18/6/16: Brexit, U.S. Elections & State of Discontent

My interview with ItalVideoNews’ Concetto La Malfa about Brexit and the US Elections:
https://alternativeeconomics.co/tubeline/#/view/PuaUax7A1sc.

25/5/16: IMF's Epic Flip Flopping on Greece

IMF published the full Transcript of a Conference Call on Greece from Wednesday, May 25, 2016 (see: http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2016/tr052516.htm). And it is simply bizarre.

Let me quote here from the transcript (quotes in black italics) against quotes from the Eurogroup statement last night (available here: Eurogroup statement link) marked with blue text in italics. Emphasis in bold is mine

“On debt, I certainly think that we have made progress, Europe is making progress. Debt relief is firmly on the agenda now. Our European partners and all the other stakeholders all now recognize that Greece debt is unsustainable, is highly unsustainable, they accept that debt relief is needed.”

Do they? Let’s take a look at the Eurogroup official statement:

Is debt relief firmly on the agenda and does Eurogroup 'accept that debt relief is needed'? "The Eurogroup agrees to assess debt sustainability" Note: the Eurogroup did not agree to deliver debt relief, but simply to assess it. Which might put debt relief on the agenda, but it is hardly a meaningful commitment, as similar promises were made before, not only for Greece, but also for other peripheral states.

Does Eurogroup "recognize that Greece debt is unsustainable, is highly unsustainable"? No. There is no mentioning of words 'unsustainable' or 'highly unsustainable' in the Eurogroup document. None. Nada. Instead, here is what the Eurogroup says about the extent of Greek debt sustainability: "The Eurogroup recognises that over the exceptionally long time horizon of assessing debt sustainability there can be no forecasts, only assumptions, given the sizable degree of uncertainty over macroeconomic developments." Does this sound to you like the Eurogroup recognized 'highly unsustainable' nature of Greek debt? Not to me...

Furthermore, relating to debt relief measures, the Eurogroup notes: “For the medium term, the Eurogroup expects to implement a possible second set of measures following the successful implementation of the ESM programme. These measures will be implemented if an update of the debt sustainability analysis produced by the institutions at the end of the programme shows they are needed to meet the agreed GFN benchmark, subject to a positive assessment from the institutions and the Eurogroup on programme implementation.” Again, there is no admission by the Eurogroup of unsustainable nature of Greek debt, and in fact there is a statement that only 'if' debt is deemed to be unsustainable at the medium-term future, then debt relief measures can be contemplated as possible. This neither amounts to (1) statement that does not agree with the IMF assertion that the Eurogroup realizes unsustainable nature of Greek debt burden; and (2) statement that does not agree with the IMF assertion that the Eurogroup put debt relief 'firmly on the table'.

More per IMF: Eurogroup “…accept the methodology that should be used to calibrate the necessary debt relief. They accept the objectives in terms of the gross financing need in the near term and in the long run. They even accept the time periods, a very long time period, over which this debt has to be met through 2060. And I think they are also beginning to accept more realism in the assumption.”

Again, do they? Let’s go back to the Eurogroup statement: “The Eurogroup recognises that over the exceptionally long time horizon of assessing debt sustainability there can be no forecasts, only assumptions, given the sizable degree of uncertainty over macroeconomic developments.” Have the Eurogroup accepted IMF’s assumptions? No. It simply said that things might change and if they do, well, then we’ll get back to you.

Things get worse from there on.

IMF: “We have not changed our view on how the outlook for debt is looking. We have not gone back. We want to assure you that we will not want big primary surpluses.” This statement, of course, refers to the IMF stating (see here) that Greek primary surpluses of 3.5% assumed under the DSA for Bailout 3.0 were unrealistic. And yet, quoting the Eurogroup document: the new agreement “provides further reassurances that Greece will meet the primary surplus targets of the ESM programme (3.5% of GDP in the medium-term), without prejudice to the obligations of Greece under the SGP and the Fiscal Compact.”  So, IMF says it did not surrender on 3.5% primary surplus for Greece being unrealistic, yet Eurogroup says 3.5% target is here to stay. Who’s spinning what?

IMF: “...I cannot see us facing this on a primary surplus that is above 1.5 [ percent of GDP]. I know it's just not credible in our view. And you will see that there is nothing in the European statement anymore that says 3.5 should be used for the DSA. So there, too, Europe is moving.” As I just quoted from the eurogroup statement clearly saying 3.5% surplus is staying.

IMF is again tangled up in long tales of courage played against short strides to surrender. PR balancing, face-savings, twisting, turning, obscuring… you name it, the IMF got it going here.

24/5/16: Greek Crisis: Old Can, Old Foot, New Flight

So Eurogroup has hammered out yet another 'breakthrough deal' with Greece, not even 12 months after the previous 'breakthrough deal' was hammered out in August 2015. And there are no modalities to discuss at this stage, but here's what we know:

1. IMF is on board. Tsipras lost the insane target of getting rid of the Fund; and Europe gained an insane stamp of approval that Greece remains within the IMF programme. Why is this important for Europe? Because everyone - from the Greeks to the Eurocrats to the insane asylum patients - knows that Greece is insolvent and that any deal absent massive upfront commitments to debt writedowns is not sustainable. However, if the IMF joins the group of the reality deniers, then at least pro forma there is a claim of sustainability to be had. Europe is not about achieving real solutions. It is about propping up the PR facade.
2. With the IMF on board we can assume one of two things: either the deal is more realistic and closer to being in tune with Greek needs (see modalities here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/05/23516-debt-greek-sustainability-and.html) or IMF once again aligned itself with the EU as a face-saving exercise. The Fund, like Brussels, has a strong incentive to extend and pretend the Greek problem: if the Fund walks away from the new 'breakthrough deal', it will validate the argument that IMF lending to Greece was a major error. The proverbial egg hits the IMF's face. If the Fund were to stay in the deal, even if the EU does not deliver on any of its promises on debt relief, the IMF will retain a right to say: "Look, we warned everyone. EU promised, but did not deliver. So Greek failure is not our fault." To figure out which happened, we will need to see deal modalities.
3. What we do know is that Greece will be able to meet its scheduled repayments to EFSF and ECB and the IMF this year, thanks to the 'breakthrough'. In other words, Greece will be given already promised loans (Bailout 3.0 agreed in 2015) so it can pay back previous extended loans (Bailouts 1.0 & 2.0). There are no 'new funds' - just new credit card to repay previous credit card. Worse, Greece will be given the money in tranches, so as to ensure that Tsipras does not decide to use 'new-old' credit on things like hospitals supplies. 
4. Greece is to get some debt reprofiling before 2018 - one can only speculate what this means, but Eurogroup pressie suggested that it will be in the form of changing debt maturities. There are two big peaks of redemptions coming in 2017-2019, which can be smoothed out by loading some of that debt into 2020 and 2021. See chart below. Tricky bit is the Treasury notes which come due within the year window of maturity and will cause some hardship in smoothing other debts maturities. However, this measure is unlikely to be of significant benefit in terms of overall debt sustainability. Again, as I note here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/05/23516-debt-greek-sustainability-and.html Greece requires tens of billions in writeoffs (and that is in NPV terms).
5. All potentially significant measures on debt relief are delayed until post-2018 to appease Germany and a number of other member states. Which means one simple thing: by mid-2018 we will be in yet another Greek crisis. And by the end of 2018, no one in Europe will give a diddly squat about Greece, its debt and the sustainability of that debt because, or so the hope goes, general recovery from the acute crisis will be over by then and Europeans will slip back into the slumber of 1.5 percent growth with 1.2 percent inflation and 8-9 percent unemployment, where everyone is happy and Greece is, predictably, boringly and expectedly bankrupt.

Source: http://graphics.wsj.com/greece-debt-timeline/

Funny thing: Greece is currently illiquid, the financing deal is expected to be 'more than' EUR10 billion. Greek debt maturity from June 1 through December 31 is around EUR17.8 billion. Spot the problem? How much more than EUR10 billion it will be? Ugh?..So technically, Greece got money to cover money it got before and it is not enough to cover all the money it got before, so it looks like Greece is out of money already, after getting money.

As usual, we have can, foot, kick... the thing flies. And as always, not far enough. Pre-book your seats for the next Greek Crisis, coming up around 2018, if not before.

Or more accurately, the dead-beaten can sort of flies. 

Remember IMF saying 3.5% surplus was fiction for Greece? Well, here's the EU statement: "Greece will meet the primary surplus targets of the ESM programme (3.5% of GDP in the medium-term), without prejudice to the obligations of Greece under the SGP and the Fiscal Compact." No,  I have no idea how exactly it is that the IMF agreed to that.

And if you thought I was kidding that Greece was getting money solely to repay debts due, I was not: "The second tranche under the ESM programme amounting to EUR 10.3 bn will be disbursed to Greece in several disbursements, starting with a first disbursement in June (EUR 7.5 bn) to cover debt servicing needs and to allow a clearance of an initial part of arrears as a means to support the real economy." So no money for hospitals, folks. Bugger off to the corner and sit there.

And guess what: there won't be any money coming up for the 'real economy' as: "The subsequent disbursements to be used for arrears clearance and further debt servicing needs will be made after the summer." This is from the official Eurogroup statement.

Here's what the IMF got: "The Eurogroup agrees to assess debt sustainability with reference to the following benchmark for gross financing needs (GFN): under the baseline scenario, GFN should remain below 15% of GDP during the post programme period for the medium term, and below 20% of GDP thereafter." So the framework changed, and a target got more realistic, but... there is still no real commitment - just a promise to assess debt sustainability at some point in time. Whenever it comes. In whatever shape it may be.

Short term measures, as noted above, are barely a nod to the need for debt writedowns: "Smoothening the EFSF repayment profile under the current weighted average maturity: Use EFSF/ESM diversified funding strategy to reduce interest rate risk without incurring any additional costs for former programme countries; Waiver of the step-up interest rate margin related to the debt buy-back tranche of the 2nd Greek programme for the year 2017". So no, there is no real debt relief. Just limited re-loading of debt and slight re-pricing to reflect current funding conditions. 

Medium term measures are also not quite impressive and amount to more of the same short term measures being continued, conditionally, and 'possible' - stress that word 'possible', for they might turn out to be impossible too.

Yep. Can + foot + some air... ah, good thing Europe is so consistent... 

23/5/16: Greek Debt Sustainability and IMF's Pipe Dreams

IMF outlined its position on Greek debt sustainability, once again stressing the fact - known to everyone with an ounce of brain left untouched by Eurohopium injections from Brussels and Frankfurt : Greek debt is currently unsustainable.

Here are some details of the IMF’s latest encounter with reality:

Firstly, per IMF: Greek “debt was deemed sustainable, but not with high probability, when the first program was adopted in May 2010. Public debt was projected to surge from 115 percent of GDP to a peak of 150 percent of GDP, primarily because the expected internal devaluation implied declining nominal GDP while fiscal deficits were expected to add to the debt burden, but also because of the decision to forgo a private sector debt restructuring (PSI).”

Several things to note here. The extent of internal devaluation required for Greece is a function of several aspects of Euro area policies, most notably, lack of functional independent currency that can absorb - via normal devaluation - some of the shocks; lack of will on behalf of the EU to restructure official debt owed by Greece to EFSF/ESM pair of European institutions and to the ECB; and effective capture of virtually all Greek ‘assistance’ funds within the banking sector and external financing sector, with zero trickle down from these sectors funding to the real economy. In other words, there were plenty of sources for Greek debt non-sustainability arising from EU construct and policies.

Secondly, “the much deeper-than-expected recession necessitated significant debt relief in 2011-12 to maintain the prospect of restoring sustainability. Private creditors accepted large haircuts;… European partners provided very large NPV relief by extending maturities and reducing and deferring interest payments; and Fund maturities were lengthened…”

Which, of course is rather ironic. Lack of functional mechanisms for the recovery in the Greek case included, in addition to those internal to the Greek economic institutions, also the three factors outlined above. In other words, de facto, 2011-2012 restructuring of debt was, at least in part, compensatory measures for exogenous drivers of the Greek crisis. The EU paid for its own poor institutional set up.

However, as IMF notes, “European partners also pledged to provide additional debt relief—if needed—to meet specific debt-to-GDP targets (of 124 percent by 2020 and well under 110 percent by 2022). Critically for the DSA, the Greek government at the time insisted — supported by its European partners — on preserving the very ambitious targets for growth, the fiscal surplus, and privatization, arguing that there was broad political support for the underlying policies.”

Oh dear, per IMF, therefore (and of course the Fund is correct here), the idiocy of shooting Greece in both feet was of not only European making, but also of Greek making. No kidding: Greek own Governments have insisted (and continue to insist) on internecine, unrealistic and outright stupid targets that even the IMF is feeling nauseous about.

“Serious implementation problems caused a sharp deterioration in sustainability, raising fresh doubts about the realism of policy assumptions, especially from mid–2014. The authorities’ hoped-for broad political support for the program did not materialize…  causing long delays in concluding reviews, with only 5 of 16 originally scheduled reviews eventually completed. The problems mounted from mid-2014, with across-the-board reversals after the change of government in early-2015. Staff’s revised DSA—published in June 2015—suggested that the agreed debt targets for 2020-2022 would be missed by over 30 percent of GDP.”

This is clinical. Pre-conditions for August 2015 Bailout 3.0 were set by a combination of external (EU-driven) and internal (domestic politics-driven) factors that effectively confirmed the absolute absurdity of the whole programme. Yes, the IMF is trying to walk away now from sitting at the very same table where all of this transpired. And yes, the IMF deserves to be placed onto the second tier of blame here. Blame is due nonetheless, as the Fund could have attempted to seriously force the EU hand on changing the programme on a number of occasions, but it continued to support the Greek programme, broadly, even while issuing caveats.

But give a cheer to the Tsipras’ Government utter senility: “Critically, …the new government insisted—like its predecessor—that it could garner political support for the necessary underlying reforms.”


And now onto new stuff.

Per IMF’s today’s note: “developments since last summer suggest that a realignment of critical policy and DSA assumptions can no longer be deferred if the DSA is to remain credible. While there certainly has been progress in some areas under the new program that was put in place in August 2015 with support by the ESM, and growth and primary balance out-turns last year were better than expected, the government has not been able to mobilize political support for the overall pace of reforms that would be required to retain the June 2015 DSA’s still ambitious assumptions of a dramatic, rapid, and sustained improvement in productivity and fiscal performance. In all key policy areas—fiscal, financial sector stability, labor, product and service markets—the authorities’ current policy plans fall well short of what would be required to achieve their ambitious fiscal and growth targets.”

Pardon me here, but I seriously doubt the primary problem is with the Greek Government inability to mobilize political support. Actually, the real problem is that the entire framework is so full of imaginary numbers, that any Government in any state of political leadership will have zero chance at delivering on these projections. Yes, the Greeks are blessed with a Government that would’t be able to replace a battery in a calculator, but now, even with fresh batteries no calculator would be able to solve the required growth equations.

So, we have the IMF conclusion: “Consequently, staff believes that a realignment of assumptions with the evident political and social constraints on the pace and scope of adjustment is needed”. In more common parlance, the IMF has to revise its model assumptions as follows:

Primary surplus (aka - austerity):  The IMF recognizes that current tax rates are already too high in Greece (that’s right, the IMF actually finds Greek tax targets to be self-defeating), while expenditure cuts have been ad hoc, as opposed to structural. Thus, with “…tax compliance rates falling precipitously and discretionary spending already severely compressed, staff believes that the additional adjustment needed to allow Greece to run sustained primary surpluses over the long run can only be achieved if based on measures to broaden the tax base and lowering outlays on wages and pensions, which by now account for as much as 75 percent primary spending… This suggests that it is unrealistic to assume that Greece can undertake the additional adjustment of 4½ percent of GDP needed to base the DSA on a primary surplus of 3½ percent of GDP.”

This is bad. And it is direct. But IMF wants to make an even stronger point to get through the thick skulls of Greek authorities and their EU masters: “Even if Greece through a heroic effort could temporarily reach a surplus close to 3½ percent of GDP, few countries have managed to reach and sustain such high levels of primary balances for a decade or more, and it is highly unlikely that Greece can do so considering its still weak policy
making institutions and projections suggesting that unemployment will remain at double digits for several decades.” ‘Heroic’ efforts - even in theory - are not enough anymore, says the IMF. I would suggest they were never enough. But, hey, let’s not split hairs.

So to make things more ‘realistic’, the IMF estimates that primary surplus long run target should be 1.5 percent of GDP - full half of the previously required. Still, even this lower target is highly uncertain (per IMF) as it will require extraordinary discipline from the current and future Greek governments. Personally, I doubt Greece will be able to run even that surplus target for longer than 5 years before sliding into its ‘normal’ pattern of spending money it doesn’t have.

Growth (aka illusionary holy grail of debt/GDP ratios):  “Staff believes that the continued absence of political support for a strong and broad
acceleration of structural reforms suggests that it is no longer tenable to base the DSA on the assumption that Greece can quickly move from having one of the lowest to having the highest productivity growth rates in the eurozone.”

Reasons for doom? 

1. “…the bank recapitalization completed in 2015 was not accompanied by an upfront governance overhaul to overcome longstanding problems, including susceptibility to political interference in bank management. …in the absence of more forceful actions by regulators, and in view of the exceptionally large level of NPLs [non-performing loans] and high share of Deferred Tax Assets in bank capital, banks will be burdened by very weak balance sheets for years to come, suggesting that they will be unable to provide credit to the economy on a scale needed to support very ambitious growth targets.” There are several problems with this assessment. One: credit creation is unimaginable in the Greek economy today even if the banks were fully reformed because there is no domestic demand and because absent currency devaluation there is also no external demand. Two: despite a massive (95%+ of all bailout funds) injection into the banking sector, Greek NPLs remain unresolved. In a way, the EU simply wasted all the money without achieving anything real in the Greek case.
2. lack of structural reforms in the collective dismissals and industrial action frameworks “and the still extremely gradual pace at which Greece envisages to tackle its pervasive restrictions in product and service markets are also not consistent with the very ambitious growth assumptions”.

So, on the net, “against this background, staff has lowered its long-term growth assumption to 1¼ percent… Here as well the revised assumption remains ambitious in as much as it assumes steadfastness in implementing reforms that exceeds the experience to date, such that Greece would converge to the average productivity growth in the euro-zone over the long-term.”


So how bad are the matters, really, when it comes to Greek debt sustainability?

Per IMF: “Under staff’s baseline assumptions, there is a substantial gap between projected
outcomes and the sustainability objectives … The revised projections suggest that debt will be around 174 percent of GDP by 2020, and 167 percent by 2022. …Debt is projected to decline gradually to just under 160 percent by 2030 as the output gap closes, but trends upwards thereafter, reaching around 250 percent of GDP by 2060, as the cost of debt, which rises over time as market financing replaces highly subsidized official sector financing, more than offsets the debt-reducing effects of growth and the primary balance surplus”.

A handy chart to compare current assessment against June 2015 bombshell that almost exploded the Bailout 3.0

As a result of the above revised estimates/assumptions: a “substantial reprofiling of the terms of European loans to Greece is thus required to bring GFN down by around 20 percent of GDP by 2040 and an additional 20 percent by 2060,…based on a combination of three measures..:

• Maturity extensions: An extension of maturities for EFSF, ESM and GLF loans of, up to 14 years for EFSF loans, 10 years for ESM loans, and 30 years for GLF loans could reduce the GFN and debt ratios by about 7 and 25 percent of GDP by 2060 respectively. However, this measure alone would be insufficient to restore sustainability.
• …Extending the deferrals on debt service further could help reduce GFN further by 17 percent of GDP by 2040 and 24 percent by 2060, and …could lower debt by 84 percent of GDP by 2060 (This would imply an extension of grace periods on existing debt ranging from 6 years on ESM loans to 17 and 20 years for EFSF and GLF loans, respectively, as well as an extension of the current deferral on interest payments on EFSF loans by a further 17 years together with interest deferrals on ESM and GLF loans by up to 24 years). However, even in this case, GFN would exceed 20 percent by 2050, and debt would be on a rising path.
• To ensure that debt can remain on a downward path, official interest rates would need to be fixed at low levels for an extended period, not exceeding 1½ percent until 2040. …Adding this measure to the two noted above helps to reduce debt by 53 percent of GDP by 2040 and 151 percent by 2060, and GFN by 22 percent by 2040 and 39 percent by 2060, which satisfies the sustainability objectives noted earlier”.

So, in the nutshell, to achieve - theoretical - sustainability even under rather optimistic assumptions and with unprecedented (to-date) efforts at structural reforms, Greece requires a write-off of some 50% of GDP in net present value terms through 2040. Still, hedging its bets for the next 5 years, the IMF notes: “Even under the proposed debt restructuring scenarios, debt dynamics remain highly sensitive to shocks.”

In other words, per IMF, with proposed debt relief, Greece is probabilistically still screwed.

Which, of course, begs a question: why would the IMF not call for simple two-step approach to Greek debt resolution:

• Step 1: fix interest on loans at zero percent through 2040 or 2050 (placing bonds with the ECB and mandating the ECB monetizes interest on these bonds payable by EFSF/ESM et al). Annual cost would be issuance of ca EUR 2 billion in currency per annum - nothing that would add to the inflationary pressures in the euro area at any point in time;
• Step 2: require annual assessment of Greek compliance with reforms programme in exchange for (Step 1).

Ah, yes, I forgot, we have an ‘independent’ ECB… right, then… back to imaginative fiscal acrobatics.

One has to feel for the Greeks: screwed by Europe, screwed by their own governments and politically ‘corrected’ by the IMF. Now, wait, of course, all the upset must be directed toward getting rid of the latter. Because the former two cannot be anything else, but friends…

21/5/16: Euro Area Income per Capita: Is the Crisis Finally Over?

Has euro area recovered from the crisis on a per-capita basis? 

Let’s take a look at the latest data available from the Eurostat, covering the period through 4Q 2015.

Looking at the Nominal gross disposable income per capita first: in 4Q 2015, income per capita in the euro area stood at +6.67 percent premium over the pre-crisis peak (measured as an average of 4 highest pre-crisis quarters) and at +3.86 percent premium to the overall highest pre-crisis quarter reading. This is not new: the measure attained its pre-crisis peak within 6 quarters following the peak quarter (3Q 2008). So by this metric, the answer to the above question is ‘Yes’.

Now, consider Real gross disposable income per capita: in 4Q 2015, real income per capita in the euro area was still down 0.57 percent on pre-crisis peak (based on 4 quarters pre-crisis peak average) and down 0.72 percent on pre-crisis peak quarter. Given the peak quarter was in 1Q 2008, we are now into 31 quarters of a crisis and counting. Notably, due to deflation at the height of the crisis, real disposable per capita income actually reached above the pre-crisis peak in 3Q 2009, and as of 4Q 2015, real disposable income per capita in the euro area is down on that reading some 1.31 percent. So by real (inflation-adjusted) metric, the answer to the above question is ’No’.

Lastly, consider Real actual final consumption per capita: in 4Q 2015, real consumption per capita in the euro area was 0.25 percent below pre-crisis peak (for peak measured as an average of four quarters including the peak quarter); and it is down 0.52 percent on pre-crisis peak quarter. As with real income per capita, we now into 31 quarters of below-peak real consumption, so the crisis goes on, judging by this metric.

Here’s a chart to illustrate:

17/5/16: Euro Area Exports of Goods Down in 1Q 2016

Euro area trade in goods data for 1Q 2016 is out today and the reading is poor.

On annual basis (not seasonally-adjusted figures), extra-EA19 exports of goods were down in 1Q 2016 to EUR485.8 billion from EUR492.0 billion a year ago, a decline of ca 1% y/y. Imports - sign of domestic demand and investment - dropped 3%. As the result, EA trade balance for goods trade only rose from EUR46.8 billion in 1Q 2015 to EUR53.9 billion in 1Q 2016.

Out of the original EA12 countries, Ireland was the only one posting an increase in extra-EA19 exports in 1Q 2016 compared to 1Q 2015 (+3%), while the largest decrease was recorded by Greece (-20%) and Portugal (-17%).

On a seasonally-adjusted basis (allowing for m/m comparatives), exports extra-EA19 fell from EUR167.3 billion in February 2016 to EUR165.1 billion in March 2016, reaching the lowest point in 12 months period. Due to an even sharper contraction in imports, trade balance (extra-EA19 basis) rose to EUR22.3 billion from EUR20.6 billion.

More details here: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7301989/6-17052016-AP-EN.pdf/70c12e75-2409-44f5-9403-fdb3eb816d1a 

17/5/16: Village May 2016: Buzz Wrecked

My article for Village magazine highlighting some longer-term risks for the Irish economy: http://villagemagazine.ie/index.php/2016/05/buzz-wrecked/.

Plenty of opportunities to the upside, but risks are material and require careful policy balancing between fiscal prudence, institutional supports for domestically-anchored companies and entrepreneurs, with a concerted effort to move away from the FDI-or-bust policies of the past 30 years.

15/5/16: Don't Rush the Cheers for Eurozone Growth, Yet

Remember record-busting 0.6% preliminary flash estimate of the first estimate GDP growth figure for Euro area released back in April? Well, it sort of was true, sort of...

Eurostat now puts 1Q 2016 growth at 0.5% q/q in its updated estimate released today - 0.1% lower than the April estimate. This figure is tied jointly for highest q/q growth figure since 1Q 2011 when it hit 0.8%.

Sounds good? Brilliant - the euro area outperformed both the U.S. and the UK. But when one looks at annual rates of growth... things are not as shiny.

In annual terms, growth rate actually fell in 1Q 2016, from 1.6% in 2Q 215 through 4Q 2015 to 1.5% in 1Q 2016. You won't be jumping with joy on that. And as the euro area lead growth indicator, Eurocoin suggests, rates of growth have been declining over the last three months through April 2016, dropping from cyclical high of 0.48 in January 2016 to a 13-months low of 0.28 in April 2016:

There is a strong smell of smoke from the Eurostat figures. Demand side of the economy is apparently booming. Despite the fact that retail sales are tanking:

Meanwhile, external trade is also underperforming (on foot of euro appreciation from November 2015 lows against both the US dollar and British pound):

Euro bottomed out at around 1.057 to the dollar at the end of November, and steadily gained against the USD every month since, with current valuation around 1.13-1.14 range. This hardly supports European exports to the U.S. Controlling for volatility, similar trend is against British Pound. About the only thing going the euro way today is yen and it is immaterial to the Euro area’s economy.

So euro zone economic growth appears to be loosing momentum since the start of 2Q 2016. And there are both short term drivers for this and long term ones.

Short term drivers, as outlined above suggest that current risks environment appears to be titled to the downside:

• Eurozone Composite Output Index by Markit posted 53.0 in April against March 53.1. Statistically-speaking, the rate of growth effectively remained static. 
• German Composite PMI was at 53.6, which is an 11-months low, French Composite index reading was 50.2 (barely above the 50.0 line, but still at 3mo high), while Italian Composite PMI in April came in at 53.1, also 2 months high. 
• Importantly, the euro zone PMI indices have been moving out of step with the Global PMI readings. In April, while eurozone PMI declined marginally compered to the end of 1Q 2016, Global PMI reading marginally picked up, rising from 51.5 in March to 51.6 in April. 
• The ongoing stagnation in France continued, while solid expansions were noted in Germany, Italy, Spain and Ireland.
• Developed markets saw all-industry output rise at the fastest pace in three months during April. However, the rate of increase still one of the weakest registered during the past three years. Growth remained only modest in both the US and the UK (UK growth slowed to its weakest pace since March 2013). This puts pressure on demand for eurozone exports and, in turn, pressures profit margins and investment.
• Given 1Q growth estimate at 0.5% (q/q growth) from the Eurostat, current level of Eurocoin suggest quarterly growth slowdown to around 0.4%. 
• Ifo’s Economic climate indicator for the Euro area has now been on a clear declining trend since mid-2015 and is now at its lowest levels since 1Q 2015 and second lowest reading in two-and-a-half years.
• In Germany, consensus estimates put gross domestic product growth at 0.3 percent in the current quarter and 0.4 percent in 3Q and 4Q, with full year growth of around 1.5 percent.

My view: we might see 2Q growth coming in at 0.3-0.4 percent, if April trends continue into the rest of 2Q. Overall, I expect 2016 growth to be around 1.4-1.5 percent which is just about to the downside on current consensus estimate of 1.5 percent.


Long term drivers for structural euro zone growth weakness: Even with positive 1Q 2016 print on growth side, it is fairly clear that euro zone lacks serious growth catalysts.

Everyone is talking about Brexit referendum and the renewal of the Greek crisis as key threats. Put frankly - this is a smokescreen. When it comes to longer term euro zone growth prospects both are irrelevant. Growth within the euro area has nothing to do with the UK. And Greece has been effectively removed from the markets and economic agents' considerations - the country is no longer commanding any serious media attention (with markets fatigued by the never-ending 'crises'). With ESM / EFSF /ECB now seemingly the sole bearers of Greek debt (with IMF likely to take back seat in the Bailout 3.0 as per http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/05/11516-71-steps-guide-to-greek-crisis.html) Greek funding issues and any risk of a default are unlikely to trigger Grexit. Put more directly, even if Greece were to exit the Euro, no one will bat an eyelid over such an event.

Meanwhile, the real long term problems for the euro area are:

• Capex remains subdued across the entire euro area, including Germany, Italy, France. 
• Fiscal policy is currently largely neutral and it is hard to see how the euro area can find any significant capacity to increase fiscal spending. 
• ECB stimulus is working in the financial markets, but not on the ground - there is still too much debt and too little prospect for a return on capital. Quality borrowers are not rushing to take on loans for capex. And the banks are not too eager to lend to borrowers with legacy leverage problems. 
• Eurozone banking is still a mess: capital and loans restructuring is sporadic, rather than systematic, negative rates taking a bite out of margins, but even if this headwind is taken out, markets volatility is not helping. 

And there are even bigger structural headwinds:

1. Lack of agility in the structurally over-regulated and sclerotic economy: technological innovation is weak, adoption of technological innovation is weak, labour force quality is deteriorating, so productivity growth has collapsed. Entrepreneurship is weak. Employment is sluggish and of deteriorating quality. That’s supply side.
2. Demand side is improving due to a short term boost from the post-Great Recession cyclical recovery. But, legacy issues of debt across corporate and household sectors and public finances are still present.
3. On financial side: banks-intermediated funding model for capex is a drag on growth and there is zero momentum on equity and direct debt issuance sides. Even with ECB going into another round of TLTROs, issuance of new bonds has spiked primarily because of larger corporates issuance, not because of market deepening.
4. On policies front, there is total and comprehensive paralysis. EU is malfunctioning, torn apart by crises of European making. National governments have lost capacity to legislate because of delegation of so much decision making to Brussels in the past. Political discontent is rising everywhere. We now have growing proportions of core European countries’ populations - the Big 4s - wanting to reexamine the entire EU.

Europe has been Japanified. And there is little that it can do to avoid this stagnation trap. There is no hope that  fiscal policy can do what monetary policy has failed to deliver - the great hope of Keynesianistas. And with that, both the monetary and the fiscal sides of European growth equation are out. What's left? Endless low interest rates (with a risk of policy error, should Germans rebel against Draghi's uncountable puts) and endless painful quasi-deflating (through low demand) of debt. Aka, pain.

11/5/16: 7+1 Steps Guide to Greek Crisis Madness

Greece is back in the news recently with yet another round of crisis talks and measures. Here's where we stand on the matter.

After another Eurogroup 'talks' this week, Greek Government is back to drawing up a new set of 'measures' to be presented to the Parliament. These 'measures' are, once again, needed for yet another Eurogroup agreement of yet more loans to the country.

The madness of this recurring annual spectacle that the EU, the Greeks and the IMF have been going through is so apparent and so predictable by now, that anywhere outside Greece itself it is simply banal.

The scenario is developing exactly along the same lines as before:

1. Greeks are running out money
2. Greek loans funds are not being remitted by the EU because of the 'lack of progress on 'reforms' which were never progressed since the Bailouts 1.0 & 2.0.
3. Greek Government insists that no more 'reforms' can be imposed onto the Greek economy because there is already no economy left due to previously imposed 'reforms'
4. IMF threatens to walk out and European authorities become 'doubtful' of Greek commitments to 'reforms'
5. European authorities and Greece get into a room to hammer our (3) as a precondition for (2) both of which are necessary to avoid Greek default and are thus required to prevent (4).
6. Greece agrees to more 'reforms', gets more loans, none of which have anything to do with actually supporting Greek economy
7. Greek government declares another 'victory' on the road of the country 'exit from an era of creditors', whilst creditors become ever more committed to Greece.
8. Within 6 months, (1) repeats anew...

And this is exactly what has been happening over the recent days.

Government partner Panos Kammenos has already heralded “Greece’s exit from an era of creditors" this week in the wake of the promises by Greece to implement new round of 'reforms' aimed at placating the EU and the IMF into providing fresh credit to Greece. The target date for Greek Government putting its tail between its legs for the umpteenth time is May 24th when the Eurogroup is supposed to meet to decide on the next round of debt financing for Greece.
What are the latest 'reforms' about?

1. New privatization fund (because previous one did nada, zilch, nothing) to sell state assets (with hugely inflated expected valuations) to investors (read vultures) to generate funds (that will fall grossly short of) required to pay some debt down.
2. New rules for working out non-performing bank loans (foreclosure & bankruptcy reforms) because under (1) above, vultures, sorry 'investors', ain't getting enough.  
3. Load of new taxes (levying coffee, fuel and even web connections, for a modern economy cannot exists in the vacuum of knowledge taxes).
4. Automatic cuts to fiscal spending should the Government breach targets on fiscal deficits assigned under 2015 'deal'.
5. EUR5.4 billion in fresh budget cuts.

In return, Tsipras is getting Eurogroup's usual waffle.

The IMF (that actually holds more central position between the Greek and the EU corners) will probably be allowed to excuse itself from underwriting Bailout 3.0 agreed last Summer. This will load full Greek bailout cost onto the EU institutions - something that Europe is happy to do because the IMF has become a realist thorn in the hopium filled buttocks of European 'policymaking'. IMF will, of course, rubber stamp the Bailout 3.0 programme by remaining an 'advisory' institution (sort of like Irish Fiscal Council - bark, but no bite). In exchange, it will get European funds to repay IMF loans and will walk away from the saga with bruises, but no broken nose. Rumour has it, Germany will accept this role for the IMF but only if Greece agrees to become Europe's holding tank for refugees (it's an equivalent of Turkey Compromise with Athens that will make Erdogan livid with jealousy).

Tsipras will also receive another promise from the EU to examine Greek debt relief. By now, everyone forgot that the EU already promised to do so four years ago (see last page, 2nd paragraph in Eurogroup statement from November 27, 2012 and reiterated it in August 11, 2015 Bailout3.0 agreement). Thus, Tsipras will be able to put a new 'certificate of a promise' (written in French or German or both, for better effect) onto his cabinet wall, while being fully aware that a promise from the EU is about as good as a used car salesman's assurances about a vehicle's transmission. The only chance any sort of relief will be forthcoming is if the IMF amplifies its rhetoric about Greek debt 'sustainability', which may happen at the next G7 meeting next week, or may not happen for another six months... who knows?

Meanwhile, the saga rolls on. Protests in Greece - 'Everyone'sOutraged', are greeted by the markets as 'Things Are Going Swimmingly' just as IMF's team is shouting 'The Patient's Dead, You Morons!' while Germans are saying first 'Nothing's Happening' and a week later changing their minds to 'Things Are so Good, We'll Have a Deal' to the solo of a Greek official singing 'We've Been Half Dozing' and a chorus of EU leaders erupting with a jubilatory 'Lalala'.

Remember: we are in Europe! Mind the gap... with reality.

21/4/16: Drama & Comedy Back: Grexit, Greesis, Whatever

Back in July last year, I wrote in the Irish Independent about the hen 'latest' Greek debt crisis: http://www.independent.ie/opinion/comment/expect-a-harder-default-for-greeks-and-less-democracy-for-the-rest-of-us-31368677.html. Optimistically, I predicted that a full-blown crisis will return to Greece in 2018-2020, based on simple mathematics of debt maturities. I was wrong. We are not yet into a full year of the Greek Bailout 3.0 and things are heading for yet another showdown between the Three-headed Hydra the inept Greek authorities, the delusional Germany, and the Lost in the Woods T-Rex of the IMF.

Predictably, IMF is still sticking to its Summer 2015 arithmetic: Greek debt is simply not adding up to anything close to being sustainable: an example of the rhetoric here. Meanwhile, the FT is piping in with a rather good analysis of the political dancing going on around Greece: here. The latter provides a summary of new dimensions to the crisis:

1. Brexit
2. Refugees crisis

But there is a kicker. Greece is now in a primary surplus: latest Eurostat figures put Greek primary balance at +0.7% GDP for 2015, well above -0.25% target. And Greek Government debt actually declined from EUR320.51 billion in 2013 to EUR319.72 billion in 2014 and EUR311.45 billion in 2015. This can and will be interpreted in Berlin as a sign of 'improved' fiscal performance, attributable to the Bailout 3.0 'reforms' and 'assistance'. The argument here will be that Greece is on the mend and there is no need for any debt relief as the result.

Still, official Government deficit shot from 3.6% of GDP in 2014 to 7.2% in 2015. Annual rate of inflation over the last 6 months has averaged just under -0.1 percent, signalling continued deterioration in economic conditions. Severe deprivation rate for Greek population rose to the crisis period high in 2015 of 22.2 percent, up on 21.5 percent in 2014. Industrial production on a monthly basis posted negative rates of growth in January and February 2016, with February rate of contraction at -4.4% signalling a disaster state, corresponding to 3% drop on the same period 2015. Volume of retail sales fell 2.2% y/y in January marking fourth annual rate of contraction in the last 5 months. Unemployment was 24% in December 2015 (the latest month for which data is available), which is down from 25.9% for December 2014, but the decline is more likely than not attributable to simple attrition of the unemployed from the register, rather than any substantial improvement in employment.

In simple terms, Greece remains a disaster zone, with few signs of any serious recovery around. And with that, the IMF will have to continue insisting on tangible debt relief from non-IMF funders of the Bailout 3.0.

It is a mess. Which probably explains why normally rather good Washington Post had to resort to a bizarre, incoherent, Trumpaesque coverage of the subject. This, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/04/20/the-crazy-reason-we-might-be-facing-a-huge-crisis-in-greece-again/, in the nutshell, sums up American's disinterested engagement with Europe. 

Enjoy. Grexit is back for a new season to the screens near you. And so is Greesis - that unique blend of fire and ice that has occupied our newsflows for 6 years now with high drama and some comedy.

21/4/16: Economic Outlook: Advanced Economies

My article on economic outlook forward for the Advanced Economies is now out at the Manning Financial quarterly: https://issuu.com/publicationire/docs/mf_magazine_april_2016_web_19042016?e=16572344/35062140.

15/4/16: Slovakia v France: Risk Divergence

I love it when the good guys lead: "Slovakia leaps ahead of France, reveals country risk survey

Full article available here: http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3545875/Slovakia-leaps-ahead-of-France-reveals-country-risk-survey.html?copyrightInfo=true

My full comment on the matter:

"From macroeconomic perspective the two economies appear to be heading in the opposite direction.

While France is experiencing weakening growth momentum with forecast real GDP growth rates for 2016-2017 at around 1.55 percent on average and declining (1H 2015 compared to current, a forecast swing of around 0.05 percentage points), Slovakian economy is gaining speed, with current forecast growth rate at around 3.57 percent for 2016-2017, representing an upgrade of around 0.3 percentage points.

Much of this is accounted for by differences in investment (rising in Slovakia, as a share of GDP, while relatively stagnant in France), as well as growth in exports of goods and services (with Slovakia expected to outperform France in terms of growth in exports in both 2016 and 2017 - a reversal on 2015 outrun).

In fiscal policy terms, both countries are expected to post modest reduction in total burden of Government in the economy, reflected in the declining ratio of Government revenues to GDP over 2016-2017. However, in France, this forecast is less certain due to political cycle and ongoing lack of progress on both structural reforms and fiscal targets. In contrast, Slovakia already runs relatively lean, strongly value-for-money focused public spending policies. As the result, even under relatively rosy projections, France will continue to post greater Government deficits than Slovakia through 2017. Crucially, even with negative Government yields on French debt, France is currently running deeper primary deficits than Slovakia, which suggests that the French fiscal space is much thinner than headline difference between the two countries suggest.

The above dynamics also point to continued divergence between the two countries' paths in terms of external balances. Slovakia's current account surplus in 2016-2017 is likely to average at around 0.15 percent of GDP. In contrast, France's current account deficit is expected to be around 0.37 percent of GDP.

In simple terms, diverging macroeconomic and political risks paths do warrant risk repricing in the case of both Slovakia (to the downside of risks) and France (to the upside in terms of risks assessment) into 2016, and possibly into 2017."

The risk trends are indeed showing counter-movement:

28/2/16: ECB in March: A Thaw or a Spring Blizzard?

My comment on what to expect from the ECB in March for Expresso http://en.calameo.com/books/004629676f86bc6c6796a.

As usual, full comment in English here:

While the transmission mechanism has been improving in recent months across the euro area, leading to stronger lending conditions across the common currency area and a wider range of the member states' economies, inflationary dynamics remained extremely weak, even when stripping out the effects of oil and other commodities prices. As the result, ECB continues to see inflation as the key target and is likely to intensify its efforts to boost price formation mechanism.

Thus, despite all the ECB efforts, inflation remains stubbornly low and even slipping back toward zero in more recent data prints. Improved lending is not sufficient to create a major capex boost on the ground, weighing heavily on growth dynamics. Lower costs of borrowing for the euro area governments, while providing significant room for fiscal manoeuvre, is simply not sufficient to sustain a robust recovery. About the only functioning side of the monetary policy to-date has been the devaluation of the euro vis a vis the US dollar - a dynamic more influenced by the Fed policy stance than by the ECB alone.

My expectation is that the ECB will cut its deposit rate to -40 bps (a cut of 10 basis points on current) with a strong chance that such a cut can be even deeper. We can further expect some announcement on an extension of the QE programme beyond the end of 1H 2017.

The key problem, however, is that the ECB is also becoming more and more aware of the evidence that past QE measures in Japan, the UK, the euro area and across Europe ex-Euro area have failed to deliver a sufficient demand side boost to these economies. Thus, in recent months, the ECB has been increasing rhetorical pressure on member states governments to engage in supply side stimuli. Unfortunately, this too is a misguided effort.

In the present conditions, characterised by markets uncertainty, heavy debt overhangs and mis-allocated investment on foot of previous QE rounds, neither supply nor demand sides of the policy equation hold a promise of repairing the euro area economy. In addition, accelerated QE will likely feed through to the markets via higher volatility and possible liquidity tightening (bid-ask spreads widening, fear of scarcity of high quality government bonds and uncertainty over viability of the current monetary policy course).

18/2/16: Europe's Problem is Not Germany...

CES-Ifo just released their survey results for the regular poll of some 220 German economists. And if you think that professionals are at any odds with Schäuble on monetary policy of the ECB, think again.

Which, of course, is absolutely correct. For German economy, ECB's policy is too loose. For French economy, about right. For Italy and Spain - probably somewhat too restrictive, although who on Earth can tell with any degree of confidence what 'about right' policy for these two can even look like...

Still, the key point remains: Euro is still a malfunctioning currency that cannot reconcile differences between various economies. In other words, Europe's problem is not Germany. It is not France, nor Spain, nor Italy. Europe's problem is not even Euro. Instead, Europe's problem is Europe.

9/2/16: Currency Devaluation and Small Countries: Some Warning Shots for Ireland

In recent years, and especially since the start of the ECB QE programmes, euro depreciation vis-a-vis other key currencies, namely the USD, has been a major boost to Ireland, supporting (allegedly) exports growth and improving valuations of our exports. However, exports-led recovery has been rather problematic from the point of view of what has been happening on the ground, in the real economy. In part, this effect is down to the source of exports growth - the MNCs. But in part, it seems, the effect is also down to the very nature of our economy ex-MNCs.

Recent research from the IMF (see: Acevedo Mejia, Sebastian and Cebotari, Aliona and Greenidge, Kevin and Keim, Geoffrey N., External Devaluations: Are Small States Different? (November 2015). IMF Working Paper No. 15/240: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2727185) investigated “whether the macroeconomic effects of external devaluations have systematically different effects in small states, which are typically more open and less diversified than larger peers.”

Notice that this is about ‘external’ devaluations (via the exchange rate channel) as opposed to ‘internal’ devaluations (via real wages and costs channel). Also note, the data set for the study does not cover euro area or Ireland.

The study found “that the effects of devaluation on growth and external balances are not significantly different between small and large states, with both groups equally likely to experience expansionary [in case of devaluation] or contractionary [in case of appreciation] outcomes.” So far, so good.

But there is a kicker: “However, the transmission channels are different: devaluations in small states are more likely to affect demand through expenditure compression, rather than expenditure-switching channels. In particular, consumption tends to fall more sharply in small states due to adverse income effects, thereby reducing import demand.”

Which, per IMF team means that the governments of small open economies experiencing devaluation of their exchange rate (Ireland today) should do several things to minimise the adverse costs spillover from devaluation to households/consumers. These are:

1. “Tight incomes policies after the devaluation ― such as tight monetary and government wage policies―are crucial for containing inflation and preventing the cost-push inflation from taking hold more permanently. …While tight wage policies are certainly important in the public sector as the largest employer in many small states, economy-wide consensus on the need for wage restraint is also desirable.” Let’s see: tight wages policies, including in public sector. Not in GE16 you won’t! So one responsive policy is out.
2. “To avoid expenditure compression exacerbating poverty in the most vulnerable households, small countries should be particularly alert to these adverse effects and be ready to address them through appropriately targeted and efficient social safety nets.” Which means that you don’t quite slash and burn welfare system in times of devaluations. What’s the call on that for Ireland over the last few years? Not that great, in fairness.
3. “With the pick-up in investment providing the strongest boost to growth in expansionary devaluations, structural reforms to remove bottlenecks and stimulate post-devaluation investment are important.” Investment? Why, sure we’d like to have some, but instead we are having continued boom in assets flipping by vultures and tax-shenanigans by MNCs paraded in our national accounts as ‘investment’. 
4. “A favorable external environment is important in supporting growth following devaluations.” Good news, everyone - we’ve found one (so far) thing that Ireland does enjoy, courtesy of our links to the U.S. economy and courtesy of us having a huge base of MNCs ‘exporting’ to the U.S. and elsewhere around the world. Never mind this is all about tax optimisation. Exports are booming. 
5. “The devaluation and supporting policies should be credible enough to stem market perceptions of any further devaluation or policy adjustments.” Why is it important to create strong market perception that further devaluations won’t take place? Because “…expectations of further devaluations or an increase in the sovereign risk premium would push domestic interest rates higher, imposing large costs in terms of investment, output contraction and financial instability.” Of course, we - as in Ireland - have zero control over both quantum of devaluation and its credibility, because devaluation is being driven by the ECB. But do note that, barring ‘sufficient’ devaluation, there will be costs in the form of higher cost of capital and government and real economic debt.It is worth noting that these costs will be spread not only onto Ireland, but across the entire euro area. Should we get ready for that eventuality? Or should we just continue to ignore the expected path of future interest rates, as we have been doing so far? 

I would ask your friendly GE16 candidates for their thoughts on the above… for the laughs…

26/1/16: Chances of Repairing Greece?..

When someone says that Europe (or anyone else) "has missed a chance to" stabilise or repair or make sustainable or return to growth Greece, whilst referencing any time horizon spanning the last 8 years - be it today or 6 months ago, or at any recent iteration of the Greek crisis, I have two charts to counter their claims:

You can't really be serious when talking about stabilising Greece. Greece has not been stable or sustainable or functioning by its Government deficit metrics ever since 1980, and by Current Account balance in any year over the same time horizon, save for the last 3 years.

Yes, there probably are means and ways to significantly improve sustainability of the Greek economy. But such means and ways would have to be radical enough to undo three and a half decades of systemic mismanagement.

23/1/16: Financial Globalisation and Tradeoffs Under Common Currency

A paper I recently cited in a research project for the European Parliament that is worth reading: "Trilemmas and Tradeoffs: Living with Financial Globalization" by Maurice Obstfeld. Some of my research on the matter, yet to be published (once the EU Parliament group clears it) is covered here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/01/19116-after-crisis-is-there-light-at.html and see slides 5-8 here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2015/09/17915-predict-conference-data-analytics.html.

This is one of the core papers one simply must be acquainted with if you are to begin understanding the web of contradictions inherent in the structure of modern financial flows (in the case of Obstfeld's paper, these are linked to the Emerging Markets, but much of it also applies to the euro).


The paper "evaluates the capacity of emerging market economies (EMEs) to moderate the domestic impact of global financial and monetary forces through their own monetary policies. Those EMEs able to exploit a flexible exchange rate are far better positioned than those that devote monetary policy to fixing the rate – a reflection of the classical monetary policy trilemma.” The problem, as Obstfeld correctly notes, is that in modern environment, “exchange rate changes alone do not insulate economies from foreign financial and monetary shocks. While potentially a potent source of economic benefits, financial globalization does have a downside for economic management. It worsens the tradeoffs monetary policy faces in navigating among multiple domestic objectives.”

Per Obstfeld, the knock on effect is that “This drawback of globalization raises the marginal value of additional tools of macroeconomic and financial policy. Unfortunately, the availability of such tools is constrained by a financial policy trilemma, [which] posits the incompatibility of national responsibility for financial policy, international financial integration, and financial stability.”

This, of course, is quite interesting. Value of own (independent) tools beyond flexible exchange rates rises with globalisation, which normally incentivises more (not less) activism and interference from domestic (or regional - in the case of monetary integration) regulators, supervisors and enforcers. In other words, Central Banks and Fin Regs grow in size (swelling to design, fulfil and enforce new ‘functions’). And all of this expensive activity take place amidst the environment where none of can lead to effective and tangible outcomes, because of the presence of the second trilemma: in a globalised world, national regulators are a waste of space (ok, we can put it more politically correctly: they are highly ineffective).

Give this another view from this argument: ‘national’ above is not the same as sovereign. Instead, it is ‘national’ per currency definition. So ECB is ‘national’ in these terms. Now, recall, that in recent years we have been assured that we’ve learned lessons of the recent crisis, and having learned them, we created a new, very big, very expensive and very intrusive tier of supervision and regulation - the tier of ECB and centralised European Banking regulatory framework of European Banking Union (EBU). But, wait, per Obstfeld - that means preciously little, folks, as long as Europe remains integrated into globalised financial markets.

Obstfeld’s paper actually is a middle ground, believe it or not, in the wider debate. As noted by Obstfeld: “My argument that independent monetary policy is feasible for financially open EMEs, but limited in what it can achieve, takes a middle ground between more extreme positions in the debate about monetary independence in open economies. On one side, Woodford (2010, p. 14) concludes: “I find it difficult to construct scenarios under which globalization would interfere in any substantial way with the ability of domestic monetary policy to maintain control over the dynamics of inflation.” His pre-GFC analysis, however, leaves aside financial-market imperfections and views inflation targeting as the only objective of monetary control. On the other side, Rey (2013) argues that the monetary trilemma really is a dilemma, because EMEs can exercise no monetary autonomy from United States policy (or the global financial cycle) unless they impose capital controls.”

Now, set aside again the whole malarky about Emerging Markets there… and think back to ECB… If Rey is correct, ECB can only assure functioning of EBU by either abandoning rate policy independence or by abandoning global integration (imposing de facto or de sure capital controls).

Of course, in a way, bondholders’ bail-ins rules and depositors bail-ins rules and practices - the very sort of things the EBU and ECB’s leadership rest so far - are a form of capital controls. Extreme form. So may be we are on that road to ‘resolving trilemmas’ already?..

Have a nice day... and happy banking...

19/1/16: After the crisis: Is there light at the end of the euro tunnel?

Here is my recent column for Cayman Financial Review covering the prospects for growth in the Euro area and the structural problems relating to the Euro institutions: http://www.compasscayman.com/cfr/2015/10/07/After-the-crisis--Is-there-light-at-the-end-of-the-euro-tunnel-/.

31/12/15: Euro's share of international reserves falls... again...

The dream of the Euro becoming world reserve currency has had a bit of a rough year in 2015. The world's most prominent bureaucurrency just kept on losing ground as the share of international forex reserves goes:

Down from 28% in 2009 to 20.3% in 2015, marking its seventh consecutive quarterly fall.

14/12/15: ECB Rates & Policy Room

My comment on monetary policy space remaining for ECB post-December decision: Expresso (December 12, 2015, page 09):