22/1/2013: US Existing Home Sales Signal Restart of Household Investment in 2012

Cycle returned to the upswing in 2012 in the US Household Investment area, despite a headline dip on monthly series basis:

• Sales of existing homes in the US fell 1% in December to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 4.94 million, according to the National Association of Realtors. The rate in November was revised down to 4.99 million from an estimate of 5.04 million released earlier. This was the highest rate of sales since November 2009. 
• Lawrence Yun, NAR's chief economist: "Record low mortgage interest rates clearly are helping many home buyers, but tight inventory and restrictive mortgage underwriting standards are limiting sales." 
• On annual basis, existing-home sales are up 12.8% from 2011. 
• The median existing-home price rose 11.5% from 2011 to $180,800. 
• Overall over 2012, existing-home sales hit 4.65 million annual rate of sales, the highest rate since 2007 and up 9.2% on full year 2011. 
• The median price reached $176,600 in 2012, rising 6.3% on 2011 and marking the highest annual growth since 2005

The Calculated Risk has an excellent analysis of underlying data: http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2013/01/existing-home-sales-another-solid-report.html

Chart from Calculated Risk summarising trends:

13/1/2013: Decoupling: US v Euro Area 2011-2060

Another interesting chart that speaks volumes about the topic I have been highlighting now since ca 2002-2003. The topic is the concept of 'decoupling' from growth momentum. Back prior to the crisis, European media loved the theory of China (or Emerging Economies, etc) displacing the US as the core drivers of global growth and, ultimately, as the centre of global economic power. At the same time, Brussels 'leaders' were keen stressing the theory of the European Century - the 21st century as the period of revival of Europe.

My reply to that was, and still is, that while the US share of global output is shrinking against rising EMs and BRICS share (S for South Africa) and while this trend is likely to continue into the future, it is the EU (more significantly, the euro area) that is dropping out of the global story by outpacing the decline of the US relative predominance. Much of this born out in the IMF projections. And here is a nice and concise OECD graphic for that:

So between 2011 and 2060 (yes, I know - time horizon very vast and thus forecasts very tentative), the US share of global GDP is expected to drop significantly: from 23% to 16% - a decline of under 38.5%. In the same period, euro area share is expected to shrink from 17% to 9% - a decline of just under 47.1%. Of course, Japan's importance to the global economy is likely to fall even more - by over 57.1%.

All in, the 'decoupling' (and I don't really like this term, because it implies removal of the OECD economies activity out of global activity, which is not happening) will take US, EA17 and Japan share of global output from 47% in 2011 to 28% in 2060 according to the OECD projections. 42.1% of this decline will be accounted for by the EA17, 36.8% by the US and 21.1% by Japan.

I don't think the 21st Century is shaping up to be the Age of the Euro...

13/1/2013: OECD charts the Great Recession

A nice chart from the OECD's latest Economic Outlook ppt presentation comparing recoveries in previous recessions with the current one:

Notice that the 1970s recession looks more like a U-shaped in terms of recovery trajectory, while the 1980s recession shows long-lasting rotated J-shape. Current one is at L-shape so far. Also, note that the 1980s recession did not recover the pre-recession peak activity levels before the subsequent recession hit.

Now, do give some contemplation to the current recession, together with the OECD forecasts for two scenarios: baseline (main forecast) and the scenario of continued euro area crisis:

This pretty well shows the tear-away speed of the US recovery expected in 2013-2014, compared to the euro area and Japan, as well as to the OECD overall. It also shows the degree of the US economy (forecast) resilience vis the euro area crisis.

2/1/2013: The Bitter ATRA Fudge

Some say never shall one let a good crisis go to waste... US Fiscal Cliff 'deal' of December 31st is an exact illustration. Here is the list of pork carriages attached to the Disney-styled 'train' of policies the US Congress enacted.

Have a laugh: http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/01/eight-corporate-subsidies-in-the-fiscal-cliff-bill-from-goldman-sachs-to-disney-to-nascar.html

And to summarise the farcical output of the Congressional effort:

• The American Taxpayers Relief Act (ATRA) has raised taxes on pretty much everyone. Taxes up means growth down. Now, recall that the US economy is not exactly in a sporting form to start with (link here).
• The payroll taxes cuts are not extended into 2013 so every American is getting whacked with some 2% reduction in the disposable income, taking out $115 billion per annum (the largest revenue raising measure in the ATRA) out of households savings, investment and consumption, or under 1% of annual personal consumption.
• The super-rich (or just filthy-rich, take your pick, but defined as those on joint incomes at or above $450K pa) will see income tax rising to 39.6% and will have to pay an additional 0.9% in Medicare tax to cover that which they will not be buying - the Obamacare. They (alongside anyone earning above $250K pa) will also pay 3.8% additional tax on 'passive' income - income from capital gains and dividends for same Obamacare.
• Dividends and CGT are raised from 15% to 20% (again for joint earners above $450K pa).

Meanwhile, the US has already breached the debt ceiling and the ATRA has done virtually nothing to address the deficit overhang. So in a summary, the 'deal' is a flightless dodo flopping in the mud of politics. There are no real cuts on the expenditure side, there are loads of tax hikes that are likely to damage demand and investment and lift up the cost of capex funding for the real economy. And there is simply more - not less - uncertainty about the future direction of policy, as the White House and the Congress are going to be at loggerheads in months to come dealing with the following list of unaddressed topics:

1. Spending cuts
2. Budget deficit
3. Further tax hikes
4. Debt
5. Reforms of the entitlements system
6. Growth-retarding effects of ATRA and Obamacare.

Obamanomics have delivered fudged recovery, fudged solutions to structural crises and real, tangible increases in taxation. The latter is the 'first' since 1993.

10/11/2012: GS on Fiscal Cliff

Earlier this week I posted few assorted analytical thoughts from various source on the US Fiscal Cliff and earlier today I posted on Goldman Sachs summary of 3 core global risks.

Here are four snapshots from Goldman Sachs on US key risks:

Fiscal cliff:

Tax hikes:

Debt ceiling:

Updated: Merrill Lynch note on US elections outcome is a superb read: here.

And Citi detailed forecasts out to 2020 from the 'cliff': here.

10/11/2012: Three core risks: via Goldman Sachs

Neat summary from Goldman Sachs on 3 core risks:

30/8/2012: 22 quarters of Europe standing still

2007-present is the period during which the advanced economies world barely moved in terms of economic growth. And this is true especially for the EU27 and the euro area 17. The next three charts document the 22 quarters during which Europe stood still:

(All charts represent author own calculations based on data sourced from the OECD)

28/8/2012: Challenging 'perpetual growth' hypothesis

Once in a while, there is a fascinating piece of thinking that focuses on the long-term economic trends that is worth reading. Robert J. Gordon's "Is the US Economic Growth Over? Faltering Innovation Confronts the Six Headwinds" (NBER working paper 18315 published last week - link here) is exactly that.

The study looks at an exceptionally complex issue of long-term (centuries-long) trends in growth from the point of questioning the basic premise of economics - the premise that future growth is a 'continuous process that will persist forever'.

Quoting from the paper, the author establishes the following basic points concerning the prospects for future growth (up to 50 years out from 2007 and abstracting from the fallout from the ongoing crisis):

1. "Since Solow’s seminal work in the 1950s, economic growth has been regarded as a continuous process that will persist forever.  But there was virtually no economic growth before 1750, suggesting that the rapid progress made over the past 250 years could well be a unique episode in human history rather than a guarantee of endless future advance at the same rate."
2. "The frontier established by the U.S. for output per capita, and the U. K. before it, gradually began to grow more rapidly after 1750, reached its fastest growth rate in the middle of the 20th century, and has slowed down since.  It is in the process of slowing down further."
3. "A useful organizing principle to understand the pace of growth since 1750 is the sequence of three industrial revolutions. The first (IR #1) with its main inventions between 1750 and 1830 created steam engines, cotton spinning, and railroads. The second (IR #2) was the most important, with its three central inventions of electricity, the internal combustion engine, and running water with indoor plumbing, in the relatively short interval of 1870 to 1900.  Both the first two revolutions required about 100 years for their full effects to percolate through the economy. During the two decades 1950-70 the benefits of the IR #2 were still transforming the economy, including air conditioning, home appliances, and the interstate highway system. After 1970 productivity growth slowed markedly, most plausibly because the main ideas of IR #2 had by and large been implemented by then."
4. "The computer and Internet revolution (IR #3) began around 1960 and reached its climax in the dot.com era of the late 1990s, but its main impact on productivity has withered away in the past eight years.  Many of the inventions that replaced tedious and repetitive clerical labor by computers happened a long time ago, in the 1970s and 1980s.  Invention since 2000 has centered on entertainment and communication devices that are smaller, smarter, and more capable, but do not fundamentally change labor productivity or the standard of living in the way that electric light, motor cars, or indoor plumbing changed it."
5. "... It is useful to think of the innovative process as a series of discrete inventions followed by incremental improvements which ultimately tap the full potential of the initial invention. For the first two industrial revolutions, the incremental follow-up process lasted at least 100 years. For the more recent IR #3, the follow-up process was much faster. Taking the inventions and their follow-up improvements together, many of these processes could happen only once. Notable examples are speed of travel, temperature of interior space, and urbanization itself."
6. "The benefits of ongoing innovation on the standard of living will not stop and will continue, albeit at a slower pace than in the past. But future growth will be held back from the potential fruits of innovation by six “headwinds” buffeting the U.S. economy, some of which are shared in common with other countries and others are uniquely American.  Future growth in real GDP per capita will be slower than in any extended period since the late 19th century, and growth in real consumption per capita for the bottom 99 percent of the income distribution will be even slower than that." 
7. "The headwinds [to growth] include the end of the “demographic dividend;” rising inequality; factor price equalization stemming from the interplay between globalization and the Internet; the twin educational problems of cost inflation in higher education and poor secondary student performance; the consequences of environmental regulations and taxes that will make growth harder to achieve than a century ago; and the overhang of consumer and government debt.  All of these problems were already evident in 2007, and it simplifies our thinking about long-run growth to pretend that the post-2007 crisis did not happen."

An interesting and highly illustrative chart plotting growth evolution:

And the conclusion? "A provocative “exercise in subtraction” suggests that future growth in consumption per capita for the bottom 99 percent of the income distribution could fall below 0.5 percent per year for an extended period of decades." Illustrated here:

28/10/2011: Euro area - growth drop out

Chart of the day today, folks is the index of quarterly real growth rates in Asia-Pacific's Advanced Economies against those in the US, UK and Euro area...

Oh, and yes, you read it right - Japan and Euro area are the two drop-outs from global growth picture since 1995. Then again, the dropping-out became even more pronounced in the current crisis. So all that price-stability... hmmm... it really pays off.

And even low interest rates were of little help for Euro area:

30/08/2011: US Consumer Sentiment collapses in August

The US Conference Board Consumer Confidence index fell in August, confirming other readings of Consumer Sentiment in the US released earlier (see chart below). The Index now stands at 44.5, down from 59.2 in July.

• The Present Situation Index decreased to 33.3 from 35.7.
  
• The Expectations Index decreased to 51.9 from 74.9 last month.
  
• US Consumer Confidence index is now at its lowest level since April 2009 (40.8).
  
• Consumers claiming business conditions are "bad" increased to 40.6 percent from 38.7 percent,
  
• Consumers' assessment of employment conditions was more pessimistic than last month. Those claiming jobs are "hard to get" increased to 49.1 percent from 44.8 percent, while those stating jobs are "plentiful" declined to 4.7 percent from 5.1 percent.
• Those expecting business conditions to improve over the next 6 months decreased to 11.8 percent from 17.9 percent,
  
• Those expecting business conditions to worsen over the next 6 months surged to 24.6 percent from 16.1 percent.
  
• Those anticipating more jobs in the medium term future decreased to 11.4 percent from 16.9 percent, while those expecting fewer jobs increased to 31.5 percent from 22.2 percent.
• The proportion of consumers anticipating an increase in their incomes declined to 14.3 percent from 15.9 percent.

Earlier-released University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index for August 2011 posted a decline from 63.7 in July to 54.9 - the lowest reading since May 1980 (see chart).

Economics 29/01/2010: US Economy Blistering Growth

US GDP grew at annualized rate of 5.7% in real terms in Q4 2009 (q-o-q growth), according to the "advance" estimate released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This is a massive jump on 2.2% real rise in Q3 2009.

Q4 increase reflected gains in private inventory investment (two consecutive quarters rise), exports, and personal consumption expenditures (PCE). Imports, which reduce GDP, also increased in Q3, signaling improved consumer and producer (intermediates) demand, but the rate of growth fell in Q4. An upturn in nonresidential fixed investment was partially offset by slowdown in federal government spending.

Real personal consumption expenditures increased 2.0% in Q4, down from an increase of 2.8% in the third quarter. Durable goods decreased 0.9%, in contrast to an increase of 20.4% in Q3 2009. Nondurable goods increased 4.3%, compared with an increase of 1.5% in Q 3. Services increased 1.7%, compared with an increase of 0.8% in Q3. This suggests rather anemic holidays season and potential reversal in consumer confidence (see below). It certainly does not add up to a robust change in the crisis-driven increases in marginal propensity to save (up 4%+ in Q4) and enhanced risk-aversion (keeping durables sales down).

Real nonresidential fixed investment increased 2.9% in Q4, in contrast to a decrease of 5.9% in Q3. Nonresidential structures decreased 15.4%, compared with a decrease of 18.4%. Equipment and software increased 13.3 percent, compared with an increase of 1.5 percent. Real residential fixed investment increased 5.7 percent, compared with an increase of 18.9%. All indicating the beginnings of a new business investment cycle - a very good sign.

A note to European policy makers: weaker currency works magic: real exports of goods and services increased 18.1% in Q4, compared with an increase of 17.8% a quarter earlier. Real imports of goods and services increased 10.5%, compared with an increase of 21.3%. This again points to depressed consumer rebound, but it also signals that inventories rebuilding might have been completed by now - a sign that we might expect much weaker contribution to GDP growth from that side of the NA in the next 2-4 months.

Stimulus is thinning out and rapidly, but on the military spending side, not in civilian consumption. Real federal government consumption expenditures and gross investment increased 0.1% in the fourth quarter, compared with an increase of 8.0% in the third. But non-defense spending increased 8.1%, compared with an increase of 7.0% in Q3.

Another lesson to European leaders: cut taxes and see things grow faster. Current-dollar personal income increased $119.2 billion (+4.0%) in Q4, compared with an increase of $35.1 billion (1.2%) in Q3. Personal current taxes decreased $11.7 billion, in contrast to an increase of $3.5 billion in Q3. Thus, disposable personal income increased $130.8 billion (+4.8%) in the fourth quarter, compared with an increase of $31.6 billion (+1.2%) in the third.

The miracle that is the resilient US economy is about to swing into action, assuming no adverse news on the Federal Reserve side.

Charts on Consumer Confidence finding upward support, again... over the downward cycle
but not over a deviation from historic trend...
not yet. Which means that we are now in the optimistic (exuberantly) territory relative to historic trends:
and

Economics 28/12/2009: Few articles worth reading

Few loose ends:

Casey Mulligan's excellent defense of Chicago School is now in print in Berkeley's Economic Press (here) - a must read.


Another interesting read is on Bloomberg (here) - hat tip to Patrick. My personal view - 3-3.5% growth for 2010 is possible for the US. Major risk factors to these figures are -

1. unemployment - rampant and stubborn;
2. interest rates reversion upward; and
3. resets of Alt-A mortgages - peaking in 2010...
   

Two major plus factors (pushing from 2.75-3% upward to 3.5%) are:

1. Mortgage defaults continuing - these put families off the track of paying 2-2.5K monthly in mortgage costs for negative equity dwellings and into renting same properties for 1-1.2K per month, generating disposable income increases of up to 1,050 per month (once interest relief is counted); and
2. The Federales are yet to inject some 50% of the allocated economic stimulus.

Related to Alt-A's and ARMs is another article in Berkeley's Economic Press latest issue of the Economists' Voice (here) - few charts from it tell the story of the rising tide of ARMs hitting the fan:
The above are going strong and are not contributing to the 'disposable income events' I mentioned above. But the next chart shows the problem of defaults in ARMs and Alt-As still being there:
So the charts above show US middle class freeing itself from the shackles of negative equity via foreclosures - and in the process regaining back financial safety and confidence. This is exactly what is missing in Ireland, where a debt jail awaits anyone who dares to default on negative equity home mortgage. While this approach reduces moral hazard, it destroys any chance for a households-led recovery in Ireland.