interprets the core constraints of the Fiscal Compact (officially known as the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union), several facts concerning Ireland’s position with respect to them are indisputable.

Firstly, the new treaty will restrict the scope for the future exchequer deficits. This has prompted the ‘No’ side of the referendum campaigns to claim that the Compact will outlaw Keynesian economics. This claim is a significant over-exaggeration of reality. Combined structural and general deficit targets to be imposed by the Compact would have implied a maximum deficit of 2.9-3.0 percent in 2012 as opposed to the IMF-projected general government net borrowing of 8.5 percent of GDP. With the value of the Fiscal Compact-implied deficit running at less than one half of our current structural deficit, the restriction to be imposed by the new rules would have been severe. However, in the longer term, fiscal compact conditions allow for accumulation of fiscal savings to finance potential liabilities arising from future recessions. This is exactly compatible with the spirit of the Keynesian economic policies prescriptions, even though it is at odds with the extreme and fetishized worldview of the modern Left that sees no rational stops to debt accumulation on the path of stimulating economies out of recessions and broader crises.

Secondly, the Fiscal Compact will impose a severe long-term debt ceiling, but that condition is not expected to be satisfied by Ireland any time before 2030 or even later.

One interesting caveat relating to the 60 percent of GDP bound is the exact language employed by the Treaty when discussing the adjustment from excess debt levels. The ‘Yes’ camp made some inroads into convincing the voters to support the Compact on the grounds that debt paydowns required by the debt bond will involve annually reducing the overall debt by 1/20^th of the debt level in excess of 60% bound. However, the Treaty itself defines “the obligation for those Contracting Parties whose general government debt exceeds the 60 % reference value to reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark” (page T/SCG/en5). Thus, there is a significant gap between the Treaty interpretation and its reality.

Another debt-related aspect f the treaty that is little understood by the public and some analysts is the relationship between deficit break, structural deficits bound and the long-term debt levels that are consistent with the economy growth potential. Based on IMF projections, our structural deficit for 2014-2017 will average over 2.7% of GDP, which implies Fiscal Compact-consistent government deficits around 1.6-1.7% of GDP. Assuming long-term nominal growth of 4-4.5% per annum, our ‘sustainable’ level of debt should be around 38-40% of GDP. Tough, but we have been at public debt to GDP ratio of below 40 percent in every year from 2000 through 2007. It is also worth noting that we have satisfied the Fiscal Compact 60% debt bound every year between 1998 and 2008.

Similarly, the Troika programme for fiscal adjustment that Ireland is currently adhering to implies a de facto satisfaction of the Fiscal Compact deficit bound after 2015, and non-fulfilment of the structural deficit rule and the debt rule any time between now and 2017. In other words, no matter how we spin it, in the foreseeable future, we will remain a fiscally rouge state, client of the Troika and its successor – the ESM.

On the negative side, however, the aforementioned 1/20^th rule would be a significant additional drag on Ireland’s economic performance into the future, compared to the current Troika programme. If taken literally, an average rate of reduction of the Government debt from 2013 through 2017, required by the Compact would see our state debt falling to 87.6% of GDP in 2017, instead of the currently projected 109.2%. In other words, based on IMF projections, we will require some €42 billion more in debt repayments under the Fiscal Compact over the period of 2013-2012 than under the Troika deal.

On the net, therefore, the Compact is a mixture of a few positive, some historically feasible, but doubtful in terms of the future, benchmarks, and a rather strict short-term growth-negative set of targets that may, if satisfied over time, convert into a long-term positive outcomes. Confused? That’s the point of the entire undertaking: instead of providing clarity on a reform path, the Compact provides nothing more than a set of ‘if, then’ scenarios.

Let me run though some hard numbers – all based on IMF latest forecasts. Even under the rather optimistic scenario, Ireland’s real GDP is expected to grow by an average of 2.27% in the period from 2012 through 2017. This is the highest forecast average rate of growth for the entire euro area excluding the Accession states (the EA12 states). And yet, this growth will not be enough to lift us out of the Sovereign debt trap. Averaging just 10.3% of GDP, our total investment in the economy will be the lowest of all EA12 states, while our gross national savings are expected to average just 13.2% of GDP, the second lowest in the EA12.

In short, even absent the Fiscal Compact, our real economy will be bled dry by the debt overhang – a combination of the protracted deleveraging and debt servicing costs. It is the combination of the government debt and the unsustainable levels of households’ and corporate indebtedness that is cutting deep into our growth potential, not the austerity-driven reduction in public spending. In this sense, Fiscal Compact-induced acceleration of debt repayments will exacerbate the negative effect of fiscal deleveraging, while delaying private debt deleveraging.

However, on the opposite side of the argument, the alternative to the current austerity and the argument taken up by the No camp in the Fiscal Compact campaigns, is that Ireland needs a fiscal stimulus to kick-start growth, which in turn will magically help the economy to reduce unsustainable debt levels accumulated by the Government.

There is absolutely no evidence to support the suggestion that increasing the national debt beyond the current levels or that increasing dramatically tax burden on the general population – the two measures that would allow us to slow down the rate of reductions in public expenditure planned under the Troika deal – can support any appreciable economic expansion. The reason for this is simple. According to the data, smaller advanced economies with the average Government expenditure burden in the economy of ca 31-35% of GDP have expected growth rates averaging 3.5% per annum. Countries that have Government spending accounting for 40% and more of GDP have projected rates of growth closer to 1.5% per annum. Ireland neatly falls between the two groups of states both in terms of the Government burden and the economic growth rate. So, if we want to have growth above that projected under the current forecasts, we need (a) to accept the argument that growth is not a matter of the stimulus, but of longer-term reforms, and (b) to recognize that for a small open economy, higher levels of Government capture of economy is associated with lower growth potential.

Despite our already deep austerity and even after the Compact becomes operational, Irish Exchequer will continue running excess spending throughout the adjustment period. Between 2012 and 2017, Irish government net borrowing is expected to average 4.7% of GDP per annum, the second highest in the EA12 group of countries. Between this year and 2017, our Government will spend some €47.4 billion more than it will collect in taxes, even if the current austerity course continues. Of these, €39 billion of expenditure will go to finance structural deficits, implying a direct cyclical stimulus of more than €8.4 billion. The Compact will not change this. In contrast, calling on the Government to deploy some sort of fiscal spending stimulus today is equivalent to asking a heart attack patient to run a marathon in the Olympics. Both, within the Compact and without it, the EU as well as the IMF will not accept Irish Government finances going into a deeper deficit financing that would be required to ‘stimulate’ the economy.

The structural problem we face is that under current system of funding the economy and the Exchequer, our exports-driven model of economic development simply cannot sustain even the austerity-consistent levels of Government spending. IMF projects that between 2012 and 2017 cumulative current account surpluses in Ireland will be €40 billion. This forecast implies that 2017 current account surplus for Ireland will be €10 billion – a level that is 56 times larger than our current account surplus in 2011. If we are to take a more moderate assumption of current account surpluses running around 2012-2013 projected levels through 2017, our Government deficits are likely to be closer to €53 billion. Our entire exporting engine will not be able to cover the overspend of this state. In short, there is really no alternative to the austerity, folks, no matter how much we wish for this not to be the case.

Instead, what we do have is the choice of austerity policies we can pursue. We can either continue to tax away incomes of the middle and upper-middle classes, or we cut deeper into public expenditure.

The former will mean accelerating loss of productivity due to skills and talent outflows from the country, reduced entrepreneurship and starving the younger companies of investment, rising pressure on wages in skills-intensive occupations, while destroying future capacity of the middle-aged families to support themselves through retirement. Hardly trivial for an economy reliant on high value-added exports generation, higher tax rates on upper margin of the income tax will act to select for emigration those who have portable and internationally marketable skills and work experience. Given that much of entrepreneurship is formed on the foot of self-employment, high taxation of individual incomes at the upper margin will further force outflow of entrepreneurial talent. In addition, to continue retaining high quality human capital here, the labour markets will have to start paying significant wages premia to key employees to compensate them for our tax regime. All of these things are already happening in the IFSC, ICT and legal and analytics services sectors.

The latter is the choice to continue reducing our imports-intensive domestic consumption, especially Government consumption, and cutting the spending power of the public sector employees, while enacting deep structural reforms to increase value-for-money outputs in the state sectors. This, in effect, means increasing the growth gap between externally trading sectors and purely domestic sectors, but increasing it on demand and skills supply sides, while hoping that corrected workplace incentives will lift up the investment side of domestic enterprises.

Both choices are painful and short-term recessionary, but only the latter one leads to future growth. Anyone with an ounce of understanding of economics would know that the sole path out of structural recession involves currency devaluation. And anyone with an ounce of understanding of economics would recognize that the effects of such devaluation would be to reduce imports, increase differential in earnings in favour of returns to human capital and drive a wider gap between domestic and exporting sectors. The former choice of policies is only consistent with giving vitamins to a cancer-ridden patient – sooner or later, the placebo effect of the ‘stimulus’ will fade, and the cancer of debt overhang will take over once again, with even greater vengeance.

Looking back over the Fiscal Compact, the balance of the measures enshrined in the new treaty is most likely not the right – from the economic point of view – prescription for Ireland today. It is probably not even a correct policy choice for the future. But the reasons for which the treaty is the wrong ‘medicine’ for Ireland have nothing to do with the austerity it will impose onto Ireland. Rather, the really regressive feature of the Treaty is that it will make it virtually impossible for our economy to deal with the issue of private debt overhang and to properly restructure our taxation system to create opportunities for future growth.

CHARTS:

Update:  In the above, I reference the 1/20th rule and identify it as 'taken literally'. This can cause some confusion for the readers. To clarify the matter, here is the discussion of the rule as 'taken' literally' as opposed to 'taken as implied' under the Treaty. The article has been filed before the linked discussion took place. Additional material on this can be found on Professor Karl Whelan's blog here.

It is also worth pointing out that I have consistently (until April 26th blogpost) referenced the 1/20th rule as applying to debt portion in the excess over 60% bound. This referencing traces back to my comments on the issue to the Prime Time programme for which I commented on the issue back in late January 2012. However, subsequent reading of the document has shown very clearly that the primary language of the Treaty clearly references one rule in the preamble, while the conditional statement in the Treaty article itself references the other. On the balance, I agree with Karl Whelan, that the implied and valid wording should relate to 1/20th of the excess over 60% bound.

Really shoddy job done by those who wrote this Treaty.