Showing posts with label Euro crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Euro crisis. Show all posts

Thursday, July 12, 2012

12/7/2012: Wealth taxes - coming up next to Europe near you...

And so wealth taxes (on those who are not all that wealthy, in fact) is a matter of EU-wide policy now, thanks to Schauble: link here and here. Note, the idea is to tax property assets in excess of €250,000 - with an additional one-off levy of 10% on top of other taxes and presumably, as per talk in one of the links about 'capital taxes' other assets can be included. And the original source for the grand idea is here.

Thus, the logic goes, you've saved for the retirement (which requires at least as much in provisions as the tax bound) and you are not a drag on social pensions system. Off you go, pay up...

One question - what happens if two years from now property values drop and your property 'wealth' declines to below €250K... do you get a refund?.. Question two - what happens when tax is levied and as the result, property markets go into further contractions, forcing question one above to the forefront?.. Question three - what happens in the long run when taxes have depleted not only disposable (investable) incomes, but also investable (and largely illiquid) wealth - do pensions provisions go up?.. do Governments step in to provide cheap capital for investment?.. does Schauble and his friends drop their own pensions demands to compensate economy for €230 billion they've sucked out of investment pool?..

Idiots squad has never been so much enforced in Europe as today.

Tuesday, June 26, 2012

26/6/2012: A Tragic, Historical Mistake... by the Germans

As you read this interview with George Soros on Euro Crisis, maybe, like me, you might wonder will there be a single century since 1862 that Europe will free itself from being a victim to some or other ' tragic, historical mistake by the Germans'? We know that neither the 19th nor the 20th centuries qualify. It looks increasingly that the current century is an unlikely candidate for such a distinction either.

Friday, June 22, 2012

22/6/2012: One hell of a graphic

Love this graphic via Washington Post:


22/6/2012: Don't rush with that 'Germany Imploding' headline, mate

So the silly season of 'Germany is collapsing' is on again today with the release of the Ifo Index and the subsequent media charade on foot of yesterday's PMIs.

Now, let's take a look at the thesis so beloved by on-line business media hacks. Is Germany really caving in?

Headline Business Climate Index from Ifo:



What do the numbers tell us?

  • Headline Business Climate index fell from 106.9 in May to 105.3 in June - a monthly drop of 1.5%. Previous monthly drop was steeper at 2.7%, but 'business media' missed that.
  • Year on year, the index is down 7.9% - steeper than back in May when it fell 6.4% y/y.
  • 3mo MA is down 1.7% on previous 3mo period and is down 5.9% y/y.
  • 6mo MA is at 108.3 same as 12mo MA and the last two months both came in at below that. But the 3mo MA is at 107.4 - and that is probably more significant of an indicator than monthly readings. 
  • June reading is the lowest since March 2010 - the headline that many captured in their reports.
So things are not great. But are the schloss walls caving in? Look at the historical chart above. Current reading. Current 3mo MA is 107.4 - well ahead of historical average of 100.8 and crisis-period average of 103.2.

Next, take a look at the components of the index:



  • Business Situation sub-index actually improved in June to 113.9 from 113.6 in May. So last m/m move was +0.5% against previous m/m move of -3.6%. Y/y comparatives are less pleasant: June 2012 y/y index fell 7.5% against May 2012 y/y fall of 6.7%. 3mo MA fell 1.8% on previous and 5.7% y/y. 
  • Overall Business Situation sub-index remain weak - marking second lowest reading since August 2010. And it is below 12mo MA of 117.0 and 6mo MA at 116.0 both in level terms and in 3mo MA terms. Still, the sub-index is well ahead of 101.7 historical average and 107.1 crisis-period average.
  • Business Expectations sub-index fell 3.6% m/m in June to 97.3 compounding the fall of 1.8% in May. Y/y sub-index is down 8.3% in June after -6.0% drop in May. 3mo MA is down 1.7% on previous and down 6.2% on same period in 2011.
  • At 100.3 3moMA is now below 6moMA at 101.2 but is identical to 12mo MA at 100.3. The 3moMA for the sub-index is basically tracing the historical average of 100.2 and is only slightly ahead of the crisis-period average of 99.7.
  • Sub-index is now at the lowest point since October 2011.
  • But I wouldn't read too much into expectations sub-index, which tends to reflect the mood of the day, rather than act as a true leading indicator.
So overall, things are weak. The weakness is not accelerating in m/m terms, but is accelerating in y/y terms. Short-term averages are performing in line with June trends. Not a happy place, but not quite Armageddon either.

Thursday, June 21, 2012

21/6/2012: IMF Article IV on euro Area: a massive miss, but loads of passion

So having penned the G20 response to the euro area crisis (see post here) last night, tonight, IMF decided to issue another missive on the topic (here). Which makes you wonder if the IMF has become so frustrated with the euro area's lack of real leadership, it has now resorted to the tactic known as blanket bombing the EU with gloomy assessments.

Here are some interesting extracts [comments and emphasis are mine]:

"Downward spirals between sovereigns, banks, and the real economy are stronger than ever

As concerns about banks’ solvency have increased—because of large sovereign exposures and weak growth prospects in many parts of the euro area—the effectiveness of liquidity operations has diminished. [It is clear that the IMF is seeing the entire euro area response policy as a set of liquidity supply measures, rather than solvency and structural reforms set of measures.]

Sovereigns, in turn, are struggling to backstop weak banks on their own. Absent collective mechanisms to break these adverse feedback loops, the crisis has spilled across euro area countries. Contagion from further intensification of the crisis—including acute stress in funding markets and tensions involving systemically-important banks—would be sizeable globally. And spillovers to neighboring EU economies would be particularly large. 

A more determined and forceful collective response is needed."

So far so good. In the nutshell, the IMF is saying that the euro crisis is now threatening the EU itself. In other words, were some nut eurosceptic to invent a tool for undermining the EU, he couldn't have done much better than inventing the current euro zone.

So what are the IMF proposals for the euro area more forceful collective response? Why, of course it is integrate more and grow.

"Completing EMU: Banking and Fiscal Union to Support Integration

A strong commitment toward a robust and complete monetary union would help restore faith in the viability of EMU. This should encompass a credible path to a banking union and greater fiscal integration, with better governance and more risk sharing. However, achieving this goal will take time and hence requires a clear timeline, with concrete intermediate actions to set the guide posts and anchor public expectations."

Err... Mr IMF, I have a question: suppose we have a banking union. Which means all banks will be regulated under singular umbrella. Note - this does not mean having a proper regime for shutting down currently insolvent banks, nor does it mean a unified system of banks assets workout. It means, however, joint deposits protection scheme. Good thing, deposits protection. Confidence improving. Alas, last time I checked, Greek banks are sick because of the sick sovereign, bonds of which they hold & of the sick economy. Spanish and Irish banks are sick because they made bad loans. In all cases so far, banks are sick not because they lack regulatory unification, and not because they lack deposits protection, but because they have bad assets. How can a banks union make these assets any better?

Good news, IMF says: "The proposed EU framework for harmonized national bank resolution processes is a necessary first step. But it needs to go further. ...A common bank resolution authority is also needed. It should be backed by a common resolution fund to ensure burden sharing and to limit fiscal costs. These efforts should be supported by a common supervisory and macro-prudential framework to forestall further financial fragmentation. While a banking union is desirable at the EU27 level, it is critical for the euro 17."

Bad news: there are absolutely no proposals even discussed yet to cover banks resolution mechanism. IMF is exceptionally silent on what should be done to achieve such 'resolution' and EU has shown no willingness to allow shutting down of a single bank. Thus, common resolution mechanism in the IMF parlance means preciously little, but in the EU vocabulary it means simply 'burden sharing'. In other words, 'banks resolution' mechanism is more about shafting bad banks debt onto all of the euro zone collectively. While this might help individual countries, e.g. Ireland, it does nothing to change the reality that euro area combined Government debt is going to be 90% of GDP this year alone. In other words, relabeling, for example, Irish banks debt an EA17 debt, instead of the Irish Government debt, will not achieve any net improvement in terms of breaking the links between banks and sovereigns (the sovereign here, thus becomes EA17 instead of national) and it will do absolutely nothing to restore functioning banking in EA17. 

My suggestion would be for IMF to be more forthright and tell exactly what this 'resolution mechanism' should look like.


IMF goes on with lofty dreamin: 

"More fiscal integration, with risk sharing supported by stronger governance, can reduce the tendency for economic shocks in one country to imperil the euro area as a whole. Ultimately, this could mean sufficiently large resources at the center, matched by proper democratic controls and oversight, to help insure budget shortfalls at the national level. Getting to this endpoint will take time. But the process can start with a commitment to a broad-based dialogue about what a fuller fiscal union would imply for the sovereignty of member states and the accountability of the center. This should deliver a schedule for discussion, decision, and implementation."

Wait, aside from the desirability of such a solution (which is open to a debate), the IMF says that the solution will take time. Lots of time. And yet, this is supposed to be a response to the ongoing acute crisis? Or does IMF honestly believe that 'a commitment to a broad-based dialogue' will do anything to compensate for the fact that euro area peripheral states are currently insolvent? How? By telling the markets that they are 'broadly-speaking talking to each other'?

I do note that the IMF is clearly stressing the need for democratic systems reforms in line with integration. I wonder, however, what they have in mind, exactly. Are they saying EU is currently not democratic enough? After all, if EU is democratic, then 'proper democratic controls and oversight' would exist already and would simply need to be deployed to a new structure...


The IMF also offers an interesting insight into its perception of the euro bonds ideas: 

"Introduction of a limited form of common debt, with appropriate governance safeguards, can provide an intermediate step towards fiscal integration and risk sharing. Such debt securities could, at first, be restricted to shorter maturities and small size and be conditional on more centralized control (e.g., limited to countries that deliver on policy commitments; veto powers over national deficits; pledging of national tax revenues). Common bonds/bills financing could, for example, be used to provide the backstops for the common frameworks within the banking union."

Interesting, isn't it? On one hand, IMF foresees limited common debt issuance. On the other it foresees this common debt being used to 'backstop ... banking union'. Now, wait - I thought banking union backstop would have to be enough to deal with current acute problems in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy. That would be what? €300 billion? €500 billion? And that would have to be 'cheaper' and 'more stable' source of funding than ECB already provides. So it cannot be 'limited' and it cannot be 'short-term' (LTROs are already €1 trillion-large and 3-years long and they are not working).


In short, I see loads of frustration from the IMF side, but no real tangible solutions to the euro are crisis. 

Tuesday, June 19, 2012

19/6/2012: Euro area - flawed from design through execution

Here's the article on euro's flawed construct from Canada's The Globe&Mail citing myself (among others). And here is the full comment on the topic:


The core mistake within the entire architecture of the euro is the creation of the common currency in the first place. 

Absent organic, democratically-anchored federal union, common currency zone is simply non-viable even at the level of the 'strong Nordic' euro, let alone at the level of the euro that binds together vastly divergent - politically, economically, culturally and institutionally - states. 

The comparison of divergences present within the euro with those present amongst the states of the US - the common argument that divergences are not the systemic weak point of the euro construct - is missing the core point. That point is that divergence within the euro area are demographically, historically and institutionally anchored and no amount of 'top-to-bottom' siloed integration and harmonization of policies will deliver on breaking these divergences. Only organic, bottom-up and horizontal integration first of political systems, alongside human capital mobility and capital mobility, with trade liberalization, stretched over a number of generations can result in the emergence of the shared platforms that can unify the systems and instituions of vastly differing demographics that represent Europe.

By foregoing flexibility of diverse currencies and monetary policy systems, by forcing superficial convergence of policies and institutions onto the economies with no developed competitive advantages suitable to the current constantly and rapidly changing world (and often even against the already existent competitive advantages), the euro has weakened, not strengthened the core economies, making it virtually inevitable that the less advanced economies of the euro area will develop an asset bubble of one type or the other as the sole driver for growth, absent real organic drivers.

The crisis of the euro does not stem from the lack of monetary fitness. The lack of such fitness is itself is the symptom of the deeper problems within the euro architecture. Instead, the crisis was caused by the failure of the European economic model that first relied on public debt and subsequently, having run out of the road on public debt financing of growth in early 2000s, on private debt. Now, like Japan of the early 1990s, Europe is a debt-ridden economy with no catalyst for growth. Like Japan, it eliminated social and entrepreneurial mobility and pursued self-preservationism at all levels of its economy for far too long. 

Alas, unlike Japan, Europe is neither an R&D, nor exports, nor modern infrastructure powerhouse in the world that is much more advanced than it was in the 1990s. Which makes euro area a Japan2.0 with far fewer options and user friendliness. 

Good luck selling that as a 'vision' to global investors.

Sunday, June 17, 2012

17/6/2012: Stability & Greek elections

Quote of the week:

Pamela McCourt: "Stability in language is synonymous with rigor mortis. - Ernest Weekley, lexicographer". To EU & its 'national' elites: watch what you wish for, for it just might happen.

And in light of the Greek elections results, 'stability' in the euro area is, indeed, a form of rigor mortis. Need proof? Here's the EU statement on the Greek elections results, quoted in full [emphasis mine]:

"The Eurogroup takes note of the provisional results of the Greek elections on 17th June, which should allow for the formation of a government that will carry the support of the electorate to bring Greece back on a path of sustainable growth.

The Eurogroup acknowledges the considerable efforts already made by the Greek citizens and is convinced that continued fiscal and structural reforms are Greece’s best guarantee to overcome the current economic and social challenges and for a more prosperous future of Greece in the euro area.

The Eurogroup reiterates its commitment to assist Greece in its adjustment effort in order to address the many challenges the economy is facing.

The Eurogroup therefore looks forward to the swift formation of a new Greek government that will take ownership of the adjustment programme to which Greece and the Eurogroup earlier this year committed themselves.

The Eurogroup expects the Troika institutions to return to Athens as soon as a new government is in place to exchange views with the new government on the way forward and prepare the first review under the second adjustment programme."

So you have to be a bit of an optimist to read any of the above as a commitment by the Eurogroup to any sort of change in the Greek bailout terms. And absent significant and rapid changes in the programme, there is not a snowballs' chance in Hell that Greece is going to satisfy these conditions in the medium term. Stability of status quo reaffirmed in the Greek elections results is, in fact, the death warrant to the yet-to-be formed Greek Government.

Friday, June 15, 2012

15/6/2012: Some probabilities for post-Greek elections outcomes

Some probabilistic evaluations of post-Greek elections scenarios and longer range scenarios for the euro area:



In considering the possible scenarios for Ireland’s position for post-Greek elections period, one must have an explicit understanding of the current conditions and the likelihood of the euro area survival into the future.

Short-term scenarios:

In my opinion, there is currently a 60% chance that Greece will remain within the euro area post elections, but will exit the common currency within 3 years.  Under this scenario, the ECB – either via ESM or directly – will have to provide support for an EU-wide system of banking deposits guarantees, and new writedowns of Greek debt, as well as full support package for Spain’s exchequer and banks. Ireland, in such a case, can, in the short term, benefit from some debt restructuring. Part of the package that will allow euro area to survive intact for longer than 6-12 months will involve increased transfer of structural funds to stimulate capital investment in the periphery, including Ireland.

On the other side of the spectrum, there is a 40% probability that Greece exits the euro area within 12 months either in a unilateral, unsupported and highly disorderly fashion (20%) or via facilitated exit programme supported by the euro area (20%). In the latter case, Ireland’s chances to achieve significant writedown of our debts will be severely restricted and our longer term membership within the euro area will be put in question. In the former case, post-Greek exit, the euro area will require very similar restructuring of debts and real economy transfers as in the first option above. Here, there is an equal chance that the EU will fail to put forward reasonable measures for preventing contagion from the disorderly Greek default to other countries, including Ireland, which would constitute the worst outcome for all member states involved.



Longer-term scenarios: 

In terms of longer horizon – beyond 3 years, the scenarios hinge on no disorderly default by Greece in short term, thus focusing on 80% probability segment of the above short term scenarios.

With probability of ca 30%, the coordinated response via ECB/ESM to the immediate crisis will require creation of a functional fiscal union. The union will have to address a number of structural bottlenecks. Fiscal discipline will have to be addressed via enforcement of the Fiscal Compact – a highly imperfect set of metrics, with doubtful enforceability. Secondly, the union will have to address the problem of competitiveness in euro area economies, most notably all peripheral GIIPS, plus Belgium, the Netherlands (household debt), France. As mentioned in the short-term scenario 1 above, growth must be decoupled from debt overhang and this will require simultaneous restructuring of real economic debt (corporate, household and government), operational system of banks insolvencies, and investment transfers to the peripheral states. The reason for the probability of this option being set conservatively at 30% is that I see no immediate capacity within euro area to enact such sweeping legislative and economic transformations. Much discussed Eurobonds will not deliver on this, as euro area’s capacity to issue such will not, in my view, exceed new financing capability in excess of 10% of euro area GDP.

The second longer-term scenario involves a 60% probability of the euro area breakup over 2-5 years. This can take the form of a break up into broadly-speaking two types of post-Euro arrangements.

The first break up arrangement will see emergence of the strong euro, with Germany at its core. Currently, such a union can include Finland, Benelux, Austria, and possibly France, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The remaining member states are most likely going to see re-introduction of national currencies. Alternatively, we might see reintroduction of 17 old currencies. Italy is a big unknown in the case of its membership in the strong euro.

In my view, once the process of currency unwinding begins, it will be difficult to contain centrifugal forces and the so-called ‘weak’ euro is unlikely to stick. Most likely combination of the ‘strong’ euro membership will have Germany, Benelux, Finland and Austria bound together.

Lastly, there is a small (10 percent) chance that the EU will be able to continue muddling through the current path of partial solutions and time-buying. External conditions must be extremely favourable to allow the euro area to continue in its current composition and this is now unlikely.


Tuesday, June 12, 2012

12/6/2012: Show Some Will, Will Ya?

From EuroIntelligence.com today [emphasis mine]: 
"Christine Lagarde told CNN (via a report in El Pais) that she agreed with George Soros’ assessment that the EU had about three months to save the euro. She added that this was not a precise date, but what mattered at this stage is the demonstration of a clear political will to solve the crisis."

Quick note to Ms Lagarde & Mr Soros: at certain point in any crisis, demonstration of a will to solve it becomes insufficient to dealing with the crisis. That point 
  1. Arrives once actual resolution becomes requisite due to the conditions of the crisis becoming immediately unsustainable (6.5% yields on Spanish & 6.1% yields on Italian 10 year bonds would qualify), and
  2. Usually arises due to continued postponement of the said resolution.
In brief - Christine Lagarde might be right on timing (3 months, but with a margin of error both ways), but she is wrong on the required course of the action. Showing will is no longer an option. Deploying solutions is now the only immediately necessary step the EU can take.

Monday, June 11, 2012

11/6/2012: ESM / EFSF : building a bypass to nowhere

A quick one. Why ESM+EFSF lending capacity can't take Spain 3-years of funding (if Exchequer funds are drawn)? Here's a chart from Bridgewater:

Estimates for banking sector needs of Spain alone are running on average around €250 billion, with some sovereign supports, this rises to €370-470 billion. This will more than top the €700 billion hypothetical capacity of EFSF/ESM funding. With full 3 years Exchequer supports, the above mid range estimate can rise to ca €550 billion. That scenario (rather benign, given the markets conditions) will leave EFSF/ESM with ca €150 billion of funds (assuming Cyprus and Ireland do not dip into the funds this year or next) and that is nopt enough to fund Italian deficits and debt redemptions for even 1 years.

As the song goes: So long and thanks for all the fish...

Thursday, June 7, 2012

7/6/2012: Sunday Times May 13, 2012


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from May 13, 2012.



With Greek and French elections results out last week, the European leadership is rapidly shifting gears into neutral when it comes to austerity. Within two weeks surrounding the French elections, the Commission has issued a set of statements pushing forward its ‘growth budget’, and issued new proposals for enhancing European investment bank.

This, of course, is a classic rhetoric of damage limitation, contrasted by the reality of the currency union that is in the final stage of the crisis contagion. Having spread from economic to financial and subsequently to fiscal domains of the euro area, the cancer of Europe’s debt overhang has now metastasised to its political leadership. And the financial pressures are back on. Since the late March, credit default swaps spreads have widened for all but two core euro area states (excluding Greece), with an average rate of increase of 10.6%, implying that the markets-priced cumulative probability of the euro zone country default within the next 5 years is now, on average, close to 24%.

Next stop is a period of extended navel-gazing, with summits and ministerial dinners, contrasted by the European electorate moving further away from the centre of power gravity.

By autumn we will be either in a selective euro unwinding (Greece exiting) or in a desperate policies u-turn into mutualisation of the national and banking debts, supported by a return to high pre-2011 deficits and an acceleration of the debt spiral.

The former is going to be extremely disruptive in the short run. Portugal will be watching the Greeks closely, while Spain and Italy will be sliding into unrest. If properly managed, Greek and, later Portuguese exits will allow euro area to cut losses. With a stronger ESM balancesheet, euro area will buy more time to deal with the markets panic, but it will still require serious structural adjustments to shore up the failing currency union. Mutualisation of debt will remain inevitable, but deficits run up can be avoided in exchange for slower reduction in deficits.

The latter option of starting with mutualising debt, while allowing for new deficit financing of growth stimuli will be a road to either a collapse of the common currency within a decade or a Japan-style stagnation. The central problem is that the current political dynamics are forcing the euro area onto the path of growth stimulation amidst a severe debt overhang. The lack of real catalysts for economic recovery means that a temporary stimulus will have to be replaced by sustained debt accumulation. In other words, the political cure to the crisis a-la Hollande, not the austerity, will spell the end of the euro zone.

There are two sides to this proposition.

Firstly, the villain of the European austerity is a bogey. In 2011-2012, euro area fiscal deficits will average 3.7% of GDP per annum, identical to those recorded in 2010-2014 and deeper than in any five-year period from 1990 through 2009, including the period covering the recession of the early 1990s. The ‘savage austerity’, as planned, is expected to result in historically high five-year average deficits. At over 3.2% of GDP, 2012 forecast deficit for the common currency zone will be 6th largest since 1990.

Instead of shrinking, euro area governments over-spending will remain relatively static under the current ‘austerity’ path. Per IMF, general government revenues will account for 45.6% of GDP in 2011-2012, well ahead of all five-year period averages since 1990 except for 1995-1999 when the comparable figure was 46% of GDP. The same comparative dynamics apply to the government expenditure as a share of GDP.

In other words, euro area voters are currently revolting against the austerity that, with exception of Greece and Ireland, is hardly visible anywhere.


Secondly, the talk about Europe’s growth stimulus is nothing more than a return to the policies that have led us into this crisis in the first place. In 1990-1994, euro area public debt to GDP ratio averaged 59%. By 2005-2009, the average has steadily risen to 71%. In 2010-2014, the forecast average will stand at 89%, identical to the ratio in 2011-2012. Euro area is now firmly stuck in the policy corner that required accumulation of debt in order to sustain economic activity. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has produced one growth policy platform after another that relied predominantly on subsidies and public investment.

By the mid-2000s, the EU has exhausted creative powers of conceiving new subsidies, just as the ECB was flooding the banking system with cheap liquidity. At the peak of the subsequent sovereign debt crisis, in March 2010, Brussels came up with Europe 2020 document – yet another ‘sustainable growth’ scheme through featuring more subsidies and public investment.

At the member states’ level, private debt-fuelled construction and banking bubbles were superimposed onto public infrastructure investments schemes and elaborate R&D and smart economy bureaucracies as the core drivers for jobs creation. State spending and re-distribution were the creative force driving economic improvements in a number of countries. Amidst all of this, euro area overall growth remained severely constrained. For the entire period between 1992 and 2007, euro area real economic growth averaged less than 2.1% per annum, while government deficits averaged over 2.5%. The only three years when public deficit financing was not the main driver of growth were the peaks of two bubbles: 2000, and 2006-2007.

In brief, Europe had not had a model for sustainable growth since 1992 and it is not about to discover one in the next few months either.

Which brings us to the core problem facing the European leadership – the problem of debt overhang.

As a research paper by Carmen M. Reinhart, Vincent R. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff published last week clearly shows, “major public debt overhang episodes in the advanced economies since the early 1800s [were] characterized by public debt to GDP levels exceeding 90% for at least five years.” The study found “that public debt overhang episodes are associated with growth over one percent lower than during other periods.” Across all 26 episodes studied, “the average duration …is about 23 years.”

Now, according to the IMF data, the euro area will reach the 90% debt to GDP bound in 2012 and will remain there through 2015. Statistically, the euro area will be running debt levels in excess of 90% through 2017. Between 2010 and 2017, IMF forecasts that seven core euro area states will be facing debt to GDP ratios at or above 90%. Of the four largest euro area economies, Germany is the only one that will remain outside the debt overhang bound. Increasing deficits into such a severe debt scenario would risk extending the crisis.

After two years of half-measures and half-austerity, the euro as a currency system is now less sustainable. The survival of the euro (even after Greek, Portuguese and, possibly other exits) will depend on structural reforms, including change in the ECB mandate, political federalisation and fiscal harmonisation beyond the current Fiscal Compact treaty.

The real problem Europe is facing in the wake of the last week’s elections in Greece and France is that traditional European elites are no longer capable of governing with the tools to which they became accustomed over decades of deficits and debt accumulation, while the European populations are no longer willing to be governed by the detached and conservative elites. Not quite a classical revolutionary situation, yet, but getting dangerously close to one.



CHARTS: 






Box-out:
This was supposed to be a boom year for car sales as the threat of getting an unlucky ‘13’ stuck on your shiny new purchase for some years was supposed to spell a resurgence in motor trade fortunes. Alas, the latest stats from the CSO suggest that this hoped-for prediction is unlikely to materialise. In the first four months of 2012, new registrations of all vehicles have fallen 8.5% year on year and 60% on 2007. New private cars registrations have suffered an even deeper annual fall, down 10.2% year on year although since the peak they are down ‘only’ 56%. The news of the motor trade suffering is hardly surprising. Unemployment stuck above 14%, fear of forthcoming tax increases in the Budget 2013, plus the dawning reality that sooner or later interest rates (and with them mortgages costs) will climb sky-high are among the reasons Irish consumers continue to stay away from purchasing large ticket items. Cyclical consumption considerations are also coming into play. Over the last 4 years, Irish households barely replaced their stocks of white goods. Given the life span of necessary household appliances, the households are likely to prioritize replacing ageing dishwasher or a fridge over buying a new vehicle. Families compression with children returning back to parental homes to live and grandparents taking over expensive crèche duties are also likely to depress demand for cars. Lastly, there is a pesky consideration of the on-going deleveraging. Irish households have paid down some €36 billion worth of personal debts and mortgages in recent years. Still, Irish households remain the second most indebted in the Euro area. New cars registrations fall off in 2012 shows that in the end, sanity prevails over vanity and superstition, at the detriment to the car sales industry. 

7/6/2012: Spanish auction

Spanish auction results:
Sold €2.07bn of debt - above target of '€1-2 billion'
10-year bonds at average yield of 6.04%, bid-to-cover ratio of 3.29 up on previous auction cover of 2.56.
New issue close to secondary yields of 6.14%
Crunchy.


Tuesday, June 5, 2012

5/6/2012: Some recent links

Few past links worth highlighting:

An excellent article from PressEurop titled "The people have become a nuisance" focusing on real democratic deficit at the heart of modern Europe as exposed by the financial crisis.

An article on MEPs approving CCCTB.

And an article on symmetric pressure on Irish corporate tax rates from the other side of the pond.

A good summary (non-technical) of Basel III expected impact on European banks.

S&P Note on USD43-46 trillion refinancing cliff.

EU Commission assessment of the graveyard: Zombies Must Do as Zombies Have Done on fiscal deficits.

PMIs for June:
And add Spain at 41.8 for Services - the latest disaster. Along with Spanish unemployment chart worth taking a look at.

Soros on grave state of financial economics.

Excellent piece on the end of easy growth path for China.