9/9/15: That poverty of low [Euro area GDP growth] expectations…

So, apparently, "strong eurozone growth" for 2Q 2015 is fuelling hopes for economic recovery and pushing markets up. Which makes for some funny reading, considering the following:
1) Eurozone GDP grew by a mind-blowing… 0.4% in 2Q 2015 in q/q terms. Which, hold your breath there, matey… was a decline on 0.52% (revised) growth in 1Q 2015.
2) It gets better, yet: growth 'improvement' was down to a rise in exports due to devalued euro (err.. now, who would have thought that to be a reason to cheer?). Exports increase accounted for 0.3% of the total 0.4% of 2Q growth. Full details are here.

The glorious achievement of the Great Patriotic Eurozone Economy under the wise stewardship of [insert a name of a Brussels Directorate or one of the EU Presidents here] was so blindingly obvious that one can't miss it using a mapping of historical past growth rates.

Yes, yes… that is right - the "strong" rate of eurozone growth in 2Q 2015 was exactly the same as that attained in Q4 2014 and identical to Q3 2010 (remember, that was 'blistering' too). 1Q 1999 - 1Q 2008 average quarterly growth rate in the eurozone was 0.56% and that was the period when the euro area was actually showing structural weaknesses compared to other advanced economies. Over the period of 12 months through 2Q 2015, average growth is 0.4% and we call this… err… "strong".

That poverty of low expectations…

8/915: Five Years of Dodd-Frank Act: Two Posts on Reforms Impact

Five years ago, on July 19, 2010, President Barak Obama signed the most far-reaching regulatory reform of the U.S. financial system since the end of the Great Depression – Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

The Act has three core pillars:

• enhanced protection of consumers;
• expanded regulatory reach over risk management (including the markets for derivatives), and
• the Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) safeguards.

Given its ambitious scope, the Act was designed to shape American response to the Global Financial Crisis, both in terms of addressing some of the underlying causes, and mitigating future systemic risks. Not surprisingly, the passage of the Act was lauded at the time as a historic moment

My first post, covering Consumer Protection and Derivatives regulations under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is available here.

My second post on Dodd-Frank Act, covering regulation of TBTF banking and financial institutions is available here.

5/9/15: Remittances, Foreign Aid & other Capital Flows

So globally, remittances by migrants are now worth more than double the total flows of foreign aid and more than portfolio flows (financialised investment). In fact, remittances are now second in importance to only FDI.

Source: Economist; H/T: @RonanLyons 

The latter fact is not surprising as remittances already were second largest source of capital inflows for developing countries at the start of the century and even before (see more on this here covering data until 2000). Interestingly, at variance with the above chart, evidence before 2000 suggests that remittances were negatively (though not statistically significantly) correlated with private capital flows. It appears this negative correlation has been substantially reversed in post-2000 period.

Another study looked at the effect of remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa - the world's poorest region overall, where foreign aid is a very important driver of 'official' development. The study (link here) found that "remittances, which are a stable, private transfer, have a direct poverty mitigating effect, and promote financial development. These findings hold even after factoring in the reverse causality between remittances, poverty and financial development." Globally, the same was established based on pre-2000 data (link here).

A 2009 paper ties remittances (positive effect on long-term growth in the receiving economy) to the degree of development of financial services in the economy (a factor that positively reinforces growth effects of remittances) - details of the study here. Which is sort of a good thing, as remittances themselves promote financial services development (see a study covering 1975-2003 period here).

Given Latin America's experience with emigration and brain drain, data on remittances effects in these countries is interesting in itself. More interesting, however, is the following study that looked at links between remittances, poverty reduction, education and health in recipient countries. "The main findings of the study are the following:

1. regardless of the counterfactual used remittances appear to lower poverty levels in most recipient countries; 
2. yet despite this general tendency, the estimated impacts tend to be modest; and 
3. there is significant country heterogeneity in the poverty reduction impact of remittances' flows.

...While remittances tend to have positive effects on education and health, this impact is often restricted to specific groups of the population."

In contrast to the above studies and many others that reference or identify positive growth effects of remittances, a 2009 IMF study found no positive links between remittances and growth (see link here). So, thankfully for us, economists, Economic Ambiguity prevails...

To make things a little better for the case of remittances v growth, another study (like IMF reliant on modern econometric techniques) looked at the causal links between remittances and growth in Latin American countries. The conclusion (see link to the study here) is that "remittances have a positive and significant effect on economic growth in both groups of countries. ...the impact of remittances is more pronounced in the presence of the financial development variable." The latter bit confirms evidence referenced earlier. 

IMF study is also (weakly) contrasted by the 2006 paper (link here) that found that controlling for endogeneity "...remittances exert a weakly positive impact on long-term macroeconomic growth."

One of the common criticisms of official foreign aid is that it fuels corruption and graft. Surprisingly, there is some evidence that remittances too achieve the same impact on key institutions in the recipient country. IMF study (see link here) found that "a higher ratio of remittances to GDP is associated with lower indices of control of corruption, government effectiveness, and rule of law."

In short, there is huge amount of interesting research on remittances... 

5/9/15: Updating America's Scariest Chart

As you know I rarely post on the U.S. economy. But recently I was updating a presentation involving the state of financial flows for retail investors and savers around the world and had to check up on my old chart that I labeled America's Scariest Chart Redux (see previous update here).

Keep in mind the dominant media meme: the U.S. economy has been growing at a robust rate and the Great Recession has been officially over now for 74 months.

So where does the current unemployment duration (in terms of average duration in weeks) stand?

Err... average duration of unemployment in the U.S. is currently at 28.4 weeks.  Over 12 months period before the onset of the Great Recession, duration averaged 16.8 weeks. Which means that even today, a full 87 months after the start of the Great Recession, average duration of unemployment is 11.6 weeks longer than it was before the crisis. Current deviation from pre-crisis levels in average duration of unemployment is consistent with this measure of labour markets performance in months 17-18 of the crisis.

Worse, we are now (still) in a situation where people on unemployment benefits are staying in unemployment longer, on average, than in any other recession on record.

Now, let's revisit the 'official' former Scariest Chart - the index of employment also plotted by each recessionary period. This chart used to be published regularly, but since end of March 2014, U.S. employment index has finally reached pre-crisis levels of employment and everyone forgot the said chart. Too bad. Here it is, updated to the latest data:

And guess what? The chart above clearly shows that the current period of 'recovery' is still the worst in terms of employment performance than any previous recovery on record.

Just thought you would like an update...

4/9/15: Russian Inflation: Forget CPI, Look at Bribes Pricing

On a 'light' Friday night note, a cheering report of inflation found somewhere (not in the ECB land, alas). Per Interfax report (link here) average bribe extended in Russia rose almost 3-fold to over RUB600,000 in Ruble terms. Between September 1, 2014 and August 31, 2015, according to the independent report prepared by anti-corruption organisation "Clean Hands", rose to RUB613,700 or USD9,440. A year ago, average bribe extended in  Russia stood at RUB218,400 or USD5,600.

That's USD inflation of 40.7% y/y or more than 2.5 times the rate of CPI in Russia.

Top 3 areas where bribery is rampant are: judiciary (>61% of all registered cases), police (39.3% of cases) and prosecution authorities (33.75%).

Perfect FX hedge... thus.


But in real news, inflation ticked up to 15.8% in August up on 15.6% in July. July push was down in part to new tariffs measures, which were supposed to be one-off, but now seemed to have fed into August too. That said, monthly increase was the second smallest this year and all of the inflation push up seemed to be down to Ruble poor showing - posting fourth straight month of declines against the USD. Next week CBR rate decision is now most likely going to come and go with rates remaining at 11%. Still, Ruble is trading within the Government 'comfort range' of RUB/USD65-70 (currently at around 68.495)

August inflation is a shocker less because of the level than because of the change in the momentum. This year, inflation peaked at 17% in March and was declining through June and rose again in July.

3/9/15: ECB Decides to Not Decide, but Reserves a Right to Decide More

ECB decision to hold rates unchanged at today's meeting was hardly of any surprise. This means there is little news in terms of actual policy actions coming from today's council. Instead, some surprises were delivered by Mario Draghi in his statement. Here is a summary.

Firstly, ECB cut GDP projections for the euro area economy. The ECB now expects euro area GDP to grow 1.4% in 2015 (down on previous forecast of 1.5%); 1.7% in 2016 (down of previous forecast of 1.9%) and 1.8% (down on previous forecast of 2.0%). The miracle of "2% growth next year or next after next" has now been abandoned. As the following tweet sums this up:

We also got revised outlook for inflation and a warning from Draghi that inflation can be low or that we might yet see deflation. ECB now projects HICP inflation at 0.1% in 2015 (previous forecast was 0.3%), 1.1% in 2016 (previous forecast at 1.5%) and 1.7% in 2017 (previous forecast was 1.8%). Which means that the ECB is still sticking to the miracle of "close to 2% inflation a year after next" target. Of course, both sets of revisions mean that declines in forecast growth in nominal incomes are going to be sharper than in real GDP. Which means euro area will get less income, more prices. That, presumably, remains the 'good side of inflation' in ECB's mind.

Draghi warned that the 'there are downside risks to September inflation projections'. Now, who could have guessed as much, given that I posted recently the 5yr/5yr swaps chart clearly showing that euro area inflation expectations in the markets have gone soft once again. Shall we repeat that again?

Source: @Schuldensuehner

Draghi's job today, however, was to talk down the euro. Which he did by simply stating that QE will be running at planned rate (EUR60bn purchases) through planned timeline (to September 2016) and can be extended and expanded if the need arises. Promptly, Euro dropped like a rock.

In a typical, by now ritualistic, referencing of the monetary policy transmission mechanism (still broken), Draghi referenced improved, but still poor credit conditions for euro area corporates. Chart illustrates:

Of course, there is little point of reminding all that growth in credit requires growth in demand. Unless, that is, you are a European policymaker who thinks (as they all seem to be required to do) that issuing loans to companies is a great idea to generate economic growth even if there is absolutely no need for new capacity creation in the economy with stalled demand.

In short, ECB has now reacted to the rot in the Emerging Markets (and in particular China). This is a reactive move with some serious wisdom behind it - the rot is not over yet, by all means and the ECB is out of the gates with signalling that it will continue priming the Government bonds markets pump to prevent any spiking in the rates or euro revaluations derailing already weak exports. With BRIC PMIs signalling ongoing and deepening deterioration in global growth conditions (link here), this is expected and wise. For now, doing nothing new, but promising to do it longer and more aggressively is the preferred response from Frankfurt. It might just be enough.

3/9/15: BRIC Composite PMI: August

Having covered Manufacturing (link here) and Services PMIs (link here) for BRIC countries, consider Composite PMIs next.

Note, to make series consistent with my previous indicator, I use x2 factor on composite PMI readings from Markit, going forward, so reference number here is not 50.0 but 100.0.

• Brazil Composite PMI firmed up marginally to 89.6 in August from 86.3 in July. This is the fifth highest reading in recent months, but sixth consecutive reading below 100. Per Markit: "Rising to a five-month high… the Brazil Composite Output Index pointed to a further, although weaker, decline in private sector output. Whereas manufacturing production decreased at a quicker rate, the reduction in service sector activity softened. … New business in the Brazilian service sector decreased for the sixth straight month in August. …Order book volumes at manufacturers dipped at the fastest pace in four years. Subsequently, the contraction in total private sector new work accelerated to the sharpest in three months."
• Russian Composite PMI was also soft, falling to 98.6 in August compared to 101.8 in July, returning the economy toward renewed recessionary momentum after fragile improvement in the first month of 3Q 2015. More on Russian Composite PMI here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/09/3915-russian-manufacturing-services.html.
• China Composite PMI too posted sub-100 reading, falling to 97.6 in August compared to 101.6 in July. Per Markit release: "Though only modest, it was the fastest contraction of output seen since February 2009. The renewed decline in overall output was largely driven by a faster contraction of manufacturing production in August. Furthermore, the latest fall in manufacturing output was the quickest seen in 45 months. Meanwhile, slower growth in service sector business activity also weighed on the headline index. Consequently, total new business at the composite level fell for the first time since April 2014, albeit marginally. ...the latest expansion in service providers’ staff numbers was the weakest seen in the current two-year sequence of job creation and fractional. Job shedding persisted at manufacturing companies, with the pace of reduction quickening slightly since July. Overall, composite employment fell for the third month in a row and at a modest pace."
• India Composite PMI firmed up to 105.2 from 104.0 in July, marking improved growth outlook for the economy and breaking, once again, trend with the rest of the BRICs. Per Markit: "India’s private sector economy improved further in August. The seasonally adjusted Nikkei India Composite PMI Output Index rose to a five-month high… The uptick in growth was boosted by a quicker expansion of services activity, as the increase in manufacturing production softened in August. …New business across the private sector as a whole expanded at a moderate pace that was the quickest since March."

SUMMARY: As charts above show, BRICs as a block are now exerting negative drag on the global economy. This is extremely worrying especially as the core drivers for this weakness are now China and Brazil, opposed to Russia. While Russian economy remains in a recession, overall, it is responsible for lesser share of negative momentum in the BRICs index than the other two troubled economies since around the start of 2Q 2015.

3/9/15: BRIC Servies PMI: August

BRIC Services PMIs are out, so here is the summary of latest changes:

• Brazil Services PMI rose to 44.8 in August from July's 39.1. This marks seventh consecutive month of Services reading below 50.0. July fire was horrific and cam on top of abysmal 39.9 reading in June. August reading is still below 50, but is now the second highest in 7 months. In 12 months from August 2014, the index posted above 50 reading in only two months. This confirms deep-running recessionary dynamic in Brazil's economy.
• Russia Services PMI came in at 49.1, below 50.0 and down on 51.6 in July. Details covered here. As noted, this is a disappointing reading signalling weak contraction in the Services side of the Russian economy, compounding sharper contraction in Manufacturing.
• China Services PMI posted 51.5 in August, down from 53.8 in July. This index has never reached below 50.0 in its history, so 51.5 is a weak reading overall. In fact, this is the slowest pace of expansion signalled by the Services sector since July 2014. Taken together with rather sharp ongoing contraction in Manufacturing, the Services PMI for China suggests that current rate of economic growth in the country is well below the target of 7% annual rate of growth targeted by the Chinese Government. Most likely, stripping out financials (supported by the Government aggressive intervention in the stock markets in recent months), China's Services PMI would be in much worse shape.
• India Services PMI came in at 51.8 - signalling acceleration in growth from 50.8 in July. This marks second consecutive month of above 50.0 readings for this index. 

Some Markit comments on the above:

For China: "The Caixin China General Services Business Activity Index …signalled the slowest increase in activity in the current 13-month sequence of expansion. Total new order growth at service sector companies also weakened in August, with the latest increase in new business the slowest seen in just over a year. According to anecdotal evidence, relatively subdued market conditions had dampened client demand in the latest survey period."

For India: "The seasonally adjusted Nikkei Services Business Activity Index [pointed] to a faster, although modest, expansion in output. Activity growth was recorded in three of the six monitored categories, namely, Hotels & Restaurants, Post & Telecommunication and ‘Other Services’. Leading services activity to increase was a further rise in incoming new work. According to panellists, higher demand coupled with capacity improvements and increased marketing all had contributed to the latest expansion in new business. Despite quickening since July, the rate of growth was moderate. While manufacturing new work rose at a weaker pace than in July, growth nevertheless outpaced that seen at their services counterparts."

CONCLUSION: BRIC economies are suffering from the twin effects on internal structural weaknesses (domestic markets and policies) and from lack of external demand growth. These leading emerging market economies are now solidly in a recessionary dynamic (Brazil and Russia), and near hard landing territory (China). India continues to break trend with the rest of BRICs, although this remains to be seen how long its economy can sustain this decoupling. 

3/9/15: Russian Manufacturing, Services & Composite PMIs: August

Russia PMI data for Services, Manufacturing and Composite posted sub-50 performance across all three indicators in August, returning the economy back to where it was around June 2015, and erasing the fragile expectations of stabilisation that were based on July data.

As noted in my analysis of BRICs manufacturing PMIs earlier (link here):

Russia Manufacturing PMI fell to 47.9 from 48.3 in July, marking 9th consecutive month of sub-50 readings and worst performance in the sector since May 2015. August move effectively demolished previous expectations of stabilisation in Manufacturing sector in Russia.

Per Markit release: "Operating conditions in the Russian manufacturing sector continued to deteriorate during August amid reports of a deterioration in the economic environment. Output was little changed, while new orders and employment both fell to the greatest degrees since May. Notably, a depreciation in the Russian rouble against the US dollar led to a sharp and accelerated increase in average input prices by raising the cost of imported goods. …The net effect was a decline in demand and a drop off in levels of incoming new business."

Meanwhile, Services PMI posted a disappointing decline from 51.6 in July to 49.1 in August, pushing the index below 50 mark once again. The index fell to its lowest level for the period covering last 5 months.

Per Markit: "The Russian service sector registered a slight fall in business activity during August as incoming new orders were barely changed and excess resources remained evident. Backlogs of work were again cut sharply, placing further downward pressure on staffing levels… Undermining service sector activity was a general lack of growth in incoming new business. Latest data showed that new work was only marginally higher, with companies bemoaning a lack of funds at clients amid evidence of a challenging economic environment.

With booth Manufacturing and Services down, Composite PMI for Russia fell below 50.0 marker in August, reaching 49.3 against 50.9 in August. This marks the second month in the last 3 months of sub-50 readings and August Composite PMI level is at the lowest levels since April 2015.

SUMMARY: As I noted consistently in the past, any sign of stabilisation in Russian economy coming on foot of disappointing 1H 2015 will require several confirmations before we can call a switch in the growth trend. This confirmation (on foot of July upside performance) did not arrive to-date.

3/9/15: BRIC Manufacturing PMIs: August

BRICs manufacturing PMIs signalled continued worsening in growth conditions in world's largest emerging markets.

• Brazil Manufacturing PMI fell to an abysmally low 45.8 in August compared to already poor 47.2 in July. This marks the fastest rate of decline in manufacturing activity in the economy since September 2011 and the 7th consecutive month of sub-50 readings in the index.
• Russia Manufacturing PMI fell to 47.9 from 48.3 in July, marking 9th consecutive month of sub-50 readings and worst performance in the sector since May 2015. August move effectively demolished previous expectations of stabilisation in Manufacturing sector in Russia. In my previous posts on the subject I have consistently noted that early signs of such stabilisation were yet to be fully confirmed and we will have to wait until we see Services PMI for Russia for more analysis.
• India Manufacturing PMI continued above-50 trend performance in August, although the index did fall to 52.3 from 52.7 in July. Statistically-speaking, 51.5 for the Indian economy is consistent with moderate growth. Overall, Indian Manufacturing PMIs have now been in continuous expansion territory over 22 consecutive months.
• China Manufacturing PMI came in at a disappointing 47.3 in August, down on already poor 47.8 in July, marking 6th consecutive month of contraction in the sector. Overall, August reading is the lowest since March 2009. The trend suggests the economy is nowhere neat the target of 7% annual growth rate targeted by the Beijing officials.

Summary view: Overall, BRIC Manufacturing PMIs signalled deepening of the ongoing economic growth slowdown in the largest emerging economies. We will need to wait for the analysis of Services and Composite PMIs to confirm this, but August has been a disappointing month for the prospects of global growth recovery.

2/9/15: House prices, rents and Irish demographics

Based on latest data from CSO, Dublin has gained disproportionately in population compared to the rest of the country in 12 months through April 2015. At the top level, Dublin population rose 30,700 in 2015 compared to overall state population rise of 25,800, which implies that ex-Dublin, the country lost population at the rate of 4,900. Dublin v rest of the state population changes were even more dramatic when one considers age distribution.

• Population aged 0-19 years rose in Dublin by 15,700 in 2015. The same group numbers increased state-wide by 19,600. Which means ex-Dublin, younger population rose only 3,900 against Dublin's 15,700. This highlights family formation dynamics in Dublin as opposed to the rest of the country.
• Younger working-age population (age 20-29) fell in Dublin by 5,700 in 2015. Across the country, the decline was 25,400. Which means that ex-Dublin, younger working-age population has declined by 19,700.
• The main cohort of working-age population (30-64 years old) has risen in Dublin by 15,700 in 2015 compared to 2014. Across the country the increase was 14,100, which implies that ex-Dublin, the state lost 1,600 adults in the main working age cohort.
• Older population dynamics were also in favour of Dublin. In 12 months through April 2015, population aged 65 and older rose in Dublin by 4,900 and it was up nationwide by 25,800. Which means that ex-Dublin, older age population rose 20,900.

The above dynamics suggest demographic support for rising property prices and rents in Dublin, as was suggested by some analysts. This may or may not be so, since population dynamics work over years, not in simple y/y terms. So let's take a look at relative changes in Dublin population compared to the rest of the state:

Dublin population, as % of state-wide population of core home ownership demographic that transacts on the purchasing side of the market (30-64 year olds) has been rising overall since falling to 27.5% in 2010 and is currently standing at 28.9%, still below 29.6% high in 1996. But the rental demographic of 20-29 year olds has shown different dynamics, reaching period trough in 2013 (at 32.3%) and rising since then to 33.1% in 2015, a level consistent with 2011. Neither suggests huge uplift in demand for rentals or owner-occupied homes.

Of course, these are cohorts of 2015. Back in 2007, when house loans were last available in plentiful supply, large share of purchasers demographic today was… err… renters. And absent credit for house purchases, as this demographic moved into purchasing age, they stayed renters.  This would suggest increased pressures on rents. But the picture is more messed up by the losses of population share in 20-29 years old group, most likely due to emigration. Longer tenure for children staying in parents' homes also should have held rents back. In other words, our traditional view of demographic distribution of buyers v renters has been messed up by the sheer duration of the current crisis.

Take 2010-2015 period. Over that time, Dublin population of 20-29 year olds fell 61,000 and across the rest of the country, this cohort numbers fell 123,000. But cohort of 30-64 year olds rose in Dublin by 60,900 against a rise of 47,600 in the rest of the country. Demand based on demographics, therefore, suggests swing from renting toward purchasing. Similar picture repeats if we take 2011-2015 cumulative changes and 2012-2015 and 2013-2015. And, still, rents were rising.

What is more mysterious is that overall working age population has been relatively mildly altered in recent years. In Dublin, working age cohort (20-64 year olds) has grown by just 10,000 in 2014-2015 period and it is up only 8,000 on 2012. The cohort is still down 13,300 on 2008. Across the country, ex-Dublin, things were much worse: since 2008 the cohort fell 62,200 and compared to 2014 it is now down 21,300. In simple terms, unless children and retirees are buying homes, there shouldn't be any dramatic uplifts in demand for property in Dublin, and most certainly outside Dublin.

Which goes to say that any claims about actual demand (based on numbers of potential renters and buyers) are a bit strained. In 2008, there were 821,200 people of age 20-64 living in Dublin. Today there are 807,900. Unemployment rose over that time too. So where is that tremendous growth in demand coming from to push property prices up? Property prices in Dublin hit a period trough in 2012. Since then, there has been a net increase of just 8,000 in 20-64 year olds cohort living in Dublin. Again, where is that spiking in demand coming from?

In my view, simple demographics do not explain Irish property prices uptick from crisis lows. Speculation and latent surplus of savings in a relatively small category of Irish residents (and ex-past), plus re-distribution within cohorts between renters and buyers are the main drivers on demand side of the equation. Supply side also contributes significantly to prices uptick. And beyond that, there has to be significant behavioural component: our addiction to property - despite all the hopes of Dublin 'planners' for an Amsterdam on the Liffey - has not gone away over the years of the crisis. The first, initial shock to the economy has had an effect of scaring us put of the markets for property. Negative equity contributed more downward momentum. But once we learned to live with our fears, we simply decided o turn back to our old model of family investment: bricks and mortar. 

30/8/15: Migration & Changes in Irish Population: Working Age Population

In two previous posts, I looked at Irish migration and population changes data from the point of:
- Top level analysis of migration and natural changes in population; and
- Migration trends by nationality.

Continuing with analysis of population data from CSO released earlier this week, let's take a look at the age composition of population.

In what follows, I define two key categories within our population:

• Working age group - population aged 20 years through 64 years. This is an approximate definition, and I prefer it to including 15-20 year olds into it, primarily because it allows for more accurate reflection of numbers in full time education. There are many caveats applicable here, so take the approximation for what it is - indicative, rather than definitive.
• Non-working age population (rest of population). Again, that is not to say that younger students do not work (at least part-time) or that people beyond 65 years of age do not work. Some do. Majority do not. When many do work, they work less hours than is required to sustain independent living, so they still rely on either pensions or social transfers or family transfers or any permutations of the three to sustain themselves.

In simple terms, mindful of all caveats, etc, a ratio of working age population to non-working age population tells so a bit about how high is the dependency weight in the society due to age distribution in population. Lower ratio means fewer working age adults having to sustain themselves and non-working age people. By sustain I mean economically sustain - by working and adding value in the economy.


Chart below shows distribution of changes in working age population and non-working age population in y/y and cumulatively from 2008:

What stands out in the chart?

1. Working age population overall has been in decline since 2010. In cumulative terms, number of working age adults has fallen 2.7% on 2008 level by April 2015 - a decline of 75,500. In 2015, the rate of decline was 0.4% - more moderate than in three previous years, but still steeper than 2010-2011 average.
2. Non-working age population remains on the rise for every year covered by the CSO series and the rate of increase in 2015 (at 2%) was the highest since 2010. Overall, over 2008-2015 period, non-working age population those 13.3% or 225,900.
3. The gap between working age population and non-working age population is now at 798,400 - the worst reading in series history and 301,400 worse than in 2008.

As the result of the above trends, ratio of working age population to non-working age population continued to fall precipitously in 2015:

In 2015, the ratio of working age population to non-working age population was 1.42 - meaning that for each non-working age person, there were 1.42 working age adults. This does not correct for the working age adults who are not in the labour force as well as for the unemployed. The best performance year in this metric was 2007 when the ratio was 1.66. In other words, in 2015, there were 24 fewer working age adults per each 100 non-working age persons than in 2007.