18/12/15: Ukraine Inches Even Closer to a Default

So, we have this:

Which means that Ukraine and Russia - so far - have failed to agree terms of debt restructuring. As a reminder, over the last few days, Ukraine and Russia were involved in a 'last minute' dialogue (via Germany) to resolve the issue.

Does this mean that Ukraine is now in a sovereign debt default? Technically - no. Ukraine will only be in a default after 10 days grace period expires, which means the parties to the talks still have 12 days to reach an agreement and avoid default.

Does this mean that Ukraine is now in breach of IMF lending criteria? Technically - no. IMF amended its own rules allowing lending to continue for countries in official sector default, as long as these countries continue to engage in debt restructuring negotiations with the lenders.

Can the two countries reach a deal in time to avoid official default? Unlikely: any deal between Russia and Ukraine (except for a deal that treats Russia under the same terms extended to private lenders - a deal that is simply unacceptable to Russia) will require approval of other (commercial) lenders under the agreement between commercial lenders and Ukraine struck earlier. There is simply not enough time to achieve such an approval, even assuming, there is a deal and the deal can be approved (both assumptions are quite a stretch).

Do both parties show will to negotiate in good faith? So far - no. Russian offer (see here) has been to restructure debt by extending repayment period (a real haircut absent nominal haircut, as far as I read this). The offer shifted Russian position in negotiations in the direction of Ukraine's position: from the opening position that the debt is official sector debt and thus should be repaid in full and in time. Ukraine's position has been to treat Russian debt equivalent to private sector debt and Ukraine (as far as public record goes) did not alter its position to move closer to Russian offer. Ukraine also deployed consistent rhetoric of "Our way or the highway" variety. In other words (I am willing to be corrected on this), Russia made insufficient step toward Ukraine, while Ukraine made no step toward Russian position whatsoever.

Note: my view has been (consistently over time) that Russia should restructure loans to Ukraine to a longer term, say 10-year, bond extended at original interest rate and allow for 2-3 years interest payments moratorium. Financially optimal solution would have been to impose a haircut on principal and extend maturity of the remaining balance. But, given Ukraine's failure to secure stronger restructuring with private sector lenders, this option is not available and is politically infeasible.

17/12/15: Re-aligning Ruble with Oil: Fed Hiccup...

Two casualties of the Fed's rate jitter: Oil & Ruble

Source: @Schuldensuehner 

Ruble is now nearing August 2015 lows on a continued trend that realigned with oil prices.

And while we are at it, another pairing:

Source: @Schuldensuehner 

Note: as of yesterday's closing Russian CDS 5 year spread was at 308.91 with implied probability of default of 19.15%. A week ago, same stood at 291.64 with implied probability of default at 18.26% and at the end of Tuesday, at 305.91 with implied probability of default at 18.99%.

But as a reminder, watch not only Brent, but also Urals-Brent spread. Hawkish dove of the Fed has less to say on that than Russian energy substitution ongoing in Europe and Turkey via Saudi's and Iranian contracts.

16/12/15: 36 years of interest rates across major advanced economies

As we inch closer to the U.S. Fed rates decision today, here is a useful chart summing up evolution of interest rates in key advanced economies over the last 36 years:

Happy lifting... 

16/12/15: Only 2/5 Global Ranking Methodologies Show an Irish Uni in Top 100

Universities rankings are a hazardous undertaking. Too many moving metrics, too many subjective inputs, too many egos fighting each other and too many euros and dollars and rupees and pounds etc at stake from funding sources. So one really should take them with a grain of salt and in comparatives look at a number of rankings across the board.

So here's a set of simple facts:

• By ARWU methodology, there are no Irish Universities in top 100 world wide: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/08/15815-irish-universities-none-in-top.html;
• By Times Higher Education methodology, there are no Irish Universities in top 100 world wide: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/11/51115-times-higher-education-rankings.html
• By US News & World Report (NWR) methodology, there are no Irish Universities in top 100 world wide: http://www.usnews.com/education/best-global-universities/search?region=&country=ireland&subject=&name= and see chart below;
• By QS rankings methodology there is only one Irish university in top 100 world wide http://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/world-university-rankings/2015#sorting=rank+region=140+country=+faculty=+stars=false+search= (see second snapshot below)
• By Wikipedia rankings, there is only one Irish university in top 100: https://www.timeshighereducation.com/carousels/wikipedia-ranking-world-universities-top-100 (see third snapshot below)

US NWR rankings:

QS rankings:

Wikipedia rankings:

Note: although QS and Wikipedia rankings for Trinity are relatively close, two methodologies are quite different. In terms of perceived robustness, ARWU and THE, are seen as top quality rankings, with QS and USNWR methodologies being usually seen as 'intermediate' quality and Wikipedia rankings being, err... a bit off-the-wall. 

Still, net effect is: 3/5 global universities rankings give Ireland zero places in top 100. No matter how you spin this, it ain't great...

15/12/15: There will be more blood: Global commodities markets

My Article for Sunday Business Post on commodities markets outlook: http://www.businesspost.ie/constantin-gurdgiev-there-will-be-blood/.

15/12/15: Europe’s Refugees Crisis: Some Economic Perspectives

In recent months, we have observed an ever-increasing cost estimates for Germany (and by a corollary Europe) of absorbing the 2015 inflows of refugees.

Central to these estimates have been numbers released by the Ifo Institute. These estimates started with the assumed inflows of 800,000 refugees in 2015 and were first pegged at EUR10 billion, “just to cover accommodation and food”. I covered these estimates earlier here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/09/22915-germanys-ifo-refugees-to-cost-ten.html.

Subsequent estimates raised both the number of refugees (to 1,100,000) and the cost per refugee, raising the estimate to EUR21.1 billion (covered here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/11/111115-new-cost-estimates-of-european.html) and per Ifo including “accommodation, food, creches, schools, German courses, training and administration” over 12 months.

In part, very high costs estimates are premised on the assumed ability of refugees to integrate into German labour markets (http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/presse/Pressemitteilungen/Pressemitteilungen-Archiv/2015/Q4/pm-20151204_Bildung_Fluechtlinge.html) due to lack of language skills, work skills and education. These assumptions - based on population averages and aggregate scores for key countries of origin for refugees - appear to be in line with German employers’ perception of refugees as generally lacking in key basic skills as noted here: http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/presse/Pressemitteilungen/Pressemitteilungen-Archiv/2015/Q4/press_20151126_sd22_fluechtlinge.html.

Taking Ifo Institute’s estimate of EUR19,000 in annual costs per refugee, and based on the EU Commission estimate that some 4 million Syrian refugees currently are in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, with some also in Egypt, Iraq and Libya, what are the chances that EU’s latest ‘aid’ to Turkey of a miserly EUR3 billion is going to be enough to address the problem?

If research also attempts to quantify cost/benefit assessment of the refugees inflows. In a more recent note (http://www.cesifo-group.de/cesifo/newsletter/1115/From_the_Editor_November_2015.html) the Institute states that “…Europe, with its ageing societies, needs new workers. Germany alone theoretically needs more than 30 million young immigrants until 2035 to keep the old-age dependency ratio constant at the current pensionable age, and maintain both the pension and contribution rates in its pay-as-you-go system unchanged. So, could the newcomers be the solution?”

The answer depends on which model one uses to estimate costs/benefits of inflows. “There have been different calculations about the benefit that refugees bring to the recipient countries. While a Keynesian model using a multiplier analysis until 2035 (!) comes to the conclusion that there are positive net benefits for the incumbent population, generational accounting models come up with frighteningly large loss estimates for the state, reaching between 79,000 and 450,000 euros per person in present value terms. This burden might well prove unsustainable if the number of immigrants continues unabated.” In other words, if you believe in a world where Government spending on anything (be it digging of ditches or building refugees shelter or hospitals) is a positive contributor to growth in the long run, things are just fine. If you believe that there can be misallocation of resources in investment and there can be inefficient transfers across generations as a result of multi annual policy commitments, things are pretty costly.

As usual, there is no agreement amongst the economists on the subject of economic impact of refugees. Which is not to warrant any statement about ethical and human dimension of how Europe should be addressing the crisis (economics, of course, is by far not the only consideration on this matter). But it is a good starting point (albeit a bit late for the current crisis) to have a debate as to the merits of different models for selecting refugees based on specific characteristics, such as prior work experiences, basic skills and education. It is also a good point to start thinking about how the balance between humanitarian assistance and development supports (in countries of origin) as well as social supports and workplace integration incentives in the host countries should/could be structured.

Ifo Institute position on the subject of host countries labour market and social supports structures is to stress the need for reducing minimum wage (Hartz IV) barriers to labour market entry. Without endorsing this view, here is an interesting link to a study that covered impacts of social welfare nets on entrepreneurship amongst migrants in the US, Canada and the UK (with Canadian experience being very interesting as Canadian model of highly selective migration filters is being advocated for Europe): http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2010/02/economics-07022010-human-capital.html.

The refugees crisis of 2015 (and possibly 2016 and on) is testing European systems (labour markets, social welfare, capital structures etc) along the economic dimension. The debates and policy responses so badly needed today should have taken place years ago. Absent these, we are now staring at the possibility that this crisis will alter our political systems, while stressing our economic and social systems. A right response would, in my opinion, involve recognising first and foremost the humanitarian dimension of the crisis, while accelerating the process for developing long term economic responses.


Note: this post is a follow up on my appearance on Bloomberg Radio last morning discussing the topic of economic impact of the refugees crisis.

15/12/15: Russian Outlook for 2016: Slon & Rain

My first column for Russian current affairs magazine Slon is out covering outlook for Russian economy for 2016: https://slon.ru/posts/61120.

I spoke about the topic on Russian TV Channel Dozhd' (Rain): https://tvrain.ru/teleshow/slon_na_dozhde/dollar_71-400099/.

14/12/15: ECB Rates & Policy Room

My comment on monetary policy space remaining for ECB post-December decision: Expresso (December 12, 2015, page 09):

14/12/15: U.S. Rates Impact on Euro: Expresso, December 12

My comments on potential impact on Euro and Euro area economy from the Fed rate hike for Portuguese Expresso (December, 12 page 03):

13/12/15: Strelka Institute: Interview

Recently, I gave an interview (in Russian) to Strelka Institute in Moscow. The interview covered the importance of linking economic development and urban design to sustain a C.A.R.E system of supports for human capital-intensive economy. Here is the interview link: http://www.strelka.com/ru/magazine/2015/12/01/gurgiev.

13/12/15: Irish National Accounts 3Q: Post 6: Exports and MNCs

In the previous 6 posts, I covered:

1. Irish National Accounts 3Q: Sectoral Growth results;
2. Irish year-on-year growth rates in GDP and GNP;
3. Quarterly growth rates in Irish GDP and GNP; 
4. Irish Domestic Demand (Household Consumption, Government Spending and Public and Private Investment)
5. Irish external trade; and
6. Evolution of per-capita metrics and the dynamics of the crisis.

So let’s get down to the last post on the matter of Irish National Accounts for 3Q 2015: the subject of Irish economy’s dependency on MNCs… err… exports that is.

Real Exports as a share of Irish real GDP stood at 120.1% in 3Q 2015, the second highest proportion on record, down from 123.0% in 2Q 2015 which was record-breaking level. Similarly, Nominal Exports as a share of nominal GDP fell from 127.2% in 2Q 2015 (highest on record) to 122.7% (second highest).

This is a remarkable set of numbers, driven predominantly by the activities of MNCs in Irish economy, and a number that is a signifier of all that is wrong with our National Accounts. Unlike countries that serve as a basis for production, Ireland serves as a basis for both some production of goods and services, but also as a platform for large scale tax optimisation. Vast majority of our exports are accounted for by MNCs trading from here, with large share of activity not taking place here, but being booked into Ireland from abroad. This distorts actual levels and value of production, but it also distorts the metrics of this economy’s openness to trade.

As the result on much of the MNCs activities, profits derived in Ireland by MNCs can go four ways:

1. They can be booked into tax havens (in which case they register as outflows from Ireland or Irish imports);
2. They can be booked in Ireland as profits and retained here (in which case they accrue to our National Accounts);
3. They can be registered here and then repatriated abroad (in which case they register as outflows of factor income); and
4. They can be booked into here and then expatriated, but remain on our books, as long as the MNCs is domiciled here (e.g. company created as an Irish entity via inversion).

We have zero ability to tell how much exactly do MNCs derive in profit from activities here and tax optimisation through here. But we do have a number that partially captures (3) above. This is provided by Net Factor Income Outflows to the Rest of the World and here is the chart showing how it evolved over time relative to Exports:

Do note that over 2011 - present period, average net outflow of factor payments abroad has fallen as a share of Exports from 17.5% in the period of 1Q 2002 - 4Q 2010 to 15.1%, the lowest period average on record. In other words, during the last 4 and 3/4 years MNCs operating from Ireland have been expatriating fewer profits abroad than in other periods in history. Question is: what happens to these retained profits over time? Obviously, these MNCs have absolutely no interest in re-investing these profits in Ireland (there is neither the scale for such reinvestment, nor the need). This suggests that either these profits are being parked until such a time as when they can be expatriated for the purpose of funding MNCs investments around the world, or the MNCs overall switched to declaring lower profits as a share of their exports.

Truth is - we do not know what is going on, though we do know that something is afoot.

Overall, however, Irish economic miracle’s dependence on MNCs-driven exports growth is growing, whilst transparency of MNCs operations here (at least as far as the National Accounts go) is declining. Happy FDI days are upon us… as long as the U.S., OECD, EU, and the rest of the host of states and organisations hell-bent on ending the free for all tax optimisation by corporates aren’t looking…

12/12/15: Irish National Accounts 3Q: Post 6: Measuring Recovery

In previous posts, I have covered:

1. Irish National Accounts 3Q: Sectoral Growth results 
2. Year-on-year growth rates in GDP and GNP in 3Q 2015 
3. Quarterly growth rates in GDP and GNP 
4. Domestic Demand and
5. External trade side of the National Accounts 

Now, as usual, let’s take a look at the evolution of 3 per-capita metrics and trace out the dynamics of the crisis.

In 3Q 2015, Personal Expenditure per capita for the last four quarters totalled EUR 19,343, which represents an increase of 2.78% on four quarters total through 3Q 2014. Relative to peak 4 quarters total (attained in 4Q 2007), current levels of Personal Expenditure on Goods & Services on a per capita is 7.14% below the peak levels. In other words, 7 and 3/4 of the years down, Personal Expenditure on a per capita basis is yet to recover (in real terms) pre-crisis peak.

Per capita Final Domestic Demand (combining Personal Expenditure, Government Expenditure and Fixed Capital Formation) based on the total for four quarters through 3Q 2015 stood at EUR 34,616, which represents an increase of 7.75% y/y. This level of per capita Demand is 11.19% lower than pre-crisis peak attained in 4Q 2007. As with Personal Expenditure per capita, Final Demand per capita is yet to complete crisis period recovery, 7 and 3/4 of the years down.

On the other hand, GDP per capita stood at EUR 42,870 on a cumulative 4 quarters basis, which is 6.2% above the same period for 2014 and is 0.98% above the pre-crisis peak (4Q 2007). Hence, GDP per capita has now fully recovered from the pre-crisis peak and it ‘only’ took it 7.5 years to do so.

GNP per capita has recovered from the crisis back in 2Q 2015, so at of Q3 2015, 4-quarters aggregate GNP per capita stood at EUR 36,508 which is 5.85% ahead of the same period through Q3 2014 and is 2.39% above pre-crisis peak. In other words, it took 7 and 1/4 years for GNP per capita to regain its pre-crisis peak.

It is also worth looking at the potential levels of output per capita ex-crisis.

To do so, let’s take average growth rates for 4 quarters moving aggregate GDP. GNP and Domestic Demand, for the period 1Q 2002 through 4Q 2007. Note 1: this period represents slower rates of growth than years prior to 1Q 2002. Note 2: I further removed all growth rates observations within the period that were above 5 percentage points for GDP and GNP and above 4% for Final Demand, thus significantly reducing impact of a number of very high growth observations on resulting trend.

Here is the chart, also showing by how much (% terms) would GDP, GNP and Domestic Demand per capita have been were pre-crisis trends (moderated by my estimation) to persist from 4Q 2007:

I’ll let everyone draw their own conclusions as to the recovery attained.