2/1/2015: Monetary Policy and Property Bubbles

Returning again to the issue of lender/funder liability in triggering asset price bubbles (see more on this here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/01/112015-share-liability-debtor-and-lender.html), CEPR Discussion Paper "Betting the House" (see
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=10305) by Òscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick, Alan M. Taylor asks a question if there is "a link between loose monetary conditions, credit growth, house price booms, and financial instability?"

The authors look into "the role of interest rates and credit in driving house price booms and busts with data spanning 140 years of modern economic history in the advanced economies. We exploit the implications of the macroeconomic policy trilemma to identify exogenous variation in monetary conditions: countries with fixed exchange regimes often see fluctuations in short-term interest rates unrelated to home economic conditions."

Do note: Ireland and the rest of euro periphery are the prime examples of this specific case.

The authors find that "…loose monetary conditions lead to booms in real estate lending and house prices bubbles; these, in turn, materially heighten the risk of financial crises. Both effects have become stronger in the postwar era."

So let's give the ECB a call… 

10/3/2014: NYSE Margin Accounts Busting Record Levels...

Two quick twitter posts on leverage accumulation in the markets.

First one via Holger Zschaepitz @Schuldensuehner:

Shows NYSE members debit balances in margin accounts - at historic highs (since 1960).

Second, via Ioan Smith @moved_average:

Shows the above as % of nominal GDP as third highest in history. As noted by @moved_average, currently margin accounts balances are at ca 26% of all commercial and household loans outstanding in the US banking system.

This is just NYSE... Do we need to add timing lines for QEs here?.. (Hint: see peaks...)

Monthly data on the above: http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?mode=tables&key=50&category=8

Here's a good post on monthly series analysis: http://www.advisorperspectives.com/dshort/updates/NYSE-Margin-Debt-and-the-SPX.php

And a telling chart from the above on growth rates in margin accounts:

Oh, and a comment from above post: margins accounts are at historic highs in real (inflation-adjusted) terms too...

Don't get too worked up if things get jittery next... cause this time (unlike in Q2 2000 and Q3 2007) things are going to be different...

Update:  via John Tracey @traceyjc84 the above expressed relative to Dow Industrials:

22/11/2013: Euro area banks: leveraged through the nose... still

All you need to know about European banks sickness (it is still raging), the state of European regulations and quality oversight over the banks (it is still crap) and just how far we have travelled from the causes of the crisis (not far at all) in one chart:

European bounds set for the banks are a joke. A bizarre joke. And yet, Europeans call this a 'reform'. And regulators in the countries with completely dysfunctional banks (e.g Ireland) harp on about their banks 'compliance' with or 'meeting' the 'European standards'...

Notice, under the US proposed standards, leverage ratio requirement will be raised to 6% for FDIC-insured banks... meanwhile in Europe, 3% is 'rigorous' and 'robust' and 'safe' and 'never again' level...

Time to smell the roses. Going at the current rate of 'reforms', it will be decades before this European mess is sorted and by then, Europe won't matter to the rest of the world... will not matter at all... backwater with a few nice museums and some statues of the Great Leader Hermit von Frompy strewn across the lovely fields of wheat...

Oh, and if you still think that Newbridge Credit Union is a Big Story - my suggestion is: time for a visit to your friendly head doctor?..

21/10/2013: Household Debt Crisis: Social Drivers

Recent CEPR Discussion Paper No. 9238 (December 2012) titled "Household Debt and Social Interactions" by Dimitris Georgarakos, Michael Haliassos and Giacomo Pasini looked at social determinants and drivers for debt accumulation amongst households.


According to the authors, "Debt-induced crises, including the subprime crisis, are usually attributed exclusively to supply-side factors. We examine the role of social influences on debt culture, emanating from perceived average income of peers. Utilizing unique information from a household survey, representative of the Dutch population, that circumvents the issue of defining the social circle, we consider collateralized, consumer, and informal loans. We find robust social effects on borrowing - especially among those who consider themselves poorer than their peers - and on indebtedness, suggesting a link to financial distress. We employ a number of approaches to rule out spurious associations and to handle correlated effects."

More specifically, the authors find that "the higher the perceived income of the social circle is, the greater is the tendency of respondents to take up loans and borrow sizeable amounts. This is true both for uncollateralized (consumer) loans and for collateralized loans…"

The above effect is "stronger for those who perceive themselves as having lower income than their social circle." In effect, this is keeping up with the Joneses effect, magnified by within-reference group peer effects.

"The tendency of households to take up uncollateralized and collateralized loans, controlling for the perceived average income of the social circle, is partly related to perceived spending ability or (computed) housing assets of members of the social circle."

"Moreover, we find that expectations about (the minimum) next period’s income are statistically significant for collateralized loans, pointing to a ‘Tunnel Effect’, but do not render perceived income of the peers insignificant. This is consistent with the idea that borrowing behavior is influenced by peer income not only because it conveys some information regarding the respondent’s own future, but also because of some comparison or envy effect." Notice - this is about basic human psychology, as co-determined by external (not internal or own-control) factors. In other words, any corrective policy will have to address the issue of peer effects, not only 'own effects'.

"Finally, the role of such comparisons is not confined to the tendency to borrow and to the level of borrowing conditional on participation, but it seems to extend also to financial distress."

To reinforce the argument above that the drivers of borrowing crises are social, not just individual (and hence any responsibility, liability and policy actions on this front have to be co-shared): "Our study has uncovered a potential for social influences on borrowing. By observing that others have higher average incomes, the household not only tries to emulate their
spending, as earlier studies have found, but also decides to borrow more, only partly because of expectations of higher future own income. Such decisions may be encouraged by a massive and unprecedented housing boom associated with high collateral values and expectations of continuing house price trends. The policy implication of our finding that social comparisons matter for debt behavior, after controlling for fundamental characteristics
of the household and region-time trends, is not to interfere with the process of forming social circles or perceptions regarding them, but rather to decouple perceptions of income or spending differences with peers from any decisions to borrow without proper account of the associated risks."

My view: let's cut puritanism bull**&t and recognise that debt crises are not solely driven/caused by the reckless behaviour of individuals taken in an isolated setting, but are social / societal phenomena. This realisation should lead us to a recognition that dealing with prevention of future crises and with the fallouts from the current ones requires co-shared responsibility and liability.


Source: for earlier version (free to download) http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=127996

13/10/2013: On Taxes, Debt & Equity

EU Commission published some interesting research into Tax Reforms across the EU. The paper is available here: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2013/pdf/ee5_en.pdf

One interesting topic covered relates to the substitution away from equity in favour of debt funding in corporate capital investment. A chart to start with:

Now, per above, the disincentives to equity investment and incentives in favour of debt seem to be the lowest (in euro area) in Cyprus and Ireland. Note that these countries are associated with aggressive brass-plating (Luxembourg) are distinct from countries with aggressive tax arbitrage activities (Cyprus and Ireland). And thus, behold the skew in the EU Commission analysis: MNCs investing into these countries do not use debt on-shoring (US MNCs do not borrow in these countries), but use registry of equity there (for example, in Irish case - due to FDI-booked investments, or equity investment by IFSC companies, ditto for old Cypriot banking system vis Russian corporates).

The EU admits almost as much:
"There is also evidence that the tax advantage of debt fuels international profit-shifting activities as
rules on interest deductibility differ between countries and there are mismatches in decisions on which instruments are considered debt financing. Several studies analyse the debt financing of multinationals with either parent companies or subsidiaries in the United States, Germany, Canada and the EU. The results of these studies suggest that firms use intra-group loans to adapt their financial structure and minimise their overall tax burden. By shifting debt to an affiliate located in a high-tax country, corporate groups are able to deduct interest payments against a higher statutory tax rate while the interest received by the lending affiliate is taxed at a lower rate. Taking data from 32 European countries between 1994 and 2003, Huizinga et al. (2008) find that a 10 % increase in the tax rate increases leverage by 1.8 %. The authors also show evidence of debt-shifting as, for multinationals with two equal-size establishments in two countries, a 10 % increase in the tax rate in one country leads to an increase in leverage of the company located in that country by 2.4 % and a decrease in leverage in the affiliated foreign company by 0.6 %."

However, overall the tax rates also play the role in this debt-shifting: "Two recent meta-studies by Feld et al. (2013) and de Mooij (2011a) review the existing empirical studies and find that ... a one percentage point higher CIT rate is associated with a 0.27 percentage point higher debt-asset ratio."

Two more major points raised in the paper:

1. Welfare costs: "The tax bias towards debt financing also creates welfare costs. Weichenrieder and Klautke (2008) estimate this cost at between 0.08 % and 0.23 % of GDP, while Gordon (2010) estimates it at about 0.25 % of GDP. As pointed by de Mooij (2011b), these estimates ...fails to take into account the heterogeneity of responses and hence the additional welfare costs due to misallocations. Existing studies also fail to include the larger welfare costs of the negative externalities of using debt, such as systemic risk, the probability of default and the social costs of business cycle fluctuations. Finally, they do not take into account the distortions created by debtshifting activities and misallocation due to international tax arbitrage and administrative and compliance costs (de Mooij, 2011b). Consequently, the welfare impact of the debt bias can be assumed to be higher than what has been found in the literature so far."
2. Banking Systems and Debt Shifting: "Keen and de Mooij (2012) ...show that taxes influence the capital structure of banks and that, despite capital requirement constraints, the size of the effects of corporate taxation on the financial structure of banks is close to those for non-financial firms." In other words: capital rules do not induce any significant changes in banks behaviour when it comes to funding of banking activities: debt incentives still drive leverage up. Furthermore, "Hemmelgarn and Teichmann (2013) have found that bank leverage, dividend payouts and earnings management (in terms of loan loss reserves) react to changes in the domestic statutory CIT (corporate income tax) rate. ...In the three years after a tax increase by 10 percentage points, the results predict an increase in leverage of 0.98 percentage points or a relative increase by about 1.1 % (in relation to the equity ratio it would mean a notable relative decrease, of 8.9 % of equity)." Core conclusion: "These results suggest that a reduction in the preferential treatment of debt would result in a significant decrease in bank leverage. In addition, the results also show that regulatory capital requirements in the banking sector alone do not seem to be a prime determinant of financial structure. ... the effect of taxation conflicts with the aim of current regulatory reform to increase capital in the context of Basel III."

9/10/2013: Leveraged and Sick: Euro Area Banks - Sunday Times October 6

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from October 6, 2013.


Newton’s Third Law of Motion postulates that to every action, there is always an equal and opposite reaction. Alas, as recent economic history suggests, physics laws do not apply to economics.

The events of September are case in point. In recent weeks, economic data from the euro area and Ireland have been signaling some improvement in growth conditions. Physics would suggest that the reaction should be to use this time to put forward new systems that can help us averting or mitigating the next crises and deal with the current one. Political economy, in contrast, tells us that any improvement is just a signal to policymakers to slip back into the comfort of status quo.

Meanwhile, the core problems of the Financial Crisis and the Great Recession remain unaddressed, and risks in the global financial markets, are rising, not falling.

More ominously, the Euro area, and by corollary Ireland, are now once again in the line of fire. The reason for this is that for all the talk about drastic changes in the way the financial services operate and are regulated, Europe has done virtually nothing to effectively address the lessons learned since September 2008.


Last month we marked the fifth anniversaries of the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and the introduction of the Irish banking guarantee. These events define the breaking points of the global financial crisis. In the same month we also saw the restart of the Greek debt negotiations ahead of the Third Bailout, the Portuguese Government announcement that its debt will reach 128 percent of the country GDP by the end of this year, a renewed political crisis in Italy, and continued catastrophic decline in the Cypriot economy. Public debt levels across the entire euro periphery are still rising; economies continue to shrink or stagnate. Financial system remains dysfunctional and loaded with risks. Voters are growing weary of this mess. In Spain, political divisions and separatist movements gained strength, while German and Austrian elections have signaled a prospect of the governments’ paralysis.

In Ireland, the poster boy for EU policies, pressures continued to build up in the banking system. The Central Bank is barely containing its dissatisfaction with the lack of progress achieved by the banks in dealing with arrears and is forcefully pushing through new, ever more ambitious, mortgages resolutions targets. Yet it is not empowered to enforce these targets and has no capacity to steer the banks in the direction of safeguarding consumer interests. Business loans continue to meltdown hidden in the accounts.

Meanwhile, the latest set of data from the banking sector is highlighting the fact that little has changed on the ground in five years of the crisis. Domestic deposits are flat or declining – depending on which part of the system one looks at. Foreign deposits are falling. Credit supply continues to shrink.


Perhaps the greatest problem faced by the euro area and Ireland is that since the late 2008, tens of thousands of pages of new regulations have been drawn up in attempting to cover up the collapse of the banking system. Well in excess of EUR 700 billion was spent on ‘repairing’ the banks. And yet, few tangible changes on the ground have taken place. The lessons of the crisis have not been learned and its legacy continues to persist.

There are three basic problems with euro area financial systems as they stand today - the very same problems that plagued the system since the start of the crisis. These are: high leverage and systemic risks, excessive concentration of the banks by size, and wrong-headed regulatory responses to the crisis.

European banks are still leveraged far above safety levels. Lehman Brothers borrowed 31 times its own capital in mid-2008. Today, euro area banks borrow even more. No new European rules on leverage have been written, let alone implemented.

New York University’s Volatility Lab maintains a current database on systemic risks present in the global banking sector. Top 50, ranked by the degree of leverage carried on their balance sheet, euro area banks had combined exposure to USD 1.376 trillion in systemic risks at the end of last week. The banks market value was half of that at USD668 billion. Average leverage in the euro area top 50 banks is 58.5 or almost double Lehman's, when measured as a function of own equity. Two flagship Irish banks, still rated internationally, Bank of Ireland and Ptsb, are ranked 37th and 46th in terms of overall leverage risks and carry combined systemic risk of USD11.4 billion. Accounting for the banks provisions for bad loans, the two would rank in top 20 most risky banks in the advanced world.

Compare this to the US banking system. The highest level of leverage recorded for any American bank is 20.4 times (to equity). Total systemic risk of the top 50 leveraged financial institutions in the entire Americas (North and South) is around USD489 billion, set against the market value of these institutions of USD1.4 trillion.

Since September 2008, systemic risk in the US banking system has more than halved. In the case of euro area, the decline is only one-fifth.

Euro area banks positions as too-big-to-fail are becoming even stronger as the result of the crisis. In the peripheral euro states, and especially in Ireland, this effect is magnified by the deliberate policies attempting to shore up their banking systems by further concentrating market power of ‘Pillar’ banks.


Another area in which change has been scarce is the regulations concerning the funding of the banks. The crisis was driven, in part, by the short-term nature of banks funding – the main cause for the issuance of the September 2008 banking guarantee in Ireland.

In the wake of the crisis, one would naturally expect the new regulatory changes to focus on increasing the deposits share in funding and on reducing banks’ reliance on and costly (in the case of restructuring) senior bonds. None of this has happened to-date and following Cypriot haircuts on depositors one can argue that the ability of euro area banks to raise funding via deposits has now been reduced, not increased.

In addition to driving consolidation of the sector, Europe’s political leaders promised to raise the capital requirements on the banks. Actions did not match their rhetoric. Higher capital holdings are not being put in place fast enough. The EU is actively attempting to delay global efforts at introduction of new minimum standards for capital. As the result, current levels of capital buffers held by the top 50 euro area banks are below those held by Lehman Brothers at the end of 2008. Irish banks capital levels, even after massive injections of 2011, are also lower than that of Lehman’s once the expected losses are accounted for.


Even more ominously, the ideology of harmonisation as a solution to every problem still dominates the EU thinking. This ideology directly contradicts core principles of risk management. By reducing diversity of the regulatory and supervisory systems, the EU is making a bet that its approach to regulation is the best that can ever be developed. History of the entire European Monetary Union existence tells us that this is unlikely to be the case.

Moving from diverse regulatory systems and competitive banking toward harmonised regulation and more concentrated financial sector dominated by the too-big-to-fail ‘Pillar’ institutions implies the need for ever-rising levels of rescue funds and capital buffers.

Currently, there are only two proposals as to how this demand for rescue funds can be addressed. You guessed it – both are utterly unrealistic when it comes to political economy’s reality.

The first one is promising to deliver a small rescue fund for future banks rescues capitalized out of a special banks levy. The fund is not going to be operative for at least ten years from its formation and will not be able to deal with the current crisis legacy debts.

The second plan was summarized this week in the IMF policy paper. Per IMF, full fiscal harmonisation is a necessary condition for existence of the common currency. A full fiscal union, and by corollary a political union as well, is required to absorb potential shocks from the future crises. The union should cover better oversight by the EU authorities over national budgets and fiscal policies, a centralised budget, borrowing and taxing authority, and a credible and independent fund for backstopping shocks to the banking sector. In more simple terms, the IMF is outlining a federal government for Europe, minus democratic controls and elections.

Under all of these plans, there is no promise of relief for Ireland on crisis-related banking debts. In fact, the IMF proposals clearly and explicitly state that the stand-alone fund will only be available to deal with future crises. Addressing legacy costs will require separate mutualisation of the Government liabilities relating to the banking sector rescues. The IMF proposal, in the case of Ireland, means accepting tax harmonisation and surrendering some of the Irish tax revenues to the federal authorities.


At this stage, it is painfully clear to any objective observer that fundamental drivers of the Financial Crisis triggered by the events of September 2008 remain unaddressed in the case of European banking. Thus, core risks contained in the financial system in Europe and in Ireland in particular are now rising once again. Politics have been trumping logic over the last five years just as they did in the years building up to the crisis. This is not a good prescription for the future.

Box-Out: 

A study by the Bank for International Settlements researchers, Stephen Cecchetti and Enisse Kharroubi, published this week, attempted to uncover the reasons for the negative relationship between the rate of growth in financial services and the rate of growth in innovation-related productivity. In other words, the study looked at what is known in economics as total factor productivity growth – growth in productivity attributable to skills, technology, as well as other 'softer' sources, such as, for example, entrepreneurship or changes in corporate strategies, etc. The authors found that an increase in financial sector activity leads to outflow of skilled workers away from entrepreneurial ventures and toward financial sector. This, in turn, results in the financial sector growth crowding out growth in R&D-intensive firms and industries. The study used data for 15 OECD countries, including some countries with open economies and significant shares of financial sector in GDP, similar to Ireland. The findings are striking: R&D intensive sectors located in a country whose financial system is growing rapidly grow between 1.9 and 2.9% a year slower low R&D intensity sectors located in a country whose financial system is growing slowly. This huge effect implies that for the economies like Ireland, shifting economic development to R&D-intensive activity will require significant efforts to mitigate the effects of the IFSC on draining the indigenous skills pool. It also implies that Ireland should consider running an entirely separate system for attracting skilled immigrants for specific sectors.

16/9/2013: Some scary charts from BIS: Yields Blowing Up & Leverage Climbs

BIS Quarterly (http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1309a.pdf) has some interesting analysis of the US yields:

"An examination of the rise in US bond yields between May and July reveals as a key  driver the uncertainty about the future stance of monetary policy. The sell-off mainly shifted bond yields at long maturities, while the short end of the yield curve remained anchored by the Federal Reserve’s continued low interest rate policy."

"In addition, the federal funds futures curve also shifted upwards, signalling market perceptions that a policy rate exit from the current 0–0.25% band had become quite likely to occur as early as in the second quarter of 2014."

"A model-based decomposition of the  10-year US Treasury yield, which sheds light on the various drivers of these shifts,  indicates that the recent yield spike was largely the result of a rising term premium. This is consistent with markets reacting to uncertainty about the extent to which an improving economic outlook would affect future policy rates. It is also consistent with uncertainty as regards the impact that a reduction in the Federal Reserve’s purchases of long-term Treasuries would have on these securities’ prices."

"In comparison, the bond market sell-offs in 1994 and 2003–04 were different in  nature. During those episodes, long-term nominal yields rose together with policy rates or on the back of expected increases in future real interest rates and inflation. By contrast, inflation expectations were largely unchanged in the second and third quarters of 2013."

Basically, as we all know  by now, current yields have nothing to do with inflation and are solely priced by reference to expected liquidity conditions. Or put differently, nothing but printing press matters. So much for monetary policy-real growth links...


And BIS does deliver a nicely focused warning: "Their recent spike notwithstanding, bond yields in mature markets remained low by historical standards. For one, the yields on sovereign bonds in the largest world economies had been on a downward trend since 2007. And investment grade spreads in the United States, the euro area and the United Kingdom declined respectively by 75, 110 and 190 basis points between May 2012 and early September 2013, falling past their earlier troughs in 2010 and reaching levels last seen at end-2007. The evolution of the corresponding high-yield bond indices was similar, with spreads declining by 230 to 470 basis points over the same period."

Go no further than the second chart above: reversion to the mean is going to be brutal. And this brutality will only be reinforced by the fact that quietly, unnoticed by most, leverage has returned: overall share of leveraged and highly leveraged loans in total syndicated loan signings is now at all-time high.

Starting with page 6 (above link), the quarterly is a must-read as it exposes growing problem with high risk debt accumulation by investors and that amidst the historically low rates. The system is back at end-of-2007 levels of credit underpricing. The big difference today in contrast with 2007 is that no one has any bullets left to fight the bear, should one appear on the horizon.

22/8/2013: Burry the Debt... Forever!

Pierre Pâris, Charles Wyplosz, 6 August 2013 column for Vox.eu, titled "To end the Eurozone crisis, bury the debt forever" is a perfect referencing point for my thinking on the debt crisis. Read it here: http://www.voxeu.org/article/end-eurozone-crisis-bury-debt-forever

Synopsis: "The Eurozone’s debt crisis is getting worse despite appearances to the contrary. How can we end it? This column presents five major options for reducing crisis countries’ debt. Looking into the details, it seems the only option that is both realistic and effective is for countries to default by selling monetised debt to the ECB. Moral hazard aside, burying the debt seems to be the only way we can end the crisis".

Can't say it better myself!

22/8/2013: Why This Time Things Might Be Different...

The readers of this blog know that I am seriously concerned with the issues of private (household) debt sustainability in the Euro area, as well as in other advanced economies around the world. In fact, my (simplified or stylised) POV on the current crisis is that we have now reached the point of long-term saturation with leverage and this is the main driver for the current Great Recession.

In a normal recession, deleveraging by one side of the economy is accommodated by leveraging up in another. For example, in a Keynesian policy set up, deleveraging of the households and non-financial corporates is accommodated by leveraging up of the fiscal side of the GDP equation. In a monetary policy setting, deleveraging of fiscal / public sector side is accommodated by lowering debt costs and thus increasing credit to the private economy. Lastly, in a normal balancesheet recession, both side of the economy can be helped in deleveraging by a combination of two policies accommodation.

In the current Great Recession, neither one of the three approaches above can work, unless at least one approach directly reduces debt levels - either via a sovereign default/writedown or a private sector writedown on a systemic scale. The reasons for this are two-fold:

1. Too much debt on all lines of the economic balancesheet: fiscal, household, NFCs and, thus, banks means that lowering the cost of debt financing is not sufficient to deliver signifcant enough room for new debt expansion; and
2. With emerging markets and middle income economies showing increasingly South-South internalised trade and investment flows patterns, the advanced economies are witnessing structural reductions in the pools of surplus (investable) savings available to them - the effect that is compounded by the adverse demographics in these economies. This means that monetary policy accommodation is funding the liquidity in the financial markets, where normally it would have been going to fund real activity.

In short, debt is the source of the crisis this time around, not the solution to the crisis as in previous recessions. And it is a proverbial perfect storm, as it comes on foot of demographic decline coincident with severe fiscal crises. The resulting squeeze on pensions in the advanced economies and on other age-related public services is yet to come.

Here is an interesting view on the continued crisis dynamics in the area of household debts in the US (with an ample warning for the rest of the advanced world) from Michael Hudson: http://www.alternet.org/economy/big-threat-economy-private-debt-and-interest-owed-it-not-government-debt (H/T to @rszbt Beate Reszat).

8/3/2013: Why Economists Failed to Predict the Twin Crises?

Wonderfully interesting recent CEPR (DP No. 9269) paper titled THE FAILURE TO PREDICT THE GREAT RECESSION. THE FAILURE OF ACADEMIC ECONOMICS? A VIEW FOCUSING ON THE ROLE OF CREDIT by Maria Dolores Gadea Rivas and Gabriel Perez Quiros (http://www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?dpno=9269.asp) takes up a gargantuan task of trying to answer why (and indeed if) economists failed to predict the latest financial and real economic crises.

In addition, the real economic downturn "has also highlighted the lack of consensus in macroeconomic thinking about how far the financial system influences economic activity."

"Basic economic theory suggests that, in a frictionless world, the shocks originating in credit markets play only a minor role in explaining business cycles. However, the presence of financial imperfections can amplify their effect on the real economy and, thus, disturbances in credit markets can lead to larger cyclical fluctuations in the real economy. These frictions also provide micro-fundamentals for analyzing the channels of transmission." This is known as the financial accelerator mechanism.

However, prior to the crisis, "the most influential dynamic general equilibrium models developed just before the recession by Chistiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouter (2007) do not incorporate any financial accelerator mechanism. The debate at that time was about the effect of frictions, nominal and real, and the role of monetary policy to offset these effects on output and inflation."

Since the onset of the crisis, a new strand of literature has taken prominence in economics, dealing more directly with the links between the economic and credit cycles. This literature is empirical, rather than theoretical in nature and focuses on historical data of financial crises. Much of the literature concludes "that there are strong similarities between recent and past crises and, consequently, the Great Recession is nothing new" and that credit growth acts as a powerful predictor of financial crises, with external imbalances useful ind erecting the turning points. Majority of studies conclude that "credit booms tend to be followed by deeper recessions and sluggish recoveries."

Per authors, "all these papers have much in common, both in the stylized facts derived from them and in their methodological foundations. They provide considerable evidence that financial markets, and credit in particular, play an important role in shaping the economic cycle, in the probability of financial crises, in the intensity of recessions and in the pace of recoveries. The argument is that the strong growth of domestic credit and leverage that fuelled the expansion phase became the trigger for a financial crisis and, therefore, for a recession4. A common finding is that downturns associated with financial crashes are deeper and their recoveries slower."

The clarity and the robustness of the new studies' results begs a question as to why "the financial accelerator mechanism did not appear earlier on the agenda of the theoretical business cycle models"? "It seems that the link between financial and real crises is so obvious that economists should have been blind when looking at data before the crisis to miss such an important feature of the data. Significantly, however, all the papers that find this clear empirical evidence date from after the financial crisis started."

The real question to ask, therefore, is "whether this ex post evidence, could be obtained ex-ante and if it is sufficiently robust to assist with economic policy decisions"?

In other words, ex-post crisis studies do not "take into account the fact that recession dating is uncertain in real time. Furthermore, when the macroeconomic variables have the property of accumulating during the expansions periods, a potential bias may arise because these variables usually present high levels just before the turning points. For example, from this literature, an analyst could extract the lesson. However, during long periods of expansions, credit to GDP growth is high and there is no recession. Also, credit as a proportion of GDP accumulates over time endogenously in different theoretical models, …and, therefore, it is endogenously high when expansions are long. Yet these high levels before turning points do not imply any power of the credit to GDP ratio in predicting the turning points. In medical terminology, the previous literature is more interested in the ”anatomy” of financial
crises, after they have occurred, than in ”clinical medicine”, that is, diagnosis from the symptoms. …For the lessons extracted from the data to be of value to policymakers in their day-to-day policy decisions, we have to understand the dynamics of these financial variables in real time without forgetting the uncertainty about turning points."

This is a brilliantly put introduction to the core thesis of the paper: "to consider the cyclical phases and, especially, recessions in an environment of uncertainty. Policymakers that see credit to GDP growing have to decide when the growth is dangerously high and could generate a turning point. If a long expansion keeps generating a high credit to GDP ratio endogenously, to cut credit dramatically could unnecessarily shorten the period of healthy growth."

Put differently, "the key question for a policymaker is to what extent the level of credit to GDP (or its variation) observed in period ”t” increases or not the probability of being in a recession in ”t +1”, or whether it changes the characteristics of future cyclical phases."

To answer these questions, the authors propose "a novel and robust technique for dating and characterizing business cycles and for analyzing the effect of financial and other types of variables. We combine temporal and spatial data and we show that this approach is legitimate, notably reduces the uncertainty associated with the estimation of recession phases and improves forecasting ability in real time."

The key results can be summarized as follows:
-- "Credit build-up exerts a significant and negative influence on economic growth, both in expansion and recession, increasing the probability of remaining in recession and reducing that of continuing in expansion."
-- "However, these effects, although significant, are almost negligible on the business cycle characteristics.
-- The authors show that "there is no significant gain in forecast performance as a consequence of introducing credit."
-- Thus, "in contrast to the previous literature, our findings indicate that the role of credit in the identification of the economic cycle and its characteristics is very limited."

Per original (and by now secondary) question asked the authors claim that their "results also explain why financial accelerator mechanisms have not played a central role in the models that describe business fluctuations. The financial accelerator was not a key point in explaining business fluctuations simply because, empirically, it did not have such a close relationship to the business cycle, either in a sample (prior to the crisis) or in an out of sample approach, once the uncertainty in dating recession periods is included in the model."

This is a really interesting paper with fundamental implications for macroeconomics and one of the earliest attempts to reconcile empirical predictability and theoretical clarity of core modern theory (namely that of the financial accelerator) relating to the financial crises and the links between the financial and real economic crises.

19/09/2011: Highly Leveraged Banks' real impact on economy

An interesting paper from CEPR sheds some (largely theoretical) light on the real side of the current global financial crisis.

CEPR DP8576 titled "Financial-Friction Macroeconomics with Highly Leveraged Financial Institutions" by Sheung Kan Luk and David Vines (September 2011: available here) models the current crisis by adding "a highly-leveraged financial sector to the Ramsey model of economic growth". The paper shows that the presence of high leverage in financial sector "causes the economy to behave in a highly volatile manner" and thus exacerbate the macroeconomic effects of aggregate productivity shocks.

The model is based on the mainstream financial accelerator approach of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (BGG). The core BGG model assumes leveraged goods-producers are subjected to idiosyncratic productivity shocks, inducing them to borrow from a competitive financial sector.

Luk and Vines, by contrast, assume that "it is the financial institutions which are leveraged and subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks." As the result of this, leveraged financial institutions "can only obtain their funds by paying an interest rate above the risk-free rate, and this risk premium is anti-cyclical [ in other words the premium is higher at the time of adverse productivity shock, i.e. during the recession], and so augments the effects of shocks."

Luk and Vines parameterise the model to US data under the assumption that "the leverage of the financial sector is two and a half times that of the goods-producers in the BGG model". The assumption is relatively robust for the current environment in the US. It is probably less robust in the case of the EU where financial sector leverage is likely to be higher in a number of countries due to:

1. Traditional over-reliance on debt financing of the banking sector
2. Lower rates of deleveraging in the banking sector than in the US, and
   
3. Greater deposits attrition during the crisis.
   

The study finds that the presence of leveraged financial institutions "causes a much more significant augmentation of aggregate productivity shocks than that which is found in the [traditional] BGG model."

In the nutshell, this provides a plausible explanation as to the channels through which financial sector funding and operational strategy risks (leading to higher leverage) transmit through to real economy. It also links more directly monetary policy to the real economy as well. Ben, keep that printing press running... nothing can possibly go wrong with negative interest rates, mate.