Tuesday, April 30, 2013

30/4/2013: The latest from the island nuked by the Troika 'rescuers'



Cypriot Parliament has narrowly (29:27 votes) approved the EU 'rescue' package agreement that covers EUR 17 billion in funds, according to the majority of the media analysts. Alas, the devil of the package is in the details.

Cyprus is not (repeat - not) getting EUR 17 billion in funds. Instead the package lists the following sources of funding:
- EUR 1.2 billion to be raised via losses on junior bonds in Popular and BoC
- The “bailin” of uninsured depositors (deposits in excess of EUR 100K) and senior bondholders is set to yield €8.3 billion
- EUR 10 billion loan from the euro zone and the IMF of which the IMF will provide EUR 1 billion (http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2013/pr13103.htm)
- EUR 1 billion from rolling over domestically-held government bonds, plus EUR 100 million from extending Russian bilateral loan
- EUR 0.4 billion from gold sales by the Cypriot central bank and EUR 0.5 billion from privatizations

Grand total is, therefore, EUR 1.2 + 8.3 + 10 + 1.1 + 0.9 = EUR 21.5 billion.

Per preliminary MOU, Cyprus 'programme' has three core pillars:

"The first pillar aims to restore the health of the financial system and minimize the contingent liabilities from the banks to the state." This includes haircuts on depositors and bondholders in the first stage - as confirmed in the today's approval vote. In later stages, this involves "a substantial reduction in the size of the banking system in relation to the economy as well as in restructuring and recapitalization of one of the banks."

“The second pillar entails an ambitious and well-paced fiscal adjustment that balances short-run cyclical concerns and long-run sustainability objectives, while protecting vulnerable groups. In addition to the fiscal consolidation already underway—estimated at about 5 percent of GDP— an additional 2 percent of GDP in measures will be implemented during the program period, including by raising the corporate income tax rate from 10 to 12 ½ percent and the tax rate on interest income from 15 to 30 percent. An additional 4½ percent of GDP in measures will be needed over the medium term to achieve a 4 percent of GDP primary surplus by 2018, which is required to put debt on a firmly downward path. There will be protection for the most vulnerable groups. The social welfare system will be reviewed to streamline administration costs, minimize the overlap of existing programs, and improve their targeting to ensure that public resources reach those in need."

The third pillar, per usual IMF waffle, involves 'structural reforms'. “To complement the fiscal consolidation efforts, the program will undertake substantial structural reforms aimed to improve the effectiveness of the public sector. The state’s capacity to collect revenues will be strengthened with the implementation of a comprehensive reform agenda to modernize and harmonize procedures, improve internal coordination, and exploit economies of scale. Public financial management reforms will include the implementation of a medium-term budget framework and the adoption of a law on fiscal responsibility. In addition, to enhance the efficiency of the economy and reduce public debt, viable state-owned enterprises will be privatized. Finally, based on an assessment of needs, the program will supplement the recent reform of the pension system with additional measures to ensure its long-run sustainability.

In short, Cyprus gets the usual Troika 'Package +' of big-bang commitments delivery of which will be measured as common not by achieved sustainability or risk metrics, but by passed legislation and enacted legal changes (paper ahead of real impact). And the '+' bit refers to the total wrecking of the Cypriot economy under the reforms of the banking sector and international financial services sector, plus tax hikes which will assure that if there is any oil / gas off-shore, Cypriots will be out with shovels and snorkelling masks to dig every hydrocarbon molecule out to repay these debts.

30/4/2013: Irish chart that worries me most

The chart that bothers me most in Irish context is:


This shows the structural nature of the growth slowdown in Ireland in post-2007 period (based on IMF forecasts through 2018). The period of this slowdown is consistent with the growth rates recorded in the 1980s. And here's the summary of decade-average real GDP growth rates:


Now, keep in mind, in the 1980s and 1990s, Irish growth was driven by a combination of domestic drivers, plus external demand, primarily and predominantly in the goods exports areas. Which means that more of our GDP actually had real impact on the ground in Ireland. Since the onset of the crisis, most of our growth has been driven by the growth in exports of services, which have far less tangible impact on the ground.

Another point to make: current rates of growth for the 2010s are below those in the 1980s and, recall back, the rates of growth achieved in the 1980s were not enough to deflate the debt/GDP overhang we had. Of course, in addition to the Government debt overhang (similar to that in the 1980s) we also now have a household and corporate debt overhang.

If the IMF projections above turn out out be close to reality, we are in a structural decline economically and are unlikely to generate sufficient escape velocity to exit the debt crisis any time before 2025 at the earliest.

30/4/2013: Why not in Ireland?..

Bloomberg has an excellent report on MIT pairing up with Russia's Skolkovo on research, education and commercialisation:

Key stats of interest: "There were 83 international branch campuses of U.S. universities as of March, not including partnerships such as MIT and Skolkovo’s, according to GlobalHigherEd.org, a website run by researchers at the State University of New York at Albany. That number has climbed from 10 in 1990, says Jason Lane, a SUNY Albany professor."

Ok, how many are in Ireland - the country with self-professed 'best educated workforce' and focused on building 'knowledge economy' self-dubbed 'innovation island', where we are so solemnly focused on exports (yes, education is exportable and it is a very high value-adding export too)? Answer: none.

There's an MIT campus in Portugal (hardly a shining light in 'knowledge economics'), there are educational 'hubs' all over the world (http://www.globalhighered.org/edhubs.php) and campuses all around the globe (http://www.globalhighered.org/branchcampuses.php). We even have 5 Irish institutions' campuses outside Ireland (though I seem to think UCD and TCD have either plans or actual campuses too, though they are not on the list), but when it comes to the closed shop market inside Ireland, there are no top-league unis from the US trading from the Emerald Isle into Europe and beyond.

Check out this map with locations and spot Ireland... http://www.globalhighered.org/maps.php

Why?.. We have lavish facilities for some ITs built around the country with little reason or rationale for their existence. Why not convert one of them into a JV with, say, Stanford? Princeton? Hell, University of Arkansas would be an improvement... Ah, I hear the Unis dons say, competition is good when it is regulated (aka, stacked in incumbents' favour), but in the age of economic crisis, why not get universities to start really competing for exports by giving them a worthy competitor here, targeting markets outside Ireland?

30/4/2013: Business Confidence... not exactly an unbiased metric of reality


Readers of this blog would know that I have always been skeptical about 'business confidence' and 'consumer confidence' surveys as indicators of true underlying activity or predictors of the future activity. In the past I have criticised the German Ifo data on business expectations (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/02/22022013-small-cloud-over-german.html) and Irish consumer confidence indicators (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/04/2642013-another-indicator-turns-south.html) as being somewhat systemically biased into the la-la land. I even lost Sunday Tribune column back in 2007 on foot of criticising one of Ireland's largest real estate brokers' research on similar methodological basis.

Now, behold research from NBER, titled "Firms’ Optimism and Pessimism"  
(NBER Working Paper No. w18989) by RUDI BACHMANN, STEFFEN ELSTNER and (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2257179) which looks at whether in general, firms’ expectations can be systematically too optimistic or too pessimistic. The authors used "micro data from the West German manufacturing subset of the IFO Business Climate Survey to infer quarterly production changes at the firm level and combine them with production expectations over a quarterly horizon in the same survey to construct series of quantitative firm-specific expectation errors."

The authors found that "depending on the details of the empirical strategy at least 6 percent and at most 34 percent of firms systematically over- or underpredict their one-quarter-ahead upcoming production. In a simple neoclassical heterogeneous-firm model these expectational biases lead to factor misallocations that cause welfare losses which in the worst case are comparable to conventional estimates of the welfare costs of business cycles fluctuations. In more conservative calibrations the welfare losses are even smaller."

Ouch… the confidence fairy might not only be a lier, but biased lier on top of that…

30/4/2013: 2012 Was Not a Year of Brilliance for the Central Bank


From the Opening Statement by Governor Patrick Honohan at the publication of the Central Bank of Ireland Annual Report 2012, 30 April 2013


"Two major elements of the Bank’s work during 2012 came to decisive junctures early this year – the liquidation of IBRC and related replacement of the promissory notes with marketable government bonds; and the introduction of an enhanced mortgage arrears resolution framework, which was announced in recent weeks. All of these measures are ultimately concerned with creating the environment for sustainable economic growth and reduction in unemployment."

It is my opinion that 2012 marked the year when the Central Bank has done the least to deliver on any meaningful reforms and change that can create or sustain "the environment for sustainable economic growth and reduction in unemployment". The bases for my opinion are:

  1. In 2013, the Central Bank attempted (key word here) to introduce an enhanced mortgage arrears resolution framework. The new framework is 'enhanced' only to the extent that the previous framework was proven to be a complete failure. However, looking forward and setting aside the failures of the very recent past, the new framework is not consistent with the goals for either reducing unemployment or enhancing prospects for economic growth. Some of my criticism of the new framework in the context of these two objectives can be found here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/04/1842013-legalising-modern-version-of.html
  2. In 2013, the Irish Government has undertaken a swap of one financial liability (promissory notes) with another (government bonds). This transaction has been deemed by myself, many others, including the IMF, to have near-zero impact on debt sustainability when it comes to the Irish Government debt. The transaction was net positive for cash flow, albeit moderately, and hugely positive for PR. while th CB of Ireland did benefit significantly from improved security underlying the ELA, this benefit came at a cost to the rest of the Irish economy in the form of the conversion of the quasi-sovereign debt (promo note) into long-dated sovereign bonds.
  3. Beyond the above two points, there has been very little progress on any tangible reforms in the banking sector in Ireland. We are still pursuing a duopoly model of the domestic banking market,  and there is no effective discussion, let alone effective resolution of the problem of lack of new entrants and lack of restructuring of the existent lenders. We have no new models of banking and lending in the country emerging after six years of this crisis and, if anything, we are now consolidating the strategic space in our banking services to a singular model of low-quality, low-access services supplied at an excessive cost. Both AIB and Bank of Ireland are pursuing this model, leaving customers to pick up the tab for reduced access to services and increased charges on the remaining services. This hardly supports Governor Honohan's claim that the Central Bank is working on creating and sustaining environment for growth.
  4. All banking sector performance parameters have been either not improving or deteriorating over 2012 within the directly state-influenced covered group of financial institutions.
Slapping ad hoc targets on the banks to reduce mortgages arrears and then introducing masers to give them power well in excess of that awarded to the borrowers is about as productive of a measure for dealing with mortgages crisis as giving hospitals management targets for reducing the number of trolleys in corridors while removing patients protection from malpractice.

The Central Bank-supplied 'framework' is thus simply not fit for purpose, neither by the criteria of dealing effectively and humanely with the debt crisis (by first removing the unsustainable debt in systemic, transparent and fairly-priced fashion, then by addressing future moral hazard), nor in terms of placing the burden of crisis resolution where the causes of the crisis rest (proportionally with both the banks and the borrowers), nor in respect of the Central Bank claimed objectives of delivering supports for economic recovery.


Updated: Central Bank of Ireland has made a claim of 2012 'profit' of EUR 1.4 billion. But wait, a business makes profit by taking investors' / equity holders' / lenders' or own funds, purchasing inputs into production, producing something and then selling that something to willing customers who pay for these goods from their own funds. Central Bank of Ireland took claims imposed by the Government of Ireland on consumers and taxpayers, gambled these claims on the banks, who were basically compelled to take 'as offered' these Central Bank-supplied 'goods' and then collected from these captive banks pay (which the banks promptly ripped-off their customers - aka consumers and taxpayers). The Central Bank subsequently relabelled these rip-off charges 'profits' and remitted them back (EUR 1.1 billion) to the Exchequer. So can anyone explain to me what Central Bank produced that someone voluntarily was willing to buy with their own cash?

30/4/2013: German credit keeps flowing to firms... & still there's no growth


Per German Ifo institute: " Credit constraints for German trade and industry edged downwards by 0.1 percentage points compared to March. Around a fifth of the companies surveyed reported a restrictive credit policy on the part of banks. Despite recent developments in the euro crisis, there have been no significant changes in the favourable financial environment of German companies.

"After last month's decrease, credit constraints for large and small firms rose again, with the latter experiencing the sharpest increase of 1.3 percent. Medium-sized companies reported an easing of credit constraints."




So things are going swimmingly in terms of credit for German enterprises. Ease of getting credit is about as good as 2005-2007 average - the years when German banks were not just lending with abandon to domestic enterprises, but were also funding massive property booms in Spain and Ireland... yet, for all the credit access, German growth is... tanking.

So much for the Irish (and other governments') thesis that if only credit flows were improved, growth will return...

30/4/2013: The horrors of Euro-austerity: Part 1

The horrors of Euro-austerity are so vivid in this chart...


It is obvious (to anyone who is economically blind or illiterate in a basic Cartesian sense) that 'sustaining growth' would have required deficits of ugh... ogh... like... say 5% pa over 2009-2013 period? Or 6%? To cumulate these to over 25-30% of GDP in added debt? What could have possibly gone wrong?..

Sunday, April 28, 2013

28/4/2013: That German Miracle...

Germany... the miracle economy of Europe:


Let's do some growth facts. recall that G7 includes such powerhouses of negative growth as Japan and Italy, and the flagship of anemia France.

1) Germany vs G7 in real GDP growth:

From data illustrated above:

  • In the G7 group, Germany ranked 6th in growth terms over the 1980s, rising to 5th in the 1990s and 2000s, and, based on the IMF forecasts, can be expected to rank 4th in the period 2010-2018. In simple terms - Germany ranked below average in every decade since 1980 through 2009 and exact average in 2010-2018 period.
  • On a cumulated basis, starting from 100=1980, by the end of this year, judging by latests IMF forecast for 2013, Germany would end up with second slowest growth in G7, second only to Italy. 
  • On a cumulated basis, starting from 100=1990, by the end of this year, judging by latests IMF forecast for 2013, Germany would end up with fourth fastest growth in G7. Ditto for the basis starting from 100=2000.
2) Germany vs G7 in annual growth rates in GDP based on Purchasing-power-parity adjustment (PPP) per capita to account for exchange rates and prices differentials:

From data illustrated above:

  • In the G7 group, Germany ranked 5th - or below average - in PPP-adjusted per capita growth terms over the 1980s and the 1990s, rising to 4th - group average - in the 2000s, and, based on the IMF forecasts, can be expected to rank 3rd - slightly above average - in the period 2010-2018. In simple terms - Germany ranked below or at the average in every decade since 1980 through 2009 and one place ahead of the average in 2010-2018 period.
  • Note: Germany is the only G7 country with shrinking overall population, that peaked in 2003 and has been declining since, thus helping its GDP (PPP) per capita performance.
Here's the chart summarising Germany's rankings in G7 in terms of two growth criteria discussed:


Germany might have been performing well in 2006 and 2011 (when it ranked 1st in real GDP growth terms) and really well in 2007-2008 and 2010 when it ranked 2nd, but other than that, it has been a lousy example for any sort of a miracle.

28/4/2013: Nassim Taleb's Reading List

Following on my link to a TED talk (go figure... I am getting soft) here's another link, this time to Nassim Taleb's reading list:

http://www.farnamstreetblog.com/2012/02/book-recommendations-from-nassim-taleb/

Worth a 'trip' to the Amazon... 

28/4/2013: A must-view TED talk

I rarely post on TED talks for a reason - aiming high, they often deliver flat repackaging of the known - but this one is worth listening to:

http://www.collective-evolution.com/2013/04/10/banned-ted-talk-rupert-sheldrake-the-science-delusion/

It has been a long running topic of many conversations I have had over the years with some of you, always taking place in private discussions, rather than in public media, that modern science is a belief-based system. My position on this stems not from a dogmatic view of science, but from a simple philosophical realisation that all sciences are based on axiomatic bases for subsequent inquiry. As axioms are by definition non-provable concepts, then the very scientific method itself is limited in its applications by the bounds of these axioms.

This is not invalidate scientific method or sciences, but to put some humbleness into occasionally arrogant position held by many (especially non-scientists) that elevates science above arts, religions, beliefs, and other systems of understanding or narrating the reality.

Saturday, April 27, 2013

27/4/2013: Bars, Pubs, Recession Craic

I recently watched an Irish comedian (let's keep the names out of this) quip that Irish people are not having that bad of a time during this recession, as we are still going out for pints, and that is all that matters in measuring our happiness.

Obviously, humor aside, there can be some truth in this. Most of entertainment and 'cultural' life in this country revolves about the pub or (in shwankier neighborhoods - around a cocktail bar). So bars sales can be a somewhat decent indicator of some sort of the social well-being in this country.

How did bar sales fare in the Great Recession? Four charts:

By value (chart above),

  • Bar sales were down 18.1% on average in the period from January 2008 through present (March 2013), aka pre-crisis period, compared to the crisis period from January 2005 through December 2007.
  • In March 2013 they were down 14.6% on pre-crisis average. 3mo average through March 2013 was down 1.5% y/y.
  • So by value of sales, we are not heading for the pub as much.
  • Worse, compared to both All Retail Sales and to Retail Sales of Food - Bars sales are doing much worse. 
  • Noting that Food sales are running above pre-crisis average, both currently and on the basis of crisis average, and also noting that Food sales are signals of us staying more at home, rather than going out to pubs and bars and restaurants, there is no indicator here that we are having good times during this recession. At least not in the pubs.
Next: volume of sales:


Again as with value of sales, volume of sales index shows that the above conjecture of 'good times' is not holding up. In fact, comparative dynamics for retail sales in bars in volume are worse than dynamics in value.

Here's a more distilled version, showing dynamics in bars sales compared to all retail sales:

And here's an illustration of divergent dynamics between food and bars sales:


Seems like if we are having 'craic' in this recession, it is not in our locals or in the Temple Bar, but with a bottle of cheaper booze at home, drumstick in hand, slippers on...

27/4/2013: Village Magazine, April 2013

The third of three posts covering my recent articles.

This is an unedited version of my regular column in The Village magazine, April 2014.




As the events of the last few weeks clearly show, Irish trade union movement is suffering from a number of acute crises, ranging from systemically existential to psychological.

First up, the crisis of identity, best symptomised by the conclusion of the Croke Park 2.0 deal in which the Unions once again traded the interests of their future members – the younger public sector workers – to preserve the privileges of their current and past members. This is hardly surprising. During the last decade-and-a-half, the Unions and their leadership have became firmly embedded in the corporatist structure of the Irish State. Self-serving, focused on the immediate membership concentrated in the least productive sectors of the economy, the unions have opted to be paid over being relevant to the changing economy and society.

Second, the crisis of the short-term memory amnesia. In recent weeks, the Irish Trade Unions have managed to produce much bluster on the topic of the centenary anniversary of the 1913 Lockout. Throughout the crisis, the very same unions have been vocal on the topics of social fairness, austerity, protection of the frontline services etc. Yet, all along, the Liberty Hall has attempted to sweep under the rug its principal role in helping the Irish State to polarize and pillage both the society and the economy during the Celtic Tiger era, in part aiding the very processes that led to our national insolvency. Promoting the narrow interests of the state and associated domestic private sectors’ elites, the Social Partnership (including the two Croke Park agreements) assured boards representations, funds and other pathways to decision-making for unions. This power was deployed consistently to reduce accountability in the public sector for decisions and actions of its foot soldiers and bosses alike. By corollary of the cooperative approach to policy formation, the Partnership also protected domestic sectors, especially those dominated by the semi-state companies.  As the money rolled into the unionized sectors of the economy, the Unions had no problem with rampant costs inflation in health insurance and services, energy, transport, and education. The interests of the own members were always well ahead of the interests of the society at large.  Thus, today, in the environment of reduced incomes and high unemployment, with hundreds of thousands households in sever financial distress, Liberty Hall sees no problem with state-generated inflation in state-controlled Unionized sectors.

All in, the irony has it, Irish Trade Unions movement has been traveling along the same road previously mapped out by the Anglo Irish Bank: reducing their scope of competencies, their reach across various social. demographic and economic groups, and focusing on a singular, medium-term unsustainable objective. Where Anglo, post-2001, became a monoline bank for funding speculative property plays, Irish Trade Unions today are a monoline agency for preserving the status quo of the incumbent public vs private sector divisions in the economy.

The failure of the Trade Unions movement model in Ireland is best exemplified by the years of the current crisis.

Since the onset of the present economic recession Irish Government policy, directly and indirectly supported by the majority of the Unions’ leaders was to consistently shift the burden of the economic adjustment to younger workers in both private and public sectors, indebted Irish households, and consumers. Liberty Hall’s clear objective underpinning their position toward these groups of people was to retain, at all possible costs, the pay and working conditions protection granted to the incumbent full-time employees in the public and semi-state sector. Grumbling about the ‘low-paid public sector workers’ aside, the Unions have consented to the creation of a two-tier public sector employment with incumbent workers collecting the benefits of jobs security and higher pay, and the new incoming workers paying the price of these benefits with lower pay and virtually no promotion opportunities. The very same unions are now acting to preserve, at huge costs to the economy, unsustainably high levels of employment in our zombified banking sector.

Even on the surface, based on the headline figures, the Unions act to protect the pay and working conditions of the incumbent public sector employees. Average weekly earnings in Ireland have fallen 2.7% between 2008 and 2012 in the private sectors, while in the broader public sector these were down only 1.1%. Over the same period of time, the pay gap between public and private sector has risen from 46.1% in favour of public sector employees to 48.5%.

But the reality is much worse than that.  Between 2008 and 2012, numbers in employment in private sectors have fallen 14.7% while in the public sector the decline was less than 8.9%.  Within the public sector, largest losses in employment took place in Defence (-20% on 2008), Regional bodies (-15.4% on 2008), Semi-State bodies (-10.1%). No layoffs or compulsory redundancies took place, with natural attrition and cuts to contract and temporary staff taking on all of the adjustments.

In simple terms, the Machiavelian Croke Park deals have meant that the Irish public sector ‘reforms’ were neither structural, nor progressive in their nature. These ‘reforms’ do not support long-term process of realigning Irish economy to more sustainable growth path away from the bubbles-prone path of the last fifteen years.

Lack of layoffs and across-the-board shedding of temporary and contract staff have meant that the public sector in Ireland has lost any ability to link pay and promotions to real productivity differentials that exist between individual employees, work groups and organizations. This effect was further compounded by the Croke Park 2.0 agreement. The shinier the pants, the higher the pay principle of rewards has now been legally enshrined, relabeled as a ‘reform’ and fully protected at the expense of younger, better educated and potentially more innovative employees.


Such a system of pay and promotions engenders severe and irreversible selection bias, whereby the quality of applicants for jobs in the public sector is likely to decline over time, with more ambitious and more employable candidates opting out of pursuing careers in the state sector. Deterred by limited promotions opportunities and lower pay for the same, and in some cases heavier workloads, younger applicants are likely to seek work in private sector and outside the country. This selection bias will only gain in strength as economy starts to add private jobs in the future recovery.

The status quo of non-meritocratic employment in the public sector will also mean continued emigration of the younger workers with internationally marketable skills.

Meanwhile, per EU-wide KLEMS database, back at the peak of the public sector activities in 2007, labour productivity in Ireland’s public sectors was already running at below 1995 levels. In Public Administration and Defence, Compulsory Social Security sector, labour productivity stood at below 86% of 1995 levels, in Education at 80% and in Health and Social Work at 95%. In contrast, in Industry, labour productivity in 2007 was running at 153% of 1995 levels.  The same holds for the technological innovation intensities of the specific sectors. Three core public sectors of public administration, education and health all posted declines in productivity associated with new technologies compared to 1995 of 17-30% against an increase of 8% in Industry and a 20% rise in Manufacturing.

If Irish public services productivity was falling in the times of massive spending uplifts and big-ticket capital investment programmes, what can we expect in the present environment of drastically reduced investment? Unfortunately, we do not have data beyond 2007 to provide such an insight.  But the most probable answer is that stripping away superficial productivity gains recorded due to higher current spend on social welfare supports being managed by fewer overall state employees, plus the productivity growth arising from reductions in employment levels, there is little or no real same-employee productivity gains in the public sector.

One has to simply consider the ‘cost reduction’ measures enacted through the Budgets 2010-2012 to realize that during the crisis, Irish public sector was shedding, not adding responsibilities. Much of these reductions in services was picked up by the private sector payees and providers. This too implies that the actual productivity in the public sector in Ireland has probably declined during the years of the crisis.

Marking the centenary anniversary of the 1913 Lockout, Irish Trade Unions movement needs serious and deep rethink of both its raison d’etre and its modus operandi. Otherwise the movement is risking being locked out of the society itself as the irrelevant and atavistic remnant of the Celtic Tiger and Social Partnership.

The Liberty Hall must shake off the ethos of corrupting proximity to the State power and re-discover its grass roots. It will also need to purge completely the legacy of the Social Partnership and embrace new base within the workforce and the society at large in order to assure its ability to last beyond the rapidly advancing retirement age of its members. Lastly, the Unions should think hard about their overall role in the society to better balance the interests of their members against the needs of the country and the reality of the new economy.

Irish society needs a strong and ethically underpinned Unions as the guarantors of the rights of association and supporters of the policy dialogues and debates. What Ireland does not need is another layer of quasi-state bureaucracy insulating protected elites and sectors from pressures of demographically young, technologically modernizing and global competitiveness-focused small open economy.