Wednesday, December 16, 2015

16/12/15: Only 2/5 Global Ranking Methodologies Show an Irish Uni in Top 100


Universities rankings are a hazardous undertaking. Too many moving metrics, too many subjective inputs, too many egos fighting each other and too many euros and dollars and rupees and pounds etc at stake from funding sources. So one really should take them with a grain of salt and in comparatives look at a number of rankings across the board.

So here's a set of simple facts:


US NWR rankings:
QS rankings:


Wikipedia rankings:

Note: although QS and Wikipedia rankings for Trinity are relatively close, two methodologies are quite different. In terms of perceived robustness, ARWU and THE, are seen as top quality rankings, with QS and USNWR methodologies being usually seen as 'intermediate' quality and Wikipedia rankings being, err... a bit off-the-wall. 

Still, net effect is: 3/5 global universities rankings give Ireland zero places in top 100. No matter how you spin this, it ain't great...

Tuesday, December 15, 2015

15/12/15: There will be more blood: Global commodities markets


My Article for Sunday Business Post on commodities markets outlook: http://www.businesspost.ie/constantin-gurdgiev-there-will-be-blood/.


15/12/15: Europe’s Refugees Crisis: Some Economic Perspectives


In recent months, we have observed an ever-increasing cost estimates for Germany (and by a corollary Europe) of absorbing the 2015 inflows of refugees.

Central to these estimates have been numbers released by the Ifo Institute. These estimates started with the assumed inflows of 800,000 refugees in 2015 and were first pegged at EUR10 billion, “just to cover accommodation and food”. I covered these estimates earlier here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/09/22915-germanys-ifo-refugees-to-cost-ten.html.

Subsequent estimates raised both the number of refugees (to 1,100,000) and the cost per refugee, raising the estimate to EUR21.1 billion (covered here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/11/111115-new-cost-estimates-of-european.html) and per Ifo including “accommodation, food, creches, schools, German courses, training and administration” over 12 months.

In part, very high costs estimates are premised on the assumed ability of refugees to integrate into German labour markets (http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/presse/Pressemitteilungen/Pressemitteilungen-Archiv/2015/Q4/pm-20151204_Bildung_Fluechtlinge.html) due to lack of language skills, work skills and education. These assumptions - based on population averages and aggregate scores for key countries of origin for refugees - appear to be in line with German employers’ perception of refugees as generally lacking in key basic skills as noted here: http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/presse/Pressemitteilungen/Pressemitteilungen-Archiv/2015/Q4/press_20151126_sd22_fluechtlinge.html.

Taking Ifo Institute’s estimate of EUR19,000 in annual costs per refugee, and based on the EU Commission estimate that some 4 million Syrian refugees currently are in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, with some also in Egypt, Iraq and Libya, what are the chances that EU’s latest ‘aid’ to Turkey of a miserly EUR3 billion is going to be enough to address the problem?

If research also attempts to quantify cost/benefit assessment of the refugees inflows. In a more recent note (http://www.cesifo-group.de/cesifo/newsletter/1115/From_the_Editor_November_2015.html) the Institute states that “…Europe, with its ageing societies, needs new workers. Germany alone theoretically needs more than 30 million young immigrants until 2035 to keep the old-age dependency ratio constant at the current pensionable age, and maintain both the pension and contribution rates in its pay-as-you-go system unchanged. So, could the newcomers be the solution?”

The answer depends on which model one uses to estimate costs/benefits of inflows. “There have been different calculations about the benefit that refugees bring to the recipient countries. While a Keynesian model using a multiplier analysis until 2035 (!) comes to the conclusion that there are positive net benefits for the incumbent population, generational accounting models come up with frighteningly large loss estimates for the state, reaching between 79,000 and 450,000 euros per person in present value terms. This burden might well prove unsustainable if the number of immigrants continues unabated.” In other words, if you believe in a world where Government spending on anything (be it digging of ditches or building refugees shelter or hospitals) is a positive contributor to growth in the long run, things are just fine. If you believe that there can be misallocation of resources in investment and there can be inefficient transfers across generations as a result of multi annual policy commitments, things are pretty costly.

As usual, there is no agreement amongst the economists on the subject of economic impact of refugees. Which is not to warrant any statement about ethical and human dimension of how Europe should be addressing the crisis (economics, of course, is by far not the only consideration on this matter). But it is a good starting point (albeit a bit late for the current crisis) to have a debate as to the merits of different models for selecting refugees based on specific characteristics, such as prior work experiences, basic skills and education. It is also a good point to start thinking about how the balance between humanitarian assistance and development supports (in countries of origin) as well as social supports and workplace integration incentives in the host countries should/could be structured.

Ifo Institute position on the subject of host countries labour market and social supports structures is to stress the need for reducing minimum wage (Hartz IV) barriers to labour market entry. Without endorsing this view, here is an interesting link to a study that covered impacts of social welfare nets on entrepreneurship amongst migrants in the US, Canada and the UK (with Canadian experience being very interesting as Canadian model of highly selective migration filters is being advocated for Europe): http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2010/02/economics-07022010-human-capital.html.

The refugees crisis of 2015 (and possibly 2016 and on) is testing European systems (labour markets, social welfare, capital structures etc) along the economic dimension. The debates and policy responses so badly needed today should have taken place years ago. Absent these, we are now staring at the possibility that this crisis will alter our political systems, while stressing our economic and social systems. A right response would, in my opinion, involve recognising first and foremost the humanitarian dimension of the crisis, while accelerating the process for developing long term economic responses.


Note: this post is a follow up on my appearance on Bloomberg Radio last morning discussing the topic of economic impact of the refugees crisis.

15/12/15: Russian Outlook for 2016: Slon & Rain


My first column for Russian current affairs magazine Slon is out covering outlook for Russian economy for 2016: https://slon.ru/posts/61120.

I spoke about the topic on Russian TV Channel Dozhd' (Rain): https://tvrain.ru/teleshow/slon_na_dozhde/dollar_71-400099/.

Monday, December 14, 2015

14/12/15: ECB Rates & Policy Room


My comment on monetary policy space remaining for ECB post-December decision: Expresso (December 12, 2015, page 09):


14/12/15: U.S. Rates Impact on Euro: Expresso, December 12


My comments on potential impact on Euro and Euro area economy from the Fed rate hike for Portuguese Expresso (December, 12 page 03):

Sunday, December 13, 2015

13/12/15: Strelka Institute: Interview


Recently, I gave an interview (in Russian) to Strelka Institute in Moscow. The interview covered the importance of linking economic development and urban design to sustain a C.A.R.E system of supports for human capital-intensive economy. Here is the interview link: http://www.strelka.com/ru/magazine/2015/12/01/gurgiev.

13/12/15: Irish National Accounts 3Q: Post 6: Exports and MNCs


In the previous 6 posts, I covered:

  1. Irish National Accounts 3Q: Sectoral Growth results;
  2. Irish year-on-year growth rates in GDP and GNP;
  3. Quarterly growth rates in Irish GDP and GNP
  4. Irish Domestic Demand (Household Consumption, Government Spending and Public and Private Investment)
  5. Irish external trade; and
  6. Evolution of per-capita metrics and the dynamics of the crisis.

So let’s get down to the last post on the matter of Irish National Accounts for 3Q 2015: the subject of Irish economy’s dependency on MNCs… err… exports that is.

Real Exports as a share of Irish real GDP stood at 120.1% in 3Q 2015, the second highest proportion on record, down from 123.0% in 2Q 2015 which was record-breaking level. Similarly, Nominal Exports as a share of nominal GDP fell from 127.2% in 2Q 2015 (highest on record) to 122.7% (second highest).


This is a remarkable set of numbers, driven predominantly by the activities of MNCs in Irish economy, and a number that is a signifier of all that is wrong with our National Accounts. Unlike countries that serve as a basis for production, Ireland serves as a basis for both some production of goods and services, but also as a platform for large scale tax optimisation. Vast majority of our exports are accounted for by MNCs trading from here, with large share of activity not taking place here, but being booked into Ireland from abroad. This distorts actual levels and value of production, but it also distorts the metrics of this economy’s openness to trade.

As the result on much of the MNCs activities, profits derived in Ireland by MNCs can go four ways:

  1. They can be booked into tax havens (in which case they register as outflows from Ireland or Irish imports);
  2. They can be booked in Ireland as profits and retained here (in which case they accrue to our National Accounts);
  3. They can be registered here and then repatriated abroad (in which case they register as outflows of factor income); and
  4. They can be booked into here and then expatriated, but remain on our books, as long as the MNCs is domiciled here (e.g. company created as an Irish entity via inversion).

We have zero ability to tell how much exactly do MNCs derive in profit from activities here and tax optimisation through here. But we do have a number that partially captures (3) above. This is provided by Net Factor Income Outflows to the Rest of the World and here is the chart showing how it evolved over time relative to Exports:


Do note that over 2011 - present period, average net outflow of factor payments abroad has fallen as a share of Exports from 17.5% in the period of 1Q 2002 - 4Q 2010 to 15.1%, the lowest period average on record. In other words, during the last 4 and 3/4 years MNCs operating from Ireland have been expatriating fewer profits abroad than in other periods in history. Question is: what happens to these retained profits over time? Obviously, these MNCs have absolutely no interest in re-investing these profits in Ireland (there is neither the scale for such reinvestment, nor the need). This suggests that either these profits are being parked until such a time as when they can be expatriated for the purpose of funding MNCs investments around the world, or the MNCs overall switched to declaring lower profits as a share of their exports.

Truth is - we do not know what is going on, though we do know that something is afoot.

Overall, however, Irish economic miracle’s dependence on MNCs-driven exports growth is growing, whilst transparency of MNCs operations here (at least as far as the National Accounts go) is declining. Happy FDI days are upon us… as long as the U.S., OECD, EU, and the rest of the host of states and organisations hell-bent on ending the free for all tax optimisation by corporates aren’t looking…

Saturday, December 12, 2015

12/12/15: Irish National Accounts 3Q: Post 6: Measuring Recovery


In previous posts, I have covered:

  1. Irish National Accounts 3Q: Sectoral Growth results 
  2. Year-on-year growth rates in GDP and GNP in 3Q 2015 
  3. Quarterly growth rates in GDP and GNP 
  4. Domestic Demand and
  5. External trade side of the National Accounts 

Now, as usual, let’s take a look at the evolution of 3 per-capita metrics and trace out the dynamics of the crisis.

In 3Q 2015, Personal Expenditure per capita for the last four quarters totalled EUR 19,343, which represents an increase of 2.78% on four quarters total through 3Q 2014. Relative to peak 4 quarters total (attained in 4Q 2007), current levels of Personal Expenditure on Goods & Services on a per capita is 7.14% below the peak levels. In other words, 7 and 3/4 of the years down, Personal Expenditure on a per capita basis is yet to recover (in real terms) pre-crisis peak.

Per capita Final Domestic Demand (combining Personal Expenditure, Government Expenditure and Fixed Capital Formation) based on the total for four quarters through 3Q 2015 stood at EUR 34,616, which represents an increase of 7.75% y/y. This level of per capita Demand is 11.19% lower than pre-crisis peak attained in 4Q 2007. As with Personal Expenditure per capita, Final Demand per capita is yet to complete crisis period recovery, 7 and 3/4 of the years down.

On the other hand, GDP per capita stood at EUR 42,870 on a cumulative 4 quarters basis, which is 6.2% above the same period for 2014 and is 0.98% above the pre-crisis peak (4Q 2007). Hence, GDP per capita has now fully recovered from the pre-crisis peak and it ‘only’ took it 7.5 years to do so.

GNP per capita has recovered from the crisis back in 2Q 2015, so at of Q3 2015, 4-quarters aggregate GNP per capita stood at EUR 36,508 which is 5.85% ahead of the same period through Q3 2014 and is 2.39% above pre-crisis peak. In other words, it took 7 and 1/4 years for GNP per capita to regain its pre-crisis peak.



It is also worth looking at the potential levels of output per capita ex-crisis.

To do so, let’s take average growth rates for 4 quarters moving aggregate GDP. GNP and Domestic Demand, for the period 1Q 2002 through 4Q 2007. Note 1: this period represents slower rates of growth than years prior to 1Q 2002. Note 2: I further removed all growth rates observations within the period that were above 5 percentage points for GDP and GNP and above 4% for Final Demand, thus significantly reducing impact of a number of very high growth observations on resulting trend.

Here is the chart, also showing by how much (% terms) would GDP, GNP and Domestic Demand per capita have been were pre-crisis trends (moderated by my estimation) to persist from 4Q 2007:


I’ll let everyone draw their own conclusions as to the recovery attained.

12/12/15: Irish National Accounts 3Q: Post 5: External Trade


In the first post of the series, I covered Irish National Accounts 3Q: Sectoral Growth results. The second post covered year-on-year growth rates in GDP and GNP, while the third post covered quarterly growth rates in GDP and GNP. The fourth post covered Domestic Demand.

Now, consider external trade side of the National Accounts.

Irish Exports of Goods & Services stood at EUR62.52 billion in 3Q 2015, a rise of 12.4% y/y, after posting growth of 13.5% y/y in 2Q 2015 and 15.5% growth in 3Q 2014. Over the last four quarters, Irish Exports of Goods & Services grew, on average, at a rate of 13.4%, implying doubling of exports by value roughly every 5.5 years. If you believe this value to be reflective of a volume of real economic activity taking place in a country with roughly 1.983 million people in employment, you have to be on Amsterdam brownies. Over the 12 months through 3Q 2015, Irish economy has managed to export EUR235.67 billion worth of stuff, or a whooping EUR27.828 billion more than over the same period a year before. That’s EUR118,845 per person working at home or at work in Ireland.

Now, moving beyond the total, Exports of Goods stood at EUR34.062 billion in 3Q 2015, up 16.07% y/y - a doubling rate of 4.5 years. Exports of goods were up 16.03% y/y in 2Q 2015 and 16.9% in 3Q 2014, so over the last 12 months, average rate of growth in Exports of Goods was 18.01%. In other words, Irish Exports of Goods (physical stuff apparently manufactured here) are running at a rate of increase consistent with doubling of exports every 4 years.

Exports of Services are still ‘lagging’ behind, standing at EUR28.458 billion in 3Q 2015, up 8.2% y/y in 3Q 2015, having previously risen 10.5% in 2Q 2015. Both rates of growth are below 13.9% heroic rate of expansion achieved in 3Q 2014. Over the last four quarters, average rate of growth in Irish Exports of Services was 8.6%, to EUR107.29 billion.

However, in order to produce all these marvels of exports (and indeed to sustain living and consumption), Ireland does import truck loads of stuff and services. Thus, Imports of Goods and Services overall rose to EUR52.788 billion in 3Q 2015, up 18.9% y/y and beating 16.5% growth in 2Q 2015 and even 18.75% growth in 3Q 2014. Over the last four quarters average rate of growth in Imports of Goods and Services was impressive 17.6%.

Some of this growth was down to increased consumer demand. Imports of Goods alone rose 5.1% y/y in Q3 2015, compared to 8.1% in 2Q 2015 and 16.7% in 3Q 2014 (over the last four quarters, average growth rate was 10.1%). Imports of Services, however, jumped big time: up 27.9% y/y in 3Q 2015, having previously grown 21.8% in 2Q 2015 and 20.2% in 3Q 2014 (average for the last four quarters is 22.6%). Of course, imports of services include imports of IP by the web-based and ICT and IFSC firms, while imports of goods include pharma inputs, transport inputs (e.g. aircraft leased by another strand of MNCs and domestic tax optimisers) and so on.

Both, exports and imports changes are also partially driven by changes in the exchange rates, which are virtually impossible to track, since contracts for shipments within MNCs are neither transparent, more disclosed to us, mere mortals, and can have virtually no connection to real world exchange rates.

All of which means that just as in the case of our GDP and GNP and even Domestic Demand, Irish figures for external trade are pretty much meaningless: we really have no idea how much of all this activity sustains in wages & salaries, business income and employment and even taxes that is anchored to this country.

But, given everyone’s obsession with official accounts, we shall plough on and look at trade balance next.



Ireland’s Trade Balance in Goods hit the absolute historical record high in 3Q 2015 at EUR15.602 billion, up 32.4% y/y and exceeding growth rate in 2Q 2015 (+27.5%) and 3Q 2014 (+17.2%). Meanwhile, Trade Balance in Services posted the largest deficit in history at EUR5.87 billion, up almost ten-fold on same period in 2014, having previously grown by 154% in 2Q 2015.

Thus, overall Trade Balance for Goods and Services fell 13.4% y/y in 3Q 2015 to EUR9.732 billion, having posted second consecutive quarter of y/y growth (it shrunk 0.51% y/y in 2Q 2015).



As chart above shows, overall Trade Balance dynamics have been poor for Ireland despite the record-busting exports and all the headlines about huge contribution of external trade to the economy. On average basis, period average for 1Q 2013-present shows growth rate averaging not-too-shabby 5.1% y/y. However, this corresponds to the lowest average growth rate for any other period on record, including the disaster years of 1Q 2008 - 4Q 2012 (average growth rate of 24.3% y/y).

Friday, December 11, 2015

11/12/15: Irish National Accounts 3Q: Post 4: Domestic Demand


In the previous posts of the series, I covered Irish National Accounts 3Q: Sectoral Growth results;  year-on-year growth rates in GDP and GNP; and quarterly growth rates in GDP and GNP.

Now, let’s look at the Domestic Demand.

Personal Expenditure on Goods & Services rose 3.63% y/y in 3Q 2015 in real terms, posting a stronger growth than in 2Q 2015 (+2.91%) and in 3Q 2014 (+1.11%). Over the last four consecutive quarters, growth in Personal Expenditure on Goods & Services averaged 3.36%. All of this is strong and encouraging, as Personal Expenditure on Goods & Services is one of the few figures still remaining in the National Accounts that are unpolluted by the MNCs activities and as such is a significant reflection of the strength of the real economy.

Despite the rise in 3Q 2015, current level of Personal Expenditure on Goods & Services remains 7.85% below pre-crisis peak levels.

Still, in 3Q 2015, Personal Expenditure on Goods & Services contributed EUR779 million to y/y growth in GDP and GNP, which is up on EUR616 million growth contribution in 2Q 2015 and on EUR236 million growth in 3Q 2014.


Expenditure by Government on Current Goods & Services fell in 3Q 2015 (down -1.38% y/y or -EUR94 million). This compares to growth of 1.82% y/y in 2Q 2015 and 3.23% growth in 3Q 2014. Over the last four quarters, Expenditure by Government on Current Goods & Services growth averaged strong 3.95% - faster than growth in Persona Consumption.

As with Personal Consumption, Government Expenditure is still down on pre-crisis peak levels, in fact, it is down more than Personal Consumption at -13.1%.


Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation continued to post literally unbelievable readings in 3Q 2015, rising 35.8% y/y, compared to 34.2% increase recorded in 2Q 2015 and to 10.1% rise in 3Q 2014. 3Q 2015 y/y growth figure was the highest on record and there is a clear pattern of dramatic increases over 4Q 2014, 2Q 2015 and 3Q 2015, with last four quarters average growth rate at 24.9% implying that Irish economy’s capital stock should be doubling in size every 3 years. This is plain bonkers and is a clear signifier of distortions induced into the Irish economy by the likes of Nama, vulture funds and MNCs.

Based on our official accounts, whilst building and construction (including civil engineering etc) added only EUR44 million to GDP in 3Q 2015, Fixed Capital Formation jumped by EUR3.1 billion over the same period of time.

Still, even with this patently questionable accounting, Irish Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation remains 11.8% below pre-crisis peak levels.



With all three components of Final Domestic Demand still under pre-crisis peak levels performance, Final Domestic Demand ended 3Q 2015 some 7.0% below pre-crisis peak. However, Final Domestic Demand did post strong growth, rising 10.2% in 3Q 2015 compared to 3Q 2014, with rate of growth in 3Q basically consistent with 10.1% expansion recorded in 2Q 2015, and up strongly on 3.1% y/y growth recorded in 3Q 2014. Over the last four quarters, Final Domestic Demand growth rate averaged 8.35%.




However, virtually all of growth in Final Domestic Demand was accounted for by Fixed Capital Formation - the only component of the Domestic Demand that is impacted by the MNCs. In 3Q 2015, growth in Final Domestic Demand stood at EUR3.782 billion, of which EUR3.098 billion came from Fixed Capital Formation side.

One additional point is worth making with respect to the expenditure side of Irish National Accounts in 3Q 2015. In last quarter, EUR497 million (or 37.6% of total GNP growth y/y) came from the expansion in the Value of Physical Changes in Stocks. This is not insignificant. In 3Q 2015, compared to 3Q 2014, Personal Expenditure in Ireland contributed EUR779 million, while Changes in the Value of Stocks contributed EUR497 million. Absent this level of growth in stocks, Irish GNP would have been up only 3.43% y/y instead of 5.5% and taking into the account last four quarters average changes in Stocks, the GNP would have been up just 2.8%. In other words, quite a bit of Irish GDP and GNP growth in 3Q 2015 was down to companies accumulating Physical Stocks of goods and services, sitting unsold.

A key observation, therefore, from the entire National Accounts series is that one cannot talk about Irish economy ‘overheating’ or ‘running at its potential output’ anymore: all three headline growth figures of GDP growth (+6.84% y/y in 3Q 2015), GNP growth (+5.50% y/y) and Domestic Demand growth (+10.23% y/y) are influenced significantly by MNCs and post-crisis financial and property markets re-pricing. In the surreal world of Irish economics, the thermometer that could have told us about economy’s health is simply badly broken.


Stay tuned for analysis of Irish External Trade figures next.

Thursday, December 10, 2015

10/12/15: Irish National Accounts 3Q: Post 3: Quarterly GDP and GNP Growth


In the first post of the series, I covered Irish National Accounts 3Q: Sectoral Growth results (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/12/101215-irish-national-accounts-3q-part.html).

The second post covered year-on-year growth rates in GDP and GNP (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/12/101215-irish-national-accounts-3q-post.html)

Now, consider quarterly growth rates analysis.

While things were bustlingly rosy for GDP and GNP based on year-on-year growth figures, the picture is much more mixed when it comes to quarterly growth rates.

Firstly, GDP at constant factor costs rose 1.43% q/q in 3Q 2015, down from 2.4% growth recorded in 2Q 2015 and on 2.54% growth recorded in 3Q 2014. In so far as this reflects sectoral activity, this slower 3Q 2015 growth is hard to interpret.

Taxes at constant factor costs actually fell 1.49% q/q in 3Q 2015, having risen just 0.37% q/q in 2Q 2015. 2014 3Q contraction was much sharper at 6.65%.

GDP at constant market prices rose 1.37% q/q in 3Q 2015, once again posting slower rates of growth than in 2Q 2015 (+1.89%) and in 3Q 2014 (+2.06%). The current rate of q/q growth in GDP was the slowest in 3 quarters, but remains significant (above 1.33% average for the period of 1Q 2013 - 3Q 2015.

GNP surprised to a downside, falling 0.81% q/q in 3Q 2015, having previously posted growth of 1.35% in 2Q 2015 and having expanded 2.71% in 3Q 2014. In fact, 3Q 2015 is the worst quarter-on-quarter growth result for GNP since 4Q 2013 and the second quarter of negative growth over the last 4 quarters (previous one was in 1Q 2015 at -0.24%).

Over the first three quarters of 2015, GNP growth averaged 0.1%, which compares poorly to 1.97% average for the first three quarters of 2014 and 3.21% average growth posted for the first 3 quarters of 2013, and ditto for 2012.


The key takeaways here are:

  1. Q/Q GDP growth remains robust, but is now the lowest in 3 consecutive quarters;
  2. Q/Q GNP growth has turned negative once again in 3Q 2015, posting the worst reading for any quarter since 4Q 2013.
  3. Meanwhile, net factor income outflows to the rest of the world are booming, hitting (on seasonally adjusted basis) the highest level since 4Q 2011 and the second highest level on record. 

In other words, MNCs extraction of profits from the economy is ramping out, which is helping the Exchequer and pushes up GDP, but also is leading to GNP growth lagging that of GDP.


Stay tuned for more analysis coming up.