18/6/2014: Russian Economy & Tech Sector

I just posted few slides from my presentation on Russian economy and tech sector delivered as keynote at Enterprise Ireland Russian Tech Forum on June 4.

Since there are two articles by a reported who attended the Forum forthcoming (based on this presentation) in Russian language European press, I might as well share the full deck here as well. So here it is:

Click on individual slides to expand

18/6/2014: Tech Start Ups in Russia: Some Facts, Some Hearsay

An interesting article on Russian tech start-up scene: http://thenextweb.com/insider/2014/06/17/startups-russia-government/ Some of it is true, some is hearsay...

If you want some added factual insights: few slides from my recent presentation at Enterprise Ireland:

17/6/2014: Gas, Oil, Russia, Ukraine & Europe: couple of links

An interesting report from Bloomberg on Russia's demand for oil exploration and production JVs with Western companies: here.
One core reference is to the new/old Bazhenov superfield which I covered before here.
Meanwhile, I commented before that Ukraine gas supply disruption is a distinct issue from the European gas supplies, as Ukraine has a separate contract relating to gas transit and this contract has always been paid in full and there are no arrears on it. Ukraine legally does not own the gas it transits. In other words, any disruption to supply of gas to Europe via Ukraine can only come from Ukrainian authorities appropriating gas that belongs to other countries. I expect this to be highly unlikely, especially since Ukraine has pumped in gas reserves sufficient to last it through mid-December 2014.
To confirm this, here is the EU Commission position on the issue of security of supply to European customers. 
And Gazprom position on the issue: "Russian gas transit supplies via Ukraine are being delivered in routine mode. The daily gas amount stands at slightly more than 185 million cubic meters. An emergency headquarters started working in Russian energy giant Gazprom, monitoring the situation every day. If Gazprom finds that gas intended for Europe is left in Ukraine, Russia will increase gas supplies via Nord Stream and Yamal-Europe projects, Miller said. The upstream throughput capacity of Ukrainian gas delivery system makes 288 billion cubic meters and the downstream one amounts to 178.5 billion cubic meters. The country’s gas transportation system consists of 72 gas compressor stations, 110 shops and 1,451 gas hubs. The length of gas pipelines makes 38,600 kilometers."

Predictably, Ukraine blames 'terrorists' (aka 'separatists') for today's explosion. Report here. However, not known for its pro-Russian views, Euronews had to acknowledge that "...explosion was far from the violence in east Ukraine..." Never mind, we know Ukraine has no extremists on the other side of the ethnic divide... why, none at all... and none of them would ever want to do any harm to Gazprom lines to Europe... why, never, of course. It is just so slightly inconvenient that Mr Yatsenuk's own backers - Euro Maidan - are on the record saying they are in favour of blowing up pipelines: http://euromaidanpr.wordpress.com/2014/04/13/plan-b-flatten-belgorod/.

Nice touch there ahead of spreading uranium, and shelling Russian cities (the brave folks would obviously expect Russia to not retaliate),

Truth is - we simply do not know who blew up the pipe, and it is unlikely we will ever find out.

17/6/2014: Ireland's Regulatory 'Resource Curse'

My WallStreet Journal op-ed on the European Commission's investigation into Apple tax affairs in Ireland is linked here.

17/6/2014: Some more troublesome facts about European Competitiveness rankings...

Yesterday, I posted briefly on World Economic Forum Competitiveness Rankings for European Union. That post is available here.

Since then, few people came back to me with a request of running the same analysis across all countries covered in the report. So here it is.

First, WEF Rankings:

Supposedly, higher ranking (lower rank number) means better economic competitiveness. Which should imply two things:
1) Negative correlation between rank and economic growth (higher competitiveness --> higher growth in the economy)
2) Negative correlation between rank improvement (improved rankings) and economic growth (improving competitiveness --> higher growth).

Here is a chart plotting average growth rate in the economies covered by WEF over 2010-2013 (same result, qualitatively, holds for 2012-2013 average, to remove some of the volatility in growth rates) and WEF rankings improvements:

No, statistically-speaking there is no relationship of any meaning between WEF Competitiveness performance over 2012-2014 and growth performance over 2010-2013.

What about rank performance in 2014 and 2012-2013 growth rates?

Nope. No relationship at all.

How about rank performance in 2012 against future 2012-2013 growth?

Totally zero relationship.

So what does this WEF Competitiveness indicator measure exactly? Pet projects of WEF members? Intensity of politically correct policies deployment in the European states? I have no idea, but their competitiveness seems to have preciously nada to do with growth performance...

15/6/2014: WEF Misses on Another 'Metric'...

WSJ reported on Finland taking the lead in the EU competitiveness gains:

Link here: http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2014/06/10/finland-leapfrogs-sweden-in-competitiveness-new-report-says/?mod=e2tw

And here is my reply...

So Finland is one of the worst performers in the EA18 in terms of actual growth outcomes during the crisis and subsequent recovery. And it was followed by Sweden (stronger performer) and the Netherlands (even worse performer than Finland)...

This just confirms simple fact: World Economic Forum is not a very good indicator of anything other than egos of its participants and 'young leaders'... full stop... 

15/6/2014: Russia-Ukraine Gas Deal: They Are Where They Were...

So yesterday's (almost/nearly)last-ditch efforts to sort out as deal between Russia and Ukraine ended, predictably, in the same stalemate. The meeting was held in Kyiv/Kiev (or whatever we should call it nowadays). European Energy Commissioner Guenther Oettinger attended, seriously phased by the possibility that Ukraine (no, not Russia) will shut off transit of Russian gas to the EU (note: Russia is not threatening to stop supplies to its non-Ukrainian buyers, so let's dispense with this bit of propaganda).

We do not know if talks will resume today. Gazprom said yesterday that no new date for talks has been fixed, but that can change any time.

So here is where we are:

Last week, Gazprom offered Ukraine exactly the same gas contract terms that were extended to Yanukovych, including the discounts. That's official: President Putin confirmed as much in public. Gazprom agreed to delay gas payments until June 16th to sort out new contract.

The discount advanced to Ukraine was $100 per thousand cubic meters (mcm) and the first price offer was $385 mcm net. Again, this was confirmed by Russian President.

Ukrainian response was that they wanted lower price and they wanted that lower price fixed over a long-term contract. We do not know how long of a fix Ukraine expected (may be, Kiev wanted something similar to Chinese deal - which came at around $350-380 mcm but covers larger volumes and options to increase these volumes further), plus involves a counterpart (China) that never failed to pay on contracts. History of Ukraine-Russia dealings on gas has been checkered at best (see this note which only touches on some top level points relating to 2009 gas deal and more here on 3 years of consecutive violation by Ukraine of the gas purchase contract: here, albeit I do find the 2009 contract to be harsh for Ukraine).

So back to the current saga. $385 mcm is lower than price Poland pays for Russian gas, which comes at a price of around $465 mcm, and is slightly above the price paid by Germany or $370 mcm (though Germany has direct access to Russian-controlled, jointly enveloped Nord Stream pipeline).

Relating to Ukraine's demands/concerns with contract duration, President Putin instructed the Government to develop an option to fix contract terms 'for a certain period' - again, we are unclear as to what duration this period refers to or what duration fix Ukraine wants.

Specifically, president Putin said: “I would like to ask the government and the head of the cabinet to think on how it could be possible at the level of the government of the Russian Federation or upon agreement with the government of Ukraine freeze these terms and make them absolutely guaranteed and free from changes for a certain period…" Ukraine's concern that the $100 mcm discount offered can be unilaterally canceled: “We have never done so. We have always demonstrated that our agreements are reliable to the maximum."

Putin's point makes sense: he offered Ukraine exactly the same terms and conditions for gas pricing as Yanukovich faced prior to Kharkiv Accords. But Kiev has some valid points too - Khrakiv Accords have been annulled by Russia on foot of Crimean crisis (see below). So it's a Russian offer of 'Yanukovich deal, pre-2010' vs Kiev counter 'Yanukovich deal post-2010'.

In response, Ukrainian PM Yatsenyuk claimed that "Russia proposed to reduce the gas price. Still, our stance was and now consists in changing the contract, and not agreeing to a decision made by the Russian government regarding the change of gas price… We are holding short: we change the contract and set a market price. We have paid the market price of $286. We are ready to pay all debts according to this price, and other proposals are unacceptable.”

Where that price of $286 mcm came from is anyone's guess. Until the overthrow of Yanukovich's Government, Kiev paid $268.5 mcm which was a special concessionary price set under the agreement in November 2013 that shelved the Ukraine's association agreement with the EU. In Q2 2014, following Russia non-recognition of the Yatsenyuk Government in Kiev, the agreement was voided and Ukraine was switched back to 2009 agreement on pricing at $385.5 mcm. This is quite reasonable: agreement on $268.5 mcm was based on specific deal struck with Yanukovich and there is no ground, in my view, on which it should translate to a government that was not recognised by Russia. Hence, 2009 deal applied, and $385.5 mcm was legit.

Now onto a tricky bit of the deal. In 2010, under the so-called Kharkiv Accords, Ukraine signed a deal with Russia that suspended $100 mcm export duty from shipments of gas to Ukraine (internal consumption, not transit). This was done in exchange for Ukraine extending the duration of Russian lease on Crimean naval facilities from 2017 to 2042. Note: $100 mcm discount did not reduce the cost of lease paid by Russia to Ukraine, but simply underpinned extension of contract duration.

What happened next is dodgy: on April 2, 2014, President Putin signed a law annulling the Kharkiv Accords. Crimea was no longer a 'leased land' and the $100 mcm discount on export duties was gone. The price of Russian gas shot straight up from $385.5 mcm to $485.5 mcm. My view is that this was wrong.

Following Russia: $385.5 mcm offer and Ukraine's initial counter at $268.5 mcm, Kiev said on Friday that it was ready to pay $326 mcm, but only over an interim period of 18 months - a period it claimed will be required to negotiate a long-term price agreement.

Now things get a bit more convoluted. Per June 11 reports, (see here), Ukrainian Minister of Energy and the Coal Industry Yury Prodan said "Ukraine believed the temporary price for Russian gas could be the mean price of $268-$385 per 1,000 cubic meters of gas until the issue is resolved in the Stockholm International Arbitration Court." Which puts pre-negotiations offer at $326.5 mcm - on-the-dot with second round counter-offer from Ukraine. So the second round offer was there before the first round offer. But to confuse things even more, the $326mcm price was not even Kiev's idea, but the EU's idea: see here.


All around - a big mess...

Per latest:  Sunday talks failed to take place...

15/6/2014: Germany's Ifo: Putin and Flickering Power

I was sent an advanced copy of the Ifo Viewpoint Nr. 154 "Putin and Flickering Power" by Hans-Werner Sinn, President of the Ifo Institute which is the official translation of the German source here.

Selective quotes with comments in italics being my own:

"The unresolved conflict in Ukraine …is also endangering Germany’s oil and gas supplies, which in turn threatens its energy turnaround since Germany’s new energy policy cannot be implemented without Russian gas. Why? Because of the inconstancy of wind and solar energy. Both sources of energy require a technology to smooth out the vagaries of their power output. This task can ultimately only be performed by gas-fired power plants co-existing alongside wind and solar energy." [Although not directly referencing the EU's feeble attempts at delivering a cohesive and coherent energy policy, this thesis clearly puts the boot into Brussels well-meaning but economically infeasible push for renewables-driven energy markets.]

"Using the figures for wind and solar energy effectively supplied during all 8,760 hours of 2011, we calculated the storage capacity required to smooth out the output fluctuations. The installed nominal output of both power sources amounted to 54 Gigawatts (GW) in that year. Their combined output reached up to 27 GW at given times, but at others it dropped to 0.5 GW, giving an average power generation of 7.3 GW. The assured output available during 99.5 per cent of hours amounted to only 0.9 GW.

To make the average output reliably available for consumption and to bring up the 0.9-GW assured output as close to the average value as possible, a storage technology is absolutely essential. The most efficient method currently available is pumped hydro storage. Around 3,300 pumped storage facilities would be required to achieve a complete smoothing of the power supply based on 2011 figures, which represents around 100 times the number of facilities currently existing in Germany. New storage facilities, however, are difficult to get built since they tend to provoke angry citizen protests. In Bavaria’s Jochberg area people raised their scythes in protest when only one such power station was to be built." [Ah, that pesky problem of people power… Pragmatically, Ifo takes it into the account. Typically, for Brussels operations, EU neglects it. End game: dysfunctional centralised policy grafted onto the locally democratic institutions of policymaking.]

"So what about smoothing only part of the “fluctuating power” instead of all of it? The results for this model are also sobering. To smooth four-sevenths of the average power output, around 440 pumped storage facilities would still be needed in Germany. This remains beyond the realms of the politically possible."

"Alternatively, power could be stored in batteries. This would require 164 million battery packs of the type used in a BMW i3 – four times the number of cars of all stripes presently in existence in Germany. The one million electric cars that are supposed to be on Germany’s roads by 2020 would deliver a meagre 0.6 per cent of the storage capacity required. And those cars would not be able to drive on windless days of the year, to prevent their batteries from running out of power."

The storage problem can only be solved through the construction of natural gas storage facilities. Such facilities require less space, can be built on flat land and the production costs are much lower. With this technology power peaks are initially used to produce hydrogen. The hydrogen is then transformed back into methane gas, which the gas-fired power stations can use to generate power where necessary. A problem yet to be solved, however, is energy loss along this storage path. Since the efficiency factor in this procedure is only a quarter, the cost of any power sent through the methanisation and gas-fired power plants would quadruple."

[So, unhappy (for Brussels and Eastern Europe) conclusion:] "In short, it is ultimately much cheaper to buy gas from Putin’s gas traders, store it in Germany and then use it to generate power in gas-fired power stations when necessary to fill the gaps left by wind and solar energy. Putin gas costs around 3 cents per kilowatt hour, whereas gas from methane obtained from wind energy conversion would be at least six times as expensive, not including the costs of building the conversion plants. If the power were to be generated offshore it would be at least ten times as expensive." [The brilliant bit of this is that it shows the German way of thinking in terms of efficiencies as opposed to, say, Irish thinking in terms of 'romantic evocations' - remember Irish policy refrain that 'wind is free energy'? Right…]

"The use of Russian gas is therefore the only solution that is halfway viable in economic terms. Under this scenario, the fluctuating power from wind and solar power is blended and smoothed with power from methane storage facilities that are replenished by Putin’s gas traders and then tapped as needed. Overall, this leads to a regular supply of energy – and it is our only option. All other alternatives are mere pipedreams."

15/6/2014: Ifo on Russia: 'Make Trade to Avoid War'...

A very interesting set of points on EU/U.S. policy on Russia from the Ifo's President, Hans-Werner Sinn (Ifo Viewpoint Nr. 155, "Why We Should Give Putin a Chance" link here)

Some quotes, my comments in italics:

“The annexation of Crimea was definitely a violation of international law. …A redrawing of borders decided upon by only one party cannot be accepted in Europe. However, it must be borne in mind that the present crisis was triggered by the West. The overtures made by NATO to Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in recent years effectively threatened to encircle Russia's Black Sea Fleet in the only ice-free port at its disposal.”

“If U.S. President Barack Obama believes that Russia is just a regional power that will have to put up with this, he is wrong…” [Even if Russia were a regional power, the region in which it co-exists with other powers is immense and directly borders three superpowers – U.S. via Pacific, EU and China. Security considerations, in Russia’s case directly link to the fact that it is literally surrounded by the Nato or Nato-related (via E.U. membership) powers on three sides. It would be exceptionally naïve, or more likely careless and callous, to assume that Nato and aligned states are not a threat to Russian security, no matter how benign the alliance is and no matter how many cooperative councils Nato has with Russia].

“…some hardliners in Washington, Brussels and Moscow obviously have their own agenda. NATO can chafe at the bit once again, and the powers-that-be in the Kremlin are not the only ones to have noticed that international conflicts are an effective way of distracting attention away from domestic problems. It is good that the German federal government is trying to exercise a moderating influence, while exercising care not to endanger the solidarity of the West's alliance.” [A logical conclusion. On both sides. Including the obvious one: Russia, but also the less discussed one: the U.S. where domestic problems for the Administration – relating to a set of policies that have effectively rendered the current Administration ineffective and necessitated ‘toughening’ by the White House of the foreign policies stance to counter rising strengths of the U.S. Republican Party. Ukraine is being de facto caught between three pressure points: (1) Russia’s growing insecurity and concerns about the geopolitical position of the country in its own neighbourhood; (2) White House’s growing weakness in domestic affairs; and (3) EU’s complete loss of raison d’etre during the Global Financial Crisis. Add to this internal collapse of the Ukrainian political and business elites and we have the current situation.]

“… we need to proceed carefully: No reasonable party can be in favour of the economic destabilization of Russia and a trade war.” [However, beyond being undesirable, such destabilisation is actually contrary to the solution needed in order to normalise the region:] “How can the cost of any further annexations be raised for Russia and the chances of finding a peaceful solution be strengthened, without doing any damage to Russia, Ukraine or the EU? The answer lies in the offer of a free trade agreement with Russia and the Ukraine as part of a new international agreement on Ukraine's future.”

[Such an agreement is neither new, nor alien idea. In fact it was proposed by President Putin himself:] “In 2010, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed a free trade area stretching to Vladivostok from Lisbon. What happened? The EU worked on a free-trade agreement with Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Armenia instead. This only increased Moscow's nervousness, because it implicitly posed the threat of customs barriers for Russia.” [Again, European position of raising barriers against external partners in order to secure gains from trade to the members of the Union or the Associate Members is the problem. Russia witnessed this in the cases of 2004 EU Accession].

[Free trade is a win-win for all parties concerned.] “Free trade with a country specialized in commodities, such as Russia, that complements the West's specialization in manufacturing, promises major trade gains that would be much greater than the benefits of trade between similar economies alone. EU politicians are currently negotiating a free-trade deal with the U.S., which would bring benefits to the countries involved. But the inclusion of Russia in a free-trade agreement could turn out to be a real gold mine for all parties.”

“In the event of political stabilization, offering Russia free trade with the West would preserve peace, bring economic advantages to Europe and effectively push forward the policy of “change through rapprochement” first implemented successfully by Willy Brandt with East Germany.”

14/6/2014: Industry vs ICT Services: Employment in Ireland

Changes in Industrial vs ICT services employment have been dramatic over the recent years. In the decade from 2003, Ireland gained 18,250 new jobs in ICT services and lost 63,425 jobs in Industry (excluding construction). This is just based on annual averages.

In Q1 2014 compared to Q1 2003, there were 19,100 new jobs added in ICT Services and 66,800 jobs lost in Industry.

Here's the problem:

1. ICT jobs involve hiring of foreign staff and intra-company transfers from abroad, Industry jobs involve more indigenous workers;
2. Both types of jobs require specialist skills, but transferability of these skills across various employers is much lower in Industry than in ICT Services, so a job lost in Industry is more likely to lead to long-term unemployment than a job lost in ICT
3. Workers in industrial employment are more likely to be older, compared to workers in ICT Services, which means that their retraining for new careers is less likely and their debt and family exposures are more likely to be significantly larger than for ICT Services workers

14/6/2014: Oilprice.com on World Cup Energy Use

A very interesting article on Oilprice.com covering energy consumption during the World Cup 2014

Full article here: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/How-Much-Energy-Will-the-2014-World-Cup-Consume.html

14/6/2014: Risk Profile for Russian Economy Shows New Strains

Quick update from my Russia Deck on ECR outlook for Russian economy's risk profile:

Click on the image to enlarge

Worth noting: this performance is not as dramatic as one could have expected given the intensity of the conflict ongoing in Ukraine and the fall-out predicted by many analysts from Crimean crisis and sanctions.