20/2/15: Russian Public Perceptions of 2014 Events

A small snippet of an insight into Russian public opinion about big themed 2014 events via Levada Center: http://www.levada.ru/eng/most-memorable-events-1

The obvious conclusion: the overall dominance of Ukraine and economic crisis in public perceptions of the most important events of 2014.

Another obvious conclusion, absolute lack of interest in the fate of Russian opposition: the Navalny case being remembered by only 2%, despite the case entering headlines once again in December 2014 - January 2015. These, of course should be seen in line with "Protests after the verdict of the Navalny brothers’ trial" (3%), pushing joint significance of the case to more respectful 5%.

Third point: whilst the Western sanctions against Russia are clearly at the forefront of public attention, the counter-sanctions (often reported in the Western press as inducing hardship on ordinary Russians) are less important than the death of opera singer Yelena Obraztsova.

Fourth point: proximately linked events are showing some interesting results: for example, "Terrorist attack in Paris" (18%) and "Solidarity marches after the terrorist attack in Paris" (10%) jointly signify singular event and by importance rival "American and Western European sanctions against Russia".

Fifth point: "The creation of the European Economic Union" (5%) is about as important to Russians as "The World Economic Forum in Davos" and probably less significant than "Power outages in Crimea due to the Ukrainian blockade" (6%).

2/9/2014: Levada Poll: Decline in Russian Public Support for Intervention in Ukraine

Levada Centre published the latest analysis of public opinion in Russia in relation to the crisis in Ukraine. The details are here [in Russian]: http://www.levada.ru/29-08-2014/chislo-storonnikov-vtorzheniya-na-ukrainu-za-polgoda-sokratilos-vdvoe

Top results summarised:

• Numbers of Russians who are prepared to support Russian direct engagement in an open military conflict is now below the number of those who oppose an open intervention for the first time since accession of Crimea.
• 43% of respondents "definitely" or "likely" will not support an open military confrontation with Ukraine now stands against 41% who are ready to support such an intervention. In March 2014, 74% supported direct intervention and in May the number was 69%.
• In March 2014, 36% of respondents said they would "definitely" support direct military intervention in Ukraine. In the latest poll the number is down to 13%.
• Only 17% think that Russia is responsible for the crisis in Eastern Ukraine, while 75% believe that Moscow bears no responsibility.
• 32% of respondents believe that Russia is interfering in the Ukrainian affairs, while 25% believe that Russia does interfere but should do so. 31% believe that non-interference is a correct approach.
• Overall, 48% of respondents are against any interference, while 40% are in favour.
• In April 2014, 35% of those surveyed viewed Eastern Ukraine as a potential member of the Russian Federation. In August poll that number fell to 21%. However, the numbers supporting independence for Eastern Ukraine rose from 25% to 40%.
• In May, 49% of Russians approved of Russian support for pro-Russian separatists, in July this proportion peaked at 56% and has now fallen back to 50% in August. Most common appropriate support means voiced are diplomatic, economic and humanitarian aid.

The survey was conducted on 22-25 of August, based on representative sampling of 1,600 respondents from 46 regions. Statistical error does not exceed 3.4%.