13/7/15: A Promise of a Deal = An Actual Surrender

So we finally have a 'historic' agreement on Greece. You know the details:

1. Tsipras surrendered on everything, except one thing.
2. One thing Tsipras 'won' is that the assets fund (to hold Greek Government assets in an escrow for Institutions to claim in case of default) will be based in Greece (as opposed to Luxembourg), managed still by Troika (it remains to be seen under which law).
3. IMF is in and is expected to have a new agreement with Greece past March 2016 when the current one runs out. So not a lollipop for Tsipras to bring home.
4. All conditionalities are front-loaded to precede the bailout funding and Wednesday deadline for passing these into law is confirmed. 

Bloomberg summed it up perfectly in this headline: EU Demands Complete Capitulation From Tsipras.

Remember,  Tsipras went into the last round of negotiations with the following demands:

Source: @Tom_Nuttall

And that was after he surrendered on Vat, Islands, pensions, corporation tax - all red line items for him during the referendum.

Reality of the outcome turned out to be actually worse. 

The new 'deal' involves a large quantum of debt (EUR86 billion, well in excess of Greek Government request from the ESM) and the banks bailout funding requirement has just been hiked from EUR10-25 billion to 'up to EUR50 billion', presumably to allow for some reductions in ELA. 

The new 'deal' only promises to examine debt sustainability issue. There are no writedowns, although Angela Merkel did mention that the plan does not rule out possible maturities extensions and repayment grace period extensions. This, simply, is unlikely to be enough.

The 'deal' still requires approval of the national parliaments. Which can be tricky. Here is the table of ESM capital subscriptions by funding nation:

Tsipras also lost on all fronts when it comes to privatisations. In fact, even if the future Government lags on these, the EU can now effectively cease control over the assets in the fund and sell these / monetise to the fund itself. Not sure as per modalities of this, but...

Detailed privatisation targets are to be re-set. Let's hope they will be somewhat more realistic (home hardly justified in the context of the new 'deal'):

To achieve this, EU had to literally blackmail Tsipras by rumour and demands:

Source: @TheStalwart

Source: @Frances_Coppola

And so the road to the can kicking (not even resolution) is still arduous:

 Source: @katie_martin_fxs

My view: the crisis has not gone away for three reasons:

1. Short-term, we are likely to see new elections in Greece prior to the end of 2015;
2. We are also likely to see more disagreements between the euro states and Greece on modalities of the programme; and
3. Crucially, over the medium term, the new 'deal' is simply not addressing the key problem - debt sustainability. 

For the fifth year in a row, EU opts for kicking the same can down the same road. 

13/7/15: IMF's Russian Economy Forecasts 2015-2016

IMF WEO update covered, briefly, changes to the Fund outlook for the Russian economy. Here's a summary:

Overall, the only point here is the delayed upgrade to Russian forecast for 2015-2016. Lower rate of contraction forecast for 2015 (from -3.833% in April WEO to -3.4% this time around) and return to (basically zero) growth in 2016 (+0.2% forecast in july compared to -1.096% in April).

In its briefing on the WEO update, IMF said (emphasis mine): "The other country where the numbers are very bad is in Russia. We now forecast Russia’s growth to be negative at -3.4 percent. It’s a bit better than the forecast in April. That comes from a small improvement in commodity prices and a small increase in confidence, but that’s clearly a very large negative number that will lead to a very tough year in Russia."

Additional risk factor, noted by the IMF, is rates reversion in the U.S. and closing on the rate reversion cycle re-start in the euro area: "...this is going to be the year in which the interest rate in the U.S. is going to start increasing. The date by which the interest rate is expected to increase in Europe will also get closer, and so you are going to see tighter financial conditions, which means that capital will tend to go back to where the rates are attractive. So far, it hasn’t been happening on a very large scale. I think we can expect some capital outflows from a number of these countries, and these always create some problems but they can handle, but that is a challenge they are going to have to face."

Just how bad the effect of rates reversion will be is hard to tell. Overall, however, Russian economy has suffered quite significantly from both, the adverse changes in the global credit flows (away from emerging markets in general) and idiosyncratic drivers pushing credit supply lower. Here are two charts covering the latest BIS data we have:

Overall credit:

Credit to non-financial private sector:

And sources of funding:

Source for charts above: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/062915.pdf

13/7/15: About That Europe's Recovery Party

Last week, IMF published its WEO update for July. Little to go by in the general 'news' terms, but a telling sign of just how well repaired the world economy is becoming.

First, off the top, IMF dropped its forecast for global growth for 2015 from 3.5% in April 2015 to 3.3% in July. 2016 outlook remains unchanged at 3.8%. Given IMF estimates 2013-2014 growth at 3.4% each year, this means that 2015 is now expected to be sub-average for the three years period - hardly a sign of an improvement.

When considered by broader regions, Advanced Economies drove deterioration in the outlook. 2015 growth in advanced economies is now projected to be around 2.1%, down on 2.4% projection back in April. 2016 outlook is unchanged at 2.4%. Meanwhile, Emerging Markets and Developing Economies growth forecast has deteriorated from 4.3% in 2015 projected back in April, to 4.2% in July update. 2016 outlook remains the same at 4.7% projected growth rate.

IMF lauded the return to growth in the Euro area, which is supposedly booming - forecast to expand at 1.5% in 2015 (July outlook), same as in April outlook. And the Fund produced a doozer of an uplift to 2016 forecast growth - from 1.6% expected back in April to 1.7% expected in July update. Meanwhile, the U.S. economy got severely downgraded to 2.5% forecast expansion for 2015 (against 3.1% forecast back in April) and to 3.0% expansion forecast for 2016 (against 3.1% forecast back in April).

You can't make this up: the return to growth in Europe is still full-blown 40 percent lower growth than in wobbling U.S. Just in case you wondered: over 2013-2015, according to the latest forecast from the Fund,

• U.S. economy will expand, cumulatively, by 5.39%
• Euro area economy will grow by 1.91%
• Japan will grow by 2.31%
• UK will expand by 7.16%, and
• Other Advanced Economies group will grow by 7.90%.

Yes, that's right - Euro area will under-perform Japan, the heroes of 'blanket QE bombing' of the economy. 

12/7/15: Instead of Abating, Greek Crisis Just Accelerated

Per latest reports, Eurogroup estimates Greek funding needs at EUR82-86 billion - a far cry from EUR53.5 billion requested from ESM. EUR10-25 billion needed for banking sector (because bailing out European states must always involve bailing out banks).

In order to continue funding discussions, Greece is required to pass the following 12 measures before Wednesday:

Source: @eurocrat 

The list is at best - silly:

• Measures 1-3, and 6 are effectively MOU for a bailout, but without an actual bailout commitments;
• Measures 4,  7-9, and 11 require significant time to properly draft, let alone implement;
• Measure 12 is senile - no one has ejected Institutions from Athens (they don't require a visa to travel there);
• Measures 5 and 10 are pro-forma.

Can anyone seriously expect any Government addressing the issues of banks recapitalisation and recovery, plus the issue of non-performing loans within a span of 3 days?

Besides all of this, the key point is that the 12 measures outlined effectively fully and comprehensively pushes Greece into worse adjustments package than anything put forward prior to the Greek referendum. And all this achieves is... brings Greece back comes Wednesday to face more negotiations over additional measures. 

Below are the four pages of key document from the Eurogroup

Source: @giopank

Alternative link to same: http://www.real.gr/DefaultArthro.aspx?page=arthro&id=432281&catID=22

Items that were not agreed upon are in the brackets. These include: nominal debt haircuts.

There is also a proposed escrow 'company' to hold EUR50 billion of Greek assets as collateral (titles to state properties) in Luxembourg (which is neither enforceable, nor serious). 

In simple terms, Greek choice is now stark and simple: accept complete control over the economy and assets from Brussels/Frankfurt or 'temporary' Grexit for 5 years with possible haircuts to debt. Germany et al just accelerated the crisis... next move: Greece.

11/7/15: Harder Default for Greece, Less Democracy for All

My article on the Greek crisis for Irish Independent: impossible mathematics of debt and the political trilemma of sacrificed democracies: http://www.independent.ie/opinion/comment/expect-a-harder-default-for-greeks-and-less-democracy-for-the-rest-of-us-31368677.html

11/7/15: For Nama, Karma's a generous bitch...

Refusing to go away... Nama story of Stg7 million 'set-aside' and Stg15 million fees demand off Pimco (notified by the fund to Nama and seemingly ignored by Nama, except to the point of not involving Pimco in subsequent sale) is now rolling into investigation stages in the UK and, potentially, the U.S. http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/news/nama-debtors-helped-uncover-7m-payment-31368628.html.

Just because, as someone pointed out to me in poignant terms: Karma is a bitch... Well, it may be so, but so far, Nama is sitting pretty, with average salary for an employee in excess of EUR100,000 and golden handshakes for the departing employees averaging EUR34,000 and lavish pensions entitlements... Karma might be a bitch, but when it comes to Nama, it is a generous bitch at our expense...

You can follow back a list of my posts on Nama most recent controversies starting from here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/07/6715-more-nama-and-ibrc-headlines.html.

Update: FT covering the Nama story: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/11109080-26f2-11e5-bd83-71cb60e8f08c.html#axzz3faW3h8ag. Because Irish reputational capital yields have been too low of late...

10/7/15: Irish Quarterly PMIs: Manufacturing, Services & Construction

Irish PMI for June, released earlier this month by Markit (co-branded by Investec) give us a chance to look at quarterly activity. Given volatility in both Manufacturing and Services activity in the monthly data, this provides a slightly better potential insight into what is going on in the economy (see caveat at the bottom of the post).

Q2 2015 average PMI for Manufacturing sector reads 55.8 - the lowest for any quarter since Q2 2014, but still solidly in an expansion range. Q2 2015 marks second consecutive quarter of declining manufacturing PMI readings. However, on a positive side, Q2 2015 was the 8th consecutive quarter of readings above 50. Year on year, growth in the sector remained largely unchanged and growth de-accelerated on a quarterly basis.

Q2 2015 average PMI for Services rose marginally to 61.8 from 61.6 in 1Q 2015 and is below 62.1 average for Q2 2014. Q2 2015 marks 18th consecutive quarterly reading above 50 for the Services sector. Year on year, growth slowed down in the Services sector and quarter on quarter it remained largely static.

Construction sector PMI (co-branded with Ulster Bank) posted quarterly average of 60.3 in Q2 2015, well above 54.0 average for Q1 2015, but below 61.2 average for Q2 2014. Thus, year on year growth fell in the Construction sector, but there was a significant acceleration in quarter on quarter growth. Q2 2015 marks 8th consecutive quarter with average PMI above 50.0.

Composite PMI (subject to future revisions due to sectoral weights changes once we have Q1 and Q2 national accounts) posted a reading of 60.4 in Q2 2015, up on 59.0 in Q1 2015 and marginally higher than 60.2 reading in Q2 2014. Year on year, composite PMI signalled basically static performance, while quarterly growth improved somewhat in Q2 2015.


Caveat: Irish PMI readings have very low direct correlation to actual growth in the economy, measured by either GDP or GNP. Historically, PMIs levels and changes explain at most ca 10.6 percent of variations in GNP and at most 8.8 percent of variations in GDP. In other words, booming PMIs, on average, do not translate into booming economy. 

10/7/15: New Greek Proposals: Can + Foot ≠ Real Solution

Greek Government proposal to the EU on Bailout package 3.0 have been published here: http://www.naftemporiki.gr/finance/story/976680/the-greek-reform-proposals.

Quick read through suggests the following:

• These proposals are pretty much in line with June 26th proposals that were subsequently rejected by the 'No' vote in the Greek referendum;
• The 'new' proposals appear to be a complete climb down from the Greek Government counter-proposals on key areas of VAT, pensions and islands measures;
• One key strategic point is that the new proposal accepts fully 'prior actions' principle of putting in place legislative backing for key early measures ahead of any bailout funds disbursal;
• The 'new' proposals submitted to Institutions contain no reference to debt sustainability and debt relief, although it appears that a preamble to the document in Greek version does mention debt relief.  There are reports also that Greek proposals sent to the Parliament contain reference to the EU commitment to 'negotiate with Greece on the issue of debt sustainability post-2022'. Which, if true, is a dead giveaway, as no one will honour any commitments on such a time scale and absent any specific conditions on debt sustainability. 2022 is the year chosen because it is when EFSF repayments start. Most expensive debt to carry for Greece - IMF and ECB - is off limits for any restructuring under this timeline;
• Crucially, the new proposal does not address in full how Greek banks ELA will be covered, and how the arrears to IMF will be covered. Neither does it explain how July 2015 debt repayments will be financed. This, jointly, means that the EUR53.5 billion request for new loans is not sufficient. The Institutions, most likely, will ask for a deposits bail-in. 
• The only differences to the 'old' Institutions' proposals include: smaller cut in defence budget (EUR200mln instead of EUR400mln), slower phasing out of the islands reduced VAT rates (throughout 2016) and slower phasing out of the EKAS supplement on pensions.
• Greek proposals contain a sub-clause of defined actions that will kick in automatically if fiscal targets are not met in the future. These include hikes on income tax for those earning EUR12,000 (2 percentage points to 35%).
• Materially, the new 'proposal' involves EUR53.5 billion in new loans via ESM (ex-IMF): http://bigstory.ap.org/article/0743c14d12d34ea38d1043b5dbcdfba5/latest-eu-economics-chief-says-greece-deal-possible. IMF porgramme runs through April 2016 and, presumably, Bailout 3.0 is going to happen via ESM alone. Which is a net negative for Greece, since it will lose its only support on debt writedown side.

These are the details so far.

My view is that this proposal will probably be acceptable to the EU, which will close its eyes on two glaringly obvious things:

1. The proposal from the EU on which this current Greek counter proposal is based was based on assumptions and estimates that are at least 3 weeks old, and for some figures - older. Economic and fiscal losses since then have been significant and most likely remain un-covered by the current Greek proposal. These losses will not be terminated immediately post-agreement, so the Greeks have a much more serious problem on their hands.

2. Most importantly, the Greek proposal does nothing to address the existent debt overhang - the one that the IMF believes cannot be addressed via enhanced 'reforms' and increased 'austerity' and requires debt haircuts. 

However, I suspect that since avoiding Grexit is now clearly Greek Government priority, and since doing the same always was and remains the EU priority, both sides will ignore the discomforts of reality. In this case, under the Bailout 3.0, Greek debt will rise (once again), Greek economy will get a negative shock of higher taxation (corporate, personal and indirect), and a large number of Greek voters will get a strong sense of having been cheated out of their 'No' votes. And then there is the risk of looming deposits bail-ins...

This can kicking will not last long...

9/7/15: BRIC Composite PMIs: June 2015 & 2Q 2015

In the previous post covering Manufacturing & Services PMIs for BRIC economies, I promised to provide a separate summary of composite PMI-signalled activity.

Here is the summary of both Services and Manufacturing PMIs moves in June:

On a simple cumulative basis (unweighted by sector weights, not to be confused with Markit's Composite PMI):

• Brazil composite activity stood at 86.4 in June, down from 88.4 in May. 2Q 2015 average was 88.5 against 98.4 for 1Q 2015 and down from 99.7 for 2Q 2014. In short - we have ongoing and worsening slowdown in activity across both sectors combined, with the fourth consecutive month of the combined reading below expansion line (100).
• Russia composite activity stood at 98.2 in June, down from 100.4 in May. 2Q 2015 average was 99.4 - an improvement on 92.2 for 1Q 2015 and better than 96.4 recorded for 2Q 2014. The ongoing slowdown is moderating, with activity across both sectors combined showing slower rates of contraction in 2Q 2015. That said, combined activity has been posting contractionary signals in 8 out the last 9 months.
• India composite activity fell to 99.0 in June, posting the first month of sub-100 reading since April 2014, down from 102.2 in May. 2Q 2015 average was 101.6 against 105.4 for 1Q 2015 and down from 102.4 for 2Q 2014. This implies that Indian economic activity growth was posting a significant slowdown q/q and y/y in 2Q 2015.
• China composite activity stood at 101.2 in June, down from 102.7 in May. 2Q 2015 average was 101.9 virtually unchanged against 102.0 for 1Q 2015 and up slightly on 101.1 for 2Q 2014.  China's economy was the only economy in the BRIC group that remained above the 100 line in June.

Charts below illustrate the latest trends:

In summary, things are getting worse, progressively across the BRIC economies, with Russia, surprisingly, presenting an upside momentum to the overall group growth dynamics. That said, the trends are yet to be fully established for Russia. Overall, BRICs have now running along the negative growth trend for some time and BRIC combined (weighted by each economy share of total group GDP) momentum is at 99.0 in June, marking the first sub-100 reading since May 2014. 3mo average through 2Q 2015 is at 100.3, down on 1Q 2015 average of 101.4 and down on 2Q 2014 average of 100.8.

9/7/15: BRIC Manufacturing & Services PMIs: June 2015 & 2Q 2015

With BRICS summit on its way, an updated post on BRIC PMIs (data from Markit):

Brazil:

Manufacturing PMI stood at 46.5 in June, singling sharp rate of contraction that was somewhat slower than the decline in May (45.9). Per Markit, "new orders and output both drop at sharp rates; inflationary pressures ease." June PMI was the highest in four months and marks the fifth consecutive month of sub-50 readings. 3mo average is now at 46.1 against 3mo average through March at 48.8 and 3mo average through June 2014 at 48.9.

Services PMI also came in at disappointing levels, falling to an abysmally low 39.9 in June from already low 42.5 in May. This marks the lowest reading in Services PMI since March 2009 and the second lowest reading in Services PMI in history.

As noted by Markit, "Private sector jobs cut at quickest pace for over six years; Steep, but slower, contraction in new orders received by private sector firms."

With 4th consecutive month of sub-50 readings, services PMI averaged 42.3 in 3mo period through June 2015, compared to 49.5 average for the 3mo period through March 2015 and 50.8 for the 3mo average through June 2014.

Overall, "Brazil’s private sector economy registered its sharpest retreat since March 2009. Down from 42.9 in May to 41.0 in June, the Composite Output Index was indicative of a steep drop in activity, with sharp falls seen at both service providers and manufacturers."

Russia:

Russian PMIs are covered in detail here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2015/07/4715-russia-services-and-manufacturing.html?spref=tw and summarised below in the table.

India:

India's Manufacturing PMI came in at 51.3, signalling weak-to-moderate expansion of manufacturing output and down from 53.5 in May. On a 3mo average basis, June 2015 PMI was at 51.7 - marginally slower than 3mo average of 52.1 for the period January-March 2015 and slightly ahead of 51.4 3mo average registered through June 2014. Markit noted that June figures presented the "slowest rise in new work since September 2014; Negligible increases in input costs and output charges."

On Services PMI side, June reading of 47.7 marks second consecutive month of sub-50 readings and a sharpening in the downturn from 49.6 in May 2015. 3mo average through June 2015 is now at 49.9 against 3mo average through March 2015 of 53.1 and 3mo average through June 2014 at 51.0. Services PMI is now sitting at the lowest level since March 2014.

Per Markit: "Falling to 49.2, from 51.2 In May, the seasonally adjusted Nikkei India Composite PMI Output Index recorded below the crucial 50.0 threshold for the first time since April 2014. Reductions in activity were centred at service providers, as manufacturing production rose during the month."

China:

HSBC Purchasing Managers’ Index for manufacturing posted at 49.4 in June. This was the fourth successive, marginally up on 49.2 in May. This marks 4th consecutive month of Chinese manufacturing PMI readings below 50. Per Markit release, "Output contracts at slower pace as new orders show signs of revival" but "Staff numbers are cut at sharpest rate since February 2009." 3mo average through June 2015 was 49.2 down from 3mo average for 1Q 2015 AT 50.0 and lower than 49.4 3mo average through 2Q 2014.

On services side, PMI posted a significant "moderation in the rate of service sector activity growth. Moreover, it was the slowest expansion in services business activity since January, as signalled by the HSBC China Services Business Activity Index posting 51.8, down from May’s eight-month high of 53.5." However, 3mo average for services was at 52.7 in June 2015, compared to 52.0 in 3mo period through March 2015 and 51.7 for the 3mo average through June 2014.

"HSBC China Composite PMI™ data (which covers both manufacturing and services) pointed to a further rise in total business activity in China during June. However, the rate of expansion eased to a marginal pace that was the slowest recorded since May 2014. This was signalled by the HSBC Composite Index posting only slightly above the neutral 50.0 mark at 50.6 in June, down from 51.2 in May."

CHARTS

As shown in the charts above, growth conditions remain negative in 3 out of 4 BRIC economies in Manufacturing and Services. No single BRIC economy is posting broad cross-sectoral growth in June and on quarterly averages basis, 

• Brazil is running negative growth signals in both Services and Manufacturing;
• Russia and China are running negative growth in both Manufacturing;
• India is running negative growth in Services.

This contrasts with 1Q 2015 when Brazil and Russia were posting negative growth across both Services and Manufacturing, while India and China were posting positive growth across both sectors.

Things are getting tougher in the BRICs...

Stay tuned for composite analysis and summary next.

8/7/15: ECB QE: Strong Monetary, Weak Real Impacts

My presentation on QE for today's hearing at the Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform, the Houses of the Oireachtas.

8/7/15: Latest Round of Greece Talks: Smoke, Fire, Grexit

Summit / Eurogroup takeaways:

1. No progress of any variety beyond the usual agreement to have more talks
2. Short term deal 'weighing in' for Sunday is rumoured - effectively a bridge loan based on Greek acceptance of pre-referendum proposals. One of proposals involved a 3-4 months long bridge financing deal (Bailout 2.1) followed by 3-4 year deal (Bailout 3.0). This was rejected by Finland.
3. Any 'possible' new deal being discussed is 2-3 years in duration - a can kicking of weak variety, in other words.
4. No haircuts on debt will be allowed.
5. Sunday - full EU heads summit (not euro alone), which indicates something serious brewing - at least in terms of applying pressure on Tsipras. Also, possible Grexit push. Summit can be 'avoided' if Greece presents an acceptable plan on Thursday. Decision to be finalised on Saturday.
6. Overall, Bailout 3.0 package of measures is now being pushed out to tougher conditionality for Greece than in previous talks.
7. Juncker stated that the EU Commission has prepared a detailed Grexit plan, inclusive of humanitarian aid. Juncker plan also includes balance of payments support scheme for non-euro states with big exposures to Greek banks: Bulgaria, Romania. Big questions are also about Macedonia and Serbia.
8. At least in theory (detailed theory per Juncker) we have the end of 'irreversibility' of the euro (for now - at single state level).
9. IMF is back in the Troika 'Institutions' pairing.
10. No parallel currency discussions - left to Finance Ministers discussions.

My take: Overall, Greek position is now nearly toast. Contrary to many expectations, a No vote did not produce a stronger playing hand for Greece. Possibly because Tsipras failed to deliver any new proposals. Sunday EU Council would be required for a treaty change. This implies two possibilities: haircuts (ruled out) or Grexit. We are leaning toward Grexit, heavily.

The acceleration in Eurogroup and council demands on Greece suggests that prior to the Referendum there was already a strong consensus that Grexit is the preferred direction for further talks.


Serious sidelines:

Italy position is optimistic on the deal, but no debt relief in sight. Still remains hard-line on Greece.

Merkel takes harder stance than anyone else: strikes down bridge agreement: "Bridge financing didn't play any role in our talks tonight." Stance on conditions: "The proposals we are expecting now encompass what we put forward for second programme plus more for third programme." Haircuts: "A haircut is not up for debate. That is a bailout under the treaties and that will not happen." Merkel isn't even keen on discussing ESM programme resumption. Tougher thing still: "The situation has become much worse. I have to take 3rd programme proposals to Bundestag - hence need detail." Which means serious hurdles to cover here.

France is the lead in Greek side support and Hollande is not impressed: "It is true that if there were no agreement, the situation would be serious. Other options would have to be sought."

Spain's Rajoy "New Greek programme will have conditions attached. Will have to be approved by institutions, then Eurogroup, then leaders". Meaningless, surprisingly.

Donald Tusk: "Our inability to find an agreement may lead to the insolvency of Greece and the bankruptcy of its banking system". Says the Greek government is to present its proposals by Thursday, July 9. Juncker put deadline at 8:30 am Friday, July 10. So lots of confusion.

Finland: ruled out Bailout 3.0 for Greece on any terms.

Belgium: Finance Minister Van Overtveldt: "very disappointed" by today's Eurogroup meeting. New Greek Finance Minister made "very good explanation" of situation, but "had no new proposals to show us". "I had the strong impression that everybody really feels the sense of urgency, except the Greek government." His boss: Belgian PM Michel: has “more and more difficulty to understand the logic of Tsipras. On the one hand he says 'we want to stay in the eurozone'. On the other hand, he's not taking any initiative, zero, nothing, to stay in the eurozone.”

Lastly - a link worth reading: http://www.capx.co/the-eurocrats-are-punishing-greece-to-scare-other-countries/