Tuesday, December 29, 2009

Economics 29/12/2009: Looking back at 2009

For those of you who missed my article in the Sunday Times last weekend (December 27, 2009) here is, per usual, an unedited version of the text.

By all possible measures 2009 will go down as yet another annus horribilis
in the history of Ireland. Some 29 months since the inception of the crisis there is hardly any sight of the end of our depression – the worst on the record that any Euro area state has endured in modern history.

In 2008-2009 Irish economy has lost a compound 9.6% of GDP and a whooping 13.2% of our GNP. Over the same period of time, Eurozone economy has contracted by the total of 3.3%.


Based on Department of Finance latest projections, by the end of 2010, our gross domestic output will fall 10.8% and GNP will have declined by 14.7%, against the European Commission forecast for the Euro area income contracting by 2.65% on 2007 levels
.

Put into perspective, assuming the current crisis runs its course as projected by analysts, the US will regain the 2007 levels of real annual income in late 2010. For Euro area, this moment will arrive in 2012-2013. Ireland is going to return to the 2007 level of prosperity in 2015 in terms of GDP and 2016-2017 in terms of GNP. And this is under optimistic assumptions of relatively robust growth post-2011
.

These figures only begin to describe the extent of our economy’s collapse in 2009. It is now a common realization amongst the economic forecasters that whatever growth we might achieve in the next few years, unemployment will remain at extremely elevated levels
.

In Q3 2009 official employment fell 40,200 on Q2 2009. This means that in 12 months to the end of September 2009, Irish economy shed some 183,400 jobs - the highest rate of jobs destruction on the record. In the course of this recession, we have now lost some 236,300 jobs
.

Back in December 2007, the live register stood at 173,200. A year later, it rose to 293,000, up 119,800 or 69.2% in 12 months period. This December, live register is lingering at 423,400 – an increase of 44.5% on 2008 levels. Sounds like an improvement? Not really. Such is the nature of statistical optics that an 8.8% rise in the number of people on unemployment benefits looks like an improvement in the rate of unemployment growth.


If in the mid 2008 Irish economy had 17th highest unemployment rate in the EU27, by the middle of this year it was the 5th highest
.

Do the math: the above jobs losses imply that in 2009 some €13.5 billion was lost in employment-related economic activity in Ireland. This translates into an additional €4-5 billion in lost private consumption while our welfare bill rose by some €3.5 billion
.

All of these jobs losses (save for ca 5,900 jobs eliminated through natural attrition in the public sector excluding health services between the end of 2007 and the end of 2009) came out of the private sector. In terms of the drain on Exchequer revenue these losses simply cannot be offset through wage bill cuts imposed by Budget 2010 onto public sector.

Even more problematic is the trend of falling labour force participation rate which has contracted from 64.2% to 62.5% in a year to Q3 2009. This change is extremely hard to reverse within a given generation. Much of the fall in 2009 has been driven by rising long-term unemployment, pushing people into permanent welfare traps, and net emigration.

In 2009, some 45,000 non-Irish nationals left the country. I would estimate that at least 20,000 Irish natives did the same. On the net, CSO data shows that while unemployment climbed by roughly 120,000 over the last 12 months, the actual fall in employment was 185,000
.

These people have left their productive employment in this state and moved on to work elsewhere. Many worked in the construction and domestic services sector and had skills beyond their jobs. Many worked in industry – where their skills and future productivity were being enhanced by on-the-job training and through experience. In Q3 2009, industry displaced construction as the leasing source of new unemployment. Quarter on quarter, industry lost 12,200 jobs in Q3 2009 relative to Q2 2009, while construction sector lost 8,700
.

But scores of those who are now emigrating out of Ireland worked in traded services and here the losses to our productive potential are even greater. 2,300 jobs were lost in professional, scientific and technical activities in Q3 alone. The future of Irish economy is in traded services – the elusive 'knowledge' economy we've been pursuing. This economy requires more people with cultural, linguistic and skills sets that are distinct from our 'national' averages. Given that we cannot hope to retrain lower skilled workers to take up jobs in professional services exports, the loss of junior non-national staff in finance, professional services and ICT is doing irreparable damage to our international competitiveness.

The good news, of course, is that we are now starting to see some re-hiring in financial services (600 net jobs created in Q3 2009 relative to Q2 2009) and MNCs-supported employment remains strong. The bad news is that serious layoffs are yet to materialize in the state-supported banking.

Lastly, 2009 was another year of banking sector disasters. Irish banks began 2009 teetering on the verge of full blow bankruptcy – with our third largest bank falling into the hands of the state and two largest banks seeing their shareholders’ capital virtually wiped out. The crisis of the early months of 2009 was temporarily resolved by the introduction of Nama, leading to a robust, but short-lived rally in banks shares. The real problems – weak balance sheets, pressured deposits, precipitously collapsing asset valuations, rapidly deteriorating loans performance and dwindling capital reserves – remain unaddressed
.

Thus, as was predicted by this column in May 2009, the Nama solution turned out to be nothing more than an expensive means for delaying the inevitable. It is by now an accepted consensus that nationalization of the main Irish banks is an inevitable denouement to the saga of misguided banks rescue measures that began with the regulatory Green-Jerseying of the banking sector against the short-sellers in the late 2007, progressing to the wholesale banks guarantee scheme in September 2008, and via nationalization of the Anglo Irish Bank, on to Nama passage in 2009
.

All along, Irish Government and banking sector have made all efforts to evade and silence critical independent analysis of the causes of the current crisis: inept regulation and enforcement, reckless risk-taking in lending and funding, and wrong-footed solutions advanced by the State. The Irish taxpayers are now facing a bill of tens of billions of Euros, as well as the decade-long prospect of zombie banking, development and property markets and construction sectors – courtesy of Nama
.

Just as in the end of 2008, only the stock markets are now capable of reflecting the extent of the expected Nama damages back to the economy. AIB shares are now trading some 36% down on their January 2, 2009 levels and 67% down from their 12-months peak. Bank of Ireland shares, having gained 32% on January prices are still down 66% on the 12-months peak
.

As Winston Churchill said once: “Courage is what it takes to stand up and speak; courage is also what it takes to sit down and listen.” One can only wish our policymakers discover the second half of this dictum in the New Year
.

Box-out:


Per latest CSO data, average weekly earnings in the Public Sector (ex Health) rose by 2.5% in 12 months to September 2009, reaching €969.11 per week. While the lower rate of increase is a welcome sign of some moderation in public sector pay, the numbers reveal a farcical nature of the Government’s efforts to date to control its own expenditure
.

Weekly earnings for the Regional Bodies rose by 4.6% (from €815.58 to €852.71), the Education Sector by 3.0%, from €944.49 to €973.10. An Garda Síochána weekly earnings excluding overtime decreased slightly by 0.1% from €1,077.55 to €1,076.22 for the same period. Now, compare this record with the rates of increases between September 2005 and September 2009 when average weekly earnings in the Public Sector (excluding Health) rose by 14.2% from €848.94 to €969.11 per week
.

The same lack of progress on reducing public expenditure is manifested in the numbers employed in the sector. Natural attrition with recruitment bans has produced a decline in Public Sector employment from 369,100 in September 2008 to 360,900 in September 2009. Just 8,200 or 2.22% fewer people worked in the Public Sector in this country despite the nearly total collapse in the Exchequer revenue. In the four years to September 2009, employment in the Public Sector rose by 17,300 to 360,90
0.

If Ireland’s public sector employment pay and numbers were to be benchmarked against the UK levels, it would take some 15-20 years before these rates of ‘moderation’ bear the fruit of reaching parity with our next door neighbors.

Monday, December 28, 2009

Economics 28/12/2009: Few articles worth reading

Few loose ends:

Casey Mulligan's excellent defense of Chicago School is now in print in Berkeley's Economic Press (here) - a must read.


Another interesting read is on Bloomberg (here) - hat tip to Patrick. My personal view - 3-3.5% growth for 2010 is possible for the US. Major risk factors to these figures are -
  1. unemployment - rampant and stubborn;
  2. interest rates reversion upward; and
  3. resets of Alt-A mortgages - peaking in 2010...
Two major plus factors (pushing from 2.75-3% upward to 3.5%) are:
  1. Mortgage defaults continuing - these put families off the track of paying 2-2.5K monthly in mortgage costs for negative equity dwellings and into renting same properties for 1-1.2K per month, generating disposable income increases of up to 1,050 per month (once interest relief is counted); and
  2. The Federales are yet to inject some 50% of the allocated economic stimulus.

Related to Alt-A's and ARMs is another article in Berkeley's Economic Press latest issue of the Economists' Voice (here) - few charts from it tell the story of the rising tide of ARMs hitting the fan:
The above are going strong and are not contributing to the 'disposable income events' I mentioned above. But the next chart shows the problem of defaults in ARMs and Alt-As still being there:
So the charts above show US middle class freeing itself from the shackles of negative equity via foreclosures - and in the process regaining back financial safety and confidence. This is exactly what is missing in Ireland, where a debt jail awaits anyone who dares to default on negative equity home mortgage. While this approach reduces moral hazard, it destroys any chance for a households-led recovery in Ireland.

Economics 28/12/2009: More evidence against Ireland's travel tax

Updated

My favorite topic is back... travel figures. RTE reports on industry estimates of 12% fall off in the number of foreign tourists (not visitors) to Ireland (here). More interesting data is courtesy of Ryanair release (these guys really should win a transparency award for publishing the data that some parts of the public sector do not want us - the public - to know).


Dublin Airport’s seat capacity has slumped from 10 to 17 ranked in a league of EU airports this winter. The report, by RDC Aviation, also shows that Dublin Airport has suffered the largest capacity cuts of any of Europe’s 25 largest airports. This slump proves that the Govt’s €10 tourist tax has devastated Irish traffic and tourism in 2009 and disproves the Dept of Transport’s false claims that Dublin Airport’s traffic collapse is “an international phenomenon” (per Ryanair statement).

Notice that table above (reproduced from the RDC raw data) clearly shows that Dublin Airport traffic fall off in 2009 relative to 2007 is also out of line with other leading airports. Table below stresses this point:
Notice airports that outperformed Dublin (in blue above) - all selected on the basis of their traffic similarity with Dublin - localized, regional traffic with smaller share of transit passengers for international connections.

Now, ANOVA for the above: while Dublin numbers changes do belong in the sample for 2008, the same is not true for 2009. This tends to support the argument that changes in Dublin capacity are not consistent with overall deterioration in economic conditions internationally.
So here we have it - another source of evidence to support 'Gurdgiev-Ryanair' conjecture that airport taxes and charges are undermining Irish airlines and travel sectors. Note - the fact that airlines are being hurt is evidenced by the fact that all major airlines present at the Dublin Airport - not only Ryanair, but also Aer Lingus, EasyJet and BMI - have made such a claim to the Government.

Per Kevin's very incisive comment (see in comments section) several points worth addressing:

"First of all you have to consider the timing of the tax, to what extent does it coincide with the fall in numbers."

This is precisely what is addressed in 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 growth rates that I added to the data. Full impact of travel tax took place in 2009. Notice the discrepancy in the rates of decline at Dublin and the differences in the Anova table - they show that 2009 regime was completely different from the 2007 and 2008 regimes.

"Then you need to allow for any other taxes/charges in these other places and their change."

Actually, no - I do not need to do so. If other places had any change in their travel tax rates, there will be an effect on these airports in the first order, and on Dublin airport at the very best in the second order. The first order effect, I would assume, will be simply much larger. Furthermore, several airports on the list have lowered their charges and several governments have repealed their travel tax. I do not control for this precisely to err on the skeptics side. Re-weighting figures by removing from the sample those airports where charges and taxes were reduced in 2009 actually changes the Anova bands by less than 0.2 points, without altering the conclusions.

"And of course you need to control for any other factors that differentially impact on capacity which may or may not be correlated with the variable you are interested in."

True. But what these might be? Macro shocks are suggested. Ok, take the logic here - the figures are bi-lateral capacity. So, if, say, potential Italian tourists to Ireland were less adversely impacted by macro shocks, their propensity to travel to Ireland would be less adversely effected by income shocks. Since Ireland experienced the worst 'macro shocks' of the entire Eurozone, then the differences in macro shocks will act to improve traffic through Dublin Airport.

What other forces can be acting here? Higher airfares? Not really - Dublin offers some of the lowest airfares, net of taxes and charges in the EU15. And it is being compared against other full cost (not low cost) airports. So price effects, again, are acting to strengthen my argument, not to weaken it.

Optimally, an econometric exercise should be carried out, alas, two obstacles prevent this from being performed:
  1. lack of coherent data across various airports; and
  2. lack of time dimension post-tax introduction.
So we can wait for another 10 years to get the data sufficient to test causality (if we do get it - remember - Dublin Airport alongside Tourism Ireland and DofT are actively attempting to suppress public releases of data on tourism flows through Dublin). Or we can just settle for the second best - an Anova.

Finally, as in medicine, economic policy should always err on the side of upholding the principle of inflicting no harm. this means, that absent full analysis of economic feasibility, no tax policy change should take place. Can anyone point me to such analysis in the case of our travel tax?

Economics 28/12/2009: Investment Funds in Ireland & other

Two recent datasets: CB's Investment Funds in Ireland and ECB's Financial Stability Review for December 2009.


Central Bank of Ireland has published new data series on Investment Funds in Ireland in December 2009. The data is reproduced in the table below with my analysis added:
This data, of course, covers IFSC-based funds which dominate (vastly) the entire sample. Overall funds issuance is up robust 16.6% (although activity on transactions side is falling - we cannot tell anything about seasonality here, as the CB just started collecting data). Real estate funds are out of fashion. Clearly so. Mixed funds and hedge funds are relatively flat and judging by the collapse in transactions are still in batten-the-hatches mode. Equity funds are in long-only mode, on a buying spree. Nice sign of renewed confidence in the global markets. Bonds funds are steady rising, albeit not at spectacular rates, which, of course, is a sign on IFSC missing on bonds over-buying activity going on worldwide.

Chart below shows how the market shares evolved over time.


ECB's latest (December 2009) financial stability report throws some interesting comparisons for Ireland. Focusing on the charts: first consider the extent of deleveraging going on in the financial systems:
So the US leads, as per IMF GFSR, with most writedowns in quantity and relative to the system. The UK comes second. Emergent markets are catching up. Japan has much smaller problem, unless yen carry trades unwind dramatically. These are on track to complete writedowns in 2010. But EU states are lagging. Ireland's figures are skewed by IFSC institutions taking serious writedowns. But overall, we still have some distance to travel on domestic banks front.

Next chart shows just how advantageous our low profit margins on the lending side have been in terms of yielding lower burden of debt servicing. This can change very fast in the New Year as retail interest rates are bound to rise. No top-up mortgages here or car loans and personal loans secured against house assets, etc. And also note that these refer to the 2005 benchmark, plus, of course, these are percentages of gross income. Given our households are now faced with some of the highest income taxes in the Euro area, good luck sustaining this low burden into 2010.
And another issue - notice how significant is the rise in burden for lower income households. Guess which households are also facing higher rates of unemployment?
Table above shows the deterioration in house prices in Ireland relative to other countries. We are now 21.1% down on 2007 figures, or at 90.9% of 2005 level of nominal prices. The worst performance of all countries, including such bubble-lovelies as Spain.
And on the commercial real estate side, we are an outlier by all measures (remember, unlike Spain, our total banking sector includes non-domestic banks as well). That is another mountain yet to be scaled in this crisis.

Economics 28/12/2009: Irish Earners - amongst highest taxed

Ireland now has some of the highest tax rates in the developed world, and this tax burden shows one of the highest rates of progressivity when it comes to the state dipping into higher earners incomes. Table below illustrates (source here):
Note how dramatic is the tax burden for higher earners in Ireland.

Now, give it a thought. We want to build a 'knowledge' economy. The main input into such an economy is individual skills of the employees. This high skills-intensity of production in the 'knowledge' economy means paying key employees more than in the 'dumb' traditional economy, where physical capital takes up much larger share of total value added. In other words, 'knowledge' economy must compete globally for human capital. The higher the quality of the talent, the greater is the intensity of competition and thus, the more important are the tax rates charged on such labour. Our tax rates simply are inconsistent with such competitiveness.

Funny thing is that most of our media - especially the Irish Times and RTE - keep on banging about the need for creating a vibrant 'knowledge' economy, while at the same time calling for higher taxes on top earners in the private sector.

Given that both papers have absolutely no real economics analysts on board, this contradiction is not surprising - it takes a real economist, with a wide knowledge of economic theory and empirical analysis, to understand the complex nature of productivity and returns to various forms of capital. Ex-banks folks and ex-political correspondents simply won't do here.

Economics 28/12/2009: Euro area forecast for growth

New Eurocoin is out and signaling improvement of the Euro area economy, albeit at a slowing rate. Inputs first:
Industrial production is tapering off through November - despite some seasonal pressure to rebuild stocks pre-sales season. Ditto for PMIs:
France and Spain continue to worry in the above due to clearly weakening domestic demand, while Italy and Germany are showing signs of advanced orders falling slightly off - future exports might be challenged.

Consumer weaknesses are highlighted below:
Loud and clear!

So forecast is for moderation in Eurocoin rise and thus a slowdown in the increase in growth into Q2 2010. Will Q1 2010 be the strongest bounce of 2010?
Forecast still to the upside in Q1 and Q2 2010, but this depends on Q4 2009 results, which