4/7/2013: Blackrock Institute Surveys: North America, Europe and EMEA: June 2013

Two charts showing most recent consensus expectations on North American, Western European and EMEA economies from the Blackrock Institute panel of economists (note: these do not represent views of Blackrock).

Notice clustering of peripherals and France, as opposed to marginally better clustering of the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium and Eurozone.

Note Ukraine as the sick man of the region. Also note Slovenia and Croatia - two EU economies that are significantly under-performing the regional grouping.

16/6/2013: Euromoney Country Risk Scores Update

Some updates from Euromoney Country Risk (ECR) reports. First a summary of latest credit risk assessment scores moves:

And on foot of Russia's score move, a related story on Russian government delaying issuance of much expected sovereign bond. Via Euroweek:


"Russia is likely to wait until autumn before bringing its mandated sovereign bond, said analysts. Forcing through a $7bn bond in one deal might also be unwise, but demand is deep and the sovereign could spread its funding plan out across separate transactions, said bankers... Investors have already priced in a large sovereign issue and Russia would not struggle to drum up demand, he added. But the problem is price."Everything is 100bp wider than a month ago and so the sovereign will hope things calm down and allow them to issue closer to the historic tights they were looking at just a few weeks ago," said another syndicate banker."

30/5/2013: That fiscal adjustment race... where we are?

How much more adjustment needed for Ireland to reach fiscal debt stabilization? Ok, nice folks at Deutsche Bank Research have done some plots and:

Which is, of course IMF number of ca 5% of GDP, and it puts Ireland neatly ahead of all peripheral states. We are, afterall, in a better position... except... well, except of one snag: GDP is not something that matters much for Ireland. Instead - we are more like a GNP economy, by which metric the primary adjustment required for Ireland to reach debt/GDP stabilisation is more like... 6.25% of GNP which puts us right at Portugal's doorsteps. Now, consider that Ireland has started the crisis well ahead of all other peripheral states and went into the Troika programme well ahead of all peripheral states, save Greece. Which means that at least a year ahead of all peripherals, we are barely ahead of them in distance to target. Yep, you know - that race ain't over until it is over.

28/5/2013: Germany Might Have Caused the Euro Crisis... but...

CNBC today cites a piece of research (http://www.cnbc.com/id/100769233) that argued that "Germany's insistence on keeping wage growth in check has given the country an unfair competitive advantage vis-à-vis its euro zone peers and is preventing troubled countries from returning to growth, a new study argues."

This non-sensical argument cuts across any reasonable understanding of competitive advantage and the role of economic policy in driving this advantage. Germany undertaking structural reforms neither prevented other states from doing the same, nor imposed any costs (or reduced competitiveness) of other states. The authors of the report and the CNBC should go back to Economics 101 to brush up on their understanding of the competitive advantage concept.

In the nutshell, it is not Germany that caused the crisis - based on competitive advantage argument - but the peripheral states' lack of reforms to deliver their own competitiveness improvements.

However, the mere idea that Germany has 'caused' the crisis in the euro area still merits consideration. There are two strands of thought on this that are potentially valid:
1) Germany actively suppressed domestic demand and thus reduced aggregate demand within the euro area: while true to the point that German domestic demand was and remains too weak, this hardly implies any negative slipovers to the peripheral economies of the euro area, unless someone makes a compelling reason as to why German consumers should be buying vastly more Greek feta cheese or olive oil, and paying vastly more for their purchases; and
2) euro area construct itself induced asymmetric development within the common currency area: Germany, as the core driver of euro area creation is, thus, to be blamed for some failures of the construct.

The latter is a preferred explanation in my opinion and there is an interesting paper from the CEPR (published in March 2013: CEPR Discussion Paper No. 9404) titled "Political Credit Cycles: The Case of the Euro Zone" by Jesús Fernández-Villaverde Luis Garicano and Tano Santos that actually confirms my gut instinct.


The authors "study the mechanisms through which the adoption of the Euro delayed, rather than advanced, economic reforms in the Euro zone periphery and led to the deterioration of important institutions in these countries. We show that the abandonment of the reform process and the institutional deterioration, in turn, not only reduced their growth prospects but also fed back into financial conditions, prolonging the credit boom and delaying the response to the bubble when the speculative nature of the cycle was already evident. We analyze empirically the interrelation between the financial boom and the reform process in Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal and, by way of contrast, in Germany, a country that did experience a reform process after the creation of the Euro."


Some more beef from the paper, as CEPR is password protected site:

Per authors, "Before monetary union took place with the fixing of parities on January 1, 1999, the conventional wisdom was that it would cause its least productive members -particularly Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland1- to undertake structural reforms to modernize their economies and improve their institutions. [However], due to the impact of the global financial bubble on the Euro peripheral countries, the result was the opposite: reforms were abandoned and institutions deteriorated. Moreover, …the abandonment of reforms and the institutional deterioration prolonged the credit bubble, delayed the response to the burst, and reduced the growth prospects of these countries."

How so?

"In the past, the peripheral European countries had used devaluations to recover from adverse business cycle shocks, but without correcting the underlying imbalances of their economies. The Euro promised to impose a time-consistent monetary policy and force a sound fiscal policy. It would also induce social agents to change their inflation-prone ways. Finally, … it would trigger a thorough modernization of the economy."

Germany actually is an example of what the euro was supposed to deliver:

"Faced with a limited margin of maneuver allowed by the Maastricht Treaty and with a stagnant economy, Germany chose the path of structural reforms, giving a new lease on life to German exports. But this did not happen in the peripheral countries. Instead, the underlying institutional divergence between them and the core increased. The efforts to reform key institutions that burden long-run growth, such as rigid labor markets, monopolized product markets, failed educational systems, or hugely distortionary tax systems plagued by tax evasion, were abandoned and often reversed. Behind a shining facade laid unreformed economies.

"The common origins of the financial boom are well understood. The elimination of exchange rate risk, an accommodative monetary policy, and the worldwide easing in financial conditions resulted in a large drop in interest rates and a rush of financing into the peripheral countries, which had traditionally been deprived of capital. Furthermore, demographics in Ireland and Spain favored the start of a construction boom with some foundations in real changes in housing demand, the opposite of Germany, where demographics depressed housing demand. … the percentage of the population between 15 and 64 increased dramatically in Ireland and, to a lesser degree, in Spain between the mid 1970s and 2007. In France and Germany, the peak happened about two decades earlier. Since then, both countries have experienced a slow decay in this segment of the population. These demographic trends were accompanied by an increase in the employment to population ratio and, thus, resulted in strong rates of growth even in the absence of productivity gains."

The paper identifies "two channels through which the large inflows of capital into the peripheral economies led to a gradual end to and abandonment of reforms":

1. The first channel "is the relaxation of constraints affecting all agents. It has long been observed in the political economy literature that for growth-enhancing reforms to take place, things must get “sufficiently bad” (see Sachs and Warner, 1995, and Rodrik, 1996). And, as the development literature has emphasized, foreign aid loosens these constraints by allowing those interest groups whose constraints are loosened to oppose reforms for longer. As explained in section 2, Vamvakidis (2007) also finds that this mechanism operates when debt grows, rather than aid."
2. "The second mechanism is more novel. It affects the ability and willingness of principals to extract signals from the realized variables in a bubble, where everything suggests all is well. A sequence of good realizations of observed outcomes leads principals to increase their priors of the agents’ quality. When all banks are delivering great profits, all managers look competent; when all countries are delivering the public goods demanded by voters, all governments look efficient (this mechanism applies both to real estate bubbles, as in Ireland and Spain, and to sovereign debt bubbles, as in Portugal and Greece). This information problem has negative consequences for selection and incentives. Bad agents are not fired: incompetent managers keep their jobs and inefficient governments are reelected. The lack of selection has particularly negative consequences after the crisis hits. Moreover, incentives worsen and agents provide less effort."

Combining the two channels: "Both of these mechanisms, the relaxation of constraints and the signal extraction problem, led to a reversal of reforms and a deterioration in the quality of governance in these countries. Somewhat counterintuitively, this observation implies that being able to finance oneself at low (or negative) real interest rates may have negative long-run consequences for growth."

There is little new here:

• "Other economists have already pointed out that the financial cycle reduces future growth, simply because of the debt overhang (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999)." [Note: the R&R 2010 controversy does little to dispel the core argument of financial cycle transmission of adverse debt effects, as I am arguing in my forthcoming Village magazine column - stay tuned for later link posting on this blog];
• "Also, researchers working on resource booms have suggested mechanisms that delay growth that apply here by analogy (a financial bubble is, in a way, a form of a resource boom). Grand, ill-conceived government programs involve lasting commitments that lead to higher taxes in the long run."
• "Also, the “Dutch disease” suffered most clearly by Ireland and Spain (with land playing the role of a natural resource here) spreads, whereby human and physical capital moves from the export-oriented sector toward real estate and the government sector. But in our view, the reform reversal and institutional deterioration suffered by these countries are likely to have the largest negative consequences for growth."
• The idea also relates to Rajan (2011), "who links the real estate bubble in the U.S. with an attempt by politicians to shore up the fortunes of a dwindling middle class." 

The authors "emphasize, instead, that in Europe the real estate boom interacted with the political-economic coalition that blocked reforms, allowing large policy errors to remain uncorrected and institutions to deteriorate."

Thus, if Germany did 'cause' the crisis in the euro periphery, it is solely by not enforcing the discipline required within a common currency area - too little stick too much carrots from Berlin was the problem, not too little imports of peripheral products into the core.

28/5/2013: That Cracking Success of the Troika Programmes

Some 'stuff' is coming out of the EU nowdays to greet the silly season of summer newsflow slowdown:

The loose-mouthed Eurogroup head Jeroen Dijsselbloem [http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130527-702547.html?mod=googlenews_wsj] is striking again. This time on Portugal's 'progress' on the road to recovery:
""If more time is necessary because of the economic setback, that more time might be considered" as long as the country is being "compliant" with the program, Mr. Dijsselbloem told reporters after meeting with Portuguese Finance Minister Vitor Gaspar."

Of course, Dijsselbloem is simply doing what is inevitable - acknowledging that the EU/Troika programme for Portugal is as realistic as it was for

• Ireland (which undertook two extensions, one restructuring, one expropriation round vis-a-vis pensions funds, and two rates cuts to-date on its 'well-performing programme' and is looking for more), 
• Greece (which received three extensions, three restructuring, PSI - aka outright default, deficit and privatizations targets adjustments),
• Spain (which so far got only banks bailouts, but has already secured two rounds of deficit targets extensions),
• Cyprus (which hasn't even received full 'support' package yet, and already needs more funds).

It is worth noting that Portugal itself has already seen debt restructuring by the Troika in two rounds of loans extensions and two rounds of interest rates cuts.

So in the world of EU logic: if loans restructuring => success.

Please, keep in mind loans restricting ⊥ <=> success (for those of you who tend to argue that my above argument can mean that absence of EU restructuring implies success).


Oh, and while on the case of Ireland, Herr Schaeuble has stepped in to put a boot into Minister Noonan's dream of ESM swallowing loads of Irish banks' legacy debts [http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2013/05/27/business/27reuters-germany-schaeuble-banks.html?src=busln&_r=0]:"European countries should be under no illusion that they can shift responsibility for problems in their national banking sectors to the bloc's rescue mechanism". Now, recall that Minister Noonan is having high hopes riding on ESM taking stakes in Irish banks to ease burden on taxpayers. See point 1 links here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/05/26052013-ireland-hard-at-work-on-troika.html

So it looks like another round of loans restructurings is in works, just to underpin the immense success of the Troika programmes in Euro area 'periphery'.

26/4/2013: ECB's policy mismatch in 6 graphs

For those interested in the monetary drivers of the current euro area crisis, here's an interesting new paper from CESifo (WP 4178, March 31, 2013): "The Monetary Policy of the ECB: A Robin Hood Approach?" by Marcus Drometer, Thomas I. Siemsen and Sebastian Watzka.

In the paper, authors "derive four sets of counterfactual national interest rate paths for the 17 Euro Area countries for the time period 1999 to 2012. They approximate desirable national interest rates countries would have liked to implement if they could still conduct independent monetary policy. We find that prior to the financial crisis the counterfactual interest rates for Germany trace the realized EONIA rate very closely, while monetary policy has been too loose especially for the southern European countries. This situation was inverted with the onset of the financial crisis. To shed light on the underlying decision rule of the ECB, we rank different rules according to their ability to aggregate the national counterfactual paths to the EONIA rate. In addition to previous literature we find that those mechanisms which care for countries who fare economically worse than the Euro Area average perform best."

Paper is available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2244821

Here are few charts, illustrating the results. In these TR references Taylor Rule, quarterly estimated backward-looking Bundesbank rule denoted BuBa, monthly estimated Bundesbank rules with interest rates smoothing denoted BuBaS and BuBaGMM respectively for backward- and forward-looking, and realised EONIA rate.

Legend:

CHARTS

Per authors: "Two results are worth noting.

First, the counterfactual interest rate path derived from the original Taylor rule and our baseline counterfactual path (quarterly estimated backward-looking Bundesbank rule) trace each other very closely. In fact, they are hardly distinguishable. The monthly estimated Bundesbank rules with interest rate smoothing (backward- and forward-looking) deviate sometimes considerably from the quarterly paths. …all four paths yield qualitatively similar results...

Second, …all four counterfactual paths for Germany lie strikingly close to the actual realization of the EONIA rate. Especially
for the southern European countries the ECB’s monetary policy has been too loose according to all four counterfactuals."

And more: "For all four sets of counterfactual national interest rate paths the Robin Hood rules outperform the standard decision rules. Especially our "economic-needs"-rule performs exceptionally good across all four specifications. Moreover, the forward looking model performs worse than the three backward looking specifications."

In other words, ECB policy rules were completely mis-matching the reality in all countries, save Germany, with (per charts above) mismatch most dramatic in… right… Ireland.

23/4/2013: Updating the cost of banking crisis data

Nice update from the ECB on the cumulated cost of the banking crisis in Europe, now available through 2012. The net effect, summing up all assumed sovereign liabilities relating to the crisis, including contingent liabilities, and subtracting asset values associated with these liabilities are shown (by country) in the chart below:

Note the special place of Ireland in the above.

For the euro area as a whole, net liabilities relating to the crisis back in 2007 stood at EUR 0.00 (EUR36.72 billion for EU27). By the end of 2012 these have risen to EUR 740.15 billion (EUR 734.23 billion for EU27).

Net revenue losses for Government arising from the banking sector rescues, per ECB are:

7/1/2013: A scary chart from Spain

If you want a frightening figure for the start of the week, here's one, courtesy of the WSJ:

Per WSJ: "At least 90% of the €65 billion ($85.7 billion) fund has been invested in increasingly risky Spanish debt, according to official figures, and the government has begun withdrawing cash for emergency payments."

"In November, the government withdrew €4 billion from the reserve fund to pay pensions, the second time in history it had withdrawn cash. The first time was in September, when it took €3 billion to cover unspecified treasury needs." Such withdrawals can lead to sales of bonds, which in turn can lead to higher yields - classic scenario of a ponzi scheme unwinding.

The point is not valuations, but risk.

"Spain will have trouble finding buyers for the estimated €207 billion in debt it plans to issue in 2013, up from €186 billion in 2012, to cover central-government operations, debt maturities of 17 regional administrations, and overdue energy bills," according to WSJ. 

But there is, of course, more. "Spain's commercial banks already have increased their Spanish government-bond portfolio by a factor of six since the start of the crisis in 2008, and now own one-third of government bonds in circulation." In other words, there is a closed loop between Spanish State, State pensions fund and the banks. A liquidity crunch or solvency problems for banks will cascade all across the debt markets, potentially triggering defaults on pensions.

Note: per Eurointelligence report earlier today, "This is old news as already back in June there was a report that Spanish debt holdings by the Reserve Fund had gone from 55% in 2007 to 90%, and it was government policy to reach 100% by replacing maturing foreign debt holdings with new Spanish debt. It is also a bit of a noisy red herring, as a stock of €65bn is about 2/3 of the government's annual pension bill, it is clear that the Social Security Reserve Fund accumulated over the past decade can never be a substantial contributor to future pensions. However, the Euro's prohibition of central bank financing of state budgets may require the creation of such buffer stocks"

13/12/2012: Italy & Spain escape bond markets scrutiny... for now

Two bond auctions for the largest peripheral euro area countries showed the sign of markets still believing the ECB promises of OMT 'some time soon' and at significant support levels.

Spain aimed to sell up to €2 billion worth of above-OMT dated paper and in the end managed to sell slightly ahead of target: €2.02 billion in 3-, 5- and 28-year bonds. Recalling that OMT is promising to purchase bonds with maturities up to 3 years, the result was pretty strong.

Average yields were 3.358% for 3-year paper (compared to 3.39% back on December 5th), 4-year yield was 4.2% down on 4.766% back at October 4, and 28-year bond yield was 5.893%.

Bid-cover ratios were 4.81 for 3-year (vs 2 on December 5), 3.13 for 5-year (vs 2.47 on October 4) and 2.09 for the 2040 bonds. This was the first time near-30-year bonds were offered since May 2011.

Spain is now out of the woods in terms of funding for 2012 - it has raised this year's requirement back a month ago - but the country will need to raise some €90.4 billion in 2013.


Italy also went to the well today, placing €4.22 billion worth of bonds - below the maximum target €4.25 billion. The bonds placed were: €3.5 billion of 3-year paper at 2.5% (down on 2.64% in November 14 auction, marking the lowest yield since October 28, 2010 auction) and €729 million of 14-year paper at 4.75% yield. Bid-cover ratios were much weaker than those for Spain: 3-year paper attracted ratio of 1.36 down on 1.5 in last month's auction.

Italy's 2013 funding requirement is expected at over €400 billion.

Thus, both Italy and Spain seemed to have benefited once again from the ECB's OMT promises. The problem is out to 2013 - with both Italy and Spain having to raise just over 1/2 of the LTROs 1&2 worth of bonds, the promise of OMT better translate into actual scaled OMT purchases, and the threat of political mess in Italy better stay out of headlines.

10/11/2012: Euro area households feeling the pain?

Couple interesting charts from the Goldman Sachs research note on French consumption woes - link):

Euro area household disposable income is now under water in the Euro area steadily since 2008, which marks 5 years of sustained contraction. More interestingly, the chart shows abysmal performance of the RDI in Germany since roughly 2004.

The next chart maps gross savings rates for households - which are falling in the Euro area, just as disposable income is falling. Given the double dip recession, this suggests that tax hikes and cuts to income are now severe enough to knock households out of precautionary savings motive. And the latter would imply that households consumption is unlikely to rise even when income growth returns.

4/10/2012: Spanish Banks Stress Tests

My article for The Globe & Mail on Spanish banks stress tests (link).

22/8/2012: Globe & Mail: The Good, the Bad & the Ugly

My tongue-in-cheek piece for The Globe & Mail on Euro area crisis: here.

20/8/2012: ECB yield cap - more questions than answers?

So ECB is discussing putting an upper bound on euro area yields. One question: what 'bounds'?

Here's a chart (courtesy of http://rwer.wordpress.com/2012/08/19/graph-of-interest-rates-1995-to-2011-for-german-france-italy-spain-portugal-ireland-and-greece/ ) showing interest rates 1995-2011 for a number of euro area states.

Should the 'ceiling' be set at Greek, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese (GISP) yields pre-1995 (around 10% or above) or German, Irish and French (GIF) yields pre-1995 (around 6.0%) or 1999-2008 average (of ca 4.2%) or what? What should be a benchmark? The delusion of the euro turning ECB-targeted gospel or the (already optimistic) pre-euro rates reality? And can euro area finances be sustained at even around 6% yields?

After all, these are hardly trivial questions. Yields must reflect fiscal and monetary realities. Setting an artificial ceiling on them by definition means evading that reality (otherwise constraint will not bind). Does Italian reality justify 6% yield target? Does French reality do same? Is the current level of Greek yields reflective of the reversion to the fundamentals-warranted long-term historical mean (perhaps with some moderate overshooting in the short run) or should Greece really be treated distinctly from Germany, France, and even Italy?

Updated: more questions:

Suppose ECB does effectively cap bond yields. Then what? Will this restore growth to the Euro area? No. Deleverage households or corporates? No. Reduce pressure on taxes? Potentially marginally. Increase Gov's capacity to borrow to 'stimulate' economy? No. Reduce pressure on Governments to reform & incentivise more public spending? Yes. Decrease the Sovereign liquidity trap? Maybe. Increase banking sector liquidity trap? Possibly.

So the price of getting better sleep for politicians will be what? Real economy still in deep deleveraging & Governments slipping back into comfort zone of tax-borrow-spend economics? A logical denouement to the failed economic analysis that see sovereign debt crisis as the main source of economic decline in the euro area.

4/8/2012: Links to my analysis of ECB's policy shift

My thoughts on Mario Draghi's quiet coup are on FTAlphaville (here) and in The Globe & Mail (here). BusinessInsider also picks on my comments (here).

3/8/2012: Did Draghi quietly score a policy coup d'etat?

Let me revisit yesterday's assessment of Mario Draghi's statements. With time passing, it is becoming clear that the key (only) tangible positive is Draghi's comment that he will focus on the shorter end of maturity curve and that this will be consistent with two things:

1. No commitment to sterilization, and
2. Commitment to targeting 'traditional monetary policy' objectives.

Let me explain why I now think these are significant game changers for ECB, and potentially, for euro area.

For some years, even before the financial crisis hit, the ECB (including Trichet before Draghi) have been focusing or attempting to focus policymakers' attention on the need for structural reforms. In the past this was accompanied with threats of tightening monetary policy. But now, such threats are clearly not credible. Hence, the ECB, to stay on the message that long-term structural reforms must be pursued needed to achieve the following objectives simultaneously:

• Reduce immediate pressure on funding indebted and deficit-laden peripherals (so reduce short-term borrowing rates)
• Increase long-term pressure on the peripherals to incentivise them pursue longer term reforms (so increase slope of the yield curve)
• Potentially support enhanced transmission of lower short-term rates into real economy (so alleviate pressure from sterilization of SMP), and lastly
• Reduce future problem of unwinding SMP-accumulated 'assets' off the ECB balancesheet

Now, what Draghi set out yesterday as a potential plan does appear to do all of the four things above. By focusing SMP on shorter term end of the yield curve, ECB will indeed lower shorter-term borrowing costs for Italy and Spain (3-5 year max maturity), while steepening 10 year instruments costs to discourage, relatively, longer term borrowings. This means Italy and Spain should get an added incentive - growing over time as overall maturity profile of their debt starts to shorten as well - to enact long-term reforms. At the same time, ECB will be buying (assuming it does go through with the threat) shorter-term instruments, implying that unwinding these assets will be a natural process of maturity. ECB will not commit to sacrificing long-term flexibility of its policy tools by expanding SMP on the longer end of the yield curve, thus reducing overall risks to the monetary policy in the future.

Some thoughts for the weekend, folks...

2/8/2012: A hell of a non-event

After all the hype and the pomp of recent weeks, today's ECB council and Mario Draghi's subsequent pressie were anti-climatic. Nay, they were outright bizarre, given the 'priming' achieved over the last week. The timeline of the whole fiasco is below - for the fun of it taken off twitter (please note: no tweets affiliations provided due to the way the data was extracted, so apologies to all).

The headline conclusion is as follows:

Sig Draghi's 'Big Bang':

1. ECB 'may' address the seniority issue of ECB over private holders of PSI bonds - an issue that should've addressed more than 3 months ago, 
2. ECB 'might' buy some Spanish/Italian bonds but ECB won't tell how much or when, 
3. It is up to 'Governments' to do something about all of this and apply to EFSF, but
4. ECB will now 'plan modalities' like the rest of the EU has been planning over the last 3 years.

Outcomes:

1. Draghi has managed to bid down Italian and Spanish bonds
2. Draghi manages to further undermine his & ECB's credibility
3. The idiots who bought into peripherals on foot of expectation Draghi was about to start buying them based on his July 26th speech should have seen it coming: Draghi: In the speech on July 26th in London, I made no reference to a bond-buying programme

*DJ Draghi: Govt Council May Consider Undertaking Further Non Standard Measures #wsjeuro
*DRAGHI SAYS INVESTOR CONCERNS ON SENIORITY WILL BE ADDRESSED
*DJ Draghi: Will Design Appropriate Modalities for Such Measures Over Coming Weeks #wsjeuro
*DRAGHI SAYS ECB MAY TAKE MEASURES TO ENSURE POLICY TRANSMISSION
*DRAGHI SAYS TENSIONS IN FINANCIAL MARKETS AMONG RISKS
*Markets rally Mario Draghi on comments about eurozone. IBEX and MIB up by around 2%
*Draghi: Governing council may undertake outright open market operations of a size adequate to reach its objective. But no firm commitments
*DJ Stoxx 600 Index Up 1% As Draghi Speaks #wsjeuro
*DJ Draghi: Inflation Likely to Decline Further in 2012, be Below 2% in 2013 #wsjeuro
*So is Draghi strategy to bid down IT+ESP bonds to buy them cheaper?
*Oh, the Italian 10-year yield just tightened several bps
*Draghi talked markets by 5%. Delivered a delay. Huge blow to credibility
*IBEX and MIB rally losing steam as ECB chief Mario Draghi statement continues
*FTSE goes from up 50 to Negative on Draghi NON comments
*DJ Draghi: Sees Significant Progress on Fiscal Consolidation in Recent Yrs #wsjeuro
*DRAGHI SAYS IMPORTANT FOR BANKS TO BOOST THEIR RESILIENCE. Yes. with all those epic earnings
*RT @EKourtali: aaand : Italian, Spanish 10-year yield spreads over German bunds reverse earlier tightening (tradeweb)
*WAAAAAAR RT @djfxtrader: #Germany's Bundesbank to DJ-WSJ: No comment on #ECB Council Decision
*DJ Stoxx 600 Index Slides Into The Red on Draghi Comments; Down 0.2% #wsjeuro
*The Market Rally Has Now Completely Vanished Amid Mario Draghi's Press Conference read.bi/N0Vn3x
*FTSE, DAX, CAC, MIB, IBEX now in negative territory as ECB boss Mario Draghi fails to deliver on eurozone action pledge
*Draghi: we have discussed possible reductions in interest rates, unanimous decision this wasn't the time #wsjeuro
*Press conference Mario Draghi: Introductory statement to the press conference via ECB PR bit.ly/Qzrdon
*Draghi: first thing is that govts have to go to the EFSF. As I've said several times the ECB cannot replace govts #wsjeuro
*LIVE: Draghi implies that seniority and EFSF/ESM measures have to happen before the ECB takes action. read.bi/Ncwtuj
*Draghi: ECB may undertake outright open market intervention of a size adequate to reach its objectives #wsjeuro
*"Many of the details [of seniority and EFSF use] will be worked out by the [ECB]" in the coming weeks. read.bi/NLo06l
*ITA +20bps SPA +10bps since Draghi started
*Draghi: the effort will be focused on the shorter part of the yield curve #wsjeuro
*"This effort is going to be focused on the shorter part of the yield curve...which will introduce discipline on the longer part." -Draghi
*DJ Draghi: This Effort is Very Different from Previous Bond-Buying Program #wsjeuro
*Markets not happy. CAC-40 turned negative having been up 1.2% earlier in #Draghi's press conference. #wsjeuro
*"I'm a little surprised by the amount of attention this received in recent press." -Draghi on saying no to ESM bank license. "Not up to us."
*The current design of the ESM does not allow to be recognized as a suitable counterparty. (for ECB repo) -Draghi
*Oh man the Spanish 10-year did not like that ESM remark. Nor Italy.
*Euro sinking like a stone. Down 200 pips since peak at start of press conference.
*SPANISH TWO-YEAR NOTE YIELD 14 BPS LOWER AT 4.80%
*Euro /Dollar breaks 1.2200
*Meanwhile... Italy Govt Bonds 10 Year Gross Yield 5.934%
*EURO EXTENDS DECLINE AGAINST YEN; WEAKENS 0.5% TO 95.42
*Markit iTraxx Europe already widened 5bps since start of Draghi speech - now at 159.5bps
*Draghi: You shouldn't assume we will or will not sterilize SMP purchases. The committees will have to tell us what is right.
*Draghi: Endorsement to do whatever it takes to preserve euro has been unanimous, but clear Mr Weidmann, BuBa have reservations #wsjeuro
*Spain CDS already 22bps wider at 560bps
*Spain's IBEX35 share index now down by almost 5% after ECB chief Mario Draghi failed to deliver on his eurozone action pledge.
*Italy Govt Bonds 10 Year Gross Yield 6.00%
*FTSE MIB -2.44%
*FTSE MIB -3.00% -- Italy Govt Bonds 10 Year Gross Yield 6.055% -- ITALY 10 - GERMANY 10 SPREAD 473bps
*IT GETS WORSE: US Futures sliding harder after Mario Draghi flop read.bi/NLpsFS
*Draghi: Even if we were ready to act now, there are not grounds to do so bit.ly/QzAPzq
*Italy Govt Bonds 10 Year Gross Yield 6.129%
*Spanish stock market has plunged 600 points in last few minutes, now down 5% pic.twitter.com/JHQZDAtl
*Draghi on whether ECB willing 2 buy private sector assets - "no reason to be specific on what other options are" - eh, left it open?
*DJ Draghi: Statement on Bond Buys Wasn't a Decision, it was Guidance #wsjeuro
*Draghi stresses bond-buying language: "MAY DECIDE" if conditions are met #wsjeuro
*Italy 10-Yr Erases Gains, Yield Rises 23bps to 6.16%
*EMU epitaph: "I want to stress the ECB remains the guardian of price stability and that remains its mandate." - Draghi.
*Bond market to Draghi: If you'd like to buy bonds, we'll make them cheaper for you... bit.ly/QzLfPG
*RT @edwardnh: Draghi has lost all credibility now. The ECB is going to do nothing. Watch yields rise.
*Draghi: it is pointless to go short the Euro. Well, if you went short the euro when Draghi started speaking you are up 200 pips
*Draghi: "It's pointless to go short on the euro because the euro will stay." The first point hardly implies the second.
*Trichet: "Speculating on Greece defaulting is a certain way of losing out" July 27, 2011. And then... bit.ly/NVWP6b
*FTSE MIB -3.17%
... and some more
*Spanish 10s hit 7% bit.ly/QA24Ks
*Priceless! RT @FGoria: S&P: Portugal 'BB/B' Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Remains Negative On Exposure To Spain

30/7/2012: Euro Area forecast by Standard and Poor

S&P's note on euro area crisis is a rather entertaining read, if you are into the sort of 'entertaining' a la mode of Quentin Tarantino... The note is The Curse Of The Three Ds: Triple Deleveraging Drags Europe Deeper Into Recession, authored by EMEA Chief Economist: Jean-Michel Six.


Snapshot of views (emphasis mine):

• A combination of public, household, and bank deleveraging are stifling growth in most European economies. [Now, I've been saying all along that we cannot ignore household debts, yes so far, European and National policymakers are utterly hell-bent on saddling indebted households with the bills for indebted states and banks. Just look at Ireland, where the banking sector is now outright moving into enslaving households by dictating to them how much they should spend on food & clothing so they can maximize extraction of mortgages repayments. And the Irish Government only eager to lend their support to the banks.]
• This is also limiting the effectiveness of the European Central Bank's efforts to support the financial sector and eurozone economies. [Not really, folks. You might missed it, but European 'leaders' are heavily taxing economy already to subsidize insolvent banks and sovereigns. Alas, the room for more taxes is limited in Europe not by household debt - about which the respective National Governments give no damn - but by the fact that Europe already has some of the highest income taxes in the world.]
• Subsequently, the S&P is cutting their base-case growth forecasts for the eurozone and U.K. economies for 2012 and 2013. See two tables below

• S&P also see a 40% chance that downside risks could push European economies into a genuine double-dip recession in 2013 (second table above).

So risk-weighted expected growth is now forecast, for the Euro area to be -0.76 in 2012 and -0.08 in 2013. If we take potential growth at 1.5%, this would imply an opportunity cost of over 3% in 2012-2013 to the Euro area economy.

And the core downside risks are:

• A hard landing in some emerging markets, delaying the recovery in world trade;
• The prospect of one of the main eurozone countries losing access to capital markets for a prolonged period; and
• A more pronounced retrenchment in consumer demand, especially in the core countries.

Key changes to previous forecasts:

• "We have cut our forecast for GDP growth in France to just 0.3% this year and 0.7% in 2013, from 0.5% and 1%, respectively, in our previous forecasts. 
• "We've also revised downward our GDP projections for Italy to negative 2.1% for 2012 and negative 0.4% in 2013. 
• "In the case of Spain, we now forecast GDP will decline by 1.7% this year and that it will be negative 0.6% next year—a cut from our previous forecast declines of 1.5% and 0.5%. 
• "For the U.K., we have revised our 2012 estimate to 0.3% this year. Yet, the provisional GDP estimate released on July 25 by the U.K. statistical office for the second quarter of negative 0.7% makes our full-year forecast more uncertain. If confirmed, this result would most likely lead to zero or slightly negative growth this year."

27/7/2012: Some thoughts on Draghi's thoughts

Just two reactions - reflective of the markets sentiment - to yesterday's statements by Mario Draghi:

Markets are thin, as Europe slides into its annual 'Beach lounge & sun screen' mode, but nonetheless yesterday's statement by the ECB chief is significant. Not a game changer overall, yet, but a sign that the team captain is starting to see the problem more clearly.

So what did he really say?

1. Raised a possibility of direct bonds purchases for distressed sovereigns (read: Italy and Spain) - in my opinion a minor issue. Take Spain - from now through mid-2015 it will need €542 billion to roll over existent bonds and fund itself, plus €20 billion potentially in regional financing. ECB's hands are currently relatively tied when it comes to rescuing Spain by the fact that two out of three tools ECB can use to do so are ineffective if not damaging to Spain. Usual policy tool of lowering interest rates will have little-to-no impact on Spain which is suffering from the same breakdown in the monetary policy transmission mechanism as the rest of the euro zone. Draghi hinted at as much within the overall euro area context. ECB can use the LTRO3 tool. Alas, (1) this would mean that LTRO3 will be explicitly focused on financing sovereign (as opposed to banking sector) needs; (2) financing Spanish Government via LTRO3 would only increase contagion from the sovereign to the banks and back to the sovereigns; (3) Unable to issue LTRO to a specific country, the ECB is likely to risk even more carry trade and contagion across the euro zone as the result of such a move. So the only tool left is SMP. ECB has built up some back pressure here with no SMP purchases in 19 weeks, hence the trigger reaction yesterday to Draghi's statement, but I have severe doubts this will work, even if restarted as the scope for SMP purchases for Spain would be well under €75-80 billion - a drop in the funding requirement.
2. Noted that elevated sovereign yields can restrict the monetary policy transmission mechanism (presumably via the heightened liquidity trap effects and carry-trade incentives), which would bring them within the ECB mandate. This is consistent with his statement to the EU Parliament earlier this month where he stressed that both inflation and deflation are part of the ECB mandate. More specifically, Draghi said that "The short-term challenges in our view relate mostly to the financial fragmentation that has taken place in the euro area... Investors retreated within their national boundaries. The interbank market is not functioning... the key strategy point here is that if we want to get out of this crisis, we have to repair this financial fragmentation... So [first] regulation has to be recalibrated completely." In other words, Draghi sees regulatory, not balancesheet barriers to interbank lending (and thus regulatory causes of a liquidity trap). Fine, but that does not mean a short-term response on the cards. And it does not mean a major departure from the previous position of the ECB that regulatory fix must be applied ahead of monetary fix.
3. Spoke about the fact that the ECB mandate is too restrictive to deliver effective monetary policy - again re-iteration on his statement to the EU Parliament and potentially a clear signal the ECB would not mind if its mandate was expanded. Yesterday, Draghi went further to link the ECB unbalanced mandate to the ECB's ability / willingness to act in the sovereign bond markets. This is what referenced in the quote that the ECB is 'ready to do whatever it takes' to preserve the euro. But the quote contains much more than that: "...another dimension to this that has to do with the premia that are being charged on sovereign states borrowings. These premia [relate to] default, with liquidity, but they also have to do more and more with convertibility, with the risk of convertibility. Now to the extent that these premia do not have to do with factors inherent to my counterparty – they come into our mandate. They come within our remit." FTAlphaville has a good note on the convirtibility bit (here).

In short, I don't read Draghi's statement as a major and definitive turnaround in the ECB policy, but rather a continued sign of ECB drift toward pressuring both: 

• the markets sentiment, and 
• the euro area policymakers to act to increase ECB powers and/or carry out significant policy framework changes (ESM, banking union etc).

Continued is the key word here, because, in my view, yesterday's statement is not as divorced from the earlier Draghi comments as some analysts might suggest (or wish for).

These pressures, however, is an important component of policy drift across the euro zone. Leaderless Europe needs a jolt from the ECB to force it out of policy stalemate. That such an approach might be working is reflected in this latest report from the 'front'.

22/6/2012: Deleveraging of Households US v UK, Spain

An interesting chart from McKinsey today updating deleveraging process for household debt in the US, Spain, and the UK:

Nothing new here (I have been saying the US is ahead of Europe on deleveraging, if only due to speedier foreclosure actions - which are slowing down due to legal challenges etc). And, unfortunately, the chart is very limited as to the scope of countries represented... but it does show how unrealistic are Spanish current expectations when it comes to how much more debt repayment would have to be generated to even get close to a more benign debt crisis in Sweden in the 1990s.

22/6/2012: One hell of a graphic

Love this graphic via Washington Post: