Friday, August 23, 2013

23/8/2013: IMHO statement on Mortgages Arrears for Q2 2013

Irish Mortgage Holders Organisation (IMHO) issued opinion on today's mortgages arrears figures: https://www.mortgageholders.ie/another-false-start-in-resolving-mortgage-crisis/

My detailed analysis of the figures is here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/08/2382013-irish-mortgages-arrears-q2-2013.html

23/8/2013: Irish Mortgages Arrears: Q2 2013


Mortgages rears figures are out for Q2 2013 and guess what, things are (predictably) getting worse. I am sure the Government will say that 'getting worse today'='getting better in the future'. As such, we do live in the world where stabilisation = decline in the rate of decline, while a slight uplift on any time series is greeted as an indisputable 'gathering growth momentum'.

What do the numbers of mortgages arrears tell us, spin aside? I highlight main conclusions in bold.

In Q2 2013 there were 919,139 mortgages accounts outstanding (EUR139,883 million in total), of which 770,610 accounts were for primary residences (EUR109,147 million). Primary residences are referenced as PDH accounts in CBofI. The balance of 148,529 accounts  (EUR30,626 million) relate to Buy-to-lets, BTLs.

This means that over the year through the end of H1 2013, the number of mortgages accounts rose 0.4% and their outstanding volumes fell 2.41%. Deleveraging is very slow in the economy, given the crisis scope: number of primary mortgages accounts rose 0.7% and their volume shrunk 2.52%, while the number of BTLs fell 1.1% and their volume shrunk 2.01%. In fact, as the chart shows, deleveraging process so far is not helping the workout of arrears:


Total number of primary accounts in arrears of any duration is up 11.46% y/y, underlying volume of mortgages represented by these is up 9.1% to EUR25.69 billion from EUR23.55 billion a year ago, while amounts in arrears are up 36.46%, breaching EUR2 billion for the first time. This means that, penalties inclusive, the arrears are now attracting ca EUR202 million in roll up charges annually or about 40% of the annual savings that we need to deliver in Budget 2014 from the social welfare funds.

Total number of BTLs in arrears was up 15.06% y/y and the amounts of mortgages outstanding for the BTLs in arrears rose to EUR10.94 billion - up 11.45% y/y, while the actual cumulated levels of arrears hit EUR1.207 billion, up 43.63% y/y.

All in, there were 182,840 accounts in arrears, representing cumulative amount outstanding of EUR36,634 million and cumulated arrears of EUR3,231 million. These were up: +11.39% y/y for account numbers (+19,924 accounts), +EUR3.267 billion or 9.79% y/y for mortgages outstanding, and +EUR 907 million or +39.05% y/y for actual arrears.


Repossessions accelerated, but remained subdued overall, rising to 1,503 accounts (1,001 accounts for primary residences). This represents a y/y increase of 13.69% for all accounts, 6.04% rise for primary residences and 32.8% jump for BTLs.

Restructured mortgages numbers declined in Q2 2013, from 106,612 accounts to 100,920 accounts over the period of 12 months through June 2013. This breaks down as per decline of 6.57% for primary residences from 84,941 to 79,357 accounts, and a decline of just 0.5% for BTLs from 21,671 to 21,563 accounts.

Performance of restructured mortgages somewhat improved, although we do not know as to why this was the case. Restructured mortgages that were not in arrears as percentage of the total number of restructured mortgages has improved from 47.35% to 53.31% for primary mortgages, and from 51.17% to 61.13% for BTLs.






And some scarier figures for the end:
  • Total number of mortgages at risk of default or defaulted (mortgages in arrears, mortgages restructured and not in arrears, and repossessions) rose to 239,834 in H1 2013 (up 11.27% y/y)
  • Total number of primary mortgages at risk or defaulted rose to to 186,202 in H1 2013 (up 9.94% y/y)
  • Total number of BTL mortgages at risk or defaulted rose to to 53,632 in H1 2013 (up 16.12% y/y)
  • 20.26% of all primary residential mortgages were in arrears or at risk of default in Q1 2013, against 18.50% in Q2 2012.
  • 36.11%of all BTL mortgages were in arrears or at risk of default in Q1 2013, against 30.75% in Q2 2012.
  • 26.09% of all residential mortgages were in arrears or at risk of default in Q1 2013, against 23.55% in Q2 2012.
  • By volume of mortgages outstanding, 33.35% of the total mortgages pool or EUR46,618 million were mortgages either in arrears, or restructured at the end of Q2 2013, up on 29.51% (or EUR42,258 million) at the end of Q2 2012.


Thursday, August 22, 2013

22/8/2013: Bank Resolution Costs, Depositor Preference, and Asset Encumbrance: IMF Paper


Daniel Hardy's paper "Bank Resolution Costs, Depositor Preference, and Asset Encumbrance" (July 2013, IMF Working Paper No. 13/172. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2307415) looks at the banks resolution structure from the point of view of costs of bankruptcy / debt restructuring arrangements.

Hardy states that "bank resolution, like bankruptcy and debt restructuring generally, inherently involves a great deal of negotiation and uncertainty…" Based on the experience, especially from the current financial crises, conflicts arising from bankruptcy or restructuring "…can add substantially to costs and delays in resolution".

To mitigate such costs, Hardy suggests, the regulators can "make some claims bankruptcy remote" via "statute and policy, as when depositors enjoy preferred status as a matter of law, or through private agreements, as when banks issue covered bonds backed by a pool of high-quality assets."

Because such 'remoteness' reduces conflicts resolution costs in the case of restructuring or bankruptcy, "the asset encumbrance that results from either mechanism can be desirable insofar as it reduces bankruptcy costs, and, through lower overall funding costs, lowers the probability of distress."

The effects of remoteness are multiple and interactive:

  1. "…the gain should be capitalized into the value of the bank, which enjoys an overall reduction in funding costs." 
  2. Non-secured borrowers need not "be disadvantaged in expectational terms: they earn more when the bank survives but bear larger net losses in case of resolution (though they spend less contending for their claims)."
  3. "Granting preferred status to (some) depositors need not provoke increased collateralization of other credits: from the point of view of the borrowing bank, collateralization and statutory depositor preference are near substitutes…" 


Note 1: point 3 above establishes non-zero value of depositors. Recall that collateralisation is the source of funding. It represents a liability on the balance sheet, but such liability is cost-reducing. Cost savings arising from collateralisation as (1) decreasing in volume of collateralisation, and (2) have a positive value the bank. Deposits-related cost savings are not decreasing in volume (no marginal pricing) for a small-medium bank (although they might be increasing for a larger bank). This is the fundamental difference in pricing of deposits.

Note 2: limited depositor guarantee schemes (DGS), consistent with the above structure (1)-(3) would be required to remain stable, with the limits of protection not subject to alteration downward in the case of the crisis.

Now, back to the paper.

"For these [remoteness inducing] measures to be valuable", the legal foundations on which they rest must be secure, and the resolution process can only start "when the borrowing bank still has enough residual assets that preferred or collateralized claims can be met. If, ex post, these conditions are not met, conflict may be intensified. Hence, bank stability might be enhanced by limiting total asset encumbrance (preferred deposits plus collateralized borrowing) to below the likely minimum level of residual assets. Authorities that are willing and able to take early corrective action, and therefore rarely have to deal with banks left with scant residual assets, can be more sanguine about asset encumbrance."

Note: the above implies that any DGS must price-in the call on assets that is senior to the collateralized call, since the timing of deposits is less tractable (due to demand deposits and short-term notice deposits) than the call on assets relating to collateralized claims. This is non-trivial, but not covered in the paper.

The conclusions of the study also "lead on to other questions [or conclusions] of practical relevance", include the following:

  • "Why is information on bank asset encumbrance not more readily available? Appropriate pricing of both collateralized and non-collateralized borrowing depends on making good estimates of probability of failure and of loss given default facing different creditors, and thus of the degree of outstanding asset encumbrance. Yet it is difficult to obtain current or detailed, bank-by-bank information …typically one cannot know the volume of assets pledged in the interbank market, to the central bank, in liquidity swap and derivative deals, etc." 
  • "What are the implications for funding behavior and stability of heterogeneity among creditors in their litigating/lobbying ability and incentives?"
  • "In what ways would statutory bail-in of unsecured creditors be symmetric to the granting depositors preferred status, and in what ways would contingent capital (“CoCos”) be symmetric to collateralized credit?" 

Overall, the main conclusion of the paper is: "Depositor preference and collateralization of borrowing may reduce the cost of settling the conflicts among creditors that arises in case of resolution or bankruptcy. This net benefit, which may be capitalized into the value of the bank rather than affect creditors’ expected returns, should result in lower overall funding costs and thus a lower probability of distress despite increasing encumbrance of the bank’s balance sheet. The benefit is maximized when resolution is initiated early enough for preferred depositors to remain fully protected."

22/8/2013: Hedges & Safe Havens out in print

Our paper on hedges and safe havens is finally out in print. Full citation:

Cetin Ciner, Constantin Gurdgiev, Brian M. Lucey, "Hedges and safe havens: An examination of stocks, bonds, gold, oil and exchange rates"

International Review of Financial Analysis, Volume 29, September 2013, Pages 202-211
ISSN 1057-5219
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2012.12.001.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1057521912001226
Keywords: Safe havens; Quantile regressions gold; Oil

22/8/2013: Burry the Debt... Forever!

Pierre Pâris, Charles Wyplosz, 6 August 2013 column for Vox.eu, titled "To end the Eurozone crisis, bury the debt forever" is a perfect referencing point for my thinking on the debt crisis. Read it here: http://www.voxeu.org/article/end-eurozone-crisis-bury-debt-forever

Synopsis: "The Eurozone’s debt crisis is getting worse despite appearances to the contrary. How can we end it? This column presents five major options for reducing crisis countries’ debt. Looking into the details, it seems the only option that is both realistic and effective is for countries to default by selling monetised debt to the ECB. Moral hazard aside, burying the debt seems to be the only way we can end the crisis".

Can't say it better myself!

22/8/2013: Sovereign Default Risk & Banks in the Euro Area Setting: Harald Uhlig


Harald Uhlig's latest paper "Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union" (CEPR DP9606, August 2013, http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP9606) "seeks to understand the interplay between banks, bank regulation, sovereign default risk and central bank guarantees in a monetary union".

The rationale for the paper is that the "European Monetary Union is in distress. Mechanisms that were meant to safe-guard key institutions and to assure stability have become sources of balance sheet risk for these very institutions. Liquidity provision within
the European Monetary Union rests upon repurchase agreements, by which banks guarantee the repurchase of assets deposited with the ECB. If either the bank fails or the asset fails, but not both, this mechanism safe-guards the repayment to the ECB, since it can either rely on the repurchase by the bank or sell the asset. However, when both fail as well as the bank home country fails, the ECB incurs a loss."

Abstracting away from the (important) debate about the implications of such a 'loss', the theoretical framework described by Uhlig is insightful and interesting. The author assumes "that banks can use sovereign bonds for repurchase agreements with a common central bank, and that their sovereign partially backs up any losses, should the banks not be able to repurchase the bonds."

Furthermore, "In the model, banks pursue their investment strategy voluntarily: it is up to regulators to potentially constrain them. Other explanations are conceivable, of course". This is different from the currently dominant views, as per Reinhart (2012a) as well as Claessens and Kose (2013). Specifically, it is distinct from Reinhart (2012b) argument as to why banks hold bonds of their home country. Reinhart argues that in a “financial repression” setting the regulators "make
[the banks] hold the sovereign bonds, perhaps with strong-arm tactics, perhaps in exchange for “looking the other way” concerning weak portfolios of commercial loans and mortgages, or simply as a “favor” in a long, ongoing relationship. Since the banks could potentially refuse, though at considerable cost, it still must ultimately be preferable to them to hold own-country bonds rather than invest elsewhere or to close: so, in some ways, this paper may also be understood as a model of financial repression." Another view for the system by which the banks end up holding rising exposures to domestic sovereign bonds is a political economy argument: "if sovereign bonds are held by home banks, it makes it politically harder to default on these bonds, as this will hurt domestic banks and savers. If so, then such a portfolio arrangement might serve as a commitment device for the government in trouble."

Uhlig's (2013) paper is not covering the underlying reasons for the holding of the bonds.

Overall, "the issue of sovereign default risk, bank portfolios and the role of the central bank has received considerable attention in the recent literature. Acharya and Steffen (2013) is a careful empirical analysis of the “carry trade” by banks, which fund themselves in the wholesale market and invest in risky sovereign bonds. They document, that “over time, there is an increase in ’home bias’ – greater exposure of domestic banks to its sovereigns bonds – which is partly explained by the ECB funding of these positions"… Relatedly, Corradin and Rodriguez-Moreno (2013) show that USD-denominated sovereign bonds of Euro zone countries became substantially cheaper (i.e., delivering a higher yield) than Euro-denominated bonds during the Euro zone crisis, and ascribe it to the usefulness to banks of Euro-denominated bonds as collateral vis-a-vis the ECB, while USD-denominated bonds do not offer this advantage." In addition, "Drechsler et. al. (2013) document “a strong divergence among banks’ take-up of” Lender-of-Last-Resort assistance “during the financial crisis in the euro area, as banks which borrowed heavily also used increasingly risky collateral”. They test several hypothesis and argue that their “results strongly support the riskshifting explanation”…"

The above supports the Uhlig (2013) model that concludes that:
-- "…Regulators in risky countries have an incentive to allow their banks to hold home risky bonds and risk defaults, while regulators in other “safe” countries will impose tighter regulation."
-- "…Governments in risky countries get to borrow more cheaply, effectively shifting the risk of some of the potential sovereign default losses on the common central bank."
-- "As a result, the monetary union has become a system engineered to deliver underpriced loans from country banks to their sovereigns, and to implicitly shift sovereign default risk onto the balance sheet of the ECB and the rest of the Eurosystem."

The last sentence is the key to it all: the euro system is now "engineered to deliver underpriced" credit "from country banks to their sovereigns", while shifting "sovereign default risk onto… the ECB and the rest of the Eurosystem".

22/8/2013: Why This Time Things Might Be Different...

The readers of this blog know that I am seriously concerned with the issues of private (household) debt sustainability in the Euro area, as well as in other advanced economies around the world. In fact, my (simplified or stylised) POV on the current crisis is that we have now reached the point of long-term saturation with leverage and this is the main driver for the current Great Recession.

In a normal recession, deleveraging by one side of the economy is accommodated by leveraging up in another. For example, in a Keynesian policy set up, deleveraging of the households and non-financial corporates is accommodated by leveraging up of the fiscal side of the GDP equation. In a monetary policy setting, deleveraging of fiscal / public sector side is accommodated by lowering debt costs and thus increasing credit to the private economy. Lastly, in a normal balancesheet recession, both side of the economy can be helped in deleveraging by a combination of two policies accommodation.

In the current Great Recession, neither one of the three approaches above can work, unless at least one approach directly reduces debt levels - either via a sovereign default/writedown or a private sector writedown on a systemic scale. The reasons for this are two-fold:

  1. Too much debt on all lines of the economic balancesheet: fiscal, household, NFCs and, thus, banks means that lowering the cost of debt financing is not sufficient to deliver signifcant enough room for new debt expansion; and
  2. With emerging markets and middle income economies showing increasingly South-South internalised trade and investment flows patterns, the advanced economies are witnessing structural reductions in the pools of surplus (investable) savings available to them - the effect that is compounded by the adverse demographics in these economies. This means that monetary policy accommodation is funding the liquidity in the financial markets, where normally it would have been going to fund real activity.
In short, debt is the source of the crisis this time around, not the solution to the crisis as in previous recessions. And it is a proverbial perfect storm, as it comes on foot of demographic decline coincident with severe fiscal crises. The resulting squeeze on pensions in the advanced economies and on other age-related public services is yet to come.

Here is an interesting view on the continued crisis dynamics in the area of household debts in the US (with an ample warning for the rest of the advanced world) from Michael Hudson: http://www.alternet.org/economy/big-threat-economy-private-debt-and-interest-owed-it-not-government-debt (H/T to @rszbt Beate Reszat).

22/8/2013: Slow Moving Sovereign Debt Crises: a new MIT Paper

Guido Lorenzoni and Ivan Werning (LW, 2013) new paper "Slow Moving Debt Crises" (June 30, 2013, MIT Department of Economics Working Paper 13-18. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2298813) theoretically links the environment and policies conditions that can lead to self-fulfilling increases in sovereign interest rates.

To do so, the authors use a model of the dynamics of debt and interest rates in a setting where default is driven by insolvency. "Fiscal deficits and surpluses are subject to shocks but influenced by a fiscal policy rule. Whenever possible the government issues debt to meet its current obligations and defaults otherwise."

The result is a model that has multiple equilibria where both "low and high interest rate equilibria may coexist". There are self-fulfilling risks as "higher interest rates, prompted by fears of default, lead to faster debt accumulation, validating default fears. We call such an equilibrium a slow moving crisis, in contrast to rollover crises where investor runs precipitate immediate default." In a sense, Italy, and potentially the rest of the euro area periphery, ex-Ireland, appear to be stuck in this 'slow moving debt crisis'.

In September 2012, commenting on the ECB announcement of OMT, the ECB’s president,
Mario Draghi, clearly linked the on-going sovereign debt crisis in euro area peripheral states to a self-fulfilling crisis: “…we are in a situation now where you have large parts of the Euro Area in what we call a bad equilibrium, namely an equilibrium where you have self-fulfilling expectations. You may have self-fulfilling expectations that generate, that feed upon themselves, and generate adverse, very adverse scenarios. So there is a case for intervening to, in a sense, break these expectations [...]”

According to LW (2013): "If this view is correct, a credible announcement is all it takes to rule out bad equilibria, no bond purchases need to be carried out. To date, this is exactly how it seems to have played out."

In the LW (2013) model, "the government faces a fluctuating path of fiscal surpluses or deficits, that are affected by shocks and the current debt level. Each period, it attempts to meet these obligations by visiting a credit market, issuing bonds to a large group of risk-neutral investors. The capacity to borrow is limited endogenously by the prospect of future repayment and default occurs when a government’s need for funds exceeds this borrowing capacity. In equilibrium, bond prices incorporate the probability of default."

Bonds can be issued as short-term and long-term. "In the case of short-term debt", LW (2013) show that "the equilibrium bond price function (mapping the state
of the economy into bond prices) is uniquely determined."

The main point, however, is that uniqueness of he price function "does not imply that the equilibrium is unique. Multiplicity arises from what we call a Laffer curve effect: revenue from a bond auction is non-monotone in the amount of bonds issued. If the borrower targets a given level of revenue, then there are multiple bond prices consistent with an equilibrium."

"With long-term bonds the price function is no longer uniquely determined, because a
bad equilibrium with lower bond prices in the future now feeds back into current bond
prices. In addition, the existence of a good and bad equilibrium may be temporary. For
example, if we follow the bad equilibrium path for a sufficiently long period of time,
the debt level may reach a level for which there exists a unique continuation equilibrium with high interest rates; the bad equilibrium may set in."

This is important to the current case, as it links directly high level debt starting position to the bad equilibrium outcome without the need to reference investors' withdrawal from the funding market. This is the core difference to the traditional crises and LW (2013) call this a 'slow moving debt crisis' "to capture the fact
that it develops over time through the accumulation of debt" as distinguished "from liquidity or rollover debt crises". The 'liquidity crisis' occurs when "current investors, …pull out of the market entirely, leading to a failed bond auction; complete lack of credit then triggers default, analogous to depositors running on banks".

LW (2013) model "can be used to identify a “safe” region of parameters, for which
the equilibrium is unique. In particular, the safe region corresponds to a low initial debt level and to high responsiveness of the surplus to debt in the fiscal policy rule."

Very interesting conclusion from the LW (2013) paper is that "with long term debt, a slow moving crisis, by its very nature is due to a breakdown in the coordination of investors at different dates. As a result, it cannot be averted by coordinating investors meeting in a given market at a certain moment of time. If, instead, the borrower could commit to a certain bond issuance, this would eliminate the multiplicity problem." The commitment that ends such a crisis, in theory, implies commitment to specific steady levels of borrowing - a deficit path - while maintaining certain debt bounds forward. In contrast to mainstream literature, LW (2013) "assume that the borrower cannot commit to a certain bond issuance, because it cannot adjust its spending needs. Thus, it will issue the bonds needed to finance its obligations." The reason for this assumption is that while the borrowers "can control the amount of bonds issued… during any given market transaction or offer", in the long run, the actual amounts raised in the markets will not be fully predictable. Per LW (2013): "consider a borrower showing up to market with some given amount of bonds to sell. If the price turns out to be lower than expected the borrower may quickly return to offer additional bonds for sale to make up the difference in funding [and thus] …the overall size of the bond issuance remains endogenous to the bond price."

LW (2013) conclude that "it seems difficult to dismiss the concern that a country may find itself in a self-fulfilling “bad equilibrium” with high interest rates. In our model, bad equilibria are not driven by the fear of a sudden rollover crisis, as commonly modeled in the literature following Giavazzi and Pagano (1989), Alesina et al. (1992) and Cole and Kehoe (1996) and others. Thus, the problems these “bad equilibria” present are not resolved by attempts to rule out such investor runs. Instead, high interest rates can be self fulfilling because they imply a slow but perverse debt dynamic. Our results highlight the importance of fiscal policy rules and debt maturity in determining whether the economy is safe from the threat of these slow moving crises."

Wednesday, August 21, 2013

21/8/2013: FinReg Appointment


The Central Bank announced the appointment of the new FinReg. Announcement is here:
http://www.centralbank.ie/press-area/press-releases/Pages/NewDeputyGovernorFinancialRegulationAppointed.aspx

My (sketchy) views on the appointment are here:
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/08/21/ireland-regulator-idUKL6N0GM1AF20130821
and here:





Critically, I do not know Mr Roux stand on key points of regulatory and strategic affairs relating to the financial services in Ireland and Europe, including:

  1. Role of competition in provision of services and securing systemic stability;
  2. Role of consumer protection in delivering the same;
  3. Role of implicit and explicit state subsidies to the incumbent institutions and the issue of TBTF institutions;
  4. Legacy debt, risks and business strategies and the regulatory approaches for dealing with these;
  5. Capture risk of regulatory and supervisory systems in the environment of social partnership and closely linked society, such as Ireland;
  6. Recent regulatory activism, e.g. shorting bans;
  7. Recent policy shifts toward centralised regulatory oversight and controls, unified banking supervision and regulation, FTT, etc.
There are other potentially important questions to be asked in days to come. 

I most certainly hope Mr Roux can continue with the competent and professional work that Mr Elderfield has started. 

To the credit of its top management team, the Central Bank today is a different institution, transformed from at the top, and still being transformed down the ranks (it takes long time to work through rank-and-file cadre pool). The transformations that took place to-date are for the better and serve as an example of what can be achieved in the rest of Irish public sector. This is not to say that the CBI is free of criticism, but to point out that there have been strongly positive changes in the institution that started with Mr. Elderfield and Prof. Honohan's appointments.

21/8/2013: Ireland's Potemkin Village (Knowledge) Economy

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article for August 18, 2013.


This week two news items offered significant implications for the framing of the budgetary policy direction for 2014-2015 and beyond.

First there was the revelation that the Revenue Commissioners are setting up a specialist unit to monitor the use of R&D tax credits by Irish and international firms. The second item was the publication of the Times Higher Education league tables ranking universities on their ability to attract corporate research funding. Both items are linked to the flagship of Irish economic policy that aims to establish R&D and innovation as the drivers of our future economic growth. Both touch upon our sacrosanct Potemkin village: the knowledge economy.


Since the Finance Act 2004, and throughout the crisis, governments have been keen on expanding Irish R&D activities amongst the indigenous enterprises and within the MNCs-dominated sectors. Over the last ten years, the main mechanism for doing so has been through the tax credits that allow the firms to claim R&D related spending. In Budgets 2012 and 2013, the current government significantly broadened the scope and the size of the scheme, and allowed new tax relief for key employees engaged in R&D activities.

Major consultancy firms providing supports for inward FDI, our state development agencies and business lobbyists – all have heralded these tax credits as visionary and imperative to making Ireland an attractive location for R&D.  Such framing of the policy debate makes this week’s news from the Revenue Commissioners significant. In truth, R&D tax credits are long overdue some serious scrutiny. The little evidence we do have suggests that the policy has failed to foster a pro-innovation culture in Irish economy after a decade long application of the scheme.

Firstly, tax credits-supported R&D activities remain too small to make any significant difference at the economy level. In 2004-2010 use of credits rose from EUR80 million to EUR225 million and at their peak, the credits amounted to less than one sixth of one percent of the Irish economy.

This is hardly a result of the scheme being too restrictive. In Ireland, firms are allowed to claim up to 25 percent of their R&D expenditure in credit. In the UK, the maximum is set at just 10 percent for the SMEs. The UK scheme is even more restrictive for larger enterprises. Furthermore, the UK applies strict criteria for SMEs that can qualify for such credits. Yet, UK R&D tax credits cover five times the share of GDP compared to Ireland.

Secondly, our tax credits scheme, along with the rest of the existent R&D and innovation support systems have failed to deliver any serious uplift in the R&D and innovation activities. Instead, these support systems have become a magnet for tax arbitrage by the multinationals and business cost optimization by Irish SMEs.

Take a look at the latest data on private sector R&D spend. Total R&D Expenditure by all enterprises in Ireland in 2012 stood at just EUR1.96 billion or 1.5 percent of our GNP. Between 2009 and 2012 this share of GNP has barely increased, rising only one percentage point, despite the large-scale increases in tax credits and other supports. The miracle of our 'knowledge economy' is, put frankly, quite feeble.

The achievements of 'Innovation Ireland' programmes are even less impressive when we consider what types of activities the R&D investments are being backed by tax credits. In 2007-2012 labour costs and current expenditures associated with R&D activities went up 29-31 percent, just as the economy was undergoing the alleged 'internal devaluation' normally associated with declines in these costs. In 2009-2012, costs associated with Payments for Licenses on Intellectual Property rose 357%. Total capital spending on R&D activities has fallen 30 percent over the same period. All in, CSO data shows that there might be significant cost shifting taking place via R&D tax credits being used to fund companies labour expenditures, as well as to optimise transfer pricing.


From economy's point of view, tax credits are one of the least efficient tools for stimulating investment in R&D and innovation. Research from the EU, published in February this year, examined the effectiveness of special tax allowances, tax credits and reduced income tax rates on R&D output. In assessing the quality of R&D projects, the authors looked at the R&D innovativeness and revenue potential. Using data on corporate patent applications to the European patent office, the authors found that a low tax rate on patent income is instrumental in attracting high quality innovative projects. In contrast, R&D tax credits and tax allowances were not found to have a significant impact on project quality.

International evidence shows that in general, all three forms of incentives are effective in raising the R&D activity. Ireland is one exception. Here, spending on R&D did not increase significantly in 2009-2012 period, rising in nominal terms by just EUR93 million for all companies and in real terms by 1.5 percent. The share of indigenous enterprises in total spending remained relatively stagnant at under 29 percent of total R&D spending. Total increase over 2009-2012 period in R&D spending by Irish-owned firms was only EUR14.5 million.

Tax credits are also reducing the overall transparency in the Irish economy when it comes to our firms performance and Government policies. Irish Government routinely references R&D tax credits as an example of pro-growth enterprise-focused policies. Yet there is no evidence directly linking economic growth, employment and enterprise outcomes to the tax credits.

In a welcome departure from our usual group-think, New Morning IP, the intellectual capital consultancy firm, recently published a report that argued that data shows no link between the introduction of the R&D tax credit and increased patenting activity by indigenous Irish companies. New Morning IP went on to state that “in our experience this tax credit has been used as a way of getting 'free money'…" It was a rare moment of truth in Ireland’s policy Byzantium, where interest groups routinely game the system for quick fixes, subsidies and protection, while ritualistically claiming unverified successes for such policies.

More distortions to the assessment of R&D tax credits effectiveness are induced by the fact that more than three quarters of R&D spend in Ireland is carried out by the MNCs. In some international studies, world-wide R&D investments by MNCs-based in Ireland are counted as if they take place here. One good example is the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard which ranked Ireland in top 10 EU countries for R&D investment in 2012. Per report, Ireland was host to 14 of the top-spending companies for R&D, but 11 of these were foreign companies and these accounted for 88.5 percent of all R&D spending attributed to Ireland.

In contrast to such reports, the European Patent Office data for 2012 put Ireland in 26th place in terms of total number of patent applications and in per-capita indigenous innovation terms, right between New Zealand and Cyprus. Not quite the achievement one finds promoted in Irish Government speeches and promotional brochures extoling the virtues of ‘Innovation Ireland’.


The above data on R&D investments and patenting activities in Ireland, correlates with the poor performance by the country academic institutions in attracting private sector research funding. The two problems are conjoined twins, born out of the lack of real innovation culture in Irish business.

This week's study by the Times Higher Education, ranked Ireland at the bottom of global league table in terms of private sector funding per academic researcher. Irish academics get an average of just over €6,000 from business research grants and general funds, or 12.5 times less than the world leader, South Korea. These numbers, of course, should be taken with a grain of salt. Lower rankings for Ireland, as well as for a number of other countries, can be in part explained by much broader academic research taking place in our universities, as well as in the bias in funding volumes in favour of specific technical disciplines. They are also reflective of the anti-innovation ethos of Ireland’s domestic enterprises. However, it also highlights the simple fact that Irish academics are often lacking policy and regulatory supports necessary to attract larger research grants.

The main point of all the data is that Irish policy supports for these high value-added activities are excessively focused on targeted tax incentives and are insufficiently aligned with the needs of the innovation-intensive sectors, businesses and entrepreneurs. Over-stimulation with targeted tax credits and exemptions is no substitute for the creation of a real culture of entrepreneurship and innovation.

To develop such culture, Ireland needs more flexible, more responsive public policy formation capable of supporting knowledge-intensive and rapidly evolving sectors, such as biotech, stem cells research, content-based ICT, remote medicine, human interface technology, customizable design and development technologies and so on. While we do have a benign corporate taxation regime, we also need a benign income tax regime to attract and anchor professional researchers and investors in innovation. Equally important are active state policies promoting start-ups and early stage enterprises. These require agile state systems for helping enterprises with issues relating to access to markets, IP, legal and regulatory matters and so on. Last, but not least, Ireland requires more streamlined and investor-friendly equity funding systems, tax laws and regulations and more open systems of IP and business ownership.



Box-out:

The latest report on the European construction industry, published this week by the German Ifo Institute shows that the residential construction sector in Europe will remain on course for further cutbacks with activity expected to hit a 20-years low in 2013-2014. The Institute forecasts show no pick up in residential building sector in Europe until 2015 and the market for new construction bottoming out at 45% below the level in 2006. The proverbial silver lining in the report comes in the Ifo forecasts for Ireland. Ifo experts see residential construction sector here switching to a 5.5% growth in 2014, followed by a 10% expansion in 2015. According to the report, “…it is encouraging that Ireland, which also had to overcome a major crisis in residential construction, is no longer a problem child.” Lets put these seemingly rosy forecasts into perspective. Currently, residential construction in Ireland is down 93 percent on peak year activity, marking the largest drop of any country in the EU. If the Ifo projections hold, by the end of 2015 Irish residential construction sector will be returned to the activity last seen in 2011. Not exactly encouraging, is it?

Monday, August 19, 2013

19/8/2013: 'Tax Haven' Ireland in the (2009) news again

I've been tracking articles relevant to the debate on the tax haven status of Ireland in relation to corporation tax for some time now.

Here's the last link which sets the chain of previous links on the topic:
http://trueeconomics.blogspot.it/2013/06/1062013-corporate-tax-haven-ireland.html

And since the above, I had couple of posts relevant to the subject:
http://trueeconomics.blogspot.it/2013/06/1662013-minister-in-northern-ireland-is.html
and
http://trueeconomics.blogspot.it/2013/07/2272013-g20-spells-out-squeeze-on-tax.html

Here are couple of most recent ones:

The Guardian covers 2009 case of Vodafone in two stories:
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/aug/18/vodafone-tax-deal-irish-office
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/aug/18/tax-vodafone-dublin
while the Tax Justice Network responds to the OECD Action Plan on corporate tax avoidance, explicitly identifying Ireland as a 'tax haven'
http://blogs.euobserver.com/shaxson/2013/07/19/press-release-response-to-oecd-action-plan-on-corporate-tax-avoidance/
and lastly the editorial in the EUObserver that also labels Ireland a 'tax haven':
http://blogs.euobserver.com/shaxson/2013/05/02/the-capture-of-tax-haven-ireland-the-bankers-hedge-funds-got-virtually-everything-they-wanted/

Note 1: The Guardian article references EUR67 million rebate on EUR1.04 billion in Vodafone dividends booked into Luxembourg. The dividends were paid on underlying revenues that were booked into Irish GDP and, thus, into our GNI (netting out transfers of royalties etc).These, in turn, required a payment of 0.59% of GNI-impacting activities to the EU Budget. While is is hard to exactly assess how much Irish Exchequer unnecessarily paid into the EU budget due to Vodafone activities, the amount is probably in excess of EUR 5 million and this compounds the transfers of EUR67 million referenced by the Guardian.


Note 2: I am not as much interested in the legal definitions of a tax haven (there are none and, thus, technically-speaking no country can be definitively labeled a tax haven) or in specific groups' definitions of the tax haven (the OECD definition is so convoluted, it virtually makes it impossible for any country with any global political clout - including that acquired via membership in the EU - to be labeled one, while the Tax Justice Network definition is broad enough to potentially include a large number of countries). I am concerned with the spirit of the concept - rent-seeking via tax arbitrage, and with the potential fallout from this in terms of distortions to economic development models and risks arising from same.

Note 3: A 'thank you' is due to a number of people who reminded me - in the context of the Guardian articles linked above - that Ireland charges a 25% corporate income tax on non-trading income. TY to    

Sunday, August 18, 2013

18/8/2013: A Baby Recession for Europe?

An interesting and forward looking study from the Eurostat on the demographic fallout from the current crisis predicting a so-called 'baby recession' in Europe. The paper is downloadable here: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-13-013/EN/KS-SF-13-013-EN.PDF

The main thesis is that "Fertility is commonly assumed to follow the economic cycle, falling in periods of recession and vice-versa, though scientific evidence is still not unanimous on this. This report looks at fertility trends in 31 European countries against selected indicators of economic recession… in 31 European countries, the economic crisis spread in 2009, while decreases in fertility became a common feature in Europe with a time lag. … In 2008, there were no falls in the rate compared to the previous year, but by 2011, the TFR had declined in 24 countries."

TFR refers to the total fertility rate.


All of this sounds reasonable, and there are some signs that fertility rates might be signaling a crisis-related decline and that such a decline might be coming. However, there is a slight hick up in the data on a number of fronts:

  1. The average TFR is running at 1.595% for the 31 countries sample in 2010-2011 against 2000-2009 average of 1.527%. In other words, the decline is not evident so far, except in one year of 2011.
  2. On country-average for 2000-2009 period, 11 out of 31 countries have been running ahead of average. In 2010-2011 period, same 11 countries run ahead of 31 countries-average. So there is no compositional change on under-performance relative to average.
  3. Over 2010-2011, TFR average for countries was ahead of 2000-2009 average for 24 out of 31 countries. 
  4. Countries that saw TFR decline from average for 2000-2009 to lower average for 2010-2011 were: Cyprus (not in crisis in 2008-2011), Luxembourg (not in crisis in 2008-2011), Hungary (in a crisis), Malta (not in crisis), Portugal (in crisis), Romania (in crisis), Latvia (in crisis), suggesting a very mixed evidence on the links between TFR and crisis to-date.
  5. The weak link is further reinforced by the fact that other crisis-hit countries have fared much better in terms of TFR: Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy, Slovenia, UK, Iceland all posted increases in terms of 2010-2011 average compared to 2000-2009 average.


Charts below illustrate (data from Eurostat report, charted and computed by myself):




Note: in the case of Ireland, weather events had potentially significant impact on 2008 and 2010 birth rates. Adjusting for these effects, 2011 reading of TFR for Ireland is hardly a significant decline.