24/2/17: 2016 to 2017: Continuity of Risks

My article for the Cayman Financial Review covering the transition in strategic and systemic risks between 2016 and 2017 is available here: http://www.caymanfinancialreview.com/2017/02/01/the-continuation-of-a-horrible-year/.

24/2/17: Delays to second bailout cause spike in Greek risk

Euromoney covering the Greek crisis (latest iteration) with a comment from myself: http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3663144/Delays-to-second-bailout-cause-spike-in-Greek-risk.html.

24/2/17: Monetary Policy Outlook for 2017

My article for Manning Financial covering monetary policy outlook is out and can be viewed here: https://issuu.com/publicationire/docs/mf_february_2017__1_?e=16572344/44717793.

Alternatively, click on the following images to enlarge

23/2/17: Welcome to the VUCA World

Much has been said recently about the collapse of ‘risk gauges’ in the financial markets, especially on foot of the historically low readings for the markets’ ‘fear index’, VIX. In terms of medium-term averages, current VIX readings are closely matching the readings for the period of ‘peak’ ‘Great Moderation’ of 1Q 2005 - 4Q 2006, while on-trend, VIX is currently running below 2005-2006 troughs. In other words, risk has effectively disappeared from the investors’ (or rather traders and active managers) radars (see chart below).

At the same time, traditional perceptions of risk in the financial markets have been replaced by a sky-rocketing uncertainty surrounding the real economy, and especially, economic policies. The Economic Policy Uncertainty Indices have been hitting all-time highs globally (see chart below), and across a range of key economies (see this for my recent analysis for Europe: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2017/01/15117-2016-was-year-of-records-breaking.html, this for Russia and the U.S.: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2017/01/17117-russian-economic-policy.html). In current data, Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPUI) has been showing extreme volatility coupled with extreme valuations. Index values are rising above historical norms both in terms of medium-term averages and in terms of longer term trends.

 Another interesting feature is the direct relationship between the EPUI and VIX indices. Based on rolling correlations analysis (see chart below), the traditionally positive correlation between the two indices has broken down around the start of 2Q 2016 and since then all three measures of correlation - the 6-months, the 12-months and the 24-months rolling correlations - have trended to the downside, turning negative with the start of 2H 2016. Since November 2016, we have a four months period when all three correlations are in the negative territory, the first time this happened since June 2007 and only the second time this happened in history of both series (since January 1997). Worse, the previous episode of all three correlations being negative lasted only two months (June and July 2007), while the current episode is already 4 months long.

Final point worth making is that while volatility of VIX has collapsed both on trend and in level terms since the start of H1 2016 (see chart below), volatility in EPUI has shot up to historical highs.

Taken together, the three empirical observations identified above suggest that the current markets and economies are no longer consistent with increased traditional risk environment (environment of measurable and manageable risks), but instead represent VUCA (volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous) environment. The VUCA environment, by its nature, is characterised by low predictability of risks, with uncertainty and ambiguity driving down efficacy of traditional models for risk assessments and making less valid traditional tools for risk management. Things are getting increasingly more complex and uncertain, unpredictable and unmanageable.

21/2/17: The Future of Finance

Last week I was speaking at a forum on Open Societies in Panama City. My speech covered the key threats and transformational changes in the global financial services. Here are my annotated slides:

20/2/17: CESIfo on Potential Gains from EU-EEC Trade Agreement

An interesting study from German's CESIfo on the potential impact of a Free Trade Agreement between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Community: http://www.cesifo-group.de/de/ifoHome/publications/docbase/details.html?docId=19267749.

Top of the line conclusions:

• EU side: "According to Ifo’s research results, a comprehensive agreement between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Community could lead to a 0.2 percent increase in real per capita income in the EU, corresponding to an annual EUR 91 upturn in per capita income." Of these, 31 billion euros in benefits are expected to accrue to Germany (net impact for Germany will be 22 billion euros due to increased Russian exports to Germany.
• Russian side: "For Russia this increase could be as high as three percent or EUR 235 per year. “These income gains stem from the fact that the economic structures on all sides are highly complementary.” Of these some EUR 71 billion is expected to come from increased exports from Russia to the EU states. Additional EUR 6 billion in exports increases will come from rising efficiencies in Russian trade outside the EU.
• Key obstacles: “A free trade agreement is barely conceivable as long as the Ukraine conflict remains unsettled. Such a pact could nevertheless form an integral part of a new strategic partnership between the EU and Russia” 

20/2/17: The Effect of GFC on Italian Non-Performing Loans Overhang

In yesterday’s post I covered some interesting current numbers relating to NPLs in the European banking sector. And sitting, subsequently, in the tin can of an airplane on my way back to California, I remembered about this pretty decent paper from Banca d’Italia, published in September 2016.

Titled “The evolution of bad debt in Italy during the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis: a counterfactual analysis” and authored by Alessandro Notarpietro and Lisa Rodano (Banca d’Italia Occasional Paper Number 350 – September 2016), the paper looked at the evolution (dynamics) of Italian banks’ NPLs since the start of the Global Financial Crisis and the twin recessions that hit Italy since 2008. Actual data is compared against “the counterfactual simulations". "A ‘no-crises scenario’ is built for the period 2008-2015. The counterfactual dynamics” generate a comparative new bad debt rate, which “depends on macroeconomic conditions and borrowing costs.”

Per authors, “the analysis suggests that, in the absence of the two recessions – and of the economic policy decisions that were taken to combat their effects – non-financial corporations’ bad debts at the end of 2015 would have reached €52 billion, instead of €143 billion."

Chart above plots the evolution of two time series of debt: actual and ex-crisis counterfactual, for non-financial corporates, showing the crisis-related debt overhang of around EUR 90 billion. More precisely: “In the absence of the two crises – and of the economic policy decisions that were taken to contrast their effects – the stock of non-financial corporations’ bad debts at the end of 2015 would have reached €52 billion, instead of €143billion. In the counterfactual scenario, the level at the end of 2015 is only 1.7 times larger than the one observed at the end of 2007; in actual data, the observed level was almost 5 times as large. As a share of total outstanding loans to non-financial corporations, bad debts rose at about 17.9 per cent at the end of 2015; had the two crises never occurred, it would have been around 5 per cent, roughly in line with the pre-crisis level.”

While the numbers may appear to be relatively small, given the size of the Italian real economic debt pile, provisioning on this bad debt overhang would amount to a serious dosh. Per the authors’ and previous estimates, roughly 13 percentage points was lost in Italian GDP (once public debt is accounted for). In other words,  through 2015, Italian economy has lost some 13.5 percent of GDP in potential output due to debt overhang. Of this, near 7 percentage points were lost due to sovereign debt-related losses and 6.5 percentage points due to corporate bad debt overhang.

17/2/17: European Non-Performing Banks' Loans 2016

Latest Fitch data shows some significant progress achieved by Ireland in dealing with non-performing loans on banks' balancesheets:

According to Fitch, Irish banking system ranked 6th worst in terms of NPLs in the EU at the end of 2016. This is a significant improvement on second and third places for Ireland during the height of the Greek and Cypriot crisis. However, the above data requires some serious caveats:

1. Ireland has been the earlier starter in the game of repairing banks' balancesheets than any other country in the Fitch's Top10 Worst systems table above;
2. Ireland's performance crucially depends on the assumed quality of mortgages debt restructurings undertaken by the banks over recent years - an assumption that is hardly un-contestable, given that the vast majority of mortgages arrears resolutions involve extend and pretend types of measures, such as extending mortgages maturity, rolling up arrears into a new (for now cheaper) debt and so on; and
3. Ireland is compared here to a number of countries where the banks bailouts have either been much shallower or completely absent.

Still, for all the caveats, it is good to see that after 9 years of a crisis, Irish banking system is no longer in top-5 basket cases league table in Europe. At this speed, by 2026, me might be even outside the top-10 table... 

13/2/17: Wages, Income and Consumption: Euro Area's Poor Performance since 2003

Based on data reported at the end of January 2017 by the Eurostat, since 2003, through 3Q 2016, or roughly across the span of 13 years,

• Nominal adjusted gross disposable income per capita has grown by a cumulative 26.37 percent in the Euro Area (EA 19) member states  
• Real adjusted gross disposable income per capita has risen only 5.30 percent
• Real actual final consumption per capita rose just 7.75 percent
• Nominal wages have expanded by 12.4 percent, cumulative.

Compared to pre-Global Financial Crisis peaks (based on the 4 quarters average around the peak) at the end of 3Q 2016:

• Nominal adjusted gross disposable income per capita was 9.7 percent higher
• Real adjusted gross disposable income per capita was only 0.73 percent higher
• Real actual final consumption per capita was up only 1.66 percent
• Nominal wages rose 4.64 percent, or less than half the rate of increase in nominal income.

As chart below shows, in simple terms, the last nine years saw:

1. Basically flat real adjusted gross disposable incomes per capita; and
2. Widening gap between real actual consumption per capita and the real adjusted gross disposable income per capita

Coupled with a simple fact that the EA19 includes countries with consumption and incomes catching up toward the EA12 averages, while gross disposable income does not net out fiscal losses sustained due to post-crisis tax and spending rebalancing across the EA19, the picture is quite dire: there is, effectively, no meaningful growth in incomes in the euro area for some 9-10 years running. Worse, when we adjust for ageing demographics, the marginal increase in the real consumption of the last 9-10 years is also far from being comforting. 

While the Eurostat does not report received real wages dynamics, using income deflator we can estimate changes in the real wages. Chart below shows the results:

In real (inflation-adjusted) terms, take home (received) wages have fallen in the EA19 group of countries in 2003-2016, with 3Q 2016 real wages index reading at around 93.6, down 6.4 percentage points on the end of 2003. A caveat applying to this is that I am using index values to map out nominal-to-real revaluation. Still, minor errors and rounding issues aside, the chart above clearly shows the lack of real wages income uplift in the EA19 since the early 2000s.

10/2/17: Sovereign Debt Bubble: Methane Emissions from the Debt Dump

Because global pile of debt growth has been outpacing global economic growth for quite some time now, the sovereign debt bubble is getting wobblier by the day.

As Fitch Ratings noted yesterday: "The number of Fitch-rated sovereigns with 'AAA' ratings is at its lowest level since 2003 and is expected to remain unchanged over the next two years". In other words, non-junk is getting smaller and smaller, even as Central Banks continue to hold more of the prime stuff.

Currently, only eleven countries have 'AAA' status with Fitch, compared with an all-time high of 16 during 2004 to 2009, "reflecting the longer term impact of the global financial crisis." Personally, I don't think this reflects the impact of the GFC alone. Instead, it reflects the fact that majority of Governments around the world have gone on a debt-piling binge post-GFC in the absence of real productivity and economic growth.

All in, less than 10 percent of the global sovereign debt issuers are now rated AAA. And only 40 percent of global sovereign debt volumes fall under AAA rating (much of this sitting in the Central Banks' vaults), "down from 48% a decade ago".

Source: Fitch Ratings

8/2/17: BRIC Composite PMIs: Russia Sustains Growth Momentum in January

Having covered January PMIs for BRIC economies for manufacturing sector (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2017/02/2217-bric-manufacturing-pmis-russia.html) and for services sector (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2017/02/2217-bric-manufacturing-pmis-russia.html), let’s update data for Composite PMI indicator.


Overall, only one BRIC economy - Russia - provided solid support to global growth in January, with China providing a slight downward momentum and India and Brazil leading to a significant downside momentum.

Brazil’s Composite PMI continued to signal severe contraction at 44.7 in January, tanking deeper into a recessionary territory compared to December 2016 reading of 45.2. This makes 23rd consecutive month of contraction. Brazil registered recessionary PMIs in both Services and Manufacturing and in both sectors, January readings were no better than December. In simple terms, there is no light in the end of Brazil’s recessionary tunnel, yet.

Russia Composite PMI posted a robust upward improvement, rising from an already fast-paced 56.6 in December 2016 to 58.3 in January 2017, marking 12th consecutive month of above 50 readings and the highest Composite PMI level on record. Impressively, both Services and Manufacturing sectors PMIs rose in January, compared to December.

Chinese Composite PMI posted a significant slowdown in growth from 53.5 in December 2016 to 52.2 in January. Still, the index remains above 50 mark for 11th month in a row. Chinese Manufacturing PMI declined substantially in January, while Services posted a very modest drop. Importantly, Chinese Manufacturing PMI has now dropped below statistically significant above-50 reading, after just one month at the level close enough to being almost statistically significant.

Third month of sub-50 readings in Services PMI and anaemic 50.4 reading in manufacturing meant that India’s Composite PMI remained below 50.0 marker for the third consecutive month, posting 49.4 in January compared to 47.6 in December. Despite index improvement (signalling slower rate of economic activity contraction), Indian economy remains in recessionary dynamics, courtesy of the completely botched self-inflicted policy mayhem - the misguided demonetisation.

Table below summarises the most recent movements in Composite PMIs

Chart below shows Composite PMIs for BRICs (quarterly basis) against the Global Composite PMI, showing that the current global growth trend is still being supported by the BRICs, with primary positive impact coming from Russian figures.

The following chart summaries the sheer magnitude of Russian growth momentum compared to BRICs-ex-Russia:

However, the good news is that despite slippage in India and extreme weakness in Brazil, overall BRIC’s contribution to global growth continues to trend upward, albeit with some significant moderation since mid-4Q 2016:

7/2/17: There's Zero Growth in Irish Patentable Innovation & Research Outputs

In a recent post on Irish patents filings and applications with the EPO, I showed that:

1. Irish R&D and innovation performance - as reflected by patents data - is hardly impressive, with the country ranking 14th in the sample of 50 countries as an origin for EPO Applications;
2. There has been no material improvement in Irish standing in the data in recent years, compared to trends.

Some of the readers have taken me to task on the second point, despite the fact that my evidence (based on EPO data) shows no gains in Irish patenting activities with the EPO in terms of both applications and filings, and in comparative terms as a share of both in the total number of EPO applications and filings. 

So I took a different exercise, plotting a relationship between average levels of filings and applications (combined) across 2006-2008 period against the same for 2014-2015 data. 

Not surprisingly, Ireland comes smack in the middle of the distribution and right on the regression line, implying that:

1. Ireland's patenting performance is to the upper range of the overall distribution of 50 countries, but it is at the bottom of this sub-group of top performing countries. In fact, Ireland's position is statistically indistinguishable from 'mediocre' or 'average' group of countries. 
2. Ireland shows only tiny growth in applications between 2006-2008 period into 2014-2015 period (see Ireland's point position just slightly above 45 degree line), which is statistically indifferent from zero growth.
3. Once we control for the factors that drive global trend in patents (blue regression line), Ireland shows no statistically identifiable growth (Ireland's point is bang on the regression line).

Yes, patents are not the only measure of innovation and R&D, but, being the core part of STEM-focused research, they are the main measure of innovation and R&D, because patents data omits only one form of innovation - that linked to software. Now, software innovation is important, and Ireland may or may not be doing well in this sub-sector, but STEM research is based not on software innovations, but on 'hard' patents. And Ireland does not brand itself as 'Software-only Innovation Hub'. In fact, Ireland spends (as a State and economy) more on STEM innovation than on software innovation, so the key focus on Irish policies is, once again, measurable via patents.

Until we get 2016 data to update the above analysis, I rest this topic discussion.